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INTRODUCTION

Under their police power, governments regulate nuisances and take
actions in emergency situations. For protecting humans, animals, and
plants from diseases and other pests (jointly referred to as diseases),
governments order inoculations, quarantine items and people, and seize and
destroy property.' With respect to plants and animals, the United States
Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to prohibit the importation and
movement of items than may be infested. 2 The Secretary also has the
authority to hold, treat, and destroy items to prevent the dissemination of
plant and animal pests. 3 State governments take additional actions to

* The research presented here is based on work supported by the Cooperative State
Research Education and Extension Service (CSREES), US Department of Agriculture
Project No. GEO00684.
** Terence J. Centner is a Professor in the College of Agricultural and Environmental
Sciences at the University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia. His research program involves
the policy analysis of agricultural and environmental issues.
1. See Tyler Denning, Comment, Averting Disaster: A Critical Analysis of
Agrisecurity in the Texas Agricultural Industry, 5 TEX. TECH. J. TEX. ADMIN. L. 255,

269-70 (2004) (noting the costs of slaughtering animals to eliminate a disease when the
government chooses to indemnify producers for destroyed animals); Gian Franco
Gensini, Magdi H. Yacoub & Andrea A. Conti, The Concept of Quarantinein History:

From Plague to SARS, 49 J. INFECTION 257, 257-61 (2004) (discussing quarantine
for preventing the spread of infectious diseases); Andrew H. Nelson, Comment, High
Steaks: Defending North Carolina'sResponse to Contagious Animal Diseases, 83 N.C.

L. REV. 238, 246-55 (2004) (reporting North Carolina's response to mad cow disease);
see also Empire Kosher Poultry, Inc. v. Buskirk, 816 F.2d 907, 916 (3d Cir. 1987)
(declining to award compensation for losses accompanying a quarantine of poultry
under an avian influenza eradication program); see generally Alfred J. Sciarrino, The
Grapes of Wrath & the Speckled Monster (Epidemics, Biological Terrorism and the
Early Legal History of Two Major Defenses-Quarantineand Vaccination), 7 MICH ST.

J. MED. & L. 117, 117-76 (2002) (discussing the use of inoculation and quarantine in
warding off contagious diseases).
2. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 391 (cattle), 7711 (plant pests), 7712 (plants), 7714 (pests and
weeds), 8303 (animals) (2006).
3. See Animals and Animal Products, 9 C.F.R. §§ 71.2, 73.1b, 82.14, 92.105,
54.124, 381.73; see generally 9 C.F.R. pts. 91-99, 327, 381, 590 (2011).
Governmental actions to control bovine spongiform encephalopathy, rinderpest, and
H5N1 avian influenza virus show successes in preventing the spread of diseases that
would harm the production of animal food products. Efforts controlling the
Mediterranean fruit fly, boll weevil, and citrus canker have been important in
maintaining food and fiber production in certain areas of the United States. See W.L.
Popham & D.G. Hall, Insect Eradication Programs, 3 ANN. REV. ENTOMOLOGY 335,

335-42 (1958) (discussing the adoption of eradication efforts in the United States); U.S.
Dep't of Agric., Boll Weevil Eradication, APHIS PLANT PROTECTION
QUARANTINE FACTSHEET (March 2007) (discussing boll weevil eradication).

AND
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prevent the introduction and dissemination of diseases, including the
destruction of property. For situations in which the public would be
harmed, a government may declare a disease to be a public nuisance and
take action to remove and destroy property to eradicate all sources.
However, the drastic action of destroying property presents the issue of
whether the government has gone too far and effected an unconstitutional
taking.5 Under the Takings Clause, a governmental action destroying
property requires the payment of compensation for property taken for
public use.6 Recent efforts by the state of Florida to eradicate the citrus
canker disease raised the issue of whether a government can destroy
property in exposure zones to control a disease under its police power or
whether such action effects a compensable taking.7 The Florida legislature
had declared citrus canker a public nuisance, and the state had adopted a
citrus canker eradication program under which trees near a known
infestation were destroyed.8

In Department of Agriculture & Consumer

4. See Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 895 P.2d 900, 909 (Cal. 1995)
(observing in an inverse condemnation claim that under an emergency exception,
governments can destroy buildings, diseased animals, rotten fruit, infected trees, and
law enforcement officers can respond to situations that endanger public safety);
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. California, 221 Cal. Rptr. 225, 229 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (finding
that under the state's police power, a state-declared emergency to eliminate the
Mediterranean fruit fly provided immunity for damages to private property); Malbrain
v. Wash. State Dep't of Agric., 86 P.3d 222, 225-26 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004), review
denied, Malbrain v. Wash. State Dep't of Agric. (In re Property at 14255 53rd Ave.),
103 P.3d 201 (2004), U.S. cert. denied, Malbrain v. Wash. State Dep't of Agric., 544
U.S. 977 (2005) (concluding that the destruction of host plants within a certain radius
of an infestation site was an emergency response governed by the law of necessity and
no compensation was due to owners of destroyed property); see United States v.
Russell, 80 U.S. 623, 629 (1871) (noting that an emergency in the time of war justified
the destruction of property but compensation was required).
5. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, (1922) (setting forth the general
rule of takings jurisprudence that property may be regulated, but regulations may go
too far and result in a taking).
6. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Protection,
130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601 (2010).
7. See Damian C. Adams et al., The Legal Basisfor Regulatory Control ofInvasive
Citrus Pests in Florida:A Review of the Citrus Canker and Spreading Decline Cases,
12 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 409, 413 (2007) (discussing the difficulty of setting a boundary
between police power actions and takings); Jonathan Sjostrom, Note, Constitutional
Law - Public Peril andPrivate Property in the Takings Clause - State v. Mid-Florida
Growers, Inc., 505 So. 2d 592 (Fla.2d DCA 1987), 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 569, 584-85
(1987) (analyzing a takings controversy to recommend judicial deference to policepower regulations).
8. See FLA. STAT. § 581.184 (2006).

.1
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Services v. Bogorff9 Ms. Bogorff and other homeowners of destroyed
citrus trees initiated a lawsuit for damages claiming the state should pay for
the trees destroyed.' 0 While the state was concerned about the profitability
of its $8 billion citrus industry," the homeowners were furious about
losing citrus trees due to their location in exposure zones.12 The
homeowners claimed that the state had violated the Takings Clause of the
Florida Constitution by destroying their trees without paying for them.'3
In responding to the homeowners' allegation of an unconstitutional
taking, the Bogorff trial and appellate courts refused to recognize that
citrus canker was a public nuisance.1 4 The courts also declined to follow
federal jurisprudence concerning the differentiation of per se and
regulatory takings to determine whether temporary invasions under a
legislative-enacted eradication program constituted a taking.'s Instead, the
appellate court decided that if Florida wanted to eradicate citrus canker, it
should pay for property destroyed.16 The court relied on earlier Florida
cases to find that the destruction of trees in exposure zones during a
temporary invasion of owners' properties was a taking that required
compensation without balancing the equities. 7 The Bogorff appellate

9.

35 So. 3d 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010), review denied, 48 So. 3d 835 (2010).

10.

See id. at 86.

11.

See Tim R. Gottwald et al., The Citrus Canker Epidemic in Florida. The

Scientific Basis of Regulatory Eradication Policy for an Invasive Species, 91
PHYTOPATHOLOGY 30 (2001) (reporting concerns about costs for grapefruit growers
and bans on citrus exports).
12. See, e.g., Peter Whoriskey, FloridiansSue over Loss of Backyard Citrus Trees,
WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2007, at A3 (reporting widespread anger and five lawsuits);
Johnny Diaz, Public Gives Canker Officials an Earful, MIAMI HERALD, July 25, 2001,
at 3B (reporting the anger of tree lovers about the eradication program); Natalie P.
McNeal,Agriculture Chief Feels the Rancor Over Canker, MIAMI POST, May 18, 2001,
at I B (reporting heating objections to the eradication program).
13. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at *2 (Fla
Cir. Ct. Feb 21, 2008).
14. See id. at *25, 80; Bogorif 35 So. 3d at 89-90.
15. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., 2008 WL 8566964, at *2-23, I1-73; Bogorff, 35
So. 3d at 89-90 (observing that the facts required "no application of multi-part,
recondite tests to decide whether the State regulation has gone too far and must pay just
compensation") (emphasis in original); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433-39 (1982) (differentiating between permanent occupations
and temporary physical invasions).
16. See Bogorff,35 So. 3d at 90.
17. The court cited Graham v. Estuary Properties,Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981)
for the principle that physical invasion or destruction is dispositive of a taking.
Bogorif 35 So.3d at 89-90. With respect to citrus canker, Dep't of Agric. & Consumer
Servs. v. Mid-Fla. Growers, Inc., 521 So. 2d 101, 105 (Fla. 1988) required payment for
destroyed healthy trees.
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court's decision that the state should pay for destroyed citrus trees raises a
number of questions about what other governmental actions regulating
disease, prescribing land use activities, precluding nuisances, and
protecting people from dangers might come under scrutiny and require
compensation. Under American jurisprudence, while property owners
have implied obligations not to use property in a manner injurious to the
community,' 8 federal and state constitutions require governments to pay for
property taken for public use.' 9 In efforts to control a disease, should
governments be able to exercise their police power to destroy property
exposed to the disease without compensation or should the government pay
for the property taken? Given recent occurrences of citrus greening, 20 mad
cow disease, 21 avian influenza,22 HIN1 (swine) flu, 23 E. coli, 2 4 and

18. See Saul Jay Singer, Flooding the Fifth Amendment: The National Flood
InsuranceProgram and the "Takings" Clause, 17 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 323, 34041 (1990) (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
491-92 (1987) and Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887)).
19. See generally John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the
Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1099, 1148-56 (2000)
[hereinafter Land Use Law] (arguing that courts have been too favorably disposed to

takings arguments); John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for
Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1287-98 (1996) [hereinafter
ColonialLand Use Law] (arguing that governments should be able to regulate without
offending the Takings Clause); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding
of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 782-84
(1995) (discussing the history and need for mandating compensation under the Takings
Clause); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 95 (1985) (arguing for a comprehensive approach to takings with the

Takings Clause applying to all modification of liability rules).
20. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR THE
FLORIDA CITRUS INDUSTRY: ADDRESSING CITRUS GREENING, COMMITrEE ON THE
STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR THE FLORIDA CITRUS INDUSTRY: ADDRESSING CITRUS
GREENING DISEASE (HUANGLONGBING) (2010).

21. See Michael B. Abramson, Mad Cow Disease: An Approach to Its Containment,
7 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 316, 333-41 (2004) (discussing the response to the
discovery of mad cow disease in the United States); Matthew L. Wald, Mad Cow
Disease in the UnitedStates: The Overview; US. Scours Files to Trace Source of Mad
Cow Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2003, at 1.
22. See Donald Kaye, Avian Influenza Viruses and their Implication for Human
Health, 40 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASE 108 (2005) (expressing concerns about avian
influenza infecting humans); Robert Webster and Diane Hulse, Controlling Avian Flu
at the Source, 435 NATURE 415, 415-16 (2005) (discussing approaches to control the
disease without culling all birds).

23.

See David Oshinsky, A Pandemic Waiting in the Wings, WASH. POST, Dec. 6,

2009, at B07 (expressing concerns about outbreaks of deadly flu); L.M. Sixel,

Businesses told to prepare before swine slu strikes, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 20, 2009, at
B3 (advising businesses to prepare for sick employees).
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salmonella enteritidis,25 governments and courts will receive requests for
compensation from persons and businesses that are adversely affected by
actions to control diseases.
Several decades ago, the Supreme Court and state courts addressed
the merits of compensating persons for the loss of property due to
emergencies and diseases.26 Generally, the courts ruled that governmental
efforts controlling disease were legitimate exercises of the police power so
no compensation needed to be paid for destroying property.2 7 However, as
society, legislatures, and courts reconsider this issue, attitudes are
changing. A government's police power is limited and governments may
incur liability when their actions go beyond acceptable governmental
powers. 28 Moreover, in addressing diseases, governments are deciding that
rather than foisting all of the losses on persons damaged by action to
control a disease, compensation might be offered due to the contributions
being made to society. 29

24. See P.J. Huffstutter, Hazelnuts Recalled by L.A.-Based Distributor,L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 2011, at AA2 (reporting sickness from E. coli linked to hazelnuts); Lyndsey
Layton, FDA Gives New Scrutiny to Makers of Raw-Milk Cheese, WASH. POST, Feb. 6,
2011, at A6 (reporting the seizure of cheese linked to E. coli to prevent illness).
25. See Lyndsey Layton, Unsafe Eggs Linked to U.S. Failure to Act, WASH. POST,
Dec. 11, 2010, at Al (noting government dysfunction in regulating dangers); William
Neuman, An Iowa Egg Farmer and a History of Salmonella, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22,
2010, at Al (citing slow governmental responses to tainted eggs).
26. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (destroying cedar trees to prevent
cedar rust from harming apples); Wallace v. Dohner, 165 N.E. 552, 553-54 (Ind. App.
1929) (approving the destruction of a crop in efforts to eradicate the European corn
borer); La. State Bd. of Agric. & Immigration v. Tanzmann, 73 So. 854, 856-57 (La.
1917) (upholding the destruction of citrus trees to prevent citrus canker from infecting
others); Carsten v. De Sellem, 144 P. 934, 937 (Wash. 1914) (upholding the
destruction of trees to facilitate the eradication of pear blight); Colvill v. Fox, 149 P.
496, 497 (Mont. 1915) (upholding the protection of the horticultural industry from fruit
diseases); Welch v. Nelson, 152 P. 788, 790 (Wyo. 1915) (recognizing the police
power to address plant pests).
27. See id.
28. See Corneal v. State Plant Bd., 95 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1957). The State Plant
Board claimed it destroyed healthy trees in an effort to eliminate the burrowing
nematode, but the court found no emergency, so the government had not acted under a
legitimate exercise of its police power. Id.
29. This generally occurs when livestock are destroyed under the Animal Health
Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 8306(d) (2006). Compensation is based on the "fair market
value" adjusted for any other compensation received for the event. Id. Compensation
tends to be lower than full market value and often excludes the market value of lost
production, loss of market share, and lost production while facilities are disinfected and
restocked. Robert H. Beach, Christine Poulos & Subhrendu K. Pattanayak, Farm
Economics and Bird Flu, 55 CANAD. J. AGRIC. ECON. 471, 475 (2007).
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This Article examines takings jurisprudence to address the question of
whether the destruction of valuable and allegedly nondiseased property in
exposure zones is a compensable taking. Part One describes the situation
in Florida under which homeowners' trees in exposure zones were
destroyed. After an overview of takings jurisprudence, Part Two analyzes
the decisions by the Bogorff trial and appellate courts. The analysis shows
the courts departing from traditional takings law to conclude that the state
needed to compensate owners losing trees. This sets the stage for
examining the difference between a legitimate exercise of the police power
and a compensable taking, with the Bogorff courts going beyond federal
takings jurisprudence to find the state's action required compensation.
Part Three examines the Bogorff courts' justification for finding the
state's action effected a taking. By examining the judicial responses to the
issues considered in the Bogorff litigation, two opportunities for judicial
discretion are identified for determining whether an action qualifies as a
valid exercise of a government's police power or constitutes a taking. The
examination reveals how activist courts can recast issues, ignore evidence,
and interpret law and evidence to find a taking.3 1 While a review of legal
principles and the evidence suggests the Bogorff courts' finding of a taking
was arbitrary and capricious, an appeal has been unsuccessful so the
district court's ruling constitutes the law of the jurisdiction.31
Part Four takes these issues and highlights how courts in other states
have employed their discretion to go beyond what is required by the federal
Takings Clause in requiring governments to compensate property owners.
Thus, the Bogorff decision may herald a change in the balance between
private property rights and exercises of the police power. Yet, this is
tempered by an examination of social costs that accompany actions to
control a disease. By granting greater compensation to property owners
damaged by disease-control efforts, the decision introduces a moral hazard
problem. With an implicit insurance policy, citrus producers lack
incentives to invest in disease prevention measures. Absent disease
prevention, disease costs will increase, burdening society with diseasemanagement expenses. If courts proceed to rebalance property rights and
the police power, they need to recognize that private property rights exist to
enhance the collective good. When addressing nuisances and controlling
diseases, disregarding established jurisprudence in an overzealous
recognition of private property rights increases governmental costs and
may detract from overall social well-being.

30. For a view that takings clauses were not intended to preclude government
regulation, see Hart, Land Use Law and Hart, ColonialLand Use Law, supra note 19.
31. See supra note 9.
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FLORIDA'S RESPONSE TO ERADICATE CITRUS CANKER

Since 1910, Florida has taken action to prevent the introduction and
dissemination of citrus canker caused by a bacterium that attacks young,
aboveground tissues of citrus plants. 32 Scientific studies report that trees
infected with the disease defoliate, drop their fruit with corresponding
losses in yields, and often have blemished fruit." Bacteria spread to new
trees via wind-driven rain, equipment, and the introduction of infected
plant material such as new trees.3 4 Although fruits from infected trees
remain edible, citrus canker reduces yields and profits.3 ' Fruit from
infected trees may be unmarketable as fresh citrus. 36 The state's decision
to take action in 1995 to eradicate citrus canker was based on two past
successes in eradicating the disease.
Because weighty evidence suggested the establishment of citrus
canker would adversely affect the state's citrus industry, the Florida
legislature declared citrus canker a nuisance. 38 Under this statutory

32. See T.S. Schubert & X. Sun, Bacterial Citrus Canker, Florida Dep't of Agric. &
Consumer Servs., Plant Pathology Cir. No. 377 (5th revision 2003), at 1-2 (citing
rootstock from Japan as the source of citrus canker and the introduction of a quarantine
prohibiting the importation of all citrus plants in 1915). Older and more hardened
leaves and twigs may become more resistant to infection. Id. at 2.
33. See James H. Graham et al., Xanthomonas Axonopodis pv. Citri: Factors
Affecting Successful Eradicationof Citrus Canker, 5 MOLECULAR PLANT PATH. 1, 2
(2004); Schubert & Sun, supra note 32, at 2. Given consumer preference for nonblemished fruit, citrus canker may markedly reduce fresh fruit sales. Tim S. Schubert
et al., Meeting the Challenge of Eradicating Citrus Canker in Florida-Again, 85
PLANT DISEASE 340, 342 fig. 7 (2001) (noting that blemishes reduce fresh fruit
consumption).
34. See C.H. Bock, P.E. Parker & T.R. Gottwald, The Effect of Simulated WindDriven Rain on Duration and Distance of Dispersalof Xanthomonas Axonopodis pv
Citri from Canker Infected Citrus Trees, 89 PLANT DISEASE 71, 71-80 (2005)
(discussing the spread of inocula by wind-driven rain to develop disease-management
strategies).
35. See D. Balasundaram et al., Spectral Reflectance Characteristics of Citrus
Canker and Other Peel Conditions of Grapefruit, 51 POSTHARVEST BiO. & TECH. 220,
220 (2009) (discussing yield reduction); Graham et al., supra note 33, at I (discussing
reduced quality and lower yields).
36. See Gottwald et al., supra note I1, at 31-32.
37. See Schubert et al., supra note 33, at 344-45.
38. See FLA. STAT. § 581.031(6) (2010) (allowing the Department of Agriculture &
Consumer Services to declare a plant pest a nuisance). See generally Graham et al.,
supra note 33, at 12 (noting difficulties in estimating costs but concluding that it was
economical to eradicate the disease); Schubert et al., supra note 33, at 350 (suggesting
that eradication was the preferred response based on cost-benefit ratios, as costs to
manage "endemic [citrus canker] would equal about $25 million for fresh fruit alone,

20111

LEGITIMATE EXERCISES OF THE POLICE POWER OR COMPENSABLE TAKINGS

199

directive, the Florida Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services
(DACS) adopted an eradication program to control this nuisance that
included the destruction of all citrus trees within exposure zones
comprising an area within a stated radius of a known infestation.
Pursuant to this authority, DACS cooperated with the U.S. Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service, which had concluded that the disease
posed a high potential for "damage to commercial and home-grown
citrus." 40
In deciding to eradicate citrus canker, DACS based its action on
scientific evidence, research of experts, and previous successes in
eradicating citrus canker. 41 For citrus canker, infected trees may not be
42
Some
visually apparent until approximately 107 days after infection.
evidence suggests that epiphytic populations of bacteria may live on trees
without infecting the trees but still may spread inocula. 43 Infectious lesions
occur in the upper canopy of trees so it may be difficult to see without
specialized equipment to raise surveyors so they have a view of the tops of

and slightly more than $150 million for the entire citrus crop .. . [excluding] the value
of the markets lost due to quarantines.").
39. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 5B-58.001, 5B-62.003 (2008). DACS also listed
numerous other diseases as nuisances. Id. at r. 5B-62.003(1-26). The 125-foot radius
was adopted in the 1980s as the exposure zone for destroying citrus trees. Haire v. Fla.
Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 870 So. 2d 774, 778 (Fla. 2004); Fla. Dep't of
Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Pompano Beach, 792 So. 2d 539, 542 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001). Destruction of citrus plants within a 125-foot radius was upheld as a valid
exercise of the state's police power in Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Polk, 568
So. 2d 35, 40 (Fla. 1990).
40. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., CITRUS CANKER ERADICATION PROGRAM,
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, 1 (April 1999) (noting justification for eradicating
citrus
canker)
[hereinafter
USDA
Assessment],
available
at
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/plant health/ea/downloads/ccea.pdf.
41. See Jianwei Qin et al., Detection of Citrus Canker Using Hyperspectral
Reflectance Imaging with Spectral Information Divergence, 93 J. FOOD ENGINEERING
183, 183-84 (2009) (noting the danger of citrus canker to citrus production); Schubert
et al., supra note 33, at 340-50 (delineation a detailed report of the Florida eradication
program including a description of how the disease spreads, the efforts by DACS to
eradicate inoculum sources, and cost justifications for the program).
42. See Tim R. Gottwald, James H. Graham & Tim S. Schubert, Citrus Canker: The
Pathogen and Its Impact, PLANT HEALTH PROGRESS, August 2002, at 6, 15 (reporting
optimal visualization following the spread of inocula by rainstorms with wind),
available
at
http://www.apsnet.org/publications/apsnetfeatures/Pages/CitrusCanker.aspx.
43. See Initial Brief of Appellants, In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) [hereinafter DACSs Initial Brie]. Epiphytic populations are
bacteria surviving independently. Id. at 12.
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the trees.44 If eradication efforts wait until the disease is visible, there is a
high probability that inocula from an infected tree will have already spread
to nearby trees.45 This means that preventive action of destroying trees in
exposure zones is recommended to prevent the disease from spreading.46
Moreover, as the number of infected trees increases, the rate of infection
accelerates. 47
After experience showed that a 125-foot radius exposure zone was
insufficient to stop citrus canker from spreading to healthy trees, scientists
recommended extending the radius to 1900 feet. 4 8 Based on the research
showing it would be economically beneficial to pursue an eradication
program involving exposure zones of 1900 feet, 49 the suggested exposure
zone was adopted by DACS,o and subsequently, by the Florida legislature
in 2002.5I The legislature also provided that noncommercial owners of

44. See Id at 12 (claiming that infected upper canopies occur when inocula are
carried to a tree by wind-blown rain); see also Gottwald et al., Geo-Referenced
Spatiotemporal Analysis of the Urban Citrus Canker Epidemic in Florida," 92
PHYTOPATHOLOGY 361, 376 (2002) (reporting large trees with infestations in their
tops).
45. This was addressed by the legislature in a definition of trees "exposed to

infection." See 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 308. The law was subsequently revised. 2002 Fla.
Laws ch. II (codified as FLA. STAT. § 581.184 (2002)).
46. See Haire v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 870 So. 2d 774, 779 (Fla.
2004) (noting the scientific study calling for buffer zones); see also Gottwald et al.,
supra note 11, at 32 (discussing the 1900-foot exposure zone).
47. See S. Parnell et al., Optimal Strategiesfor the Eradicationof Asiatic Citrus
Canker in Heterogeneous Host Landscapes, 99 PHYTOPATHOLOGY 1370, 1374 (2009)
(reporting that as the density of host distribution increases, the incidence of disease is
higher).
48. See Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. City of Pompano Beach, 792 So.
2d 539, 542 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (reporting that the 125-foot exposure zone was
inadequately reducing the occurrence of citrus canker); Schubert et al., supra note 33,
at 346 (reporting that research supported removal of exposed citrus within a radius of
1900 feet of an infected tree in order to have a 95% chance of eliminating all of the
subsequent infections).
49. See Schubert et al., supra note 33, at 350 (noting that the eradication costs were
justified due to the long run costs of managing infected trees).
50. See Patchen v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 906 So. 2d 1005, 1006
(Fla. 2005) (citing the adoption of the 1900-foot radius); Fla. Dep't of Agric. &
Consumer Servs. v. City of Pompano Beach, 792 So. 2d 539, 542 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001) (reporting that a task force recommended the 1900-foot distance to DACS);
Graham et al., supra note 33, at I1 (reporting that experts selected the distance and this
was incorporated into legislation); Gottwald et al. (2001), supra note 11, at 32
(reporting selection of the 1900-foot distance).
51. See 2002 Fla. Laws ch. 11 (codified as FLA. STAT. § 581.184 (2002)). The
adoption of legislation was to strengthen eradication efforts that had been challenged in
the courts. Gottwald, Graham & Schubert, supra note 42, at 23; see also Meszaros v.
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trees destroyed as part of eradication efforts would be compensated at the
rate of $100 per tree, but that was limited to $55 for fiscal year 20022003.52 There was additional support for the eradication of the disease
because of the projected environmental damage from copper bactericides
that would be employed to manage the detrimental effects of the disease.
In conjunction with the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's)
citrus canker quarantine program, 54 DACS removed more than 1.56 million
commercial trees and nearly 600,000 trees from noncommercial properties
that were infected or within 1900-foot exposure zones. 5 With respect to

Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 861 So. 2d 86, 87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

(reporting the 1900-foot requirement).
52. See FLA. STAT. § 581.1845 (2010) (listing $55 per tree as compensation for
See generally U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL SOUTHEAST REGION AUDIT REPORT, ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH
INSPECTION SERVICE CITRUS CANKER ERADICATION PROGRAM, STATE OF FLORIDA,

residential property owners).

Report No. 33099-2-At, at 8 (August 2002) (reporting a cooperative agreement to
provide $100 to homeowners who lost a citrus tree under the eradication program);
Barry K. Goodwin & Nicholas E. Piggott, Spatiotemporal Modeling of Asian Citrus
Canker Risks: Implicationsfor Insurance and Indemnification FundModels, 91 AM. J.
AGRIC. ECON. 1038, 1039 (2009) (reporting that some residents received vouchers for
$100 to be used for the purchase of replacement trees); Marisa Louise Zansler, The
Economic Impacts to an Industry Associated with an Invasive Species: The Case of
Citrus Canker in Florida (2004) (Ph.D, dissertation, University of Florida) at 28 (noting
$100 vouchers to compensate residential owners for trees destroyed to be used at WalMart for purchasing replacement non-citrus plants).
53. See F. Behlau et al., Effect of Frequence of Copper Applications on Control of
Citrus Canker and the Yield of Young Bearing Sweet Orange Trees, 20 CROP
PROTECTION 300, 301 (2010) (expressing concerns about groundwater contamination
and accumulations of copper in soils); M.M. DEWDNEY & J.H. GRAHAM, FLORIDA
CITRUS PEST MANAGEMENT GUIDE: CITRUS CANKER (University of Florida IFAS
Extension, Nov. 2009), available at http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/CG040 (calling for
minimizing copper use).
54. See USDA Assessment, supra note 40, at 1-2 (identifying the need for a citrus
canker eradication program); USDA, Citrus Canker: Payments for Commercial Citrus
Tree Replacement, 65 Fed. Reg. 61,077-80 (Oct. 16, 2000) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R.
pt. 301) (amended regulations for providing payments for the destruction of
commercial citrus trees due to citrus canker); USDA, Citrus Canker: Payments for
Recovery of Lost Production Income, 66 Fed. Reg. 32,713-17 (June 18, 2001) (to be
codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 301) (establishing a program for paying for lost production
income of commercial citrus growers due to the removal of trees to control citrus
canker); USDA, Citrus Canker: Payments for Commercial Citrus Tree Replacement, 66
Fed. Reg. 43,065-66 (Aug. 17, 2001) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 301) (establishing
a final rule concerning payments to replace commercial citrus trees destroyed in efforts
to eradicate citrus canker).
55. See Gottwald, Graham & Schubert, supra note 42, at 2 (reporting for MiamiDade and Broward counties).
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the Bogorff lawsuit, more than 100,000 noncommercial citrus trees in
Broward County owned by 50,000 homeowners were destroyed.56
However, citrus canker continued to spread. By the mid-2000s, the
increased dispersal of citrus canker by hurricanes and the presence of the
Asian leaf miner altered the merits of the state's eradication efforts.5 ' The
government recognized that the cost estimates of eradication were too low
and USDA decided that the eradication of citrus canker in Florida was
infeasible.58 DACS discontinued eradication efforts in January 2006,59 and
the state's eradication program for citrus canker was repealed,60 and DACS
adopted a program to maintain low inoculum levels that would minimize
the impact of citrus canker on commercial fruit production.'
The repeal of the eradication program did not placate the public furor
of owners whose citrus trees had already been destroyed. The Bogorif
lawsuit was an action in inverse condemnation against the state, requesting
full payment for trees destroyed under the state's citrus canker eradication
program.62

The plaintiffs introduced evidence that their trees within the

1900-foot exposure zones were healthy yet were destroyed.6 1 With this
evidence, the plaintiffs claimed that the state's eradication program set an
opening bid of $55 per tree for the value of a destroyed tree, but if a tree

56. See Dep't. of Agric. and Consumer Servs. v. Bogorff, 35 So. 3d 84, 86-7 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (reporting number of trees and homeowners).
57. See Gottwald, Graham & Schubert, supra note 42, at 16 (noting that the
wounding of citrus foliage by the leaf miner accelerates the spread of citrus canker);
Graham et al., supra note 33, at 4 (observing that the wounds created by the Asian leaf
miner provide a longer period of exposure for bacterial infection by citrus canker);
Michael Ivey et al., Post-HurricaneAnalysis of Citrus Canker Spread and Progress
Towards the Development of a Predictive Model to Estimate Disease Spread Due to
Catastrophic Weather Events, PLANT HEALTH PROGRESS, August 2002, at 3-4,
at
available
http://www.freshfromflorida.com/pi/canker/pubs/Post%20Hurricane%20Analysis%201
-Plant%20Health%20Management.pdf (estimating how hurricanes spread citrus
canker); Parnell et al., supra note 47, at 1375 (acknowledging that hurricanes spread
the disease).
58. See Letter from Chuck Conner to Charles H. Bronson, Florida Comm'r of
Agric., USDA (Jan. 10, 2006), availableat http://www.doacs.state.fl.us/pdf/Canker
%20-%20Bronson.pdf) (reporting on the events leading to discontinuing the
eradication program).
59. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at *l l12, 33 (Fla Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008).
60. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 51-58.001 (2008).
61. See USDA, supra note 58 (announcing the approach of maintaining low
innoculum levels for sustained citrus production in Florida).
3-21.
62. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., 2008 WL 8566964, at *37-47,
63. See Dep't. of Agric. and Consumer Servs. v. Bogorff, 35 So.3d 84, 88 (Fla Dist.
Ct. App. 2010).
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was worth more, the state must pay the full value of the property taken. 4
The trial and appellate courts agreed with the plaintiffs and ordered the
state to pay more than $11 million.65
The claim in the Bogorff lawsuit alleged a taking in violation of
66
Article X of the Florida Constitution. However, the appellate court cited
several federal cases, and the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal
takings jurisprudence is insightful. Because federal courts have had more
opportunities to evaluate takings claims, a richer body of jurisprudence
addresses the federal Takings Clause. Therefore, an overview of federal
takings jurisprudence is helpful in establishing a foundation for a
subsequent analysis of Florida law to determine whether the Bogorff court
correctly found there was a taking. 68 Moreover, the analysis helps address
the question of whether other state courts might follow Florida in requiring
compensation to property owners who experience losses from
governmental actions to control or eradicate diseases.
III.

TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE

While governments normally acquire property through their power of
eminent domain, in other instances they decline to exercise this power and
their actions result in de facto takings of property through physical
invasions.69 A government may also take action that exceeds its police
power, resulting in a taking of property without just compensation.70
Inverse condemnation actions are used by plaintiffs to obtain just

64. See Id. at 91.
65. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., 2008 WL 8566964, at *2, T 1; 53 4; Bogorff, 35
So.3d at 87. The state was allowed setoffs so the damages are less. Id.
66. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a).
67. See Bogorff, 35 So. 3d at 89. The court cited United States v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945) and United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333 (1910)
concerning the destruction of property, but declined to examine more recent cases. Id.
at 89. Later, the court cited Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960), Webb's Fabulous Pharm. Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S.
155 (1980), and Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Id. at 89-94.
68. However, Florida's Takings Clause is not identical to the federal clause.
69. See Sayre v. City of Cleveland, 493 F.2d 64, 70 (6th Cir. 1974) (requiring a
physical invasion); Patchen v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 906 So. 2d
1005, 1011 (Fla. 2005) (J. Quince dissenting) (citing inverse condemnation as "a cause
of action to recover the value of property by a property owner against an agency which
has taken private property without a formal exercise of the power of eminent
domain."); Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Minn. 2008) (defining
a de facto taking as one clothed with eminent-domain power).
70. See Corneal v. State Plant Bd., 95 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1957) (finding no emergency
so the government's action was not under its police power).
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In considering
compensation for alleged takings of private property.'
whether a government's action constitutes a regulatory taking, a court
considers whether the government is justified in using its police power or
whether the governmental action goes beyond its power to rise to the level
of a compensable taking.72 For inverse condemnation proceedings alleging
a taking under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, courts rely on the
Supreme Court's pronouncement in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon: "if

regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 7 3 Subsequent to
this decision, courts have recognized that excessive regulation can
constitute a taking for which the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment requires payment.7 4 Further inquiry into the impact and
character of the governmental action is needed.
A. Basic Categoriesof Takings

To respond to an allegation of a regulatory taking, the initial inquiry
is whether the property use at issue was one of the rights acquired by the
owner.75
The "bundle of rights" that accompanies the fee simple
ownership of property is limited by the historic common law maxim sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas: "use your own property in such a manner

as not to injure that of another." 7 6 Under this principle, owners have an
implied obligation not to use property in a manner that is injurious to the

71.

See Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson

City, 473 U.S. 172, 196 (1985); Tampa-Hillsborough Cnty. Expressway Auth. v.

A.G.W.S. Corp., 640 So. 2d 54, 57-58 (Fla. 1994).
72. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (considering a state law
that took away rights from coal companies on lands close to improved properties
owned by others).
7 3. Id.
74. See Williamson Cnty. Reg'I Planning Comm'n, 473 U.S. at 197. Williamson
also notes the distinction between takings and due process violations. Id. at 197-98.
75. See Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of
Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
321, 326 (2005) (advancing the argument that "background principles serve as an
affirmative defense to takings liability for which the government bears the burden of

proof').
76.

Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 492 (1987);

see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992) (noting that a
conclusory assertion of not having rights due to associated injury to others is
insufficient); State Plant Bd. v. Smith, 110 So. 2d 401, 405 (Fla. 1959) (recognizing the
state's police power to destroy private property that was a nuisance). See generally
Patrick C. McGinley, Bundled Rights and Reasonable Expectations: Applying the
Lucas Categorical Taking Rule to Severed Mineral Property Interests, 11 VT. J.
ENVTL.

L. 526, 570-71 (2010) (noting that the Lucas case also imposes this common

law maxim).
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community.
Moreover, in preserving "public weal," states may restrict
the uses individuals can make of their property as part of the burden of
common citizenship. This has been interpreted to enable governments to
preclude the use of property in a manner that is a nuisance, 79 as courts have
concluded that "[t]o destroy property because it is a public nuisance is not
to appropriate it to public use."80 For inverse condemnation claims, a
government may raise background principles of common law property and
nuisance to show that property owners never acquired rights to make
certain uses of properties.8 1
Two types of governmental actions have been categorized by the
Supreme Court as takings that do not require further inquiry. 8 2 The first
type involves the occupation or permanent encroachment by a government
of private land, which is generally defined as a permanent physical
invasion. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Court
noted that a minor but permanent physical occupation of property
constituted a taking for which compensation was due. 84 A slightly
different problem is presented by a governmental regulation that deprives
owners of all economically beneficial or productive use of their land. In
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Supreme Court found that
governmental actions leaving owners with no value in their land were also
77. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491-92 (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665
(1887)).
78. See id. at 491 (citing Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5
(1949)).
79. See Reaver v. Martin Theatres of Fla., Inc., 52 So. 2d 682, 683 (Fla. 1951)
(finding a drive-in theater was not a nuisance per se so could not be enjoined); In re
Seligman v. Walkley, 343 N.Y.S.2d 374, 377 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (finding the
destruction of an infested crop was the common-law right of the state to abate a public
nuisance).
80. See State Plant Bd. v. Smith, 110 So. 2d 401, 405 (Fla. 1959) (citing the
common law maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas); see also Gray v. Thone, 194
N.W. 961, 963 (Iowa 1923) (recognizing that property taken to abate "a nuisance or to
prevent the spreading of a pestilence is not taken for public use.").
81. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992) (finding that the
government needed to identify background principles of nuisance and property law that
prohibit the owner's intended uses); see also Jones v. Trawick, 75 So. 2d 785, 787 (Fla.
1954) (finding that a property owner did not have a right to develop property as a
cemetery as it was a nuisance that would injure others); McGinley, supra note 76, at
571 (noting that, under Euclidean zoning, a government may limit land to a single use).
82. See Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1289-90 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (classifying both categories asperse takings).
83. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616-17 (2001) (remanding an
inverse condemnation claim to determine whether there was a regulatory taking);
Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (considering a physical invasion).
84. See 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
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takings.8 ' The Lucas decision identified a "categorical rule that total
regulatory takings must be compensated." 86
But categorical takings prescribed by the Lucas court do not include
situations in which a government precludes nuisance activities, precludes
actions that would injure others, or destroys property in emergency
situations. 8 7 Although the court found that the state of South Carolina had
taken the plaintiffs property, the court cited two examples of state actions
that would not effect a categorical taking: state action to prevent an activity
that would flood neighbors' properties and directing the removal of a
nuclear power plant that was astride an earthquake fault."
Such regulatory action may well have the effect of
eliminating the land's only economically productive use,
but it does not proscribe a productive use that was
previously permissible under relevant property and
nuisance principles. The use of these properties for what
are now expressly prohibited purposes was always
unlawful, and (subject to other constitutional limitations) it
was open to the State at any point to make the implication
of those background principles of nuisance and property
law explicit. 89
Lucas suggests that if longstanding general common law principles of
public nuisance limit property owners' rights concerning the use of their
properties, a state regulation confirming these limitations is not a taking. 90
Thus, it may be found that state restrictions on property rights based on

85. See 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
86. Idat 1026.
87. See id at 1029 n. 16 (noting that states may duplicate results that could be
achieved under private nuisance law and may destroy real and personal property in
cases of actual necessity to prevent the spreading of fire or to forestall other grave
threats to property).
88. See id at 1029.
89. Id. at 1029-30.
90. See id at 1030 (observing "that the Takings Clause does not require
compensation when an owner is barred from putting land to a use that is proscribed by
those 'existing rules or understandings' is surely unexceptional."). See generally
Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the
Roots of the Takings "Muddle ", 90 MINN. L. REv. 826, 837 (2006) (finding that Lucas
does not totally preclude state restrictions on property rights); James L. Huffman,
BackgroundPrinciples and the Rule of Law: Fifteen Years after Lucas," 35 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 1, 3, 5-6 (2008) (noting that because property rights are defined by common law
nuisance a state's action that does not go beyond its police power to abate nuisances is
not a taking).
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background principles of property and nuisance law are permitted.9' State
restrictions that do not go beyond common law nuisance or property law
are not takings. 92
Lower courts, but not the Supreme Court, have called both
"permanent physical invasions" and "the deprivation of all value" as per se
takings. 93

Commentators also call both categories per se takings 94 or

categorical takings.9 5 However, in the absence of such a definition by the

91. See Karkkainen, supra note 90, at 837 (questioning the Lucas decision to
recognize background principles of property law and nuisance)
92. See Huffman, supra note 90, at 3 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Carolina Coastal Counsil,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).
93. See Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1289-90 (Fed.
Cir. 2008); Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, No. 00-2449, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 22348,
at 21 (1st Cir. 2001); Dist. Intown Properties Ltd. v. Dist. Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 879
(D.C. Cir. 1999); Wash. Legal Fdn. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice, Fdn., 106 F.3d
640, 645 (5th Cir. 1997); Texas Manu. Housing Ass'n v. Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095,
1105 n.11 (5th Cir. 1996); 767 Third Ave. Assoc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1575, 1583
(Fed. Cir. 1995). A Florida court has labeled per se and total deprivations as facial
takings. Shands v. City of Marathon, 999 So. 2d 718, 722 n. 8 (Fla. Ct. App. 2008).
94. See Robert Brauneis, The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings'
Jurisprudence: The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613, 691 (1996) (asserting Lucas established a per
se takings category); McGinley, supra note 76, at 535 (saying that Lucas posited aper
se taking rule); Steven J. Eagle, Planning Moratoria and Regulatory Takings: The
Supreme Court's Fairness Mandate Benefits Landowners, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 429,
473 (2004) (saying a complete deprivation of value is a per se taking); Oliver C.
Houck, More Unfinished Stories: Lucas, Atlanta Coalition,and Palila/Sweet Home, 75
U. COLO. L. REV. 331, 355 (saying that a per se taking includes situations where
property has lost its economic value); Mark E. Sabath, Note, The Perils of the Property
Rights Initiative: Taking Stock of Nevada County's Measure D, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 249, 251, (2004) (declaring "a 100% diminution in property value is a 'per se
taking"'); Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property:
Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 327 (2006)
(claiming Lucas defined "total deprivation of economic value as a per se taking");
Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation between Ends and Means in
American Property Law, 94 CORN. L. REV. 959, 979 (questioning "whether or not total
deprivations of economic value should be per se takings").
95. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 75, at 324 (noting that categorical takings had
previously been limited to permanent physical occupations); Carole Necole Brown,
Taking the Takings Claim: A Policy and Economic Analysis of the Survival of Takings
Claims after Property Transfers, 36 CONN. L. REV. 7, 17 n.56 (2003) (saying that
pursuant to Loretto, permanent physical occupations are categorical takings); Huffman,
supra note 92, at 2-3 (using the term categorical takings for physical invasions and the
Lucas categorical taking ); McGinley, supra note 76, at 526 (saying that Lucas
established a second categorical rule).
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Supreme Court, per se physical invasions and categorical deprivations of
value remain distinct. 9 6
Regulatory takings, a third category, involve governmental actions
that go so far in compromising the rights of property owners that they "are
functionally equivalent to the classic taking." 9 7 Regulatory takings are
governmental actions that go "too far." 98 Courts have defined "too far" as
"the point at which regulation becomes so onerous that it has the same
effect as an appropriation of the property through eminent domain or
physical possession." 99 Regulatory takings are governed by standards set
forth by the Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City. 0 0 Determining whether a government action is a regulatory
taking requires an ad hoc inquiry of the economic impact of the regulation
on the claimant, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations, and the character of the
governmental action.' 0 ' Under the Penn Central standards, a government
must pay owners whenever its action too severely denigrates private
property interests. 102
Moreover, governmental action that singles out individuals or classes
of property for harsher treatment suggests a taking. 0 3 This intimation
comes from the Supreme Court's decision in Armstrong v. United States in
96. See F. Patrick Hubbard et al., Do Owners Have a Fair Chance of Prevailing
Under the Ad Hoc Regulatory Takings Test of Penn Central TransportationCompany,
14 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 121, 126-28 (differentiating per se takings from the
total takings categorical rule).
97. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 130
S. Ct. 2592, 2601 (2010) (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539); see
also Robert G. Dreher, Lingle's Legacy: Untangling Substantive Due Process from
Takings Doctrine, 30 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 371, 402-03 (2006) (noting that claimants
of an inverse condemnation claim "must expect to have to demonstrate the economic
burdens on their property that are so severe that they are the functional equivalent of
physical dispossession.").
98. See Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537-38 (2005); Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992); Williamson Cnty. Reg'1 Planning
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 199 (1985).
99. Williamson Cnty. Reg'/ PlanningComm'n, 473 U.S. at 199.
100. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
101. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39; Macdonald, Sommer& Frates v. Cnty. of Yolo,
477 U.S. 340, 348-49 (1986).
102. See, e.g., Mann v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 743 (Ga. 2007)
(observing that the appellant's property interest was so severely restricted that it
amounted to an unconstitutional taking); 614 Co. v. Minneapolis Cmty. Dev. Agency,
547 N.W.2d 400, 407-08 (Minn. 1996) (finding appellant's ability to raise financing to
be severely inhibited so there was a cause of action for a taking).
103. See Karkkainen, supra note 90, at 909 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364
U.S. 40,49 (1960)).
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which it stated that "some people alone [should not] . . . bear public

burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as
a whole."3 '" The Court reaffirmed this principle in Lingle v. Chevron USA,
Inc., but noted that governments can interfere with property rights for the
public good. 1os Thus, the Supreme Court recognizes that property can be
regulated to a certain extent, with the issue of whether a government went
too far being determined by the factors enunciated in Penn Central.t os
Numerous inverse condemnation claims concerning a broad range of
zoning and land use regulations,' 07 health and safety ordinances, 0 8 and
nuisance regulations' 09 have presented courts with opportunities to clarify
the meaning of the Constitution's Takings Clause.
B. DistinguishingTakingsfrom Due Process

In addressing claimants' arguments of unconstitutional takings, courts
consider whether property owners should be able to secure compensation

104. 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 483 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1987) (agreeing with

Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 40).
105. See 544 U.S. 528, 538-39 (2005) (acknowledging that "government regulationby definition- involves the adjustment of rights for the public good," citing Andrus v.

Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979)).
106. See, e.g., Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25981, at 3738 (9th Cir. 2010).
107. See Williamson Cnty. Reg'1 Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172, 175 (1985) (alleging the application of zoning laws and regulations
amounted to a taking); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 611 (2001) (contesting
the application of wetlands regulations as takings); City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 698 (1999) (considering a refusal to allow plaintiffs to develop
property).
108. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277-81 (1928) (finding that red cedar trees
infected with cedar rust located within a certain radius of an apple orchard were a
public nuisance and could be destroyed without compensating owners); Loftin v.
United States, 6 Ct. Cl. 596, 612 (U.S. Ct. Cl. 1984) (noting that the state could destroy
cattle infected with tuberculosis without compensation under its police power to abate a
public nuisance); State Plant Bd. v. Smith, 110 So. 2d 401, 404-05 (Fla. 1959)
(concerning takings and due process claims under a citrus disease control program);
Haire v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 870 So. 2d 774, 778-79 (Fla. 2004)
(considering a challenge to a citrus canker eradication program); In re Seligman v.
Walkley, 341 N.Y.S.2d 374, 377 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (finding the destruction of
infested potato crop was a public nuisance so no compensation was owed).
109. See, e.g., Davet v. Cleveland, 456 F.3d 549, 553 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming an
administrative determination that a condemned building was a public nuisance so that
the city could demolish it without compensating the owner).
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for interferences with property rights."o For takings challenges involving
regulatory actions, the guarantee of compensation for property embodied in
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments applies to regulations that were not
As the Supreme Court
part of the government's police power."'
commented in Mugler v. Kansas:

A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes
that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the
health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any
just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of
property for the public benefit.. .. The power which the
states have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their
property, as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or
the safety of the public, is not, and, consistently with the
existence and safety of organized society, cannot be,
burdened with the condition that the state must compensate
such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may
sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a
noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the
community. The exercise of the police power by the
destruction of property which is itself a public nuisance, or
the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its
value becomes depreciated, is very different from taking
property for public use, or from depriving a person of his
property without due process of law. In the one case, a
nuisance only is abated; in the other, unoffending property
is taken away from an innocent owner.112
Following this interpretation, courts review regulations employing a due
process analysis to determine whether they protect health, safety, or
welfare." 3 Regulations that prevent injuries in the community are within
the police power so they do not violate the Due Process Clause." 4

110. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los
Angeles, 483 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (finding that takings jurisprudence is not to limit
governmental interference but rather to pay when the interference amounts to a taking).
I 11. See Dreher,supra note 97, at 373-74.
112. 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887).
113. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (finding that
restrictions under a zoning ordinance did not deprive a property owner of due process
of law).
114. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 666 (1887); see also Brauneis, supra note
94, at 628 (discussing due process cases).
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To determine whether a government's regulation adversely affects
property rights, the Mugler Court observed that if a right does not inhere in
citizenship, governmental legislation to promote the common good does
not impair or interfere with any constitutional property rights. "'
The principle that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law, was
embodied, in substance, in the constitutions of nearly all, if
not all, of the States at the time of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment; and it has never been regarded as
incompatible with the principle, equally vital, because
essential to the peace and safety of society, that all
property in this country is held under the implied
obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious
to the community.116
With this precedent, later courts upheld health and safety statutes as
well as land use regulations as legitimate exercises of the police power
without regard to the financial detriment they imposed on property
owners. 117 Under the legitimate exercise of its police power, a government
could prohibit land uses for the public good and property owners did not
need to be compensated.
The nearly unbridled use of the police power was changed by the
Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon in which the Court
examined Pennsylvania's Kohler Act to determine whether it was a valid
exercise of the police power."' The Act precluded coal companies from
mining anthracite coal in such a way as to cause the subsidence of
structures used as dwellings for humans. 11 9 In responding to the coal
company's challenge, the Supreme Court acknowledged that private rights
must yield to governments' police power so that governments can function.
Yet, governmental limitations on property rights are limited; otherwise,
"the contract and due process clauses are gone."1 2 0 Police power

115.

See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 662-63.

116. Id. at 665 (citations omitted).
117. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (banning the use of property
as a brickyard); Euclid, 272 U.S. 365 (declaring zoning constitutional); Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (allowing the destruction of healthy cedar trees to
protect apple production). See generally Dreher, supra note 97, at 375 (discussing the
judicial examination of the history of regulations as a due process issue).
118. See 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
119. See id. at 412-13.
120. Id. at 413; see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 473 (1987) (citing Mahon, 260 U.S. at 393).
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regulations that diminish private property values beyond a certain
magnitude are exercises of eminent domain and governments must pay for
property taken.121 While "[t]he greatest weight is given to the judgment of
the legislature," aggrieved parties are able to contend that their diminished
property values are so great that the regulation is unconstitutional.122 With
this foundation, the Mahon Court proceeded to determine whether the
Kohler Act could be sustained as a valid exercise of the police power. 12In
deciding that the Act could not be sustained, the Court noted that while
governments can regulate property, "if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking." 24
Subsequent cases did not immediately adhere to the suggested
analysis of looking at the magnitude of the loss to determine the
constitutionality of a regulation.125 Rather, significant land use regulation
cases continued to be analyzed under a categorical due process analysis.1 26
In Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,1 2 7 the Court upheld municipal zoning
provisions that averredly destroyed a great part of the owner's value. 281In

Miller v. Schoene,129 the Court upheld a state statute that authorized the
destruction of cedar trees without compensation to prevent the spread of a
disease that harmed apple production.1 30 Under these due process analyses,
the courts never addressed the issue of whether takings jurisprudence
precludes governments from enacting regulations to protect the public from
harm without compensating adversely affected property owners.
Furthermore, Mahon did not answer the question "whether a
regulation that 'goes too far' exceeds the government's police power, and

121.
122.

See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
Id.

123. Seeld at 414.
124. Id. at 415.
125. See Dreher, supra note 97, at 377 (observing that the case was cited infrequently
over the next 40 years).
126. See id. at 377-78 (noting that Mahon was seen as a Due Process and Contracts
Clause case rather than a takings case, citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365 (1926), Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), and Nectow v. City of Cambridge,
277 U.S. 183 (1928) as showing a continued analysis of land use regulations under a
due process analysis).
127. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
128. See id. at 384, 397 (declaring a zoning ordinance to be a valid exercise of
authority so there was no due process violation).
129. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
130. See id. at 277 (allowing the destruction of healthy cedar trees to protect apple
production).
131. See Dreher, supra note 97, at 378 (noting that the Court also failed to provide a
definitive answer to the question of "whether the proper remedy for a regulatory taking
is payment of just compensation, rather than invalidation of the offending ordinance").
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is thus a violation of the Due Process Clause, or whether it instead effects
an actual taking of the owner's property for which just compensation must
be provided under the Takings Clause."' 32 Succeeding cases developed
takings jurisprudence so that land use regulations effected a taking if they
did not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denied owners
By employing a
economically viable uses of their properties.13 3
"substantially advances" formula set forth by the Supreme Court in Agins
v. City of Tiburon,' 34 the earlier due process analysis was incorporated into
a takings analysis. 3 1
This blurring of due process and takings arguments was disapproved
in Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc.,13 6 where the Supreme Court found that the
"substantially advances" formula of Agins was not germane to identifying
regulatory takings. 137
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.. . provides
that private property shall not "be taken for public use,
without just compensation." As its text makes plain, the
Takings Clause "does not prohibit the taking of private
property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of
that power." In other words, it "is designed not to limit the
governmental interference with property rights per se, but
rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise
proper interference amounting to a taking."
With this description of the Takings Clause, the Lingle Court proceeded to
find that the Agins "substantially advances" formula prescribes an inquiry
in the nature of a due process test.

132. See id. at 379 (identifying an ambiguity in the conclusion reached by the Mahon
court).
133. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 334 (2002); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 700 (1999);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485, 496 (1987).
134. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
135. See Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005) (reciting that "there
[was] no question that the 'substantially advances' formula was derived from due
process, not takings, precedents.").
136. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).

137. See id. at 545.
138. Id. at 536-37 (citations omitted).
139. See id. at 540. See generally Mann v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 745
(Ga. 2007); Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 639 (Minn.
2007); West Linn Corporate Park, L.L.C. v. City of West Linn, 240 P.3d 29, 40-41 (Or.
2010).
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The Lingle Court observed that the "substantially advances" formula
has logic in addressing challenges under the Due Process Clause.140 A
regulation that fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective may be
arbitrary and irrational in violation of a person's due process rights. 141
Drawing upon precedent, the Court recognized that the Due Process Clause
accords persons a remedy against regulations lacking a reasonable
justification of a legitimate governmental objective.14 2 In contrast, a
"substantially advances" inquiry does not address the Takings Clause since
it "reveals nothing about the magnitude or character of the burden" of a
regulation.14 3 Moreover, a "substantially advances" inquiry does not
address the distribution of the regulatory burden among property owners.14 4
"In consequence, this test does not help identify those regulations whose
effects are functionally comparable to government appropriation or
invasion of private property." 45
With the Lingle Court's clarification of the inquiry to be used for
evaluating regulatory taking claims, lower courts need to differentiate due
process and takings claims. When considering a takings claim, courts can
no longer look at the merits of the governmental action 46 or ask whether
the means chosen by government advance the ends.147 Nor may courts ask
whether the regulation chosen is effective in curing the alleged ill.1 4 8
Rather, these relevant concerns are confined to a substantive due process
inquiry. 149 Challenges based on a takings claim will consider the actual

140. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542.
141. See id.
142. See id. (citing Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)).
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542.
146. See Equity Lifestyle Properties, Inc. v. Cnty. of San Luis Obispo, 505 F.3d 860,
870 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting the Lingle differentiation of takings claims and due process
violations); Vanek v. State of Alaska Bd. Of Fisheries, 193 P.3d 283, (Alaska 2008)
(noting that a takings analysis is not the same as due process analysis); Wensmann
Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 639 (Minn. 2007) (noting that the
character of takings inquiry involves the nature rather than merit of the governmental
action).
147. See Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 559 F.3d 1260, 1278 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (citing Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005)).
148. See id; see, e.g., Daihl v. Cnty. Bd. of Appeals of Baltimore Cnty., 265 A.2d
227, 230-3 1 (Md. 1970) (observing in a request for a rezoning that hindsight might
support a different zoning but cannot substantiate error in the zoning adopted by the
city council).
149. See Rose Acre Farms, 559 F.3d at 1278.
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burden on property rights imposed by the regulation at issue.150 Courts
look at the magnitude and character of the burden to determine whether it
is "functionally comparable to government appropriation or invasion of
private property."151 If the burdens are too great, there is a taking.15 2 If the
burdens are placed on a few and not spread among taxpayers, this supports
a conclusion that the regulation effects a taking.153
By separating due process issues concerning the validity of
governmental actions from the issue of just compensation, Lingle curtails
the issues that are evaluated as takings.' 5 4 Issues concerning the legitimacy
of a government's action are not part of a takings challenge but rather are
to be examined under a due process inquiry.' 5 5 Courts have followed
Lingle's distinction between takings and due process.1 56 Takings claims
under the Fifth Amendment do not bar substantive due process claims and
the absence of a taking does not preclude a successful due process claim. s5

150. See id.; see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542 (identifying the magnitude and
character of the burden as being important for takings claims).
151. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542; see also Kafka v. Montana Dep't of Fish, Wildlife
& Parks, 201 P.3d 8, 32 (Mont. 2008), cert. denied, Wallace v. Montana, 130 S. Ct.
394 (2009) (finding no compensable taking for actions precluding charging fees for
shooting game).

152. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
153.

See Mann v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 745 (Ga. 2007) (finding

Georgia's sex offender law to be unconstitutional to the extent that it precludes
offenders from living in their houses that are within 1000 feet of areas where minors
congregate); Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 639 (Minn.
2007) (suggesting that the allocation of the burdens on few property owners may be a
taking).
154. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540.
155. In Lingle, the Court said that "[a]lthough a number of our takings precedents
have recited the 'substantially advances' formula minted in Agins, . . . [w]e conclude
that this formula prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a takings, test,
and that it has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence." Id.
156. See Mann v. Calumet City, Ill., 588 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2009) (observing
that the plaintiffs advanced a due process claim rather than a taking); Action
Aptartment Ass'n v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 509 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir.
2007) (observing that the Fifth Amendment did not preempt the substantive due
process allegation).
157. See Crown Point Dev. v. City of Sun Valley, 506 F.3d 851, 855-57 (9th Cir.
2007) (observing that the denial of a permit to develop a subdivision did not foreclose

the plaintiff's due process theory).
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C. Temporary Invasions May Not Be Compensable Takings

In the Bogorfif lawsuit, both the trial and appellate courts found that
DACS's actions in destroying trees constituted a compensable taking.' 58
The trial court addressed plaintiffs' claim as one of common law inverse
condemnation, and then responded to the issue of whether there was a
taking under the Florida Constitution.1 59 Inverse condemnation is an
eminent domain proceeding brought by property owners instead of the
government.160 In Florida, "inverse condemnation actions are governed by
the same rules that apply to eminent domain proceedings."'61 If the state
confiscates private property for public use under its power of eminent
domain or regulates private property to "effectively deprive[] the owner of
the economically viable use of that property," it must pay the property
owner.162
The Bogorff trial court opined that a physical invasion accompanied
by the destruction of citrus trees was a taking without distinguishing
between physical occupations and temporary invasions.1 63 The appellate
court found that the destruction of plaintiffs' citrus trees, which involved a
physical invasion with the destruction of property, was a taking.16 4 Yet,
not every invasion and not every action resulting in the destruction of

158. See Dept. of Agric. and Consumer Servs. v. Bogorff, 35 So. 3d 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2010).
159. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at *2, I
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008).
160. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 n.2 (1980) (distinguishing
inverse condemnation from eminent domain to call it "a shorthand description of the
manner in which a landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of his property
when condemnation proceedings have not been instituted."); Rubano v. Dep't of
Transp., 656 So. 2d 1264, 1266 (Fla. 1995) (noting that when a government "has
effectively taken private property without a formal exercise of the power of eminent
domain, a cause of action for inverse condemnation will lie."); Fla. Dep't of Envtl.
Protection v. West, 21 So. 3d 96, 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) ("[w]here no formal
exercise of eminent domain power is undertaken, a property owner may file an inverse
condemnation claim to recover the value of property that has been defacto taken.").
161. See Dep't of Transp. v. Jirik, 498 So. 2d 1253, 1255 n.2 (Fla. 1986) (considering
whether the elimination of direct access to real property amounts to a taking).
162. See Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622, 623-24 (Fla. 1990)
(concerning the state's recordation of a map reserving property for storm water
drainage thereby precluding the issuance of development permits).
163. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at *2-23,
1-73 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008) (addressing the physical destruction of property
valued at more than what property owners were paid to find a taking without analyzing
the character of the action).
164. Dep't. of Agric. and Consumer Servs. v. Bogorff, 35 So. 3d 84, 90 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2010).

20111

LEGITIMATE EXERCISES OF THE POLICE POWER OR COMPENSABLE TAKINGS

217

private property effects a compensable taking. Because the destruction of

trees was pursuant to a legislatively-adopted eradication program, the court
needed to examine the magnitude and character of the burden.165 The
court's finding that DACS invaded plaintiffs' properties and destroyed
trees does not answer the question whether the actions were a compensable
taking.
Since the 1982 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.

decision,166 the Supreme Court has distinguished between types of
67
invasions in determining whether governmental actions effect a taking.'
The issue involves the character of the invasion.168 Courts differentiate
temporary invasions from permanent physical occupations due to
distinctions in the property rights involved. The right to exclude others
from property is a fundamental property right.169 A permanent occupation
of property, however small, severely interferes with the owner's right to
exclude others and is therefore deemed a per se taking requiring
compensation.1 70 For temporary physical invasions, however, ownership
rights are denigrated but property owners retain their right to exclude
others so the burden imposed is not as severe.171 Temporary physical
invasions may not constitute per se takings and may not effect a taking if
In other situations, invasions by
they are transient in nature.1 72
governments are trespasses rather than takings. 7 3

165. See, e.g., Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 559 F.3d 1260, 1278 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
166. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
167. See id. at 421; Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 332 (2002).
168. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982)
(noting that the right to exclude is one of the most essential sticks in a property owner's
bundle of rights).
169. See id. (identifying an owner's right to exclude as the most fundamental of all
property interests).
170. See id. at 430; Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. Macklin, 361 F.3d 934, 959 (7th Cir.
2004) (noting that small invasions can support a claim in inverse condemnation).
171. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434; Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d
1339, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (differentiating temporary physical invasions from
permanent occupations).
172. See Boise Cascade Corp., 296 F.3d at 1357 (finding that transient intrusions by
federal officials did not effect a taking).
173. See id. at 1355 (noting that governmental intrusions not permanently usurping
an owner's exclusive right to possess, use, and dispose of property is in the nature of a
trespass); Jones v. Phila. Police Dep't, 57 Fed. Appx. 939, 942 (3d Cir. 2003)
(addressing an intrusion by the police).
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A number of courts have had opportunities to consider temporary
physical invasions that destroy property.' 74 Four situations can be
described where a government physically entered private property, or
caused the entry of a substance, and damaged valuable property interests
yet did not effect a compensable taking. The first two situations involve
governmental actions to address plant pests. The third category comprises
actions removing dangerous physical structures while the fourth involves
the entry of floodwaters. Under each of these situations, DACS's actions
are evaluated to discern whether the facts show a compensable physical
taking.
1. Destroying Plants to Eradicate a Beetle
An analogous factual situation to Florida's citrus canker eradication
program was Washington State's action to eradicate the citrus longhorned
beetle, as reported in Malbrain v. Washington State Department of
Agriculture.175 Based on the recommendations of a state scientific
advisory panel, the Washington State Department of Agriculture developed
an eradication plan and the governor proclaimed a state of emergency to
prevent the beetle from becoming established in Washington.176 Under the
eradication plan, all potential host species within a one-eighth mile radius
of the infestation site were removed despite no proof of infection. 177 MS.
Malbrain and other property owners lost trees because they were
susceptible to being commandeered by the invasive beetle.' 7 8 Fruit, alder,
willow, oak, and some conifer trees owned by fifty-one landowners were
destroyed on approximately thirty-two acres.179 The state arranged to pay
landowners for the purchase of replacement plants and supplied vouchers
that could be used to purchase non-host species of vegetation. 8 0 Some
landowners were unhappy with the loss of their plants and were not
satisfied with the state's payment scheme, so they brought a lawsuit
claiming inverse condemnation and requested payment for the value of
plants taken.' 8'
The Malbrain appellate court concluded that the

174. See Alan Romero, Takings by Floodwaters, 76 N.D. L. REV. 785, 788-97 (2000)
(distinguishing among different types of flooding and the requirement of compensation
under the Takings Clause).
175. See 86 P.3d 222, 223 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
176. See id. at 223-24.
177. See id. at 223.
178. See id at 224. The eradication program also included insecticide injections in
trees for the next one-eighth mile. Id. at 223.
179. See id.
180. See Malbrain, 86 P.3d at 224.
18 1. See id.
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destruction of property to avert the dissemination of the beetle did not
require compensation.182

The appellate court noted the general rule that physical invasions by
governments are takings.183 However, the court also observed that there
were exceptions to the rule as some physical invasions are not takings.' 84
Moreover, governmental destruction of property does not always require
compensation.' 85 In destroying trees that were a real property interest, the
state had temporarily entered the plaintiffs' property in response to an
emergency.186 The governmental action caused injury to the property, but
the government did not permanently occupy the properties so it was not a
In finding that there was no
permanent physical occupation.'8
compensable taking, the Malbrain court found that the infestation created
an emergency; the situation was similar to cases applying the law of
necessity or the conflagration doctrine. 8 8 In addressing an emergency
such as fire or pestilence, a government may employ reasonable means
without being obligated to pay for property taken. 189 For insect pests,
property owners do not have a right to use their property in a manner
creating a nuisance that interferes with the general welfare of the
community.' 90 Thus, the state's action of destroying plants in an exposure
zone did not effect a compensable taking.'91
Florida's approach to eradicating citrus canker was similar to
Washington's actions to eradicate the citrus longhorned beetle. DACS
adopted an eradication program, the Florida legislature declared citrus
canker to be a nuisance, and the legislature approved statutory provisions
for the eradication of the disease. 192 Both the Washington and Florida
agencies relied on recommendations from scientific panels for devising

182. See id. at 225.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 224-25.

185. See Malbrain, 86 P.3d at 227 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40
(1960) for the conclusion that governments can destroy property without
compensation).
186. See id. at 227 (observing there was no permanent occupation).
187. See id. at 225.
188. See id. at 226-27. For the emergency, the state did not need to wait for the
infestation to occur. Id. at 227.
189. See id. at 226-28 (citing Miller v. Schoene, 376 U.S. 272 (1928)).
190. See Malbrain, 86 P.3d at 227.
191. See id at 229.
192. See 2002 Fla. Laws ch. 11 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 581.184 (2002), amended
by s. 1, ch. 2006-45); see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 5B-58.001, 5B-62.003
(2008).

220

JOI RNAL OF FOOD

lAW & POLICY

[Vot,.7

their eradication efforts.193 The invasions under both programs were
temporary and property owners subsequently had the right to exclude
others from their properties.1 9 4 Both programs involved the destruction of
all host plants in exposure zones, with nominal compensation to owners
who lost valuable plants. Yet the Washington court found no compensable
taking due to the emergency created by the invasive foreign pest.
At the request of the plaintiffs, the Malbrain court considered the
Florida Supreme Court's decision in Department of Agriculture &
Consumer Services v. Mid-Florida Growers 95 involving the destruction of
citrus trees under a Florida eradication program.' 96 The Washington court
interpreted Florida law as not requiring compensation for nondiseased
destroyed trees in a zone that created a nuisance or emergency. 197 While
the Malbrain dicta are not controlling in Florida, it sets forth the position
that the control of a disease allows for the destruction of healthy property
in legislatively-prescribed exposure zones.' 98 Because the Bogorff trial and
appellate courts declined to recognize citrus canker as constituting a public
nuisance, they found that property owners needed to be compensated.199 If
DACS's actions were under its police power to address a nuisance, the
Malbrian analysis of takings suggests that the Bogorff trial and appellate
courts erred in finding a compensable taking. 200

193. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at *1011, TT 26-30 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008); DACSs Initial Brief,supra note 43, at 2;
Malbrain,86 P.3d at 223.
194. The right to exclude is characterized as the most fundamental of all property
interests. See Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
195. 521 So.2d 101 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988).
196. See Malbrain,86 P.3d at 228-29.
197. See id. at 229 (interpreting Haire v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs.,
870 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 2004) as not requiring compensation for the destruction of trees
that were not infected).
198. See id.
199. The Bogorfif trial court claimed that citrus canker was not a public nuisance by
failing to consider public welfare. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08),
2008 WL 8566964, at *15, 47; 25, 80 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008); Dep't. of Agric.
and Consumer Serv. v. Bogorff, 35 So. 3d 84, 89 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
200. In responding to the Bogorff takings allegation, DACS declined to claim that its
destruction of trees was an emergency response. In its initial brief, DACS never used
the word "emergency." See DACS's Initial Brief, supra note 43. In the reply brief,
DACS declined to claim that its emergency police power justified the citrus canker
eradication program. Reply Brief of Florida Department of Agriculture, etc., at 6, In re
Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08) (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., Sep. 21, 2009); but see
FLA. STAT. § 581.031(6) (2010) (authority for DACS to declare citrus canker a
nuisance); see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 5B-62.003 (2010) (listing citrus canker
as a nuisance).

2011]

LEGITIMATE EXERCISES OF THE POLICE POWER OR COMPENSABLE TAKINGS

221

2. Spray Damage from Eradicating the Mediterranean Fruit Fly
A second example of an invasion of property to eradicate an insect
pest was reported in Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Calhfornia.20 1 The
state of California took action to control an invasion of the Mediterranean
fruit fly. 2 02 Under state authority, the California Department of Food and
Agriculture adopted regulations delineating eradication areas in which the
use of insecticides and chemicals could be employed to eliminate the
The state administrative code identified premises within
pest. 2 03
eradication areas as public nuisances subject to all relevant laws relating to
nuisance prevention and abatement.2 04 When the infestation proved more
difficult to control than originally thought, the governor declared a state of
emergency, and power under this emergency supplemented the
administrative code's provisions. 20 5 The state invaded private property
through an aerial spray program that deposited chemicals on properties
susceptible to an infestation. 206
The state's actions in controlling the Mediterranean fruit fly resulted
in incidental damages to automobile paint.2 07 In Farmers Insurance
Exchange, insurance companies sued the state in inverse condemnation for
damages incurred by vehicle owners that the insurance companies were
208
In defense, the state argued the program was an
obliged to pay.
emergency response to an insect pest under its police power so that
damages inflicted were noncompensable. 2 09 The appellate court agreed
with the state. 2 10 In reaching this result, the California court observed that
emergencies justifying police action without compensation included the
demolition of buildings to prevent the spread of a conflagration and the
destruction of diseased animals, plants, and fruit. 2 1 1 A government's action
will be upheld as part of a government's police power if it was reasonably
necessary to protect order, health, and general welfare.2 12 State action to

201.

221 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).

202. See id. at 227.
203. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 3591.5 (2010).
204. See id.at § 6762.
205. See FarmersIns. Exchange, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
206. See id. at 227-29.
207. See id. at 229.
208. See id. at 227.
209. See id. at 229 (citing as justification damnum absque injuriaunder the exercise
of its police power).
210. See FarmersIns. Exchange, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 230.
211. See id. at 229 (citing earlier case law).

212. See id.
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eradicate a fruit fly infestation fell within this emergency exception.
Therefore, the plaintiffs' private interests were subservient to the right of
the state to proceed in a manner to protect public health and safety. 2 14 The
state did not have to compensate the insurance companies for claims paid
on damaged vehicles.
California's approach to eradicating an agricultural pest was similar
to that employed by Florida. Both states' eradication programs were
adopted under governmental authority, both involved temporary invasions
onto private properties that damaged property interests, and both involved
damages to property in exposure zones without proof that the properties
were infested. With the termination of the eradication efforts, property
owners had complete control of their properties. The decision in Farmers
Insurance Exchange supports the conclusion that DACS's actions did not
constitute a compensable taking. 2 15 Because Florida was responding to a
pest under a legislative decision to safeguard public welfare, compensation
is not required. However, because the Bogorff trial and appellate courts
refused to recognize the disease created a nuisance, they concluded that the
state had no justification under its police power for destroying property
without compensation.2 16
3. Demolishing Blighted Buildings
Numerous governments have enacted legislation under which
buildings on private properties can be demolished to protect the public
from dangerous situations.2 17 This occurs when the government exercises
its police power and adopts a municipal ordinance or law permitting
demolition of dangerous buildings.218 No compensation is required when a
government destroys property to protect the public from a dangerous

condition. 2 19 Although the actions may involve physical entries on owners'

213. See id.
214. See id.
215. However, although the legislature found introduction of citrus canker to
constitute an emergency, 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 308, DACS did not raise an emergency as
a defense in the lawsuit. See supra note 200.
216. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at * 15,
47; 25, 80 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008); Dep't of Agric. and Consumer Servs. v.
Bogorff, 35 So. 3d 84, 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
217. See Davet v. Cleveland, 456 F.3d 549 (6th Cir. 2006); Hoeck v. Portland, 57
F.3d 781, 787 (9th Cir. 1995); Vill. of Lake Villa v. Stokovich, 810 N.E.2d 13, 27 (Ill.
2004), appeal denied, 2004 Ill. LEXIS 999 (1ll. May 24, 2004).
218. See, e.g., Vill. of Lake Villa, 810 N.E.2d at 28, 31 (finding a demolition
provision constitutional and that a building was dangerous and unsafe).
219. See Sershen v. Cholish, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117772, at 34 (M.D. Pa. 2009).
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properties and the destruction of property with value, if it is a legitimate
exercise of the police power to confront a nuisance and the invasion is
temporary, the government does not need to pay for the destroyed

property. 22 0
These cases show that whenever a government destroys property
pursuant to a police-power regulation, the issue is not simply whether there
was a physical invasion. Physical invasions are permitted if individuals'
private property rights are subservient to the public welfare.22 1
Compensation is not required for physical invasions if the government's
action responded to an emergency or a public nuisance. Absent a valid
justification, however, actions by a government that take property are
compensable.
4. Temporary Flooding Caused by Governmental Action
A fourth category of temporary invasions to private properties
involves governmental actions resulting in flooding. Courts distinguish
between permanent flooding and temporary periods of flooding.222
Permanent invasions by floodwaters resulting from governmental action
require compensation as takings of owners' property rights.223 For most

220. See Hendrix v. Plambeck, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 8787 (7th Cir. 2011); Hoeck
v. Portland, 57 F.3d 781, 787 (9th Cir. 1995).
221. See Davet, 456 F.3d at 553.
222. See John J. Constonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A DecisionalModelfor
the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465, 543-50 (1983) (critiquing Loretto's
differentiation of permanent occupation from temporary invasion to suggest that the
real issue is the denial of owners' rights to exclude others from properties); Romero,
supra note 174, at 788-89 (noting that if a governmental action causes flooding that is
permanent, the property owner is entitled to compensation under the Fifth
Amendment).
223. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, Nos. 2009-5121, 2010-5029,
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 6417 (Fed. Cir. March 30, 2011) (differentiating temporary
from permanent flooding and finding flooding that was temporary did not require
compensation); Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924) (acknowledging
that there was no permanent invasion of private property by governmental action so
plaintiff did not prove a taking); Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting that a permanent physical occupation by waters of private land
would be a compensable taking); Murphy v. Vill. of Plainfield, No. 08 CV 3293, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26960, at 22 -24 (D. 111.March 31, 2009) (observing that proof of an
unconstitutional taking by flooding requires a permanent invasion of land amounting to
an appropriation); Drake v. Walton Cnty., 6 So. 3d 717, 720 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)
(observing that governments cannot divert floodwater onto the property of another
without compensating that property owner); VLX Properties, Inc. v. So. States
Utilities, Inc., No. 5D99-3314, 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 9251, at 12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000) (finding physical occupation meant there was a taking); Spaeth v. City of
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temporary invasions, courts examine the nature and magnitude of the
governmental action.224 Intermittent flooding resulting in a temporary
physical invasion may constitute the taking of an easement.225 However,
flooding due to rare storms or special events does not rise to the level of a
compensable taking. 22 6 For other situations, temporary invasions may be
tortious acts and consequential damages could be appropriate.22
Cases involving flooding in Florida suggest that DACS's invasions in
Bogorff a one-time event to remove trees in exposure zones, did not
constitute a compensable taking. The Fourth District Court of Appeal
opined that temporary takings theory requires an ongoing regulatory taking
to be recognized under inverse condemnation; otherwise, the injured
parties should seek damages under negligence. 22 8 The Fifth District was
more open to finding temporary invasions to be takings by suggesting that
substantial periodic flooding constitutes a taking. 2 29

Plymouth, 344 N.W.2d 815, 822 (Minn. 1984) (finding that the city could not abate the
flooding so the city needed to commence eminent domain proceedings).
224. See, e.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 6417, at 28-29
(focusing on the governmental policy rather than the nature of the action); Ridge Line,
Inc, 346 F.3d at 1356 (looking at the nature of the governmental action).
225. See Ridge Line, Inc, 346 F.3d. at 1354 (observing that permanent destruction or
exclusive occupation is not always required); S. Fla. Water Manage. Dist. v. Basore of
Fla., Inc., 723 So. 2d 287, 290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, 740 So. 2d
527 (1999) (recognizing authority that temporary flooding may result in a taking and
noting that accidental crop damage from negligence would not be a compensable
taking); Allianz Global Risks U.S. Ins. Co. v. New Hampshire, No. 2009-745, 2010
N.H. LEXIS 127, at 7-8 (N.H. Nov. 10, 2010) (noting that temporary takings may be
compensable).
226. See, e.g., S. Fla. Water Manage. Dist., 723 So. 2d at 288, 290 (deciding that a
one in fifty-year storm event was not a taking); Anhalt v. Cities & Villages Mut. Ins.
Co., 637 N.W.2d 422, 435 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (observing that with no permanent

physical occupation, there was no taking).
227. See e.g., Ridge Line, Inc., 346 F.3d at 1358 (observing that the facts need to be
examined to determine whether there was a compensable taking or whether tort law
applies); Allianz Global Risks U.S. Ins. Co., 2010 N.H. LEXIS 127, at 7 (citing Barnes
v. United States, 538 F.2d 865, 870, where the court found that the water invasion to
plaintiffs property was not a taking but rather a tort).
228. S. Fla. Water Manage. Dist., 723 So. 2d at 290 (declining to go beyond what the
Supreme Court enunciated in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.

Cnty. of Los Angeles 482 U.S. 304).
229. See VLX Properties, Inc. v. So. States Utilities, Inc., No. 5D99-3314, 2000 Fla.
App. LEXIS 9251, at 9 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). We find that the rule applied in
Associates of Meadow Lake, Inc. is more in line with the emerging law that recognizes

the right to compensation for temporary takings.

Id.

See also, e.g., Tampa-

Hillsborough Cnty. Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S., Corp. 640 So. 2d 54, 58 (Fla.
1994). The facts of the VLX Properties case, however, presented a takings case
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The federal and Florida cases seem to be in agreement that temporary
invasions of a recurring nature effect compensable takings. 23 0 The issue
involves "the character of the invasion." 2 31 But the flooding cases suggest
that destroyed property and consequential damages are not enough to
establish a taking. Rather, the government's action must destroy the
property's actual usefulness and value.23 2 DACS's actions lack the
character of invasions that are compensable because the removal of trees
under Florida's eradication program only interfered with an owner's
property once, the state provided funds for replacement trees, owners
retained the usefulness of their residential properties, and owners thereafter
were free from governmental interference. Under flooding jurisprudence,
the Bogorff plaintiffs cannot show recurrences that are required to establish
a compensable taking.
D. DACS's Invasions andDestruction of Trees
Returning to the Bogorff inverse condemnation lawsuit, to justify a
conclusion that DACS's invasions and destruction of trees constituted a
taking, proof under one of the categories of takings was required. Judicial
evaluations of physical invasions in other courts show that the existence of
a physical invasion does not mean there is an unconstitutional taking; under
the U.S. Constitution, only permanent physical occupations are per se
takings. 2 33 Additionally, invasions and other actions that render property
valueless are categorical takings. All other physical invasions may
constitute regulatory takings if the burdens imposed are too severe.
1. No Permanent Occupation or Categorical Taking
The Bogorff trial court cited a definition of a taking as:
entering upon private property for more than a momentary
period and, under the warrant or color of legal authority,
devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally
involving flooding rather than flooding causing a taking. See VLX Properties Inc.,
2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 9251, at *6.
230. See Romero, supra note 174, at 789 (acknowledging something less than
permanent flooding may constitute a taking).
231. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982);
United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917); Fla. East Coast Properties, Inc. v.
Metro. Dade County, 572 F.2d 1108, 1111 (5th Cir. 1978) (referring to the "character
of the invasion" as the key question to determine whether there is a taking).
232. See Fla. East Coast Properties,Inc., 572 F.2d at 1111 (differentiating a taking
from tortious invasions).
233. See supra Part II.A.
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appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such way as
substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment thereof.23 4
With this definition, however, the court did not explain how DACS's
actions operated to oust owners and deprive them of all beneficial
enjoyment of their properties. The homeowners lost citrus trees, received
funds to replace them, and continued to use their properties as
residences.235 Because owners were never substantially ousted from their
properties, the Bogorif trial court lacked justification for finding a taking
under its definition.
Turning to Florida legal precedents, an evaluation of the facts shows
that the destruction and removal of citrus trees did not constitute a
permanent physical occupation or recurring invasion of an owner's
236
While the trees were permanently destroyed, DACS's action
property.
was a temporary invasion to control the dissemination of a disease. With
the removal of infected trees and trees in exposure zones, the state exited
the properties. DACS's actions preserved for owners their rights to
exclude others from their properties.237 In the absence of a permanent
physical occupation, there was no per se taking.
With respect to the issue of whether DACS's action resulted in a
categorical taking, the facts show that the destruction of citrus trees did not
deprive property owners of all economic value or use of their properties. 2 38
Despite the invasion and destruction of trees, property owners were able to
continue with the use of their real estate. Moreover, although citrus trees
were destroyed, the state provided owners funds to purchase replacement
plants. 239 Florida courts follow federal law in observing that categorical

234. In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at *38, 1 6
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008) (citing Poe v. State Road Dep't, 127 So.2d 898, 900 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1961), which quoted 12 FLA. JUR., EMINENT DOMAIN § 68).
235.

The court separates the trees from the land. This is improper. See Clark v. J.W.

Conner & Sons, Inc., 441 So. 2d 674, 676 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (trees are part of
the value of the underlying property).

236. The flooding cases suggest that recurring physical invasions may be
compensable. See infra Part II.C.4.
237. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982)
(noting that the right to exclude is "one of the most essential sticks" in a property
owner's bundle of rights).
238. In fact, one real estate appraiser testified that most residents had no diminution
in their property value as a result of the removal of their citrus trees. See DACS's
Initial Brief, supra note 43, at 45-46.
239. See FLA. STAT. § 541.1845 (2010), repealed by 2010 Fla. Laws 35 (providing

$55 per tree); Dep't. of Agric. and Consumer Servs. v. Bogorff, 35 So. 3d 84, 91 (Fla.
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takings are limited to situations where property owners are deprived of "all
economically beneficial or productive use." 24 0 Thus, under takings
jurisprudence, DACS's actions did not effect a categorical taking.
2. Inadequate Analysis to Find a Regulatory Taking
For regulatory takings, federal jurisprudence holds that owners'
claims should be analyzed under the factors set forth by the Supreme Court
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.241 The major
consideration is the severity of the burden that the government has imposed
on the owners' property rights.242 Florida courts have recognized that the
Penn Central balancing test is appropriate for regulatory takings,243 but
have expanded the factors. In Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc.,2 44 the
Florida Supreme Court listed six factors to be used to determine whether a
regulation is a legitimate exercise of the police power.2 45
In finding that DACS's actions were a compensable taking, the
Bogorff trial court delineated the six factors enumerated by the Graham
court:
1. Whether there is a physical invasion of the property.
2. The degree to which there is a diminution in value of
the property. Or stated another way, whether the
regulation precludes all economically reasonable use
of the property.
3. Whether the regulation confers a public benefit or
prevents a public harm.

Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (noting the $55 per tree statutory payments and retail gift cards as
being paid to owners losing trees).
240. See Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami, 801 So. 2d 864, 869 (citing Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).
241. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
242. See Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (drawing the
regulatory takings test from the unique burdens imposed by physical takings); see also
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978).
243. See Keshbro, 801 So. 2d at 871 (observing that regulations falling short of
categorical takings are analyzed under a Penn Central inquiry); Shands v. City of
Marathon, 999 So. 2d 718, 723 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that anything less
than the elimination of total value is analyzed under the factors enumerated in Penn
Central); Leon County v. Gluesenkamp, 873 So. 2d 460, 467 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(enumerating three factors from Penn Central for evaluating whether a regulation
constitutes a taking).
244. 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Taylor v. Graham, 454 U.S.
1083 (1981).
245. See id. at 1380-81.
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4. Whether the regulation promotes the health, safety,
welfare, or morals of the public.
5. Whether the regulation is arbitrarily and capriciously
applied.
6. The extent to which the regulation curtails investmentbacked expectations. 246
However, the Bogorfif trial court declined to evaluate DACS's actions
under the listed factors. 24 7 Rather, the court analyzed the issue of the value
of trees destroyed but did not evaluate the character and nature of the
burden as required under Graham or Penn Central.248 In concluding that
physical invasions accompanied by destroyed trees were dispositive, the
trial court failed to analyze the severity of the burden imposed by the
state's action and did not acknowledge the distinction between permanent
occupations and temporary invasions.249 Instead, the court proceeded to
selectively evaluate and cite judicial precedents concentrating on the trees
destroyed, never considering the six factors it enumerated.25 0
For example, Graham lists "[t]he degree to which there is a
diminution in value of the property. Or stated another way, whether the
regulation precludes all economically reasonable use of the property." 25 1
The Bogorfif trial court never considered the value of the plaintiffs'
properties and failed to acknowledge that the destroyed trees were a minor
part of their properties' value.2 52 Under inverse condemnation claims,
courts focus on the nature and extent of the government's interference with
owners' rights in the parcel as a whole to determine whether the actions

246. Id.
247. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at *4047, TT 11-21 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008).
248. See id. at *15-23, TT 48-74. The court did not look at the characteristics of
DACS's intrusion onto a property or consider the extent of the intrusion to the use of
the property as a residence. Id. There was no evidence that residents were excluded
from their residences. Id.
249. See id.; see also Dep't. of Agric. and Consumer Servs. v. Bogorff, 35 So. 3d 84,
90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
250. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., 2008 WL 8566964, at *15-23, IT 48-74.
251. Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1380 (Fla. 1981).
252. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., 2008 WL 8566964 at *45-46, 19 (claiming that
the property's value did not matter since only the trees from the properties were taken);
see also Horn v. Corkland Corp., 518 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(reporting that a trespass which resulted in the destruction of trees had not changed the
value of the property so there were no damages); Clark v. J.W. Conner & Sons, Inc.,
441 So. 2d 674, 676 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that trees are part of the value of
the underlying property).
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effect a taking.253 The Bogorfif trial and appellate courts also rejected
evidence that the eradication of citrus canker bacteria was to prevent harm
to producers and the state's economy.254 In declining to acknowledge that
infected trees have decreased fruit yields thereby harming producers, the
courts erred in applying the third factor listed by the Graham court.
Turning to the fourth factor, courts need to consider public welfare.255
In responding to plaintiffs' inverse condemnation claim, the Bogorff trial
court limited its analysis to threats to "public health, safety or morals."2 56
Similarly, in considering DACS's nuisance defense, the trial court opined
that "[c]itrus canker does not pose a threat to the health or safety of humans
or animals."257 By omitting consideration of public welfare, the trial court
failed to consider a valid justification for DACS's destruction of trees in
exposure zones.258 Associated with the court's refusal to consider public
welfare is its refusal to acknowledge that trees infected with citrus canker
have decreased yields so that failure to eradicate the disease would affect
homeowners.2 59
Finally, while citing the Graham factors that trial courts should
consider in determining whether a regulation constitutes a taking, the
Bogorff trial and appellate courts omitted an examination of the extent to
260
which the regulation interfered with investment-backed expectations.
The plaintiffs continued to live in their homes and the removal of the trees
resulted in no decrease in the properties' values. 2 6 1 DACS's temporary
invasions were not that intensive.

253. See State, Dep't of Envtl. Regulation v. Schindler, 604 So. 2d 565, 568 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (noting the requirement to evaluate the whole property); see also
Taylor v. Vill. of North Palm Beach, 659 So. 2d 1167, 1172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(citing with approval the Schindler decision to evaluate unitary parcels); Fla. Game &
Fresh Water Fish Comm'n v. Flotilla, Inc., 636 So. 2d 761, 765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994) (concluding that in deciding whether governmental actions effect a taking, the
whole property needs to be considered).
254. See infra Part IIL.B.
255. See Graham, 399 So. 2d at 1381.
256. In re Citrus Canker Litig., 2008 WL 8566964, at *15, 47.
257. Id. at *25, 80.
258. See Haire v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 870 So. 2d 774, 782 (Fla.
2004) (concluding the citrus eradication program was a legitimate objective to further
public welfare).
259. See USDA Assessment, supra note 40, at 6 (noting heavy losses in commercial
and private citrus production from citrus canker).
260. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., 2008 WL 8566964, at *45-46, 19; Dep't. of
Agric. and Consumer Servs. v. Bogorff, 35 So. 3d 84, 89-90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010);
see Graham, 399 So. 2d at 1381; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
261. See DACS's Initial Brief supra note 43, at 45-6.
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On appeal, the Bogorff appellate court declined to look at the unique
circumstances of DACS's intrusions because it felt that a physical invasion
was sufficient to establish a taking. 26 2 The court claimed that "[t]he facts
of this case require no application of multi-part, recondite tests to decide
whether the State regulation has gone too far and must pay just
compensation." 26 3 Because the Bogorfif trial and appellate courts omitted
consideration of public welfare and did not look at the factors required by
Graham, the courts lacked justification for finding a regulatory taking.264
This shows the courts' decisions as arbitrary and capricious; there was no
permanent physical occupation, no categorical taking, and inadequate proof
to establish a regulatory taking. Under Florida law, the appellate court
erred in upholding the trial court.265
IV.

Altering Takings Jurisprudence

The state's decision to destroy citrus trees to eradicate citrus canker in
Florida was contentious due to the different objectives of the state's citrus
industry and thousands of noncommercial growers, some of whom were
the plaintiffs-homeowners in the Bogorfif lawsuit. The industry favored
eradication efforts based on cost-benefit projections that the elimination of
citrus canker would prove economically advantageous in the long run.266
Since infected trees usually bear some edible fruit, homeowners felt the
disease was not that troublesome.2 67 This meant that many homeowners
preferred to preserve their citrus trees regardless of the presence of disease
and did not support the eradication program requiring the destruction of
trees in exposure zones.268
In approaching the Bogorff plaintiffs' claim of a taking, the trial and
appellate courts seem to have been blinded by the physical invasion of
DACS's personnel onto plaintiffs' properties and public sentiment that

262. See Bogorff 35 So. 3d at 89-90.
263. Id at 90 (emphasis in original).
264. See Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Polk, 568 So. 2d 35, 39 (Fla. 1990)
(requiring an analysis of the factors in Graham, 399 So. 2d at 1380-81).
265. See Rubano v. Dep't of Transp., 656 So. 2d 1264, 1266 (Fla. 1995) (noting that
proof of a taking is required as an element of an inverse condemnation claim).
266. See Schubert et al., supra note 33, at 346 (reporting that commercial growers
realized that in the long run they would be better off if the disease were eradicated).
267. See id. (reporting that although citrus canker is not fatal, it leads to reduced fruit
production and detracts from the ornamental value of trees owned by residential
property owners).
268. See id. (reporting that citizens did not realize that the debilitating affects of the
disease favored an eradication program).
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eradication was to benefit the citrus industry.269 In reaching their
conclusion that there was a compensable taking, the trial and appellate
courts addressed not only the takings issue but also the legitimacy of
DACS's action under the legislatively-approved eradication program. An
examination of the courts' opinions identifies how an activist judiciary has
discretion in analyzing takings claims and may select evidence to support a
decision that ignores scientific and legislative findings.
A. Analyzing a Takings through a Due Process Analysis

For the inverse condemnation claim in Bogorff the trial court
proceeded to assume that it was "the trier of all issues, legal and factual,
except for the question of what constitutes just compensation."27 But, in
addressing the claim, the trial court proceeded to evaluate more than
whether DACS's actions had taken the plaintiffs' property without the
payment of adequate compensation. The trial court specifically addressed
the issue of whether the plaintiffs' citrus trees presented an imminent threat
to welfare or constituted a public nuisance.2 71 In addressing public welfare,
the court examined the state's police power. Pursuant to existing case law,
this meant that the plaintiffs had implicated and the court considered
272
In analyzing the public purpose of the
substantive due process concerns.
state's citrus canker eradication program, the propriety of the state's
actions, and whether the property taken had value, the trial court's
deliberations involved consideration of both the Takings and Due Process
Clauses.2 7 3

269. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at *1523,
48-74 (Fla Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008); Dep't. of Agric. and Consumer Servs. v.
Bogorff, 35 So. 3d 84. 89-90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). The appellate court stated that
physical invasions were "the clearest example of a governmental taking for which just
compensation is due." Bogorff, 35 So. 3d at 89. The court also decided that since
citrus canker was not dangerous to humans, the eradication program was to benefit the
citrus industry. Id.
270. In re Citrus Canker Litig., 2008 WL 8566964, at *2.
75-100.
271. Seeid.at 2-3,T2;23-31,
272. See Haire v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 870 So. 2d 774, 781 (Fla.
2004).
273. In re Citrus Canker Litig., 2008 WL 8566964, at *23, T 73 (considering the
purpose of the 1900-foot policy); id. at 30, N 97 (determining that a study employed by
the state to justify the eradication program was flawed); id. at 30-3 1, 98 (finding that
the state could not do what was required for eradication); id. at 31, 99 (evaluating the
state's records of infestation). The trial court impliedly admitted it was a due process
issue in its conclusions of law by citing the Haire district court: "[t]his action does not
violate due process. . . ." Id. at 43-44, 16.
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However, the Bogorfif trial court proceeded to evaluate both the
takings and due process issues by analyzing plaintiffs' claims as a taking
for which the court would act as the trier of facts.274 By evaluating issues
concerning the legitimacy of the eradication program as a taking rather
than under the due process clause, the trial court employed the wrong
inquiry.275 Federal, state, and Florida courts have distinguished inquiries
that are appropriate for takings from those to be used in evaluating a denial
of due process.276 Under Florida law, governments may regulate the use of
property or even destroy property without compensation under their police
power if the action is based on an emergency or responds to a public
nuisance. 277
1. Differentiating Takings from Due Process
In questioning the legitimacy of the 1900-foot exposure zone, the
Bogorff trial court was not addressing the issue of a taking. A takings
claim considers the actual burden on property rights imposed by the
regulation, with courts determining whether the statute is "functionally
comparable to government appropriation or invasion of private
property." 27 8 In analyzing the legitimacy of the 1900-foot exposure zone,
the Bogorfif court was addressing a due process challenge. In Florida,
constitutional provisions on just compensation and due process are
contained in separate provisions of the Florida Constitution and "the

274. See id. at 2; 9-15, f 24-47.
275. See Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622, 625 (Fla. 1990)
(noting the difference between eminent domain and police power); see also Dreher,
supra note 97, at 387-88 (identifying the legitimacy of a government's action as a due
process issue separate from takings); Karkkainen, supra note 90, at 828 (noting that
Lingle separates takings jurisprudence from due process).
276. See Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005) (limiting the
substantially advances formula to due process inquiries and finding it is inappropriate
for a takings test); Gray v. Thone, 194 N.W. 961, 963 (Iowa 1923) (recognizing the
distinction between eminent domain and the police power); Haire, 870 So. 2d at 78081(observing two separate constitutional provisions that protect property rights: takings
and due process); Balch v. Glenn, 119 P. 67, 69-70 (Kan. 1911) (differentiating takings
from the limitation or destruction of property under the exercise of the police power).
277. See Corneal v. State Plant Bd., 95 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1957) (observing that the
police power is broad but that the destruction of property under the power "is justified
only within the narrowest limits of actual necessity, unless the state chooses to pay
compensation.").
278. See Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 559 F.3d 1260, 1284 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
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analysis under due process is different from the analysis under just
compensation."2 79
Article X, section 6 of the Florida Constitution delineates Florida's
just compensation clause: "No private property shall be taken except for a
public purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner or
secured by deposit in the registry of the court and available to the
owner." 280 Florida's Due Process Clause is contained in Article I, section
9, and reads: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against
oneself."281
"[C]ourts frequently fail to make the distinction between two ways in
which government may abuse its power." 282 Just compensation involves
the taking of property because of its need for the public use. Furthermore,
under the Takings Clause, overbearing interference in property rights by
the government is precluded.2 83 Due process involves the regulation of
property to prevent its use in a manner that is detrimental to the public
interest.284 It also involves the arbitrariness of governmental regulations,
which involves the legitimacy of a statute or regulation.285 In addressing
the legitimacy of the scientific study recommending the 1900-foot
exposure zone, the Bogorff trial court was engaged in a due process
inquiry; it involved a question of arbitrariness in establishing the distance
of the exposure zone.
Under the Florida Constitution, the requirement of due process is
analyzed under a rational relationship test. 286 With respect to personal
property, this involves the question of whether the government can justify
its infringement of property rights by a legitimate governmental
287
objective.
A statute must bear "a reasonable relation to a permissible

279. Tampa-Hillsborough Cnty. Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S., Corp., 640 So. 2d
54, 57 (Fla. 1994).
280. FLA. CONST. art. X,§ 6 (2010).
281. Id.atart.1,§9.
282. Tampa-HillsboroughCnty., 640 So. 2d at 57 (citing Patrick Wiseman, When the
End Justifies the Means: Understanding Takings JurisprudenceIn a Legal System With
Integrity, 63 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 433, 438 (1988)).

283. See id.
284. See Haire v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 870 So. 2d 774, 781 (Fla.
2004).
285. See id.at 782.
286. See State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 1205, 1214 (Fla. 2004) (analyzing a due
process argument).
287. See id.; see also Suit v. State, 906 So. 2d 1013, 1016 (Fla. 2005) (observing that
the rational basis test requires a legitimate governmental interest); State v. Saiez, 489
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legislative objective and [cannot be] discriminatory, arbitrary, or
oppressive." 28 8 In determining whether a statute bears a reasonable
relationship to a legitimate governmental objective under a rational basis
test, any reasonable relationship between the act and the furtherance of a
valid governmental objective suffices.2 89
Concerning the state's citrus canker eradication program, the Florida
Supreme Court had previously considered its legitimacy; the court found in
Haire v. Florida Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services that
"there is no question that the protection of the citrus industry is a legitimate
objective for the use of the State's police power." 2 90 Other judicial
precedents noted that the citrus industry plays an important role in the
state's economy so police power-based regulations will be upheld by the
courts. 291 However, the Bogorff trial court declined to accept the
legitimacy of the state's eradication program by questioning whether
DACS's action in destroying all trees in exposure zones involved a threat
to public welfare.292 While the court acknowledged a rational basis test, it
weighed the evidence and felt a second study was required to justify the
1900-foot exposure zone.2 93
Under Florida law, courts do not weigh evidence for due process
claims.294 Rather, any credible evidence is sufficient and no second

So. 2d 1125, 1127 (Fla. 1986) (noting that the due process clause allows governments
to interfere with property rights but places limits on the interferences).
288. Warren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 899 So. 2d 1090, 1096 (Fla. 2005).
289. See Robinson, 873 So. 2d at 1214.
290. Haire v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 870 So. 2d 774, 781-82 (Fla.
2004).

291.

See Coca-Cola Co. v. Florida, 406 So. 2d 1079, 1085-86 (Fla. 1981) (upholding

regulations prescribing labeling requirements for Florida citrus products). In 2003, a
district court had taken judicial notice that the state's citrus industry is a great asset and
the industry's protection "redounds greatly to the general welfare of the
commonwealth." Haire, 836 So. 2d at 1047 (citing earlier pronouncements by the
Florida Supreme Court that the protection of the citrus industry affected the welfare of
so many that its protection is within the police power of the sovereign); see also
Johnson v. State, 128 So. 853, 857 (Fla. 1930) (acknowledging the state's citrus
industry as affecting the welfare of the state).
292. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at *3,
2;11T31; 15 47 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008).
293. See id. at *9, T 24-25.
294. See Haire, 870 So. 2d at 787 (noting that "under a rational basis test, 'a
legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding"'); see also Lucas v.
Englewood Cmty. Hospital, 963 So. 2d 894, 896 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Hudson v.
Florida, 825 So. 2d 460, 468-69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
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opinion is required.2 95 Given the state legislature's justification for
adopting the citrus eradication program, 296 DACS had no obligation to
produce additional evidence to sustain its program.29 7 Since the evidence
adduced at trial showed a credible scientific study justifying the exposure
zone, the Bogorff trial court developed a new methodology for analyzing
takings claims under the Florida Constitution. The court declined to
acknowledge the due process issues by rolling them into the takings
allegation.
2. Rejecting the Scientific Study
The Bogorff trial court rejected the scientific study forming the basis
for the state's citrus canker eradication program. 2 98 With this conclusion,
the court decided the eradication program was not an appropriate
regulation under the state's police power.2 99 The validity of the scientific
study does not concern whether there was a taking; it involves due process.
Because this issue involved the state's justification for its eradication
program rather than how the regulatory action burdened plaintiffs'
properties, it cannot be evaluated as part of the takings claim. 3 0o Instead,
the Bogorff court needed to distinguish the plaintiffs' takings claim from
their argument concerning the validity of the state's eradication program.
On appeal, DACS argued that the court improperly rejected its evidence,
but the appellate court failed to see the due process issue so retorted that

295. See Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass'n v. Thomas, 434 So. 2d 306, 308 (Fla. 1983).
"Under a "rational basis" standard of review a court should inquire only whether it is
conceivable that the regulatory classification bears some rational relationship to a
legitimate state purpose." Id.
296. See 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 308.
297. See Hudson, 825 So. 2d at 468-69.
298. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at *9,
24; 30, 97; 48, 25 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008).
299. See id.; see also Tampa-Hillsborough Cnty. Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S.,
Corp., 640 So. 2d 54, 58 (Fla. 1994) (observing that a constitutional challenge to a
statutory mechanism involves due process).
300. See Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005) (noting that due
process is to protect individuals from the exercise of a state's police power without any
reasonable justification); Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 559 F.3d 1260, 127677 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (disapproving of the "substantially advances" test for due process);
Haire v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 870 So. 2d 774, 786 (Fla. 2004)
(noting that a trial court cannot reject legislative choices based on the court's view of
the scientific evidence); Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622, 625
(Fla. 1990) (observing that the police power involves the regulation of property to
prevent use detrimental to public interest).
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trial courts weigh evidence. 30 1 By not employing a due process analysis to
evaluate the latter claim, the trial and appellate courts departed from
existing jurisprudence to respond to the plaintiffs' claims. 30 2
The state's eradication program was initially adopted by DACS, and
later endorsed by the state legislature. 303 The program's exposure zone
was based on a study by a USDA scientist who was an expert on citrus
canker.304 Subsequently, a task force of regulatory individuals, scientists,
and citrus industry representatives who dealt with citrus canker
unanimously recommended the adoption of the study's 1900-foot exposure
zone.305 The trial court, however, decided to question the merits of the
study and summarily decided that DACS failed to determine whether "the
Gottwald study was based on sound scientific principles."306 But, the
Florida Supreme Court had already heard a similar challenge in Haire v.
Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services.307
In
addressing the issue of whether the citrus canker law was a legitimate
exercise of the state's police power, the supreme court replied:
[A]ll that is required is that the law not be arbitrary or
capricious, and the Court need only determine that the law
bears a reasonable and substantial relationship to the purpose
sought to be attained. Under this standard of review,
referred to as either the reasonable relationship or the
rational basis test, a "state statute must be upheld . . . if there

is any reasonable relationship between the act and the
furtherance of a valid governmental objective."30 8
The Bogorfif trial court also failed to follow the supreme court's
finding that the legislature's adoption of the 1900-foot eradication zone

301. See Dep't. of Agric. and Consumer Servs. v. Bogorff, 35 So. 3d 84, 87-88 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
302. See Dreher, supra note 97, at 402-403 (predicting that by distinguishing
between takings and due process challenges, few governmental regulations will effect a
regulatory taking).
303. See 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 308.
304. See Gottwald et al., supra note 11, at 32 (reporting the study advocating the
1900-foot radius). An earlier supreme court decision had cited Dr. Gottwald as an

expert in epidemiology, plant pathology, and citrus canker. See Haire v. Fla. Dep't. of
Agric. and Consumer Servs., 870 So. 2d 774, 778-79 (Fla. 2004).
305. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at *1011,
26-30 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008); DACSs InitialBrief supra note 43, at 2.
306. In re Citrus Canker Litig., 2008 WL 8566964, at *9, TT 24-25.
307. 870 So.2d 774, 782 (Fla. 2004).
308. Id. (citing Lane v. Chiles, 698 So. 2d 260, 262 (Fla. 1997)).
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was justified by the best available science.309 In Haire, the court noted that
any conflicting evidence regarding the appropriateness of the scientific
study or its recommendations "was a matter of debate for the
Legislature." 30 o The legislature's directive only needed to bear a
reasonable relationship to a legitimate objective; trial courts do not get to
weigh the merits of a government's selected course of action.3 1 By
rejecting the state's scientific study, the Bogorff trial court declined to
follow established law in reaching its decision.
3. Improper Hindsight Analysis
The Bogorff trial court reached its conclusion that the state's action
was not rational by looking at events transpiring after the adoption of the
eradication program. 3 12 The court claimed DACS could not assert that
citrus canker was a public nuisance because the agency failed to follow the
protocol it delineated in the study.3 13 The notion that an ineffective or
foolish regulation constitutes a taking has been rejected by courts; 314 the
success of a governmental action is not relevant as to whether the action
effects a taking.315 As the Supreme Court remarked in Lingle v. Chevron
USA, Inc.,

an ineffective regulation may not significantly burden
property rights at all, and it may distribute any burden
broadly and evenly among property owners. The notion that
such a regulation nevertheless "takes" private property for

309. See Id. at 786. The Haire district court concluded: "that the trial court erred in
rejecting the legislative choice based on its own view of the scientific evidence and

improperly substituted its judgment for that of the Legislature, which determined that
the 1900-feet (sic) eradication zone was justified by the best available science. .. . We
agree." Id.
310. Id.
311. See id. at 782, 786-87.
312. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at *30-

31, TT 98-100 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008).
313.

Seeid.at30, 98.

314. See Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005); Dreher, supra note
97, at 402 (commenting that the ineffectiveness of a regulation is a due process issue
rather than a taking).
315. See Karkkainen, supra note 90, at 828 (claiming that the substantially advances
formula of the Agins court was repudiated by Lingle so that a heightened substantive
due process review has no place in takings jurisprudence); see also Action Apt. Ass'n
v. Santa Monica Rent Control Opinion Bd., 509 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2007)
(noting that courts do not second-guess governmental actions to implement
indisputably legitimate goals).
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public use merely by virtue of its ineffectiveness or
foolishness is untenable.' 16
However, an argument that the eradication program was foolish or
unworkable may be evaluated as an issue of substantive due process. 3 17
Due process is a separate issue from takings, and under due process,
Florida's eradication program should have been upheld if there was any
reasonable relationship between the state's actions and any valid
In examining the state's objective, the court
governmental objective.'
inappropriately examined the wisdom of the legislature in choosing the
means to be used and whether the means chosen would in fact accomplish
Instead, the court needed to look at the
the intended goals.3 19
constitutionality of the means chosen. 32 0 By evaluating the merits of the
governmental action rather than burdens imposed on property owners, the
Bogorfif trial court found a taking without a requisite evidentiary
foundation.
B. Labeling the Prevention ofHarm as a Benefit
Considerable controversy exists about whether particular state actions
are intended to prevent harm or confer benefits.32' In Florida, courts have
opined that citrus canker eradication programs confer benefits on the citrus
industry so the destruction of healthy trees resulted in a taking. 32 2 Yet,
efforts to safeguard plants, animals, and humans from plagues, scourges,
316. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543.
317. See id. at 542 (stating the arbitrariness of a regulation or irrational decision of a
legislative body may run afoul of the Due Process Clause); Dreher, supra note 97, at
405 (observing that the failure of a regulation to accomplish a stated objective would

be considered by a due process inquiry).
318. See Haire v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 870 So. 2d 774, 782 (Fla.
2004) (considering the validity of a citrus canker eradication program).
319. See Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 15 (Fla. 1974) (discussing how
it is not the role of the court to question the legislative means chosen or their
effectiveness).
320. See id at 15-16.
321. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Responsibility, Causation, and the Harm-Benefit
Line in Takings Jurisprudence,6 FORDHAM ENvTL. L. J. 433, 491-521 (1995) (arguing
that the government should compensate persons when there are few adversely affected
by governmental action); Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of the "Harm/Benefit " and
"Average Reciprocity of Advantage" Rules in a Comprehensive Takings Analysis, 50
VAND. L. REV. 1449, 1472-1524 (1997) (advocating rules to evaluate the validity of a
government's exercise of its police power).
322. See Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Mid-Fla. Growers, Inc., 521 So. 2d
101, 103 (Fla. 1988); In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL
8566964, at *23, TT 73-74 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008).
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and diseases involve governmental action to prevent maladies that are
detrimental to public welfare. By directing actions to prevent or eradicate
diseases, governments act to prevent harm. When DACS took trees and
destroyed them, it did not take the trees for its use or use by the citrus
industry. Rather, the reason for destroying the trees was to confront a
disease that was projected to adversely affect all citrus growers and the
state's economy. The benefits to the citrus industry and all growers
resulted from stopping bacteria from reducing fruit yields that would cause
harm to producers. An analysis of the facts involving the disease and
jurisprudence concerning a harm-benefit dichotomy suggests the Bogorff
trial and appellate court findings are arbitrary and capricious. The courts
miscategorized the evidence of harm as a benefit.
1. Diseases Cause Harm
Numerous courts in other jurisdictions have considered governmental
actions to confront diseases. 3 23 Some courts automatically acknowledge
the ability of a government to take action under their police power to
confront diseases.324 In an Indiana case involving the destruction of a crop
to control the European corn borer, the court found that the state officers
had authority to destroy the plaintiffs crop to protect an important food
supply. 325 The legislative authority applied to the northeastern portion of
the state and did not depend on an actual infestation on an owner's
property. 3 26 The Iowa Supreme Court approved an action by the state of
destroying property without compensation under a statute applying to a
class of plants that served as hosts to black stem rust in wheat.327 While

323. See, e.g., Skinner v. Coy, 90 P.2d 296, 303 (Cal. 1939) (citing cases from other
jurisdictions supporting the destruction of property to prevent the spread of disease);
see also supra note 26.
324. See Wallace v. Feehan, 206 N.E.2d 438, 442 (Ind. 1934) (noting that the validity
of statutory provisions to address a pest attacking plants was not questioned as being
proper under the state's police power); Gray v. Thone, 194 N.W. 961, 963 (Iowa 1923)
(claiming there were too many cases to cite authorizing the destruction of animals
having a disease as an exercise of the police power); Balch v. Glenn, 119 P. 67, 69-70
(Kan. 1911) (observing that the state could classify San Jose scale as a nuisance and
take action under its police power to protect the fruit industry); Kroplin v. Traux, 165
N.E. 498, 501 (Ohio 1929) (observing that "the elimination of disease, whether in
human beings, crops, stock, or cattle, are in general authorized under the police
power."); Stickley v. Givens, 11 S.E.2d 631, 635 (Va. 1940) (noting that the validity of
statutes authorizing the destruction of animals and plants have been sustained as an
exercise of the police power).
325. See Wallace, 206 N.E.2d at 442, 444.
326. See id. at 440.
327. See Gray v. Thone, 194 N.W. 961, 963 (Iowa 1923).
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the destruction of property to control a disease served a public purpose, it
was not devoted to a public use, so it was not a compensable taking.328 As
noted by the Florida Supreme Court, diseases are prevented or eradicated
to prevent harm, and the accompanying destruction of property does not
require compensation.329
The Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
observed that, in general, governments can proscribe harmful uses of
property without the requirement of compensation.3 30 Yet, the elimination
of harm cannot serve as the touchstone to determine whether compensation
is due because many laws and regulations seek to prevent public harm. 33 1
With this limitation, Lucas found that if a regulation preventing harm took
all of the value of the owner's property, there was a compensable
categorical taking. 332 However, the Lucas opinion went further and
commented that the distinction between harm and benefits is "often in the
eye of the beholder."33 3 Under this interpretation of the police power, a
broad range of governmental purposes satisfies the requirement of a
legitimate state interest.3 34
Moreover, in connection with an eminent domain challenge, the
Supreme Court acknowledged in Kelo v. City of New London335 that a
"government's pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit individual
private parties."336 As recently noted by the Supreme Court of Delaware, a
project that results in a substantial benefit to private interest may

328. See id. at 963. As further support for the principle that controlling disease does
not take property for a public use, see Balch v. Glenn, 119 P. 67, 69-70 (Kan. 1911);
Colvill v. Fox, 149 P. 496, 499 (Mont. 1915); Bowman v. Virginia State Entomologist,
105 S.E. 141, 145 (Va. 1920); cf, Yancy v. United States, 915 F.2d 1534, 1542 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (requiring compensation for the loss in value of a quarantined turkey flock).
329. See Corneal v. State Plant Bd., 95 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1957) (finding that the
destruction of diseased trees did not require compensation).
330. See 505 U.S. 1003, 1022 (1992).
331. See id. at 1026. See generally Dreher,supra note 97, at 386-87 (commenting on
the Lucas decision).
332. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026-27.
333. Id. at 1024. See generally Huffman, supra note 90, at 5-6 (noting that Lucas
allows governments to confer benefits without incurring takings liability).
334. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1023; see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 834-35 (1987) (acknowledging that a broad range of purposes satisfy a legitimate
governmental interest); Martin v. Section 28 Partnership, Ltd., 772 So. 2d 616, 620
(Fla. Ct. App. 2000) (acknowledging that numerous Florida cases illustrate the
principle that a broad range of governmental purposes uphold property regulations).
335. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
336. Id. at 485.
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nevertheless serve a public purpose.3 37 If courts find that "the issue of
private benefit to nearby properties is irrelevant" for eminent domain
proceedings,3 38 a similar standard may apply to inverse condemnation
claims.
Idiosyncrasies of Florida law have led courts to feel that the benefits
of the citrus canker eradication program were mainly for commercial
growers. However, this conclusion does not mean that there was a taking.
In declining to compensate owners of destroyed cedar trees, the Supreme
Court in Miller v. Schoene approved similar benefits for Virginia's apple
growers. 3 39 The Florida Supreme Court observed in Graham v. Estuary
Properties,Inc. that the public may benefit when the state takes action to
prevent harm. 3 40 This suggests that the conclusion by the Bogorff trial
court that DACS's actions constituted a taking had no reasonable
foundation, departed from established law, and was arbitrary and
capricious. In addressing citrus canker, the eradication program addressed
the harm that would occur if citrus canker became established in Florida.
The legislature had a legitimate objective in taking the recommended
action to stop the disease.
2. Ignoring Evidence of Benefits to Noncommercial Growers
Although the eradication of a disease is primarily to prevent harm,
secondary benefits may be identified. The Bogorff trial court found that
"[t]he undisputed evidence demonstrates that the 1900-foot policy was
primarily adopted to protect the commercial citrus industry," 34' and the
appellate court concluded that the trees were not destroyed to prevent harm
but to benefit an industry. 34 2 These conclusions ignored the evidence set
forth by the USDA. 3 4 3 In its assessment of Florida's eradication program,
the USDA observed that the program was "necessary to prevent damage to
commercial and home-grown citrus and further spread of the bacterial

337. See Key Properties Group v. City of Milford, 995 A.2d 147, 152 (Del. 2010)
(concerning condemnation of property to develop sewer service that resulted in

significant benefits for a private developer).
338. See Hoffman Family L.L.C. v. City of Alexandria, 634 S.E.2d 722, 730 (Va.

2006).
339. See 276 U.S. 279 (1928) (making a choice to support apple production at the
expense of owners of cedar trees).
340. See 399 So. 2d 1374, 1382 (Fla. 1981).
341. In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at *23,

73

(Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008).
342.

See Dep't. of Agric. and Consumer Servs. v. Bogorff, 35 So. 3d 84, 89 (Fla Dist.

Ct. App. 2010).
343. See USDA Assessment, supra note 40, at 1.
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disease agent." 344 The USDA also pointed out that citrus canker "could
adversely affect homeowners who depend on backyard plantings to
supplement their food supplies." 34 5 Because the disease reduces yields and
fruit quality of infected trees, the eradication of citrus canker would be
beneficial to homeowners. Furthermore, infected trees also may lose their
ornamental value, so that the eradication of citrus canker would benefit
homeowners who valued their trees as part of their landscaping. 3 46 In
adopting legislation to address citrus canker, the Florida legislature also
identified benefits to all citizens of the state due to property and sales taxes
paid by citrus growers and the industry, and the revenues generated
through the marketing and sales of citrus products.3 47
Turning to the Bogorff appellate court's claim of benefits, while
benefits to the industry, citrus growers, and the state's economy offered a
justification for the state's eradication program, the state's actions
specifically involved the elimination of future harm. 3 48 The citrus canker
eradication program offered no funds, direct benefits, or tax breaks to citrus
producers, other than nominal payments for destroyed trees. Instead, the
state's actions sought to prevent citrus canker from spreading and
adversely affecting other owners of citrus trees, including homeowners.
By eliminating the disease, owners of citrus trees, citrus growers, the citrus
industry, and the public would benefit. All of the benefits accruing to the
citrus industry come from the elimination of a disease that harms trees and
adversely affects fruit quality.
Under a distinction between harm versus benefits, state actions to
eradicate diseases are based on the prevention of harm and are exercises of
the state's police power. The Bogorff court chose to ignore the scientific
evidence and established jurisprudence. Under its analysis, preventing a
disease from harming property is a benefit so governments need to pay for
property destroyed in stopping a harmful disease.
V.

REBALANCING RIGHTS

By ignoring general takings rules and declining to analyze
governmental actions under a due process inquiry, the Bogorff decision

344. Id.
345. Id. at 6.
346. See Schubert et al., supra note 33, at 346.
347. See 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 308: "WHEREAS, every citizen in the state benefits
from property taxes, sales taxes, and other revenues generated by the citrus
industry.... Id.
348. See USDA Assessment, supra note 40, at I (observing that eradication was to
prevent damage to citrus).
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invites legislatures and courts to reallocate responsibilities and rebalance
rights to provide greater protection for private property rights. 3 49 Bogorif
may herald a change in the balance of private property rights versus police
power. 35 0 Property rights advocates want governments to pay when
regulatory actions diminish property values. 35 1 With considerable public
support for reducing government regulation, courts and legislatures may
find opportunities to reinterpret takings law to require governments to pay
for property losses due to temporary invasions or significant diminutions of
value. 352
Bogorff's hostility to police power actions corresponds to the
legislative responses to the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo v. City of
New London.3 53 Under a state statute that authorized the use of eminent
domain to promote economic development, New London had proposed to
condemn non-blighted properties and lease part of the condemned land to
private parties for office space.354 In affirming the city's actions for its
development project, the Court adopted a broad definition of public
purpose under which community benefits would satisfy the Constitution's
"public use" requirement.3 55 After adopting this low threshold for finding

349. This appears to be counter to the Supreme Court's recent analysis of takings
issues. See Mark Fenster, The Takings Clause, Version 2005: The Legal Process of
Constitutional Property Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 667, 671 (2007) (analyzing
differences in judicial approaches to takings issues and deferring "to the expert
decisions of other institutions.").
350. See Richard A. Epstein, How to Create-orDestroy-Wealth in Real Property,58
ALA. L. REV. 741, 763 (2007) (observing that a strong system of private rights will
make takings law more coherent).
351. See generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The EndangeredSpecies Act: A Case
Study in Tankings & Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 343-44 (1997) (considering
takings under the Endangered Species Act); William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong
Principle,the Narratives of Takings, and Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1151, 1172 (1997) (advocating a process-based approach to the Takings Clause).
352. See Epstein, supra note 350, at 743-44 (arguing that the expansion of the police
power has weakened property rights).
353. 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005). See generally Steven S. Kaufman, Community
Efforts to Attract andRetain Corporations:Legal and Policy Implications of State and
Local Tax Incentives and Eminent Domain: Regional Economies and the
ConstitutionalImperative of Eminent Domain, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1199 (2008);
Andrew P. Morriss, Supreme Court Economic Review Symposium on Post-Kelo
Reform: Symbol or Substance? An Empirical Assessment of State Responses to Kelo,
17 S. CT. ECON. REV. 237 (2009); Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the
PoliticalResponse to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009).
354. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475-76.
355. Seeid.at484.
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a public use,356 the Kelo Court acknowledged that a state was free to place
"further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power."357
The public and state legislators were not happy with the Kelo
outcome as they felt that it slighted property owners,
and the Court's
359
decision resulted in considerable state legislation.
Forty-six state
legislatures responded within two years of the Kelo decision by considering
bills to restrict eminent domain powers.360 The property rights legislative
proposals disclose actions that can limit governmental interferences and
expand private property rights. However, most of the enacted property
rights laws do not provide much assistance in restricting eminent domain
Because of the inability of the public and legislatures to
powers. 3
implement meaningful public-use limits on eminent domain, the judiciary
may be viewed as offering the best bulwark against overreaching
governmental actions that interfere with property rights.362
The Bogorfif trial and appellate court decisions emulate the legislative
responses to Kelo to curtail governmental actions that interfere with
property rights. The analysis of how the Bogorfif courts reached the
conclusion that DACS's actions effected a taking discloses avenues for
establishing judicial limitations on exercises of police power. After
identifying arguments that offer courts opportunities for giving greater
deference to private property rights, an examination of social costs suggests
that enhancing owners' property rights may not be beneficial. Balancing
property rights with social welfare remains challenging.

356. See James W. Ely, Jr., "PoorRelation" Once More; The Supreme Court and the
Vanishing Rights of Property Owners, 2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 39, 64 (arguing that
Kelo eviscerates the public use limitation to allow interest groups to work with local
governments to condemn property for vague public purposes); Richard A. Epstein, The
Public Use, Public Trust & Public Benefit: Could Both Cooley and Kelo Be Wrong?, 9
GREEN BAG 2d 125, 131 (2006) (arguing that Kelo is wrong).
357. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489.
358. See Kaufman, supra note 353, at 1213-14 (identifying eight categories of state
responses that serve to limit the rights of states to use eminent domain for economic
development and claiming 32 states enacted laws restricting or prohibiting the use of
eminent domain for economic development); Julia D. Mahoney, Kelo 's Legacy:
Eminent Domain and the Future of Property Rights, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 125-29
(discussing the political response to Kelo); llya Somin, Controlling the Grasping
Hand: Economic Development Takings after Kelo, 15 S. CT. EcoN. REV. 183, 191-92

(2007) (discussing Kelo and dangers of the economic development rationale).
359. See Somin,supra note 353, at 2102.
360. See Morriss, supra note 353, at 239-40 (concluding that forty-two state enacted
legislation or amended their constitutions in response to Kelo).
361. See Somin, supra note 353, at 2103-04 (maintaining "that the majority of the
newly enacted post-Kelo reform laws are likely to be ineffective.").
362. Id. at 2170-71.
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A. Expanding Takings
From time to time, state courts have adopted interpretations of their
state's takings law that digress from federal takings jurisprudence. This
ability of states to have divergent state law is one of the strengths of the
Courts adopt different
nation's federal system of governance. 36 3
interpretations of state takings clauses for reasons of fairness and in
response to policy arguments.364 Several examples show how courts can
expand interference with property rights that effect takings requiring
compensation or expand situations that require payments. A court may
expand the interferences that constitute takings, employ an ad hoc inquiry
with greater deference to damages incurred by property owners advancing
claims of regulatory takings, or use its discretion in its analysis of harm,
nuisances, and emergencies.
1. Recognizing Interferences Requiring Compensation
A few court cases may be highlighted to show how the judiciary
might be more open to finding governmental interferences with property
rights constitute takings. In an Iowa lawsuit, the court unilaterally decided
a nonphysical easement was a de facto taking. An Oregon court expanded
takings to include rights in land. Cases on airport noise highlight the
categorization of interferences as peculiar, special, or not suffered by the
public as a whole to support a finding that a governmental action
constituted a compensable taking.
The Iowa Supreme Court offered more protection under its state
constitution for takings when it considered the application of a state anti-

363. See, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine Revisited: How a Conflicts
Perspective Can Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1235, 1274 (1999)
(responding to concerns about different outcomes that the federal system was designed
to enable states "to pursue local policies diverging from those of its neighbors.").
364. See, e.g, Stanley Mosk, The Emergence of State Constitutional Law: State
Constitutionalism:Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1081, 1082 (1985)
(noting that the Founding Fathers recognized the primacy of the states in protecting
individual rights). However, the most famously quoted statement about the federal
system allowing for different state interpretations of law occurred in the dissent of New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932): "[i]t is one of the happy incidents
of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments.") (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). See also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 664 (2000) (Stevens,
J., dissenting); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 600 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 58 (1st Cir. 2008); Santa Monica
Beach v. Superior Court, 968 P.2d 993, 1027 (Cal. 1999) (Baxter, J., dissenting).
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nuisance law. 36 5 Every state has enacted an anti-nuisance law to assist
existing businesses by providing them a defense against allegations of a
nuisance. 3

In an Iowa lawsuit, property owners alleged that an anti-

nuisance law effected a taking even though there were no facts that showed
a physical invasion.367 The Iowa court held that an Iowa anti-nuisance law
created an easement that effected a taking without a physical invasion. 3 68
Even when later confronted with the argument that a second anti-nuisance
law did not involve a physical invasion, the Iowa court defiantly retorted:
Whether the nuisance easement . .. is based on a physical

invasion of particulates from the confinement facilities or
is viewed as a nontrespassory invasion akin to the flying of
aircraft over the land, it is a taking under Iowa's
constitution. 369
Under these Iowa decisions, the Iowa Supreme Court declined to follow
federal jurisprudence on takings and expanded property owners' rights
against governmental actions.370 The Iowa court invalidated the statutory

365. See Bormann v. Kassuth Cnty. Bd. of Sup'rs, 584 N.W.2d 309, 321 (Iowa
1998), cert. denied sub nom. Girres v. Bormann, 119 S. Ct. 1096 (1999) (interpreting
IOWA CODE § 352.11 as effecting a taking); see also Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684
N.W.2d 168, 179 (Iowa 2004) (interpreting the immunity provided by IOWA CODE §
657.11(2) as violating article 1, section I of the Iowa Constitution).
366. See Terence J. Centner, Creating an 'Undeveloped Lands Protection Act' for
Farmlands, Forests, and Natural Areas, 17 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1, Appx. 1
(2006) (listing state statutes).
367. Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 321.
368. See id at 317. 'To constitute a per se taking, the government need not physically
invade the surface of the land." Id. Terence J. Centner, Anti-Nuisance Legislation:
Can the Derogation of Common Law Nuisance Be a Taking?, 30 ENvTL. L. RPTR.
10253, 10255 (2000) [hereinafter Anti-Nuisance Legislation] (discussing anti-nuisance
statutes that may go too far); Terence J. Centner, Governmental and Unconstitutional
Takings: When Do Right-to-Farm Laws Go Too Far, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 87,
117-141 (2006) [hereinafter Takings] (evaluating the constitutionality of an Iowa law
to suggest that the court deviated from federal takings law).
369. Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 173-74 (Iowa 2004).
370. Iowa's interpretation of anti-nuisance laws has not been followed by courts
examining anti-nuisance laws in other states. See Centner, Takings, supra note 368, at
125 (observing that invasions of personal interests in land do not constitute a physical
invasion so are not per se takings); Jeffry R. Gittins, Comment, Bormann Revisited:
Using the Penn Central Test to Determine the Constitutionality of Right-to-Farm
Statutes, 2006 BYU L. REv. 1381, 1396 (2006) (noting that Iowa's Bormann decision
has not been accepted by courts outside of Iowa); Jason Jordan, Comment, A Pig in the
Parlor or Food on the Table: Is Texas's Right to Farm Act an Unconstitutional
Mechanism to Perpetuate Nuisances or Sound Public Policy Ensuring Sustainable
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provision, and because the plaintiffs had not requested compensation, the

court did not determine damages for a temporary taking. 371 The court's
decision precluded the legislature from interfering with property owners'
rights to confront nuisances.
In Oregon, plaintiffs alleged a taking due to the nearby construction
of a major highway that resulted in drainage waters entering the plaintiffs'
properties. 37 2 The supreme court noted that, for the purpose of takings,
property includes "the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to
the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it." 373 By
recognizing that the state had taken plaintiffs' rights in the land rather than
part of the land itself, the court found evidence that supported plaintiffs'
claim of a taking.374 Due to the deposits of mud, dirt, and silt upon
properties owned by the plaintiffs, they were entitled to permanent
damages and the state acquired an easement for drainage waters.37 5 A
subsequent Oregon case summarized Oregon's law of taking to include
governmental acts that "deprive an owner of the useful possession of that
trespasses or by repeated nontrespassory
which he owns, either by repeated
37 6
'nuisance."'
called
invasions
Governmental actions causing interferences that are not suffered by
the public generally may be found to constitute compensable takings.
For example, the adoption of a new zoning ordinance that resulted in a few
properties near an airport suffering substantial declines in property value
may support a finding that the public is receiving an easement for which

compensation must be paid.3 78 Another example involving noise from an
airport suggests that if injury is special and peculiar to nearby property
owners and different in kind from the inconveniences suffered by the

TECH. L. REV. 943, 972 (2010) (evaluating a Texas anti-nuisance law
to conclude it does not result in a unconstitutional physical taking).
371. See Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 321.
372. See Cereghino v. State Hwy. Comm'n, 370 P.2d 694, 698 (Or. 1962); see also
Lincoln Loan Co. v. State Hwy. Comm'n, 545 P.2d 105, 106, 109 (Or. 1976) (finding
plaintiffs had stated facts sufficient to maintain a taking for damages accruing from the
construction of a nearby highway).
373. Cereghino, 370 P.2d at 697 (citing United States v. General Motors Corp., 323
U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945)).
374. See id.
375. See id. at 695, 698-99.
376. Lincoln Loan Co. v. State Hwy. Comm'n, 545 P.2d 105, 108 (Or. 1976) (citing
Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 376 P.2d 100, 106 (1963)).
377. See, e.g., Biddle v. BAA Indianapolis, LLC, 860 N.E.2d 570, 580 (Ind. 2007).
378. See Interstate Cos., v. City of Bloomington, 790 N.W.2d 409, 415 (Minn. 2010),
proceedingsstayedpending rev., 2011 Minn. LEXIS 33 (Minn. Jan. 26, 2011).
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public generally, there may be a taking if property owners cannot make
reasonable uses of their properties.3 79
In other instances, a court may label the government's interference
with the use and enjoyment of property as sufficiently direct, peculiar, and
of a magnitude to support a finding of a compensable invasion. 380 For
example, an invasion of sewage due to a government's action causes
interference so substantial that it supported an inverse condemnation
claim. 38 Alternatively, instead of a physical invasion, the taking of the
right to use and enjoy property may be of such a magnitude that the
property owner alone should not be expected to bear the burden. 3 82
Fairness and justice require that the interference amounts to a taking and
the public pay for it.383
2. Greater Deference to Damages
A second idea for expanding compensatory interferences involves
giving greater deference to damages. Whether this occurs due to a
provision in the state's constitution or a judicial interpretation of a taking, it
may offer additional opportunities for courts to require restitution against
overreaching governmental activities. For Colorado property owners, the
state constitution allows compensation for governmental takings causing
384
In response to an inverse condemnation action, the state
damage.
supreme court ruled that a property owner damaged due to a taking of
adjacent property could recover damages. 8 The court observed that such
a conclusion was to prevent an inequitable result in which the property
"retains more than a de minimis value but, when its diminished economic
value is considered in connection with other factors, the property
effectively has been taken from its owner." 386 However, plaintiffs only

379. See Biddle, 860 N.E.2d at 580 (finding that the plaintiffs retained valuable uses
of their properties so there was no compensable taking); Henthorn v. City of Oklahoma
City, 453 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Okla. 1969) (finding that whether there was substantial
interference with a property owner's use and enjoyment of property was a question for
the trier of facts).
380. See Dunn v. City of Milwaukie, 2011 Ore. App. LEXIS 173, at 15-16 (Or. Ct.
App. Feb. 23, 2011).
381. See Id. at 16.
382. See Sundell v. Town of New London, 409 A.2d 1315, 1318 (N.H. 1979).
383. See id
384. See COLO. CONST. art. 11,§ 15 (2010).
385. See Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of La Plata,
38 P.3d 59, 63-64 (Colo. 2001); see also City of Northglenn v. Grynerg, 846 P.2d 175,
179 (Colo. 1993).
386. Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, 38 P.3d at 66.
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3 87
Mere
receive damages if there is unique or special injury to the owner.

diminution in value due to a governmental action is not sufficient to
establish damage under the Colorado provision.
The Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged that the state
constitution has broader language for takings than the U.S. Constitution in
that it requires compensation where private property is taken, destroyed, or
damaged. 39 In considering whether an airport needed to compensate
landowners for navigational easements, the court adopted its own test for
determining which interferences are a taking.
[W]hen those interferences reach the point where they
cause a measurable decrease in property market value, it is
reasonable to assume that, considering the permanency of
the air flights, a property right has been, if not 'taken or
destroyed,' at the very least 'damaged,' for which our
constitution requires that compensation be paid.390
Under this test, property owners need to show a repeated and aggravated
invasion of property rights that results in the deprivation of the practical
enjoyment of property and a definite and measurable diminution of
value. 39 1 Another court noted that, due to the clear intent of Minnesota law
to fully compensate citizens for losses accompanying state action, owners
suffering a substantial and measurable decline in market value must be
compensated.392
Other states' supreme courts have recognized that their just
compensation clauses offer more protection than provided by the Fifth
Amendment. 393 Under state law, consequential injury peculiar to an
owner's land and of a kind not suffered by the public as a whole may be
compensable.3 94 A state compensation clause may intend "to secure to
owners, not only the possession of property, but also those rights which

387. See Grynerg, 846 P.2d at 179.
388. See id
389. See Alevizos v. Metro. Airports Comm'n of Minneapolis & St. Paul, 216
N.W.2d 651, 661 (Minn. 1974).
390. Id. at 662.
391. See id.
392. See Interstate Cos. v. City of Bloomington, 790 N.W.2d 409, 413 (2010).
393. See Varabedian v. City of Madera, 572 P.2d 43, 52 (Cal. 1977); Buhmann v.
Montana, 201 P.3d 70, 88 (Mont. 2008); Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo,
705 N.W.2d 850, 856 (N.D. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1130 (2006); Hall v. South
Dakota, 712 N.W.2d 22, 27 (S.D. 2005).
394. See Hall, 712 N.W.2d at 27.
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Due to interpretations of a state
render possession valuable." 395
compensation clause, governments may need to compensate property
owners for temporary physical invasions. 39 6 These scattered cases disclose
that state courts are able to expand takings jurisprudence beyond what is
recognized under the U.S. Constitution.
3. Declining to Recognize Harm, Nuisances, or Emergencies
Third, a state court might refuse to recognize harm, nuisances, or
emergencies to thereby deprive a government from having a justification
for acting under its police power. As reported in the discussion of harm
from citrus canker, the distinction between harm and benefits is in the eye
of the beholder. 97 Thus, courts have discretion in declining to recognize
harm, thereby supporting a finding that the government's action was a
taking.
Courts also have discretion in determining whether a government's
action is to address a public nuisance.39 8 In Bogorff, the court found that
citrus canker was not a nuisance, therefore the state's action was not
justified and resulted in a taking. A Texas court decided that the question
of whether something is a public nuisance is a judicial question rather than
legislative. 399 Another possibility is for a court to find that a property
owner was consciously singled out or selected to bear a burden which
defendant consciously elected not to impose on others. 400 By placing too

395. Wild Rice River Estates, 705 N.W.2d at 856 (citation omitted) (interpreting N.D.
CONST. art 1, § 16); Knutson v. City of Fargo, 600 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing
Wild Rice River Estates).
396. See Buhmann v. State of Montana, 201 P.3d 70, 88 (Mont. 2008) (interpreting
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 29).
397. See supra Part III.B.
398. See Locklin v. City of Lafayette, 867 P.2d 724, 729 (Cal. 1994) (affirming a
trial court's finding that a watercourse was not part of a public improvement so that the

city was not responsible for its water runoff that contributed to flooding); Keshbro, Inc.
v. City of Miami, 801 So. 2d 864, 876 (Fla. 2001) (observing that the trial court's
finding that a building had become so inextricably intertwined with nuisance drug and
prostitution activity that the city could order its temporary closure without effecting a
taking); Morain v. City of Norman, 863 P.2d 1246, 1249 (Okla. 1993) (observing that
the trial court found that the flooding did not create substantial interference destroying
or impairing the land's usefulness so there was no taking).
399. See Dallas v. Stewart, 2011 Tex. LEXIS 517, at 17 (Tex. 2011) (citing an earlier
case regarding citrus canker).
400. See Argent v. United States, 124 F.3d 1277, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (precluding
summary judgment on a takings argument that allegedly singled out the plaintiff to
bear burdens not imposed on others).
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many burdens on a few, the governmental action is not addressing a public
nuisance so it would be compensable.40 1
Plaintiffs may also allege that the government's action did not address
an emergency and, therefore, the government did not act under its police
power and it needs to pay for the property it damaged or destroyed. In a
case involving the destruction of property at a mobile home park, the
plaintiff introduced evidence that some of the destroyed property was
neither a nuisance nor an emergency.4 02 The court thereby concluded that
the plaintiff had established a case in inverse condemnation.403
In the absence of a viable nuisance, emergency, or other defense, a
government's action that damages property may constitute a taking. Courts
have discretion in determining whether a nuisance or emergency existed
and have some leeway in determining whether governmental actions
require compensation.
B. ExaminingSocial Costs

While augmenting property rights may have considerable appeal to
citizens, legislatures, and courts, a weightier question is what these rights
mean to society. Is it beneficial to require governments to pay for property
rights damaged or destroyed when they take action to control diseases, stop
nuisances, or act to address emergencies? People form governments to
maintain order, delineate rights, and provide for the enforcement of
rights.4 04 In taking action, governments weigh private and public rights to
maximize benefits for the common good, while simultaneously seeking to
enhance private rights enjoyed by individuals.4 05 Under the federal and
state constitutions, Americans have significant rights and freedoms, but the

401. See id. (citing Richards v. Wash. Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 556-57 (1914)).
402. See Gifford v. City of Tampa, 2009 U.S. Dist. 61616, 9 (M.D. Fla. July 20,
2009).
403. See id.at 8-9.
404. See City of Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1911) (noting that
governments exist to maintain social order and legislatures have discretion in imposing
liability on governments to protect citizens and preserve social order); Sandstorm v.
Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 189 P.2d 17, 20 (Cal. 1948) (recognizing governments' purpose
of maintaining social order and protecting public and individual welfare); Missouri ex
rel. City of Trenton v. Missouri Public Serv. Corp., 174 S.W.2d 871, 876 (Mo. 1943)
(acknowledging that courts settle matters and enforce laws to maintain social order).
405. See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING COMMON GROUND ON
THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND 68 (2007) [hereinafter On Private Property] (questioning
how to define owners' rights to maximize utility); see also Eric Freyfogle, Property
and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 75, 114-15 (2010) [hereinafter Property and
Liberty] (arguing that the most weighty rational for property is to use it to benefit
people in general and not to cause harm).
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rights are not elevated over the collective good. Instead, private rights are
granted to individuals in furtherance of overall social well-being, meaning
406
that individual rights are balanced with the needs of society.
This balance is reflected in historic common law nuisance and
governmental actions in addressing public emergencies.407 However, as
Americans' ideas about the common good shift, rules of property
ownership may shift along with them.408 A state may choose to reexamine
its rights and rebalance conflicting interests. Demographic, economic,
aesthetic, cognitive, and ecological changes may lead legislatures and
courts to alter public and private rights,409 and states may decide to grant
more rights to property owners.410 However, as more rights are granted to
property owners, governments may incur more costs in maintaining public
safety, health, and welfare. Another issue accompanying the rebalancing
of rights is whether the new assignments are beneficial in enhancing total
social welfare.
The police power exists to allow governments to act in the best
interests of citizens as a whole, and the control of contagious diseases has
Property that may transmit
traditionally been found to further this goal .
a disease is considered to be communally harmful, and may be destroyed
without compensation. Under this approach, persons have incentives to
take actions to avoid exposure and prevent infestations. If governments are
required to compensate persons for losses experienced when controlling a
disease, how might this affect individuals and their responses to potential
disease outbreaks?

406. FREYFOGLE, On Private Property, supra note 405, at 113-14 (observing that
from a moral point of view, persons should not be able to do things that harm their
communities).
407. See Guimont v. Clarke, 854 P.2d 1, 8 (Wash. 1993) (noting that if background
principles of nuisance and property law prohibit a viable use of property, a government
proscription of the use is not compensable); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. California, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 229 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (noting emergencies justifying the use of the police
power); Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 895 P.2d 900, 909 (Cal. 1995) (observing
that if a governmental acts under an emergency justified by the police power, the
resulting loss does not matter as it is not compensable).
408. See Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, supra note 405, at 78 (noting that private
nuisance was historically a source of property but more recently is viewed by some as a
restraint on property rights).
409. See FREYFOGLE, On Private Property, supra note 405, at xxi (noting changes
that may lead to property conflicts).
410. See Hart, Land Use Law, supra note 19, at 1154 (noting that federalism was to
enable states to have choices in awarding damages for governmental actions).
411. See Santiago Legarre, The HistoricalBackground of the Police Power, 9 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 745, 794 (2007) (commenting on the historical use of the police power to
promote public health and safety).
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From an efficiency viewpoint, disease-control efforts should place
responsibilities on persons best able to take actions to avoid exposure and
eliminate the disease. 412 For most diseases, this involves persons or
property owners who would suffer losses if they or their properties became
413
diseased. Governments can also play a role in preventing disease.
When governments employ nuisance law or take emergency action to
confront a disease without compensating persons experiencing property
losses, people have an incentive to take preventive actions to minimize
Individuals recognize that they lose if a disease becomes
losses.
established, so they use care to prevent it. 4 14 However, if property owners
are paid for the diminished value of properties adversely affected by a
disease, as was ordered by the Bogorff court, the incentive to take
preventive action is removed.4 15 This introduces a moral hazard problem;
property owners lack appropriate incentives to take preventive measures to
preclude the introduction of diseases.4 16
When governments must pay for property damaged in controlling
diseases, the requirement represents an implicit insurance policy for
producers without any risk classification or incentive to make investments
in disease control.4 17 Although insureds may be able to take actions to

412. See M.G. Ceddia, J. Heikkila & J. Peltola, Managing Invasive Alien Species
with Professionaland Hobby Farmers:Insights from Ecological-Economic Modelling,
68 ECOL. ECON. 1366, 1367 (2009) (noting the difference between producers without
an incentive to take preventive measures to address a disease and those that do).
413. See Beach, Poulos, & Pattanayak, supra note 29, at 472 (discussing public and
private efforts to prevent disease damages).
414. This may not be true for noncommercial producers because production has little
economic importance for them so they lack meaningful financial incentives to carry out
effective disease-prevention measures. See Ceddia, Heikkila, & Peltola, supra note
412, at 1367.
415. See Beach, Poulos, & Pattanayak, supra note 29, at 481 (reporting that
compensation payments to owners losing birds under a program to control avian
influenza tends to reduce optimal preventive investment).
416. See Goodwin & Piggott, supra note 52, at 1043 (noting that insureds exercise
less care and prevention when insurance payments are available). See also Terence J.
Centner and Susana Ferreira, Controlling Diseases and Nuisances: Time-Based Rights
and AgriculturalProduction, 29 LAND USE POL'Y 513, 519 (2012) (arguing that the
requirement to compensate property owners for property in exposure zones may
remove incentives to invest in disease-control activities to thereby detract from total
social welfare).
417. See Benjamin M. Gramig, Richard D. Horan & Christopher A. Wolf, Livestock
Disease Indemnity Design When Moral Hazard Is Followed by Adverse Selection, 91
AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 627 (2009) (noting problems that accompany payouts that are not
related to risk and preventive measures); Goodwin & Piggott, supra note 52, at 1039
(discussing the development of insurance products to deal with situations where it is
difficult to observe disease prevention measures by producers).
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prevent diseases or minimize losses, under an insurance program offering
guaranteed payouts, insureds have little incentive to invest in these
actions. 4 18 The expected result is less success at preventing disease, greater
probabilities that the disease will spread, and higher costs of disease
control. 4 19 Thus, the Bogorfif decision eliminates incentives to control
disease, increases the probability that a disease will become established,
and increases the costs that society must bear managing established
diseases. In Florida, this has resulted in a citrus canker epidemic sweeping
through the citrus production areas of the state, and corresponding disease
management programs introducing copper into the environment. 4 20 if
recognizing private property rights leads to the establishment of a disease,
the overall result is probably a loss in social welfare.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Bogorfif decision offers courts arguments for limiting police
power actions by reinterpreting state constitutional mandates. To augment
private property rights, governments may be required to compensate
persons for more actions that denigrate rights. Courts also may expand the
definition of a taking to include more actions and situations where rights
are damaged. Under either of the scenarios, governments might be saddled
with more expenditures necessary to control diseases or provide for public
welfare. Alternatively, governments might engage in fewer actions to
protect the public, including actions to safeguard public health and safety
and public works projects that temporarily involve trespasses on private
property. Due to reinterpretations of the police power and takings,
governments would reduce their actions to avoid expenditures required to
compensate owners for property damaged or destroyed.
An analysis of the trial and appellate court decisions in Bogorfif shows
how courts can readjust property rights. The courts failed to differentiate
between permanent occupations and temporary invasions to find that a one-

418. See Goodwin & Piggott, supra note 52, at 1039-40 (identifying moral hazard);
Beach, Poulos, & Pattanayak, supra note 29, at 474 (noting that producers may choose
"to free-ride on the disease control efforts of other[s]").
419. See Beach, Poulos, & Pattanayak, supra note 29, at 481 (reporting that
governments might not pay compensation if such would displace private disease
control measures); S. Sartore et al., The Effects of Control Measures on the Economic
Burden Associated with Epidemics of Avian Influenza in Italy, 89 POULTRY SC. 1115,
1121 (2010) (arguing that proactive preventive measures is financially superior to
reactive approaches to cure a problem).
420. See Behlau et al., supra note 53, at 305 (advocating applying copper sprays
every 21-28 days for economical control of citrus canker); Dewdney & Graham, supra
note 53, at 4 (recommending five copper sprays applied at 21-day intervals).
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time invasion of property to eradicate a disease was a de facto taking. The

courts analyzed the legitimacy of the state's eradication program and the

legislative declaration of a nuisance by weighing evidence under a takings
analysis rather than employing a substantive due process inquiry. The
Bogorff trial court ignored evidence showing the failure to eradicate citrus
canker would harm homeowner citrus producers and the state's economy.
Instead, the trial and appellate courts decided that the government should
pay for property destroyed in actions to eradicate a serious plant disease.
While the analysis of the courts' decisions suggests the courts failed to
follow established Florida jurisprudence and arbitrarily decided that
DACS's actions constituted a compensable taking, appeals have been
unsuccessful; the district court's ruling constitutes case law that may be
followed by other courts.
However, despite the possible lapses in complying with established
jurisprudence, the real damage of the district court's holding is that it
detracts from social welfare. By finding that a state's just compensation
clause overrides the police power under which public nuisances and
emergencies may be addressed without compensation, the decision may be
expected to raise the costs of agricultural production and other
governmental actions to detract from overall social welfare. By installing a
property rights system that guarantees citrus producers payments for
damaged property interests, the appellate court's decision eliminates
producers' incentives to take preventive measures to control citrus canker.
Absent effective disease prevention, more diseases will become established
resulting in more expensive agricultural production with associated costs.
Similar results may occur in the land use context if governments
cannot take actions to address nuisance situations without paying for
If governments must pay for actions
ancillary property damages.
denigrating property rights, the costs will limit their governance with a
corresponding loss of communal benefits. 42 1 Although courts are intended
to be the final arbitrator in takings cases, constitutional protections against
takings were not intended to grant courts carte blanche to override the
police power. As set forth by the Founding Fathers in the Preamble to the
Constitution, "We the People of the United States, in Order to .. . promote
the general Welfare, . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution. . . ."

Governments exist to promote general welfare: 4 2 2 courts should be hesitant
421. For example, governmental redevelopment projects often lead to beneficial
property reallocations and foster innovative projects designed to promote economic
growth. See Mahoney, supra note 358, at 127 (noting limitations from prohibiting
condemnations for economic development).
422. Moreover, property law should protect liberty to the extent that liberty promotes
the common good. Freyfogle, PropertyandLiberty, supra note 405, at 117.
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to reject established jurisprudence if the result will be the antithesis of the
people's welfare. By expanding private property rights, the Bogorff
decision places additional costs on governments and detracts from overall
social welfare.

TOWARD A CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT: AGRICULTURAL
BIOTECHNOLOGY AS A PUBLIC HEALTH INCENTIVE IN LESS-DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES*

Chidi Oguamanam**
I.
II.

III.

IV.

...........................................
INTRODUCTION
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY ...........................

258
260

..... 261
.......................
A. Genetic Engineering.
B. Competing Forms ofAgriculturalPractice.........................261
AGRO-BIOTECH VS. OTHERS: CLAIMS AND COUNTERCLAIMS ....... 265
A. Sustainability,Cost, Efficiency and Environmental
..... 265
...............................
Arguments
B. Boost in Global Food Productionand Panaceato Global
........... 268
.............................
Hunger
..... 269
................
C. FoodSecurity and FoodSafety
..... 274
D. ChemicalizationofAgriculture ................
AGRO-BIOTECH AND GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH

................ 277

A. The Casefor Bio-fortificationand FunctionalFood: Two
..... 282
...............................
Analogies
1. The Anti-obesity Campaign...........................283
2. Global Public Good Approach to Functional Food ........... 286
288
B. HarvestPlusModel .............................
292
........
.........
Benefits
and
C. Biofortification:Drawbacks
V. CONCLUSION

........................................

...... 295

"Do we change the food supply or do we change the consumer to
meet health needs? One involves evolution within the food industry, the
other involves a revolution in nutrition education." - Milly RyanHarshman, 1997'

*© Oguamanam 2012
**LL.M. Ph.D. (British Columbia), Associate Professor, University of Ottawa, Faculty
of Law (Common Law Section); Email: Chidi.Oguamanam@uOttawa.ca; Website:
http://www.chidioguamanam.com. This Article is dedicated to the eternal memory of
my father and hero: Chief John Emegharaible Oguamanam (1934-2011). Thanks to
David Dzidzornu for reading and commenting on earlier versions of this Article.
Thanks also to the anonymous reviewers and to Kathryn D. Smith and other members
of the editorial team of the Journal of Food Law and Policy for their useful
interventions through the editing process.

257

258

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

I.

[VOL. 7

INTRODUCTION

Discourses on global public health crises, especially as they impact
the less-developed world, focus mostly on the issue of access to life-saving
drugs for needy populations. 2 Also, they implicate the misalignment of
global pharmaceutical research and development (R&D) agenda with the
health needs of the poor. 3 Equally attracting significant attention is the role
of intellectual property in driving up the cost of drugs and exacerbating the
drug access freeze to needy populations.4 More often, the conceptual
strings of these discussions are woven around a complex interaction of
themes, including those of globalization, the development narrative, and
strategic changes in international lawmaking, especially in the areas of
intellectual property, international trade, and the correlating supervisory
international institutional and global governance regimes,

1. See Milly Ryan-Harshman, Food Biotechnology: Food Industry, Nutrition and
Public Health, 56 PROC. NUTRITION Soc. 845, 847 (1997).
2. See Michael Zisuh Ngoasong, The Emergence of Global Health Partnershipsas
Facilitatorsof Access to Medication in Africa: A Narrative Policy Analysis, 68 Soc.
SCI. & MED.

949 (2009); NEGOTIATING HEALTH:

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND

ACCESS TO MEDICINE (Pedro Roffe, Geoff Tansey & David Vivas-Eugui, eds., 2005);
HOLGER P. HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS AND

ACCESS TO MEDICINES (Oxford University Press 2007); see also Stephen Barnes,
PharmaceuticalPatents and TRIPS: A Comparison of India and South Africa 91 KY.
L.J. 911, 926 (2003); Christopher K. Eppich, Patenting Dilemma: Drugs for Profit
Versus Drugs for Health, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 289, 290 (2002); Frederick M.
Abbott, The Doha Declarationon the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Lightening
a Dark Cornerat the WTO, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 469, 470 (2002); Susan K. Sell, TRIPSPlus, Free Trade and Agents and Access to Medicines, 28 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 41
(2007).
3. See Chidi Oguamanam, Patents and Pharmaceutical R&D: Consolidating
Private-PublicPartnershipApproach to Global Public Health Crises, 13 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 556, 559 (2010); Taiwo A. Oriola, Strong Medicine: Patents, Market,
and Policy Challenges for Managing Neglected Diseases and Affordable Prescription
Drugs, 7 CAN. J. L. & TECH. 57, 60-61 (2009); Ending the R&D Crisis in Public
Health, BRIEFING PAPER No. 22 (Oxfam International), (2008) [hereinafter Briefing
Paper]; Anup Shah, The Pharmaceutical Corporations and Medicinal Research,
GLOBAL ISSUES (Oct. 2, 2010), http://www.globalissues.org/article/52/pharmaceuticalcorporations-and-medical-research.
4. See Thomas K. Mirabile, AIDS, Africa and Access to Medicines, 11 DETROIT
COLL. L. J. INT'L L. 175 (2002); see also Eppich, Sell, Barnes, Abbott, supra note 2,
and Shah, Oguamanam, Oriola, Briefing Paper,supra note 3.
5. See generally SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW AND THE
GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003) [hereinafter Private
Power]; PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS
THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2002); INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND

DEVELOPMENT (Daniel Gervais, ed., 2007); Susan K. Sell, The Quest for Global
Governance in Intellectual Property and Public Health: Structural Discursive and
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The emphasis on access to drugs as a panacea for global public health
crises accounts for only one response to a complex situation. It is a
response that focuses mainly on therapeutic intervention, which is often a
crisis-driven initiative. A more strategic response to global public health
crises would be a preventive one. 6 Public health crisis intervention
essentially involves both therapeutic and preventive strategies. These
strategies are not necessarily mutually exclusive. However, in some cases,
a good preventive intervention is more cost-effective, socially and
economically, in part, because it radically reduces the burden and general
cost of therapeutic intervention in the long run. 8 For example, on a
cumulative scale, the high rate of infant and maternal mortality in lessdeveloped countries can be more effectively tackled by strategic investment
in the promotion of sanitary, nutritional and general lifestyle education for
mothers and mothers-to-be. 9 The result of such an approach would be
more enduring than an ad hoc supply of donor-sponsored patented drugs or
dietary supplements at critical stages of pregnancy or postpartum.
Without underrating the subject of access to drugs for needy
populations, this article aims at shifting the focus on the traditional sites of
discussion of global public health crises, especially in the legal literature.
It explores how the relationship between biotechnologies, specifically
agricultural biotechnology, and nutritional health could constitute a tool for
positive public health impact for less-developed countries. As its core
objective, this paper aspires to call attention to a preventive rather than a
therapeutic approach to global health crises, by focusing on public health
aspects of agricultural biotechnology.'o

Institutional, 77 Temple L.R. 363 (2004) [hereinafter Global Governance]; PETER
DRAHOS & JoH'N BRAITHWAITE, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000); CHIDI
OGUAMANAM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: A DEVELOPMENT
QUESTION (2011).
6. See PUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS: THEORY, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 28-29 (Ronald

Bayer et al., eds., 2007).
7. Id at 29.
8. See generally LAURIE GARRETT, BETRAYAL OF TRUST: THE COLLAPSE OF
GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH (2000) (arguing for a concerted internal global strategy for
public health based on preventative measures, including lifestyle changes, monitoring,
equitable access and more objective approaches to understanding of diseases and
appropriative therapeutic interventions).
9. See Jerker Liljestrand, Strategies to Reduce Maternal Mortality Worldwide,
WORLD BANK, HEALTH NUTRITION AND POPULATION, http://info.worldbank.org/etools/
docs/library/48578/Strategies%20to%20reduce%20MMR.doc (last visited Mar. 4,
2012); see also Jerke Liljestrand, Reducing Perinataland Maternal Mortality in the
World: The Major Challenges, 106 BR. J OBSTET. GYNAECOL. 877 (1999).
10. The link between public health and agricultural biotechnology is approached, for
the most part, within the rubric of broader public policy debates around the reception
and acceptability of biotechnology and associated products, including the debate over
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Mindful of the controversies, reservations and high-stakes debates
surrounding agricultural biotechnology in particular, and the political
economics of global agriculture in general," this paper attempts to rise
above the two extremes of often-uninformed skepticism and uncritical
enthusiasm and sentiments over agricultural biotechnology. This paper
explores how aspects of advances in agricultural biotechnology could be
made accessible, in a sustainable way, to less-developed countries as a tool
to mitigate, in a deliberate and targeted fashion, nutritional lapses that
constitute significant aspects of public health crises in those countries. In
order to mitigate the public health challenges in less-developed countries,
this paper will examine the potential and real obstacles that assail a
selective or targeted deployment of agricultural biotechnology. Finally,
this paper will consider ways around the identified challenges.
II.

AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY

The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity defines
"biotechnology" as "any technological application that uses biological
systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make or modify
products or processes for specific use."' 2 Literarily, "bio" technology
presupposes the application of technological knowledge, insight and
practices to life forms. In terms of its practical applications, biotechnology
embraces a very wide scope, as "a mdlange of scientific techniques, which
can be applied to alter the genetic composition or genetic structure of an
organism."' 3 It is inherently an interdisciplinary endeavor. 14 When
the appropriate method of public education and information (e.g. through disclosure

and labelling) of genetically engineered products. See Mitchell Berger, Public Health
and Agricultural Biotechnology: A Review of Legal, Ethical and Scientific

Controversies Presented by Genetically Altered Foods (2000) (unpublished MPH
Dissertation, Emory University), available at http://www.dissertation.com/book.php?
method=lSBN&book=1581120931 (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).
11.

See generally Berger, supra note 10; see also GENE TRADERS: BIOTECHNOLOGY,

WORLD TRADE, AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF HUNGER

(Brian Tokar, ed., 2004);

Carmen G. Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization,Food Security and the Environment: The
Neoliberal Threat to Sustainable Rural Development, 14 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 419 (2004) [hereinafter Trade Liberalization]; ROBERT E. EVENSON, V.
SANTANIELLO, & DAVID ZILBERMAN, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN AGRICULTURAL

BIOTECHNOLOGY (2002); Carmen G. Gonzalez, InstitutionalizingInequity: The WTO
Agreement and Agriculture, 27 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 433 (2002) [hereinafter
Institutionalizing Inequity]; D. JOHN SHAW, GLOBAL FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL
INSTITUTIONS (2009).

12. United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, Art. 2, June 5, 1992, 1762
U.N.T.S. 79, available at http://www.cbd.int/convention/text/ (last visited Jan. 31,
2011).
13. John Adeoti & Adetola Adeoti, Biotechnology R & D Partnershipfor Industrial
Innovation in Nigeria, 25 TECHNOVISION 349, 352 (2005) (citing Rohini Acharya, The
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biotechnological methods are applied to a specific subject area, the latter
becomes an object of the "biotechnology suffix." Agricultural and health
R&D are currently the two most prominent sites for the application of
biotechnology. Specifically, when biotechnology is deployed for the
purpose of R&D in agriculture/food, or health production and delivery, it is
often referred to as health or agricultural biotechnology, respectively. The
concept of agricultural biotechnology includes other applications of
biotechnology in the context of agriculture and food; hence in terms of
specificity, references are made to some open-ended but related fields,
including food, nutrition, environmental, crop or plant biotechnologies.
Thus, the interrelatedness of agriculture, food, nutrition and diet allows for
a fluid conceptualization of the concept of agricultural biotechnology to
accommodate all these associations and more as the case may permit.
A.

Genetic Engineering

At the core of biotechnology and, to a large extent, agricultural
Genetic
biotechnology is the phenomenon of genetic engineering.
engineering is the practice of using molecular information and other
techniques to deliberately modify or manipulate life forms for various
human needs, especially in health and agriculture, including desirable and
non-desirable or other experimental outcomes.'" It is a critical aspect of
agricultural biotechnology. However, its utility and applications are not
limited to agriculture and food. Genetic engineering is a crucial industrial
tool or model for R&D, especially in pharmaceutical, chemical,
environmental and allied sciences, just to mention a few. In the 21st
century, genetic engineering has radically redefined the face of modem
agricultural, as well as R&D and aspects of service delivery.
B. Competingforms ofAgriculturalPractice

The advent of genetic engineering, including industrial use of
recombinant DNA, cell fusion and various new bioprocessing techniques,
as the key features of modem biotechnology in the agricultural arena, has
led to the present, albeit inchoate, attempt at re-categorization of the forms

Impact of New Technologies on Economic Growth (1995) (unpublished PhD
Dissertation, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Maastricht
University, Netherlands).
14. See Id. at 349, 352-53 (discussing some of the disciplines implicated in the
exploration of biotechnological activities include genetics, genomics, proteomics,
biology, molecular biotechnology, bioinformatics, food science & technology,
medicine, cell and tissue culture).
15. See Chidi Oguamanam, Agro-Biodiversity and FoodSecurity, MICH. ST. L. REV.
215, 222 (2007).
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of prevailing agricultural practices. Genetic engineering techniques have
not only broadened the scope of agricultural production, they have also
yielded perhaps the most encompassing definition of biotechnology, "to
include the application of scientific and engineering principles to the
processing of materials by biological agents (e.g. microorganisms) or any
technique that uses living organisms (or parts thereof), to make or modify
products, to improve plants or animals, or to develop microorganisms for
specific uses." 6 Perhaps the encompassing and increasingly central nature
of biotechnology in agriculture contributes to the lack of clarity or
consensus on what now qualifies as conventional farming or agriculture.
Analysts readily make a distinction between "organic" or "biological"
agriculture and "conventional" or "industrial" agriculture. According to a
report by the United Nations University's Institute of Advanced Studies
(UNU-IAS), "'organic or biological agriculture' designates an agricultural
mode of production that does not rely on the use of chemicals, e.g.,
fertilizers and chemical pesticides. It also excludes any genetically
modified organism, and is labour intensive.""
On the other hand,
conventional agriculture essentially depicts the mechanization of
agricultural production through emphasis on monocultures, synthetic
inputs, applications of chemical fertilizers, pesticides and various
techniques for the optimization of agricultural production in the short run.
The ample flexibilities and variations in the applications of agricultural
biotechnology place it at the intersection of conventional and industrial
agriculture, especially given regard to the convergence of the two
concepts.1 9

16.

Adeoti & Adeoti, supra note 13, at 352. In its various established forms such as

cell and tissue culture, recombinant DNA/genetic engineering, bioprocessing and
bioinformatics, biotechnology is central to modem agricultural production and health
services delivery, production, as well as R&D in the two sectors.
17. This form of inchoate or arbitrary classification is problematic in many respects.
At best they serve analytical convenience. For example, it is hard to think of an
agricultural practice that is not fundamentally biological in nature.

18. ALBERT SASSON, FOOD AND NUTRITION BIOTECHNOLOGY: ACHIEVEMENTS,
PROSPECTS, AND PERCEPTIONS 24, UNU-IAS Report (2004).
19. Conventional agriculture, simply, is a reference to an intensive approach to
farming, especially at a time when agricultural production was essentially a labor
intensive exercise with little mechanical support. See ANNIE EICHER, ORGANIC
AGRICULTURE: A GLOSSARY OF TERMS FOR FARMERS AND GARDENERS (Feb. 2003),
available at http://watoxics.org/healthy-living/healthy-food/sustainable-agriculture/
Glossary.pdf/at download/file (according to Eicher, the Organic Farming Program
Coordinator for the University of California Cooperative Extension, conventional and
industrialized agriculture have melded in the last 60 years following World War 11.
Consequently, the terms appear to be used interchangeably). See also Horticulture &
Small Farms: Glossaryof Terms, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, http://ucanr.org/sites/
ceplacerhorticulture/EatLocal/Glossary/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).
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Contrary to the impression by the UNU-IAS, it may be inaccurate to
assume that any form of agricultural practice that does not involve genetic
engineering or genetic modification qualifies as "organic" or so-called
biological agriculture, which classification also conveniently fits traditional
agricultural practices in the indigenous and rural communities.2 0 n reality,
entitlement to the often contested "organic" certification in the agricultural
sectors is not necessarily premised on zero tolerance of the presence of
transgenic components. Rather, for the most part, it is now a matter of
marketing and branding. On a more serious, practical and less-delusional
note, organic status is determined more by what constitutes an acceptable
level than the total absence of transgenic material.2 1
Today, genetic engineering is at the core of modem agricultural
biotechnology, which constitutes an important feature of 21st century
technological advancements. All other agricultural practices, including
traditional, non-industrial, labor-intensive or "folk" agricultural practices in
indigenous and local communities, whether they qualify as organic or
biological farming, are often evaluated vis ci vis genetic engineering or
agricultural biotechnology. 22 The latter now constitutes a permanent
comparator in relation to other modes of agricultural production and
Thus, it would appear that biotechnology or genetic
practices.23
its historical precursor, namely the modification of living
and
engineering
organisms (especially plants and animals) through hybridization and
artificial selection, currently constitute the so-called conventional
agriculture.
In underscoring the evolution and significance of modem
biotechnology in the agricultural arena, it has been observed that:
In the last two hundred years, mechanization, scientific
plant breeding, hybridization, and chemicalization, in
20. See Chidi Oguamanam, Tension on the Farm Fields: The Death of Traditional
Agriculture?, 27 BULL. SCI. TECH. & Soc. 260, 262-63 (2007).
21. See Maria Lee & Robert Burrell, Liabilityfor Escape of GM Seeds: Pursuingthe
'Victim'? 65 MOD. L. REV. 517, 518 (2002) (wherein the authors argue that if there is
wide-spread cross-pollination then "GM-free will no longer mean 'no GMOs present';
'organic' will not mean GM-free"); see also Commission Regulation 1804/99, art. 23,
1999 O.J. (L 222/1) (EC) (supplementing Regulation on Organic Production of
Agricultural Products, 2092/91, 1991 that provides for a maximum threshold of
inadvertent contamination without loss of certified organic status); Oguamanam, supra
note 20, at 269 (where the author observes that "[r]ealistically, many organic farmers
are concerned with determining what amount of transgenic material would be
unacceptable for organic certification. Indeed, for consumers, the "organic label" poses
a semiotic quandary rather than being a safety or quality assurance alternative to
transgenic food products").
22. See Oguamanam, supra note 15; see also Oguamanam, supra note 20.
23. Id.
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terms of the use of pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers,
have become the key features of agricultural practices in
the industrialized world. 'The discovery of recombinant
DNA in the early 1970s rapidly opened new frontiers' in
the agricultural revolution.
Essentially, they involve
applications of molecular genetics or biological processes
in agriculture through the selection of natural strains (gene
splicing) associated with desirable traits and other
molecular and scientific devices for the manipulation of
plant and animal life forms. 24
Accordingly, the art and science of "gene splicing" or genetic
manipulation is a crucial feature of agricultural biotechnology, a subset of
biotechnology steeped in diverse techniques for manipulating genetic
material of living organisms and for exploring and exploiting the complex
chemistry of biological systems for food production and other agroindustrial ends." 25 In terms of its significance, "[t]he advent of agricultural
biotechnology (as an offshoot of biotechnology) shifts agriculture from
land-based farming and opens it up to transdisciplinary convergences in
therapeutics, pharmaceuticals, chemicals and marketing in complex
industrial and political economics of globalization," 26 transforming it from
a mode of life to a mode of production.27
The manipulation of plant and animal genes for food production
opens the practice of agriculture to possibilities that transcend addressing
global hunger. In other ways, this approach to agricultural production
provides a concrete basis for reflective critique or understanding of the
limitations of organic/biological and other non-conventional agricultural
practices. Nonetheless, the advent of agricultural biotechnology and its
modus operandi are as controversial as its real, perceived or potential
benefits. Resistance or opposition to agricultural biotechnology is more
often premised on the disputation over most of the benefits claimed by its
proponents.28 In some ways, the ongoing debate between proponents and
opponents of agricultural biotechnology assists to unravel the gaps in
competing models of agricultural endeavor. As well, such conversation
24.
25.
26.
27.

Oguamanam, supra note 15, at 221-22 (footnotes omitted).
Id at 222.
Id.
See SHELDON KRIMSKY & ROGER P. WRUBEL, AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY
AND THE ENVIRONMENT: SCIENCE, POLICY AND SOCIAL ISSUES 213 (1996).
28. See Jeffrey Burkhardt, Agricultural Biotechnology and Future Benefits
Argument, 14 J. AGRIC. & ENVTL. ETHICS 135 (2001) for a general review of the

philosophical basis/justification for agricultural biotechnology and an exploration the
future benefit analysis (FBA) in regard to prevailing objections to genetically modified
organisms.
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provides an opportunity for the exploration of the potential for
complementary engagement and application of the benefits of agricultural
biotechnologies alongside other models of agricultural production for
optimal ends. Without being exhaustive, the following few examples
illustrate the polarizing claims, counterclaims and resistances that
undergird the tension between agricultural biotechnology, especially
genetic engineering, and other modes of agricultural production.
III.
A.

AGRO-BIOTECH VS. OTHERS: CLAIMS AND COUNTERCLAIMS

Sustainability, Cost, Efficiency and EnvironmentalArguments

Promoters of organic or non-conventional agriculture are quick to
claim that, in comparison to conventional or industrial agriculture
(including agricultural biotechnology), their approach is more natural, more
environmentally friendly and more sustainable in the long run.29 For a
number of reasons, this would seem self-evident. Organic or biological
agriculture - hardly precise terms - is labor-intensive, diversity-sensitive,
and mostly subsistent, involving the use of little or no chemicals, and
mainly engages in natural selection, shifting cultivation and other
environment-regarding practices. In contrast, conventional agricultural
practices, especially agricultural biotechnology, are industry-driven; they
involve full-scale, energy-intensive industrial monocultural production and
direct manipulation of genetic compositions of life forms.
When all of these claims are unpacked, they do not seem as settled as
they are presented. For instance, claims to sustainability are as contested as
those for environmental friendliness made in favor of organic or biological
agriculture. Interestingly, the same claims are also made in support of
agricultural biotechnology. Organic agriculture is said to amass too much
pressure on agricultural lands. 30 The amount of agricultural land required
for sustainable organic farming far exceeds land use for conventional
agriculture. 31 Also, organic or forms of non-conventional agriculture, do
not adequately or readily adjust to radical changes in the natural

29. This is often in contrast to the process of gene splicing or genetic engineering,
which involves direct artificial manipulation or tinkering with the genetic compositions
of living organisms. Ironically, biotechnology is also represented as hardly at odds with
the natural process and as indeed based on "nature's own methods." For perspectives
on the contested ideology of nature and natural process in an agricultural context, see
KRIMSKY & WRUBEL, supra note 27, at 227; see also Oguamanam, supra note 15, at
222.

30. See Milly Ryan-Harshman, Food Biotechnology: Food Industry, Nutrition and
Public Health, 56 PROC. NUTRITION Soc. 845, 846 (1997).
3 1. Id.
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environment such as drought, soil erosion, severe changes in weather
patterns, etc.
Agricultural biotechnology is associated with the potential to cut back
on the amount of land required for agricultural production by using
techniques such as no-till farming practices, for example. No-till farming
is "an agriculturally-sustainable method of preventing soil erosion." 32 In
addition, no-till farming prevents various other forms of agricultureinduced environmental degradation. Also, in some cases agricultural
biotechnology makes it possible to genetically predispose crops to consume
less water or other agricultural nutrients, thus mitigating the pressure on the
natural environment, starting with land, which is historically associated
with agriculture. Cumulatively, these and other related benefits of
agricultural biotechnology provide an empirical basis for the claim by its
proponents that agro-biotechnology is a sustainable agricultural practice.
For example, limiting water consumption for agriculture assumes a
compelling imperative in the light of dire apprehensions over global water
crises, to which many less-developed countries, especially in sub-Sahara
Africa, are vulnerable.33 In drawing attention to the importance of
agricultural biotechnology for global water crises, G.J. Persley remarks that
"[b]ecause land and water for agriculture are diminishing resources, there is
no option but to produce more food and other agricultural commodities
from less arable land and irrigation water. The need for more food has to
be met through higher yields per units of land, water, energy and time." 3 4
Generally, ongoing concerns about global water supply and rapidlycreeping effects of global climate change require a more creative
agricultural strategy, one now within the purview of agricultural
biotechnology. 3' Despite its advantage in regard to water and land use,
32. Id.
33. Water Crisis, WORLD WATER COUNCIL (2010), http://www.worldwatercouncil.
org/index.php?id=25 (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) ("water withdrawals for irrigation
represent 66 % of the total withdrawals and up to 90 % in arid regions"). Globally, per

capita water use reflects the dichotomous difference in lifestyle between rich and poor
societies. Consequently, given the spatial, geographical, ecological, even temporal
variations in the availability of water, there is an increasing scarcity of water for human
needs, especially in agricultural production in Sub-Saharan Africa and other vulnerable
regions of the globe. This state of affairs is a recipe for food insecurity. See generally
Igor A. Shiklomanov, World Water Resources and their Use, UNESCO (1999),
http://webworld.unesco.org/water/ihp/db/shiklomanov/index.shtml
(for
databases
providing information on world water usage).
34. See G.J. Persley, Biotechnology and the Poor: Promethean Science, in
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE POOR 3, 3 (G.J Persley & M.M. Lantin eds., 2000).
35. For example, agricultural biotechnology is a tool of intervention in crop

production systems, including the development of genetically engineered crops capable
of adapting and better responding to change in climate. See Travis Lybbert and Daniel
Summer, Agricultural Technologies for Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation in
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there are reservations about the negative environmental ramifications of
agricultural biotechnology, especially those that stem from its direct or socalled non-natural manipulation of genetic compositions of plants and
animals. The result of these interventions is the introduction, by raw
ingenuity of human intervention, of what analysts call strangers or nonThe presence of these
naturally occurring entities to the ecosystem.
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) is associated with environmental
and ecological distortions, the full impact of which are hard to measure
both in the long and short runs.
Notwithstanding attempts to downplay problems around GMOs from
health, environmental, safety, cultural, philosophical and other
perspectives, these anxieties have yet to abate. 38 Opposition to GMOs and
the processes of their production has continued to galvanize
environmentalist rhetoric that appears to have defined agricultural
biotechnology in the court of public opinion. The environmentalist
critiques of GMOs seem to overshadow (or at least compete with) other
more tenable arguments in support of the potential or real contributions of
agricultural biotechnology to sustainable agriculture. The short point is
that as between organic or non-conventional agricultural practices and
agricultural biotechnology, especially the practice of genetic engineering,
claims to the environmental friendliness and sustainability of their
endeavors are contested and do not lend themselves to easy resolution.

Developing Countries: Policy Options for Technological Diffusion, ICTSD Issue Brief
#6 (May 2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/45728070/AgriculturalTechnologies-for-Climate-Change-Mitigation-and-Adaptation-in-Developingcountries. See also Green Biotechnology and Climate Change, THE EUROPEAN
ASSOCIATION FOR BIOINDUSTRIES, (June 2009), http://www.europabio.org/positions/
GBE/PP 090619 ClimateChange.pdf.
36. See Oguamanam, supra note 28, at 222 and accompanying text.
37. Analysts readily point to a 1999 research finding suggesting that pollen from
genetically modified Bt corn was harmful to the larvae of monarch butterflies. See
John E Losey, Linda S. Rayor & Maureen E. Carter, Transgenic Pollen Harms
Monarch Larvae, 399 NATURE 214 (1999). This and similar research has been disputed
in some quarters, including at the USDA, a situation that further fosters the controversy
over agricultural biotechnology. Like most claims over agricultural biotechnology,
research on the effect or impact BT com pollen on monarch butterfly remains
inconclusive and is hardly resolved with any clarity. For general overview of the state
of literature on Bt corn and the monarch butterfly, see Richard L. Hellmich, Monarch
Butterflies and Bt Corn, AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY (March 8, 2008),
http://agribiotech.info/details/Hellmich-Monarch%20Mar%208%20-%2003.pdf.
38. For a general articulation of arguments against agricultural biotechnology from
diverse perspectives, see Miguel A. Altieri, The Case Against Agricultural
Biotechnology, CORPWATCH (June 10, 2003), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id
=7030.
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B. Boost in Global FoodProductionand Panaceato Global Hunger
The second aspect of these contested claims is one that appears
obvious on its face: agricultural biotechnology boosts global food
production and constitutes a panacea to global food insecurity. 39 Increased
food production at a mind-boggling industrial scale is facilitated by diverse
techniques of agricultural biotechnology. This would appear to be a
palpable contention. However, whether that translates into any significant
impact on the reduction of hunger and promotion of food security is
another matter entirely. Some analysts do not find a corollary between
increased food production in the present era of agricultural biotechnology
and any significant reduction of hunger, especially among the global
population in dire need. 40 Also, there is no compelling correlation between
advances in agricultural biotechnology and food security. More critical
policy introspection around agricultural biotechnology suggests that the
technological approach is not indispensable to tackling global hunger. Put
differently, without agricultural biotechnology, the world is capable of
feeding itself.4 1 For many, global hunger is less a consequence of food
production than of food distribution and the global political economics of
agriculture. 42
The dubious impact of agricultural biotechnology, or industrial
agriculture in general, on both the eradication of hunger and food

39. See Biotechnology in Food and Agriculture: FAO Statement on Biotechnology,
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS (March 2000),

http://www.fao.org/biotech/fao-statement-on-biotechnology/en/.
40. See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Markets, Monocultures and Malnutrition: Agricultural
Trade Policy Through an Environmental Justice Lens, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 345,
351, 359-60 (2006); see also Gonzalez, InstitutionalizingInequity, supra note 11.
41. See Margareta Wandel, Genetically Modified Foods in Norway: A Consumer
Perspective in BIOTECHNOLOGY UNGLUED: SCIENCE, SOCIETY AND SOCIAL COHESION

70 (Michael D. Mehta, ed., 2005) (contending that in Norway and other Scandinavian
countries where a more deliberative and critical policy approach is the norm for
evaluating agricultural biotechnology, policy makers recognize that agricultural
biotechnology is not sine qua non for addressing hunger and food supply.; see
generally Altieri, supra note 37.
42. See generally Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization; Brian Tokar, The World Bank,
Biotechnology and the 'Next Green Revolution' in GENE TRADERS: BIOTECHNOLOGY,
WORLD TRADE, AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF HUNGER (Brian Tokar, ed., 2004);

Devinder Sharma, The Great Trade Robbery: World Hunger and the Myths of
IndustrialAgriculture in Tokar, supra note I1; GORDON CONWAY, THE DOUBLY GREEN
REVOLUTION: FOOD FOR ALL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1997); FRANK ELLIS,
AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1992); LIZ YOUNG, WORLD
HUNGER (1997);
and Food Security Statistics, FOOD AND AGRIGULTRUAL

ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS (2008), http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/
food-security-statistics/en/.
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insecurity, is tied to the global political economics of agriculture.4 3 This
phenomenon has been dealt with elsewhere and is outside the scope of this
paper. The global political economics of agriculture are driven in part by
the international historical division of labor.45 In that matrix, lessdeveloped countries and centers of agricultural biodiversity serve as
producers of raw materials and feeders of global commodity markets under
inequitable bargains.46 Coupled with the globalizations in legal and
regulatory frameworks of the new international trade and intellectual
property order, there is unprecedented tightening of corporate proprietary
control of new technological innovations in agriculture and allied sectors.47
Consequently, access to the benefits of increased food production in the
wake of advances in agricultural biotechnology remains a challenge.48
Rather, there is an exacerbation in unidirectional transfer of resources and
knowledge from less-developed countries to the Western agro-industrial
complexes.4 9
C. FoodSecurity and FoodSafety
Even if agricultural biotechnology results in increased food supply to
feed the world's poor, such does not necessarily translate into an
43. See Young, supra note 42, at 150; Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization, supra note
11, at 422; Conway, supra note 42, at 288-89.
44. See generally Gonzalez, supra note 40 and Gonzalez, InstitutionalizingInequity,
supra note 11.
45. Id.
46. Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization,supra note 11, at 433-34.
47. See generally Altieri, supra note 38; Carmen Gonzalez, Genetically Modified
Organisms and Justice: The International Environmental Justice Implications of
Biotechnology, 19 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 580 (2007); see also Keith Aoki &
Kennedy Luvai, Reclaiming 'Common Heritage' Treatment in International Plant
Genetic Resourc'es Regime Complex, MICH. ST. L. REV. 35 (2007).
48. See AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE POOR (2000), (J.G. Persley &
M.M. Lantin eds.).
49. According to Altieri, supra note 38, "Biotechnology is a technology under
corporate control, protected by patents and IPR, and contrary to famers' millenary
traditions of saving and exchanging seeds." There is a relationship of dependence
between biotechnology and traditional agricultural, medicinal, genetic resources,
practices and associated knowledge systems in indigenous and local communities and
centers of biological diversity. As a consequence of this epistemic dynamic,
biotechnology is a site for appropriation of local knowledge systems through the
incorporation or use of insights from local knowledge custodians in biotechnology
R&D. While the latter is easily a subject of intellectual property protection, the extent
to which intellectual property accommodates local knowledge is open to politico-legal
negotiations. This state of affairs is at the basis of discourses around the concept of
biopiracy. See generally, IKECHI MGBEOJI, GLOBAL BIOPIRACY: PATENTS, PLANTS AND
INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE (2006); VANDANA SHIVA, MONOCULTURES OF THE MIND:
PERSPECTIVES ON BIODIVERSITY AND BIOTECHNOLOGY (1993).
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The misalignment of agricultural
improvement in food security.
biotechnology with food security is rooted in complex dynamics. A few
factors assist to illustrate this point. Most of the technologies, including
agricultural biotechnologies, are concentrated in the rich industrialized
countries of the world.50 These countries have championed recent strategic
changes that have resulted in the tightening of intellectual property law in a
manner that guarantees them firm control of innovations in agricultural and
other technological sectors.5 ' In addition, continued convergences in
agricultural biotechnology, chemical, pharmaceutical and allied industries
and the relaxation of anti-trust laws help to consolidate monopolistic
tendencies in these sectors.52 A combination of these and other factors
invigorated by globalization's neo-liberal economic and trade liberalization
policies demonstrate that advances in agricultural biotechnology may not
be a panacea for food insecurity, especially in less-developed countries.
Food security is a concept with multiple perspectives.
Overall,
virtually all perspectives on food security denote physical and economic
accessibility by all peoples at all times to adequate, safe, nutritionally
suitable, and culturally and personally acceptable food in manner that is

50. This trend is not necessarily sustainable as it has potential for transformation.
For example, the two interrelated and paradigmatic technologies of the last and present
centuries, namely information and communications technology and biotechnology, are
critical in the ongoing exponential developmental progress and transitions in the three
key less-developed countries of Brazil, India and China (analysts have joined Russia to
the three under the so-called BRIC bloc of countries). These countries have the

potential to rival the United States, Canada and Argentina, now the current global
leaders in agricultural biotechnology. For perspectives on the BRICs, which recently
admitted South Africa into their exclusive group, see Dominic Wilson and Roopa
Purushothaman, Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to 2050, Global Economics Paper
No. 99, GOLDMAN SACHS (October 1, 2003), http://antonioguilherme.web.br.com/
artigos/Brics.pdf.
51. The TRIPS Agreement is the symbolic depiction of new changes in intellectual
property. In a way, TRIPS is a global imposition of the U.S.'s all-inclusive and
permissive intellectual property regime into the realm of life forms, specifically
incorporating innovations around genetic resources. In addition, the United States's
continued negotiation of bilateral trade agreements after TRIPS and its support for the
WIPO Patent Agenda gradually prods the international intellectual property order onto
a TRIP-plus regime. See SUSULE F. MUSUNGU & GRAHAM DUTFIELD, MULTILATERAL
AGREEMENTS IN A TRIPS-PLUS WORLD: THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION (2003), (exploring how recent intellectual property reforms at the

WIPO, especially the patent and digital agenda promote and co-opt less-developed
countries into standard of intellectual property protection that transcend those of the
TRIPS Agreement); see also Jean-Frid6ric Morin, Multilateralisingthe TRIPS-Plus
Agreement: Is the US Strategy a Failure?,12 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 175 (2009).
52. See Susan K. Sell, supra note 5, at 369-70.
53. See FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, TRADE
REFORMS AND FOOD SECURITY: CONCEPTUALIZING THE LINKAGES 25-26 (2003).
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sensitive to their human dignity and for their overall active and healthy
lifestyle. 54 It follows that food security, food safety, nutrition, and public
health have a symbiotic relationship. Forms of agricultural production,
including so-called conventional and non-conventional agriculture, are
practices at the critical intersection of food security and food safety. We
shall explore that intersection in the next section.
From the above overview of food security, it is possible that
agricultural biotechnology has real and practical potential to advance or
undermine food security. In regard to advancing food security, agricultural
biotechnology may not, however, be a magic bullet. Its role could be
complemented by other modes of agricultural production and practices in
order to factor in the cultural and human dignity aspects of food security.
As for the second potential, there are many ways in which agricultural
biotechnology could undermine food security. For instance, the industrial
and commercial focus of agricultural biotechnology accounts for the
concentration of research, and innovative and developmental endeavors on
a few monocrops." Because agricultural biotechnology is industrially and
commercially driven, it targets crops and plants on the basis of their
commercial viability. 56 That priority is hardly the driving factor in
indigenous and rural communities where agriculture is first a cultural
process and a factor of cultural and ecological diversities of people and
their environment.
Consequently, in some ways, agricultural biotechnology appears to be
antithetical to agro-biodiversity. The idea of agro-biodiversity refers, for
the most part, to diverse ways in which "farmers use the natural diversity of
the environment for production, including not only their choice of crops but
also their management of land, water, and biota as a whole."57 Because
agricultural and food production are culturally located and culturally driven
practices, they correlate with diversities in the ecological features of
peoples and civilizations. In that way agricultural biodiversity guarantees

54. See Oguamanam,supra note 15, at 230; Ryan-Harshman, supra note 30, at 845.
55. See Persley & Lantin, supra note 48; see also Altieri, supra note 38; see
generally Shiva, supra note 49.
56. See Jay P. Kesan, Intellectual Property Protection and Agricultural
Biotechnology: A Multi Disciplinary Perspective, 44 AM. BEHAv. Scl. 464, 465-66
(2000); see generally Bongo Adi, Intellectual Property in Biotechnology and the Fate
of Poor Farmers' Agriculture, 9 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 91 (2006); Oguamanam,
supra note 20.
57. Oguamanam, supra note 15, at 220 (quoting Harold Brookfield & Christine
Padoch, Appreciating Diversity: A Look at the Dynamism and Diversity of Indigenous
FarmingPractices,36 ENVIRONMENT 6, 9 1994).
58. See Assya Pascalev, You Are What You Eat: Genetically Modified Foods,
Integrity and Society 16 J. AGRIC. ENvTL. ETHICS 583 (2003); see also HARRIET V.
KUHNLEIN & NANCY J. TURNER, TRADITIONAL PLANT FOODS OF CANADAIAN
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aspects of food security, especially in regard to access to
culturally/personally acceptable foods, which are reflective of the human
dignities of peoples.
In contrast, biotechnology's tendency to promote monocultures shortchanges a crucial aspect of food security for a critical segment of the
population that relies on the diversity in traditional landraces and animal
resources. Also, the political economics of agriculture tightens proprietary
control of the end products of innovations in agricultural biotechnology and
creates a culture of dependence on technologically endowed countries by
many in the less-developed world.
Physical access to agricultural
biotechnology or genetically modified (GM) foods presents considerable
challenges for needy populations 9 akin to those posed by access to
essential drugs. Because of cost, affordability and distribution constraints,
agricultural biotechnology end-products are often delivered to needy
populations in less-developed countries as food aid. 60 Often, like high-end
patented drugs, GM foods are fast becoming part of ad hoc crisis
intervention relief packages. For the recipients in less-developed countries,
this phenomenon detracts from physical accessibility, cultural suitability
and human dignity, which are necessary elements of food security.
The reluctance of some to embrace GM foods and other products of
agricultural biotechnology, in a way, demonstrates the latter's inability to
satisfy the aspect of cultural and human dignity elements of food security.
For many who resist these products due to cultural, philosophical, religious,
environmental and other considerations, the question, however, is not
whether they are physically available, affordable, or nutritionally safe.
Rather, it is whether they are acceptable. 6 1 The short point here is that the
relationship between agricultural biotechnology and food security unravels
as a more complex analytical morass than what appears obvious at first
glance.

INDIGENOUS

PEOPLE:

NUTRITION,

BOTANY

AND

USE

(1991),

available

at

http://www.fao.org/wairdocs/other/ai215e/ai215e00.htm.
59. See Conway, supra note 42, at 227; see also Altieri, supra note 38, (arguing that
most rural populations in the tropics live in very challenging environmental condition
and are threatened by global warming while hardly being impacted by modem
agricultural science).
60. See Shaw, supra note 11, at 201 (where the author notes that contrary to the
preference of global food aid agencies such as the UN World Food Program to source
food aid locally to support local economies, donor countries, especially the US, tie food
aid to their interest. The US requires, for example, that donations be sourced from their
surplus stocks and that three-quarters of which be bagged, fortified or processed
products.).
61. See Chidi Oguamanam, IntellectualPropertyRights in Plant Genetic Resources:
Farmers' Rights and Food Security in Indigenous and Local Communities, 11 DRAKE
J. AGRIc. L. 273, 301 (2006).
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Finally, in regard to the safety component of the food security
discourse, the role of agricultural biotechnology takes an explosive and
sometimes passionate turn. Perhaps there is as much a case to be made in
favor of agricultural biotechnology's ability to promote food safety as can
be made for its converse impact on food safety. Arguably, most of the
objections to agricultural biotechnology, especially those stemming from
environmental, health and sustainability are aspects of the reservations over
the safety of products of agricultural biotechnology. 62 In short, opposition
to agriculture biotechnology is woven around inter-connected and yet
emerging themes.
In many quarters, the benefits of agricultural biotechnology are
presented as constituting the critical strategy for the advancement of public
On other fronts, agricultural biotechnology products and
health.63
processes are represented as sources of significant threats to public health
and myriad economic and social issues.64 This ironic twist underscores the
contentious nature of policy debate around biotechnology in general and
agricultural biotechnology in particular. Safety concerns over the products
of agricultural biotechnology are more hotly debated in the specific and
interrelated contexts of food, medicine and nutritional health. This is
hardly surprising because, in virtually all civilizations known to mankind,
food has a symbiotic relationship with medicine. 65 Food biotechnology, a
subset of biotechnology and, indeed, agricultural biotechnology, is "the use
of living organisms, or parts of living organisms to create new, or improved
The advent of agricultural biotechnology, like
food products." 66
has revolutionized nutritional and food science.
in
general,
biotechnology
The increasing role of agricultural biotechnology as a significant source for
the global food supply and the interrelation between agriculture, food,

62.
63.

See generally Tokar, supra note 11; Berger supra note 10.
See generally Sasson, supra note 18; Persley & Lantin, supra note 48; Ryan-

Harshman,

supra

note

30;

COUNCIL

FOR

BIOTECHNOLOGY

INFORMATION,

http://www.whybiotech.com/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2012) (an industry think-tank of
leading agricultural biotechnology companies committed to the promotion of
biotechnology and its benefits).
64.

See

generally

ECONOMIC

AND

SOCIAL

ISSUES

IN

AGRICULTURAL

BIOTECHNOLOGY (R.E. Evenson et al., eds., 2002); KRIMSKY & WRUBEL, supra note
27; Tokar, supra note 11; CARY FOWLER & PAT MOONEY, SHATTERING: FOOD,
POLITICS AND THE Loss OF GENETIC DIVERSITY (1990).
65. In many indigenous and local communities, there is no stark line of distinction
between food and medicine. On a general conceptual level, where hunger is construed
as a disease, food is a cure. Beyond that, the ecological harmony prevalent in the
indigenous conceptual worldview extends to the fusion or unity of purpose between
food and medicine. On the connection between food, culture and medicine, see
Pascalev, supra note 58, at 588.
66. Ryan-Harshman, supra note 30, at 845.
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nutrition, health and medicine makes agricultural biotechnology a critical
aspect of public health discourse.
Food security and food safety provide a strong foundation for disease
prevention. Also, they are crucial incentives for prolonging life, as they
provide an appropriate basis for organized effort by the community or
population for informed choices toward a healthy lifestyle. Consequently,
food security and food safety are critical to public health. Although the
present analysis focuses on the public health ramifications of food security
and food safety, it bears mentioning that public health transcends, and is
not limited to, the two subjects.67 The central focus of public health is the
prevention of diseases through strategic interventions aimed at the
promotion of healthy lifestyles, informed choices and general surveillance
of potential threats to the health of the population.
We have already noted that the extent to which agricultural
biotechnology promotes food security is dubious, or at best uneven, in
relation to different elements of food security. Opinion on biotechnology's
impact on food safety is equally conflicted. A positive alignment between
agricultural biotechnology and food safety translates into a positive impact
on public health. Conversely, if we posit that products of agricultural
biotechnology or food biotechnology and GMOs in general are not safe
foods, then, of necessity, agricultural biotechnology's impact on public
health would be potentially negative.
D. ChemicalizationofAgriculture

Food safety concerns over the products of agricultural biotechnology
are integral aspects of reservations over the latter's environmental impact
and general concern about its sustainability. 6 9 In this regard, it is not
unusual to lump these concerns with more enduring public health worries
over the increased chemicalization of agricultural production. Agricultural
biotechnology is often lumped together with other variants of what has
been called conventional agriculture, which is characterized by intense
mechanization, scientific plant breeding, hybridization and severe use of
agrochemicals for herbicidal and pesticidal ends.
In terms of its

67. See Bayer, supra note 6 at 28-29.
68. Id. See also Constitution of The World Health Organization (Preamble),WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/About SEARO const.pdf
(last visited Mar. 4, 2012). For a classical conceptualization and examination of the
concept of public health, see C-E. A. Winslow, The Untilled Field of Public Health 51
SCIENCE 1306, 23-24 (1920).
69. See generally Miguel Altieri, Genetic Engineering in Agriculture: The Myths,
Environmental Risks and Alternatives, MINDFULLY (2001), http://www.mindfully.org/
GE/GE2/GE-Ag-Myths-Risks-Altieri.htm;
Richard
Hindmarsh,
The
Flawed
Sustainable Promise of Genetic Engineering,21 THE ECOLOGIST 196 (1991).
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mechanization and industrial appeal, agricultural biotechnology shares
common features with its precursors. However, with regard to its emphasis
on genetic engineering, agricultural biotechnology marks a significant
evolution in conventional agriculture.
Major criticisms of conventional agriculture during the period
preceding the full-blown introduction of genetic engineering centered on
excessive chemicalization and mechanization of the agricultural process,
especially at the wake of the defunct Green Revolution.70 Concerns over
the environmental impact, sustainability, and general reservations regarding
the escalation of costs of agro-inputs constituted the albatross of the Green
Revolution initiative.7 1 In addition, scientists have linked chemical
fertilizers and the introduction of excess nitrogen to water systems with an
increase in carcinogens in the environment and, consequently, the rate of
cancer in the population.72 Overall, even though the Green Revolution
accomplished, to some extent, the increased production of high-yielding
varieties (HYVs) of target crops to address global hunger and food crisis in
the post-World War II period, the overall social cost of chemicalized
agriculture remains a matter of continuing inquiry.
In a way, genetic engineering-driven agricultural biotechnology
marks a remarkable shift in the scientific template of agricultural
innovation. However, there appears to be no dedicated attempt to explore
the extent to which agricultural biotechnology is distinguishable from its
precursor and other forms of conventional agriculture. It is hardly
surprising that most of the criticism of the failed Green Revolution has
been transferred to agricultural biotechnology - and for a good reason.

70. See Conway supra note 42, at 44-45; see also Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization,
supra note 11, at 423; VANDANA SHIVA, THE VIOLENCE OF THE GREEN REVOLUTION:
THIRD WORLD AGRICULTURE, ECOLOGY AND POLITICS (1991); STRUCTURAL
ADJUSTMENT, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (David Reed ed.,

1996).
71. Id.
72. See Daniel Peer, The Toxic Consequences of the Green Revolution, US NEWS &
WORLD REPORTS (July 7, 2008), http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/world/2008/07/
07/the-toxic-consequences-of-the-green-revolution.html (stating many critics of the
Green Revolution refer to the negative environmental impact of the excessive use of
chemical fertilizers, especially on ground water and on the food chain with
consequence in the escalation of cancer, lupus, and several immune diseases, as well as
alleges and asthma); see also Peter Rosset, Joseph Collins, and Frances Moore Lapp6 ,
Lessons from the Green Revolution: Do We Need New Technologies to End Hunger?,
TIKKUN MAGAZINE, March/April 2000, at 52, available at http://www.biotechinfo.net/lessons.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2012) (stating some associate the use of
chemical fertilizers as part of corporate consolidation between agricultural, chemical
and petro-chemical industries' dominance in global grain supplies and food production,
a situation that has continued in the current era of genetic engineering and modem
agricultural biotechnology).
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However, such wholesale transfer of fault and general conflation of the
internal dynamics of conventional agriculture have not allowed for a
dispassionate investment of effort to truly appraise the nature of changes in
agricultural production brought about by full-blown genetic engineering.73
The vociferous nature of the exchange between promoters and opponents
of agricultural biotechnology is one that hardly accommodates a
dispassionate attempt to scrutinize those claims with the benefit of the
doubt.
For instance, agricultural biotechnology is often portrayed as an
alternative to the chemicalized agriculture of the Green Revolution era.74
The argument is that through genetic engineering, agricultural
biotechnology has potential to reduce the use of chemicals for agricultural
purposes. Assuming this claim has any iota of credibility, the reduction of
chemicals from the agricultural process will disburden it from extensive
public health and food safety concerns that have continued to dog industrial
agriculture. Secondly, as already noted, genetic engineering has real
potential to facilitate radical reduction in the use of water for agricultural
purposes. Similarly, proponents argue that agricultural biotechnology
potentially promotes the use of less land to grow more food. Assuming
these claims to be conclusive or even tenable, their overall "social
economics of scale" for human agricultural endeavor would warrant serious
consideration for the future of agriculture. The reality, however, is that like
most scientific claims, the devil lies in the details.
In addition, most claims in the arena of biotechnology are readily
matched with counterclaims. For example, casting doubt over the potential
of biotechnology to reduce the use of agricultural chemicals, it has been
noted that, "the use of chemical inducers to activate desired traits is a
feature of agro-biotechnology that dampens the hope of respite from
chemicalized agriculture.
Contrary to its promoters' claims, agrobiotechnology is implicated in the increased use of agro-chemicals." 75
Similarly, the potential of agricultural biotechnology to use less land,
thereby potentially freeing up land for other uses, is admittedly an
economic efficiency model. But that feat can be counterbalanced by
73. The role of corporate interests in the promotion of the Green Revolution and the
enthronement of what analysts have called petro-dependant or chemical farming was
one of the Achilles' heels of the Green Revolution. In comparison to the Green
Revolution era, the contemporary epoch of genetic engineering-centered agricultural
biotechnology is virtually shaped by corporate interests with very limited public
involvement. In addition to other criticism of genetic engineering, this state of affairs
justifies the tendency to conflate Green Revolution dynamics with genetic engineering

and agricultural biotechnology.
74. See KRIMSKY & WRUBEL, supra note 27, at 213; Oguamanam, supra note 14, at
225; see generally Ryan-Harshman,supra note 30.
75. Oguamanam, supra note 15, at 225 and n. 49.

TOWARD A CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT

2011]

277

concentration of agricultural biotechnology on a few monocrops at the
expense of agro-biodiversity, which encourages the growing of diverse
varieties of agricultural products through several methods 6 and in different
ecological and diverse socio-cultural settings. Because of its relative
novelty, the inchoate nature of scientific claims in general, as well as the
passionate propaganda with which agricultural biotechnology is promoted
and resisted, it has not been easy to accurately audit each aspect of its
claims that warrant being taken more seriously than others.
Indeed, the complex and generally intricate nature of the scientific
and technological processes involved in agricultural biotechnology do not
lend themselves to cherry-picking one process or outcome over others. For
instance, genetic engineering interventions may accomplish storage or
marketing objectives such as elongating the shelf life and promoting
efficient handling of sensitive fruits and vegetables. However, the overall
health and environmental ramifications of such fruits and vegetables and
the process of their production may not be immediately evident. A fullscale exploration of the real and potential impact of genetic engineering
and agricultural biotechnology is outside the scope of this paper.
The prevailing reservations and skepticisms over genetic engineering
have not retarded its advancement. The continued entrenchment of
agricultural biotechnology in global food production is a reality that can no
longer be wished away. However, as with new technologies and scientific
innovations, the imperative for a prudent and critical approach to genetic
engineering is no less compelling. Genetic engineering in particular, and
agricultural biotechnology generally, present significant opportunities in
specific areas that are open to constructive exploitation. In this regard, the
next section examines the potential impact of agricultural biotechnology on
aspects of the global public health crisis.
IV.

AGRO-BIOTECH AND GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH

As noted already, lack of access to essential drugs for populations in
need appears to dominate contemporary discussion on the global public
health crisis. 7 7 Similarly, crisis management of specific pandemics through

76. Id. at 223 and n. 37.
77. See generally Richard E. Gold, Gene Patents and Medical Access, 49 INTELL.
PROP. F. 20 (2009); Alexander G. Watson, InternationalIntellectual Property Rights:
Do TRIPS' FlexibilitiesPermit Sufficient Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Medicines in
Less-developed Countries?, B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. (2009); Maxwell R. Morgan,
Medicinesfor the Less-developed World: PromotingAccess and Innovation in the Post
TRIPS Environment, 64 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 45 (2006); James Thuo Gathii,
Rights, Patents, Markets and the Global AIDS Pandemic, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 261
(2002); Thomas K. Mirabile, AIDS, Africa and Access to Medicines, 11 DETROIT COLL.
L. J. INT'L L. 175 (2002); and supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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sometimes ad hoc manufacture and dispensing of required vaccines and
other epidemiological interventions define recent public health
interventions on a global level. 7 8 Although these models of public health
interventions incorporate therapeutic and preventive elements, the latter is
at the core of the public health imperative. Historically, occasional
outbreaks of diseases that constitute threats to public health require both
therapeutic and preventive interventions.79 In these contexts, the essence of
therapeutic intervention on affected members of the population is
preventive, especially in regard to epidemics and other infectious diseases
that expose the population to danger. When an infected member of the
population is treated, the risk of the spread of the disease to others is
contained. Public health is preventive health.80 Most of preventive
"medicine" is about encouraging a physically active and generally healthy
lifestyle. This is often accomplished through various forms of publiccentered education on personal and public hygiene, habit and general
promotion of prudent choices in diverse spheres that have ramification for
overall health and well-being of both the individual and the community.
Apart from an occasional outbreak of diseases that are not necessarily
linked to a population's lifestyle choices, significant pressures on today's
public health are lifestyle-driven. For instance, "mutual relationships
among environmental, social variables, nutrition, and public health, and
nutritional deprivation" have long been implicated as factors that
predispose a population to disease. 8 ' According to the World Health
Organization (WHO), nutritional deficiency is a driver of adverse health
outcomes and it makes other stressors such as infectious disease more
potent. The organization describes "malnutrition as the greatest single risk
factor contributing to the global burden of disease." 82
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is a specialized
agency of the United Nations with mandates that include improving the
quality of nutrition, food and agricultural supplies and the general standard

78. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also Thomas Pogge, Human Rights
and Global Health: A Research Program,36 METAPHILOSOHPY 182, 183 (2005).
79. See OBIJIOFOR AGINAM, GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE: INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND PUBLIC HEALTH INA DIVIDED WORLD 46-59 (2005).
80. See Bayer, supra note 6, at 28.
81. Richard D. Semba, Nutrition and Development: A Historical Perspective, in
NUTRITION AND HEALTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 6 (Richard Semba & Martin W.
Bloem eds., 2002).
82. ROLAND LABONTE, TED SCHRENCKER, DAVID SANDERS & WILMA MEEUS,
FATAL INDIFFERENCE: THE G8 AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH 96 (2004), available at

http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-45682-20 1-1-DOTOPIC.html.
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It estimates that the number of
of living of local populations.83
undernourished peoples in the world rose from 923 million in 2007 to 963
million in 2008, and continues to grow in the wake of current global food
crises. 84 FAO states that 907 million of those hungry in 2007 lived in lessdeveloped countries and "[o]f these, 65 percent live in only seven
countries: India, China, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Pakistan and Ethiopia.""
Despite notable progress in Southeast Asia, especially in Thailand and
Vietnam, "nearly two-third of the world's hungry live in Asia (583
million)."86 Sub-Saharan Africa has the unenviable record of having the
highest proportion of undernourished people, with one in three people
chronically hungry, a total of 236 million. 87 Overall, Asia and Sub-Saharan
Africa post the highest rates of child malnutrition in the world. Multiple
combinations of interrelated but innumerable factors - including illiteracy,
poverty, high food prices, political instability, harsh climatic conditions,
and the recent economic downturn - account for this dangerous and
gloomy profile.
The FAO criterion for undernourishment is premised on the daily
intake of calories at a level regularly "insufficient to meet dietary energy
requirement[s]." 8 8 In Fatal Indifference, Laponte et al. point out that the
FAO criterion "does not refer to shortages of micronutrients such as iodine,
vitamin A and iron that may be critical for health, and which affect much
larger numbers of people." 89 Malnutrition is a significant factor in the high
rate of infant and maternal mortality, as well as the generally low life
expectancy in many less-developed countries. The developmental and
economic impact of malnutrition as a public health challenge to lessdeveloped countries is recognized at diverse international institutions and
ad hoc global policy forums, notably the United Nations, the WHO, FAO,
UNICEF, the World Bank, and even the G8 of the world's industrialized
nations.90

83. See Statement of Mandate, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/about/mission-gov/en/ [hereinafter Statement of
Mandate]; see also Shaw, supra note 11, at 67-68.
84. See Number of Hungry People Rises to 963 Million, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
online at
9, 2008),
(Dec.
NATIONS
UNITED
OF
THE
ORGANIZATION
http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/8836/ [hereinafter Hungry People]. These
figures are the latest available, from 2008.

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.

88.

LABONTE ET AL. supra note 82.

89. Id. at 96.
90.

See generally id.
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Strikingly, the United Nations Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs), which outline the international development objectives projected
to be realized by the year 2015, identify key aspects of the factors linked to
the public health crisis in less-developed countries. 9 1 These aspects include
reduction of extreme poverty and hunger, child mortality, improvement of
maternal health, combating specific disease epidemics, promotion of
universal primary education, gender equality and empowerment of women.
These key aspects bear direct relevance to nutritional health. For example,
poverty has a chicken-and-egg relationship with illiteracy. Jointly and
severally, they escalate the cycle of ignorance that undermines the
promotion and management of a healthy maternal and infant lifestyle for
the collective health of the population. The final part of the MDGs focuses
on the forging of a global "partnership of development." This omnibus part
of the MDG centers on collaborative strategies between developed and
less-developed countries, which target development initiatives aimed
primarily at poverty eradication.
Similar to the sentiments in the MDGs, the G8 of industrialized
nations has made a commitment to International Development Goals
(IDGs) in regards to, among other things, tackling the scourge of poverty in
less-developed countries. 92 The G8 seeks to reduce the number of children
less than five years old who are underweight, which is its key indicator of
poverty. The G8 Africa Action Plan mentions food security in the context
of economic development, and includes the adoption of new
biotechnologies. 9 3 The suitability of agricultural biotechnology for lessdeveloped countries, as well as the appropriate modality for its uptake,
remains a policy challenge. So far, this has been approached in multiple
combinations of development assistance, agricultural assistance, food aid,
emergency food reliefs and various other means.
Prevailing inequities in the international trade framework and the
global political economics of agriculture have cast a dubious cloud on the
sincerity and true motives of agricultural assistance and food aid for lessdeveloped countries. 94 Food aid and agricultural assistance critics have

91. See United Nations Millennium Development Goals, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).
92. See LABONTE ET AL., supra note 82, at 98.
93. See G8 African Action Plan, SOMNET KANANASKIS SUMMIT CANADA (2002),
http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/assets/pdfs/2002kananaskis/afraction-en.pdf.

The African Action Plan was adopted by the G8 leaders in Kananaskis, Alberta,
Canada, in 2002 pursuant to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

The latter is an Africa-driven initiative to identify and tackle priority areas of the

continent's development challenges.
94. See Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization,supra note 11, at 470-71; LABONTE
supra note 82, at ch. 5 and 7; cf Shaw, supra note 11.
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5
insinuated a number of ulterior motives tenable under those initiatives. 9
As between the recipient countries and their local producers on the one
hand, and the donor countries and their agro-biotech companies on the
other, it is not clear who actually benefits from food aid or other forms of
agricultural assistance.96 Also, it is hard to ascertain whether food aid and
agricultural assistance advances food security in the recipient or in the
donor countries.97
Similar sentiments apply in regard to the perceived negative impact of
emergency food relief. Akin to the tendency of big pharmaceutical
companies to donate patented drugs that are on the verge of expiration to
needy populations, 98 donors capitalize on food aid for "food dumps" to
offload surplus agricultural products to circumvent WTO anti-dumping
rules.99 Continued agricultural subsidies in developed countries destroy the
export capacity of food aid recipients, a situation that raises doubts on the
altruistic foundation of food aid. Non-emergency food aid presents a
potential threat to food security in recipient countries. They open up
markets for donor countries as well as upset the traditional pattern of food
production in recipient countries. 0 0
The public health impact of nutritional deficiencies in less-developed
countries assumes a crisis dimension.'0 o Despite the reservation trailing the
nature of agricultural biotechnology and the suspect nature of agricultural
assistance and GMO food aid, agricultural biotechnology is an attractive
incentive to tackle malnutrition as the "greatest single risk factor
contributing to the global burden of disease."1 02 The potential of

95. According to LABONTE ET AL., supra note 82, at 100, food "aid is motivated at
least partly by a desire to absorb domestic production surpluses." See also Shaw, supra
note 11, at 21.
96. See generally Shaw, supra note 11.
97. See LABONTE ET AL., supra note 82, at ch. 7, which explores the negative impact
of agricultural subsidies by industrialized countries on agricultural production, food
security and export potentials of recipient countries.
98. See Shah, supra note 3.
99. LABONTE ET AL., supra note 82, at 102.
100. See Shaw, supra note 11, at 28-29; LABONTE ET AL., supra note 82 at 101.
101. See generally Sasson, supra note 18; LABONTE ET AL., supra note 82; MEDECINS
SANs FRONTIERES, MALNUTRITION: HOW MUCH is BEING SPENT? 3 (Nov. 2009),
available at http://www.msf.org/source/malnutrition/2009/NutritionHowMuchisBeing
Spent.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2012). For a discussion of how rampant malnutrition is a
factor in the mental, physical and intellectual development of more than 100 million
children globally and how parental nutrition education is superior to large, politically
motivated feeding or aid programs, see generally WORLD BANK, REPOSITIONING
NUTRITION AS CENTRAL TO DEVELOPMENT: A STRATEGY FOR LARGE-SCALE ACTION
(2006), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NUTRITION/Resources/
281846-11 31636806329/NutritionStrategy.pdf.
102. See LABONTE ETAL., supra note 82, at 96.
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agricultural biotechnology as a tool to alleviate malnutrition in lessdeveloped countries and among less-endowed populations is only one
aspect of its possible impact on public health. In other applications, such as
biopharming, agricultural biotechnology, and especially genetic
engineering, are used to exploit living organisms for the production of
pharmacologically active substances. In the context of other complex
disciplinary convergences, genetic engineering facilitates the "pharming"
of crucial organs for complex medical procedures and pharmaceutical
R&D. Agricultural biotechnology is an integral aspect of the twenty-first
century medical revolutions in ways that reinforce the traditional affinity
between agriculture, food and medicine.' 03
A. The Casefor Bio-fortification and Functional Food: Two Analogies
Of particular interest in this article is the role of agricultural
biotechnology in the development of so-called functional food. In the
words of one analyst,
[flood fortification to improve the nutritional quality of
diets was first practised during the mid-1990s.

. . . The

potential of foods to provide health benefits is known as
functional food research, which is somewhat of a
misnomer because all foods are functional. The term
nutraceuticals may be more appropriate, even though it
tends to medicalize the food supply. Biotechnology,
specifically genetic engineering, will assist the food
industry in capturing the highest market potential for

functional food.104
Besides market capture for functional foods, agricultural
biotechnology is potentially a strategic resource for reversing the negative
effect of malnutrition as a significant risk factor to the global public health
crisis. To accomplish this objective, especially for less-developed
countries and other disadvantaged or malnourished populations, we must of
necessity de-emphasize the market economic dynamics, the political
economics of agriculture for the developmental imperative, and the urgent
intervention considerations invoked by the association of malnutrition with
public health crises.' 0 5 That way, we are more likely to temper, if not get
103. See generally Sasson, supra note 18; Ryan-Harshman, supra note 30; see also
KUHNLEIN & TURNER, supra note 58.
104. Ryan-Harshman, supra note 30, at 847.
105. Many critics of agricultural biotechnology or industrial agriculture (e.g. Tokar,
supra note 10; Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization, supra note I1; Conway, supra note 42;
Altieri, supra notes 38 & 69; FRANK ELLIS, AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN DEVELOPING
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around, most of the existing obstacles, including resistances to GMOs and
products of agricultural biotechnologies. From the FAO data highlighted
above,' 06 the statistics of malnutrition's impact on the public health of the
less-developed countries of Africa and Asia depict the problem in a crisis
mode. It is a problem requiring an urgent intervention. This "crisis
interventionist approach" in the use of agricultural biotechnology to
address the negative public health impact of malnutrition on less-developed
countries can be analogized to two patterns of response to public health
challenges at various national and global levels, namely the anti-obesity
campaigns in developed countries and the global public good approach to
health provisions.
1. The Anti-obesity Campaign
Various governments of the industrialized world, including the U.S.,
Canada, France, U.K. and most other European countries have responded
to the "obesity epidemic" that has arisen in those countries since the
1990s.' 07 Although the WHO recognized obesity as a global epidemic that
constitutes an ongoing threat to public health, countries at highest risk are
those in the affluent regions of the world. Like malnutrition, obesity is
mostly a lifestyle-based crisis, even thought it has genetic ramifications in
some cases.
Leading the way, the WHO issued its promotional document on the
dangers of obesity and related diseases titled World Strategy for Food,

agree that both forms of agricultural
production jointly or severally advance the neoliberal political economics of agriculture
and create a culture of dependence on external multi-national agro-allied corporations
by less-developed countries for food. Indeed, in order to adapt agricultural
biotechnology for meaningful crisis intervention, we need to create a platform in which
the application of benefits of agricultural biotechnology is need-driven, rather than
market-driven.
COUNTRIES (1992); YOUNG, supra note 41)

106. See Hungry People, supra notes 84 and 85.
107. The World Health Organization reports that in 2008 1.5 billion adults were
overweight-and nearly 500 million of these were obese. Obesity and Overweight,
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (March 2011), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/
factsheets/fs3l l/en/. For a review of the latest CDC report on obesity across the U.S.,
see Miranda Hitti and Louise Chang, How Fat is Your State?, WEBMD (July 8, 2009),
(reporting that
http://www.webmd.com/diet/news/20090708/how-fat-is-your-state
according to the 2009 US Center for Disease Control (CDC) figures, 26.1% of US
population was obese in 2008, compared to 25.5% the year before); see also OECD,
available at
HEALTH AT A GLANCE 2009: OECD INDICATORS (2009),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/2/44117530.pdf (stating the median percentage for
the prevalence of obesity in OECD countries is almost 15 percent according to
2006/2007 figures and the US has the highest percentage of obesity amongst the 30
OECD countries).
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Physical Exercise and Health.08 According to the WHO, "[t]he strategy

addresses two of the main risk factors for noncommunicable diseases,
namely, diet and physical activity, while complementing the longestablished and ongoing work carried out by WHO and nationally on other
nutrition-related areas, including malnutrition, micronutrient deficiencies
and infant and young-child feeding." 09 In some industrialized countries,
more than half of the population falls within the overweight and obesityborderline categories. For the first time in those countries, overweight and
obesity constitute significant threats to life expectancy, resulting in health
and social impacts on a comparable scale to other entrenched public health
challenges, notably smoking, for example."10 Also, like malnutrition, the
impact of obesity on overall population health is hardly an isolated one.
"Obesity is a risk factor for many chronic illnesses, particularly heart
diseases and diabetes.""'
At different national governmental levels, most developed countries
responded to the obesity epidemic through the institutionalization of a
combination of various public health education and lifestyle awareness
programs. These include revisions of the dietary and physical exercise
regimen, especially for youths and school-age children in public schools
and elsewhere, labeling regimes for food and food-processing industries,
including restaurants and eateries.11 2 Also, these countries embarked on
dedicated education and various campaigns using the diverse new media to
sensitize the public on the dangers of obesity and the lifestyles that

108. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD STRATEGY ON DIET, PHYSICAL,
ACTIVITY AND HEALTH (2004), available at http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/
strategy/eb 1344/strategy english web.pdf.
109. Id.
110. For instance, Statistics Canada reports that the number of obese Canadians
doubled between late 1978 and 2005 and has continued to go up. See Statistics Canada,

Obesity - the key figures according to Canada's statistics,

UNIVERSITE LAVAL,

http://obesity.ulaval.ca/obesity/generalities/prevalence.php (last visited Mar. 4, 2012);
for more up-to-date statistics, see Obesity in Canada a Snapshot, PUBLIC HEALTH
AGENCY OF CANADA (2009), http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/publicat/2009/oc/pdf/oceng.pdf.

111. Indicators of Well-Being in Canada, HUMAN RESOURCES AND
DEVELOPMENT CANADA, http://www4.hrsdc.gc.ca/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).

SKILLS

112. For example, noting the association of saturated and trans-fat, excess sugar and
calories with obesity, most beverage companies have capitalized on the market niche
for low trans/saturated fat and calorie-/sugar-free brands. On an annual basis, Health
Canada issues Canada's Food Guide (no longer published, see website), which
highlights suggested national dietary regimen for various age groups as a public health
promotion strategy. For the current guide, see Eating Well with Canada's Food Guide,
HEALTH CANADA, http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/fn-an/food-guide-aliment/index-eng.php (last
visited Mar. 4, 2012).
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predispose populations to it." 3 Such campaigns have also elicited
innovative responses in both public and private sporting, outdoor and
indoor physical exercise entrepreneurships now enhanced by new
information technologies. These campaigns have also resulted in positive
reactions from the biotechnology, food, beverages and allied industries that
now capitalize on the opportunity to advance R&D on functional and antiobese foods and drinks.It 4
The proactive role of many industrialized countries in promoting the
nutritional health of the population pursuant to their anti-obesity public
health programs takes the form of a crisis intervention strategy. Recently,
the current U.S. First Lady, Michelle Obama, unveiled her White House
Legacy Initiative, which is aimed at curbing childhood obesity. Dubbed
the "Let's Move" campaign, it marks a significant renewal of attention to
obesity, in a crisis-intervention fashion, for a country that is said to spend
$150 billion annually on preventable obesity-related diseases.115 In this
crisis mode, objections or traditional libertarian criticisms to state
paternalism and state erosion of citizens' free choice in regard to regulatory
intervention on food and beverages are easily blunted by the overarching
public-regarding objectives that underlie the anti-obesity campaigns.l16

113.

For example, the U.S. Congress mandated the Centers for Diseases Control and

Prevention to initiate nutrition and physical activities and related programs as a nationwide strategy to tackle obesity and other chronic diseases. In 2006, the CDC published
the first report on the progress of the initiative in 20 states. See generally Sue Lin Yee,
Pam Williams-Piehota, Asta Sorensen, Amy Roussel, James Hersey & Robin Hamre,
The Nutrition and PhysicalActivity Programto Prevent Obesity and ChronicDiseases:
MonitoringProgressin Funded States, 3(1) PREV. CHRONIC Dis. A23 (2006), available
at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmd/articles/PMCI500956/pdf/PCD31 A23.pdf.
114. Food product labelling is an important aspect of the work program and mandate
of the United States Food and Drug Administration and the Department of Agriculture,
and their Canadian Counterparts, Health Canada and Canada's Food Inspection Agency
(which administers Canada's Food and Drugs Act and associated regulations). In the
last few decades, the labelling regimes for a number of food items, especially
beverages and general groceries, have been required to include information on
nutritional values, ingredients, calories, fat, trans fat, carbohydrates, cholesterol and
sugar counts.
115. See Editorial, On Michelle Obama's Obesity Campaign, THE SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Feb. 10, 2010, at A13, availableat http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article
.cgi?f=/c/a/2010/02/09/EDQM1BUHO3.DTL.
116. For insight into the ideology-driven debate on state paternalism on citizen's food
choices and related matters, see the self-explanatorily titled book: DAVID HARSANYI,
NANNY STATE: How FOOD FASCISTS, TEETOTALING DO-GOODERS, PRIGGISH
MORALISTS, AND OTHER BONEHEADED BUREAUCRATS ARE TURNING AMERICA INTO A
NATION OF CHILDREN (2007). But see Kenneth Calman, Beyond the "Nanny State":
Stewardship and Public Health, 123(1) PUBLIC HEALTH e6-el0 (2009), available at

http://www.publichealthjrnl.com/issues?Vol=123. (Calman argues that the state has
the duty to preserve the health of the individual and the public and that such a duty
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That approach is comparable to the present proposal to extend the use of
agro-biotech food fortification mechanisms and products to less-developed
countries in order to tackle the public health menace that malnutrition, like
obesity, poses. As already noted, this strategy does not of necessity
dispense with valid objections and lingering criticism of agricultural
biotechnology, especially in the context of less-developed countries. But
pragmatically, from a crisis point of view, the strategy assumes an urgency
that eclipses some, even the most pertinent, of the objections.
2. Global Public Good Approach to Functional Food
The second analogous response is global in scale and scope. As
mentioned earlier, recent discourses on the global public health crisis focus
on lack of access to essential drugs for needy populations." 7 In part, this is
blamed on the unaffordable cost of such drugs as a result of the extant
global intellectual property system. Because of endemic poverty, the
majority of people in the less-developed world cannot pay for essential
drugs." 8 Consequently, pharmaceutical R&D does not target their health
needs."' In the hard and cold economics of pharmaceutical R&D, it does
not matter that not even "10% of global health research spending is devoted
to the health needs of 90% of the world's population." 20 Consequently,
the public health needs of less-developed countries, especially in regard to
access to essential drugs, take the status of "global public goods." The
latter refers to those goods that cannot be provided by market forces.121
would often necessitate restricting citizen's choices). In November 2010, the Board of
Supervisors of the California City of San Francisco voted overwhelmingly to ban the
practice by restaurants to offer children free toys with meals containing more than
prescribed levels of calories, sugar and fat, like the so-called Happy Meale, one of the
niches of the global fast food giant, McDonald's. The ban, which is sure to outrage
libertarians, is scheduled to take effect at the end of 2011. See Joe Eskenazi, San
Francisco Bans Happy Meal, SAN FRANCISCO WEEKLY Nov. 2, 2010, available at
http://blogs.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/2010/l /happymealbanpasses_-_with.php.
117. See generally supra note 2 and accompanying text.
118. Id.
119. See DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 5, at 167-68: ("[p]atent-based R & D
is not responsive to demand, but to ability to pay").
120. Els Toreele, Martine Usdin & Pierre Chirac A Needs-Based Pharmaceutical
R&D Agenda for Neglected Diseases, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (July 31, 2004),
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/topics/research/Needs%20based%20R&D%20
for%20neglected%20diseases%20Els%2OPierre%2OMartine.pdf; see also P. Trouiller,
P. Olliaro. E. Torreele, J. Orbinski, R. Laing & N. Ford, Drug Development for
Neglected Diseases: A Deficient Market and a Public-health Policy Failure, 22:359
(9324) LANCET 2188 (2002) (discussing how tropical diseases are neglected because of
diminutive financial returns).
121. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS FOR HEALTH,
available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/9241590106.pdf; see also GLOBAL
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Accordingly, since the provision of such goods are outside the capacity of
relevant national governments and market forces, the responsibility to do so
becomes a matter for concerted international effort.12 2
For some analysts, the global public goods argument explains the role
of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the WHO, and various
national and intergovernmental organizations in the facilitation of access to
essential drugs outside a strict market paradigm to stem public health crises
In recent times, there has been a
in less-developed countries. 12
foundations and private non-profit
charities,
proliferation of diverse
initiatives that now constitute active players in the public health dynamics
of less-developed countries.124 There is no dearth of literature on the
emergent patterns or forms of private-public partnerships under which
these initiatives operate. For the most part, the essential drugs required to
tackle aspects of public health crises in less-developed countries are subject
to patents held by pharmaceutical companies. Without doubt, these
companies are central to emerging forms of non-market or quasi-market
125
interventions to the supply of essential medicines to populations in need.
Given their high stakes in intellectual property, they are actively engaged in
negotiating forms of private-public partnerships (PPP) in pharmaceutical
R&D, targeting key vaccines and the supply of essential drugs and delivery
of urgent medical relief to needy populations via forms of non-market

interventions.126
The foregoing situation is not entirely different from, and can be
analogized to, the need to extend fortified biotechnology food products (as
global public goods) to tackle malnutrition as a source of the public health
burden in less-developed countries. Agricultural biotechnology, like
pharmaceutical production, is an innovation-intensive enterprise. Like the
pharmaceuticals, most biotechnology products are subject to patents.
PUBLIC GOODS FOR HEALTH: HEALTH ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVES

(R. Smith, R. Beaglehole, D. Woodward, & N. Drager eds., 2003).
122. For further perspectives on global public goods, including environmental
protection, public health, education, and scientific advancement, see generally Keith E.
Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and
the Privatizationof GlobalPublic Goods, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 279 (2004).
123. See generally Briefing Paper,Oguamanam, Oriola, supra note 3.
124. See Oguamanam, supra note 3 (referencing such organizations as The Bill &
Melinda Gates Foundation, The William Jefferson Clinton Foundation, the Wellcome
Trust, Universities Allied for Essential Medicines, Medicines Sans Frontiers and
several disease specific initiatives such as the Roll-Back Malaria Partnership, Drugs for
Neglected Diseases Initiative, and the Global Network for Neglected Tropical Disease
Control and the United States Presidential Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief).
125. See generallyOguamanam, supra note 3.
126. Examples include Advance Market Commitments, Product Development
Partnerships, Priority Review Voucher, etc. For a general review of these and other
frameworks, see Briefing Paper,supra note 3.
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Given that most of the malnourished population in less-developed countries
lives on less than one dollar per day, they are unable to afford functional
biofortified foods necessary for mitigating their endemic malnutrition. 2 7
Agricultural-biotechnology companies control most of the patents in the
area of GM food products. These companies have the potential to assist in
the development and delivery of targeted biofortified or functional foods as
public health incentives. They are critical stakeholders on how these
Naturally, agricultural biotechnology
initiatives are implemented.
companies are interested actors in the programs presently underway
regarding the development and dissemination of biofortified food crops
targeting populations in need.
Intervention on a global scale for hunger-containment reflects a
melange of crisis-management and broader socio-economic policy
approaches. Consequently, the global food and agricultural landscape is
buffeted by a complex array of bureaucracies operating at multifarious
levels, including intergovernmental, regional, national, non-governmental,
private and diverse civil society initiatives. 2 8 Given the technology and
research-intensive nature and obligate interdisciplinarity of food and
agricultural subject matters, the global agricultural and food question is
often one of political economics. Inherently, within that matrix are the
interrelated issues of equity, access, markets, and development in the
context of the tension between public and private interests in agricultural
and food production. Of all the variegated global food and agricultural
institutions ably discussed in John Shaw's recent work, Global Food and
Agricultural Institutions, perhaps none more than the Consultative Group
on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) reflects the practical
imperative for a non-market or public-goods approach in the extension of
the benefit of agricultural biotechnology as public health incentives in lessdeveloped countries. 129
B. The HarvestPlusModel
The CGIAR was established in 1971 as a private-public initiative that
manages the use and access to samples of plant genetic resources (PGRs) in
global ex situ seed banks for agricultural research, including plant

127. Critics of agricultural biotechnology harp on the twin subjects of access and
affordability.

For example,

Altieri,

supra note

38,

at 2

observes:

"[m]ost

biotechnological innovations available today bypass poor farmers: first because these
farmers cannot afford the seeds that are protected by patents owned by biotechnology

corporations, and second, because this modem technology is not adapted to the
marginal environments where resource-poor farmers live."
128. See generally Shaw, supra note 11.
129. Shaw, supra note 11, at 88-89.
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breeding. 130 The principal sponsors/financiers of CGIAR include the FAO,
the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank, private charities
and various national governments.'31 It is worth noting that these publicly
held PGRs in ex situ global seed banks were historically sourced from
centers of biodiversity, mainly less-developed countries. CGIAR held "the
largest single collection of plant genetic materials, comprising 650,000
accessions (about 10 percent of the world's collection)" until 2008.132 The
CGIAR describes itself as "a strategic alliance of countries, international
and regional organizations, and private foundations supporting 15 33
international agricultural Centers [IARCs] that work with national
agricultural research systems and civil society organizations including the
private sector." 34 These federating IARCS exist as autonomous entities
but are jointly committed to the CGIAR mission of providing "the world's
largest investment in generating public goods for the benefit of poor
agricultural communities in the developing countries."115 According to the
CGIAR, the alliance "applies cutting-edge science to foster sustainable
agricultural growth" to reduce poverty and enhance human, agricultural
and environmental well-being that benefits the poor.136
CGIAR's activities focus on five thematic strategies and priorities
aimed at the delivery of the benefits of agricultural innovation to the needy
in less-developed countries. They include sustainable approaches to
agricultural production, promotion of national agricultural research
capacity, germplasm taxonomy, collation, conservation and dissemination,
and policy research on interrelated agricultural subject matters, such as
food, health, new technologies and natural resources conservation. 13 7 With
the complement of the International Food Policy Research (IFPRI), one of
its federating IARCs, CGIAR's policy research has recently garnered
traction in the areas of poverty alleviation, eradication of hunger and
malnutrition. Under the auspices of its programmatic model, the Global
Challenge Program, CGIAR launched the Generation Challenge Program
aimed at extending the benefits of biotechnology, especially molecular

130. Id. at 88, 153.
131. Id. at 90.
132. Id. at 161.
133. 13 of these IARCs are located in less-developed countries. See Shaw, supra
note 11, at 153.
134. Oguarnanam, supra note 61, at 282, n. 42.
135. Shaw, supra note 11, at 153.
136. Who We Are, CGIAR, http://www.cgiar.org/who/index.html (last visited Mar. 4,
2012).
137. See CGIAR SCIENCE COUNCIL, SUMMARY OF REPORT ON SYSTEM PRIORITIES
FOR CGIAR RESEARCH 2005-2015 (2005), availableat http://www.sciencecouncil.
cgiar.org/fileadmin/user-upload/sciencecouncil/Reports/SCPriorities prFinal l-r_.pdf.
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biology, to the global stock of genetic resources and putting them at the
disposal of needy families and farming communities to plug the gap
between hungry and healthy families.' 38
To shore up its dwindling financial fortune in the 1990s and, in part,
to "draw more attention to agriculture by pointing out its close links with
high-profile issues, such as health, the environment and conflict,"' 3 9 the
CGIAR embarked on a conscious re-branding effort that resulted in the
near-renaming of IARCs as "Future Harvest Centers." Essentially, the
Future Harvest [FH] brand was the coordinating platform for launching the
CGIAR effectively into the biofortification campaign. The FH highlighted
the link between agriculture and myriad development issues, including the
public health impact of nutritional deficiencies and the remedial role of
biotechnology, specifically via the biofortification option.
Unfortunately, FH was the first casualty of its own success. Its social
and development marketing quickly lost favor with CGIAR leadership and
key donors. Consequently, the FH brand was disbanded. In-house postmortem reflection on the early demise of FH initiative implicates internal
intrigues within the federating IARCs under the CGIAR umbrella.14 0 It
also points to perceived conflict between resource mobilization and
communication. The latter is quite instructive as it may provide a clue to
donor disaffection for the FH modus operandi. It is possible that given
FH's emphasis on social marketing and development, some donors were
not pleased that proprietary interests in the PGRs innovations within the FH
agenda were completely out of the equation. CGIAR is a private-public
partnership and terms of access to the benefits of its innovation remain a
contentious issue. FH's modus operandi and orientation toward social
marketing and development may not have adverted the historic delicate
balance that characterizes debates over CGIAR's oversight or role in regard
to use and access to PGRs in ex situ seed banks under its jurisdiction.141
Private stakeholders within the CGIAR have yet to dissociate their interest
from proprietary control of research outcomes.

138. See The Generation Challenge Programme, CGIAR, http://www.generationcp.
org/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).
139. Nathan Russell & Ruth Raymond, Collective Communications on the CGIAR: A
Short History ofa Long Standing Endeavour, CGIAR, http://www.cgiar.org/pdf/scw
HistoryofCollective%20Communications.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).
140. See id.
141. For instance, Mgbeoji and others suggest that CGIAR was set up and allowed
free hand to access global gene banks to facilitate the funneling of the South's PGRs to
the North's industrial agricultural complex, which could no longer be guaranteed at the
formal end of colonialism. See IKECHI MGBEOJI, GLOBAL BIOPIRACY PATENTS, PLANTS
AND INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE 106 (2006); see also WILLIAM LESSER, SUSTAINABLE
USE OF GENETIC RESOURCES UNDER THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY:
EXPLORING ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING ISSUES 99 (1997).
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Despite the demise of FH strategy, the CGIAR, in alliance with its
affiliate LARCs, has continued the biofortification project. The primary
vehicle has been the HarvestPlus initiative, "a global alliance of research
institutions and implementing agencies coming together to breed and
disseminate crops with nutritive value (biofortification), e.g. with a higher
content of iron, zinc and vitamin A." 4 2
In terms of its governance framework, HarvestPlus is a partnership
between the Colombia- and U.S.-based International Center for Tropical
Agriculture (CIAT) and IFPRI; both are CGIAR's IARCs. HarvestPlus is
administered by a Project Advisory Committee (PAC) which is composed,
in part, by representatives of both CIAT and IFPRI.143 After its launch in
2004, HarvestPlus is on record as the first recipient of funding for
biofortification research granted by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
(BMGF), an organization that is also proactive in a public goods approach
to global health crises, especially in less-developed countries. HarvestPlus
has since expanded its donor list, marking a strategic new phase in nonprofit interest in activities of CGIAR and in the advancement of public
goods approach to agricultural biotechnology. HarvestPlus prides itself "as
a global leader in developing biofortified crops and now works with more
than 200 agricultural and nutrition scientists around the world."l 4 4
Experts claim that "[t]he biofortification approach is backed by sound
science." 45 Investigations into the scientific integrity of biofortification
confirm that most staple crops have substantial and useful genetic traits and
variations that are stable across a range of growing environments. They
also affirm that breeding programs can easily manage nutritional quality
traits in many staple crops while traits for qualitative nutrition can be fused
with greater agronomic traits capable of enhancing yields. 146
HarvestPlus's initial efforts at biofortification focus on six select
staple crops over which pre-breeding studies have been completed. They
are beans, cassava, sweet potatoes, rice, maize and wheat. Although these
crops are low in micronutrients, they are subject to high consumption in
less-developed countries. Combining conventional and novel breeding
techniques, as well as molecular biological insights, biofortification is a
quasi-biotechnological intervention program aimed at inducing or boosting
micronutrient-enhancing traits in the target crop for improved nutritional
outcomes. In essence, it is a nutraceutional or functional food initiative.

142. Sasson, supra note 18, at 14.
143. Breeding Cropsfor Better Nutrition, HARVESTPLUS, http://www.harvestplus.
org/content/governance (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).
144. About HarvestPlus, HARVESTPLUS, http://www.harvestplus.org/content/aboutharvestplus (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).
145. Sasson, supra note 18, at 14.
146. Id.
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Since 2005, these crops have remained active targets of different aspects of
biofortification R&D that seeks to extend nutritional benefits to vulnerable
and malnourished populations in less-developed countries. Cumulatively,
these crops are critical sources of staple food for significant population
groups in Mexico, for example, and most less-developed countries of Asia,
Africa and South America.
HarvestPlus's phased program of work has a far-reaching, ambitious
scope. Its stated aims are to: 1) determine nutritionally optimal breeding
objectives; 2) screen CGIAR germplasm for high iron, zinc and betacarotene amounts; 3) examine the effects of food processing on
micronutrient content and bioavailability; 4) identify the [genetic] markers
available to facilitate the transfer of traits through conventional breeding;
5) undertake in vitro and animal studies to determine the bioavailability of
the enhanced micronutrients in promising lines; and 6) begin bio-efficiency
studies to determine effect on biofortified crops on micro-nutrient
status." 147
C. Biofortification:Drawbacks and Benefits
As already noted, most of the criticisms associated with the uptake of
agricultural biotechnology, food aid and agricultural assistance, especially
by less-developed countries, are tenable in regard to biofortified food
products. For example, Altieri argues that:
People do not exhibit vitamin A deficiency because rice
contains little vitamin A, or beta-carotene, but rather
because [instead of a more varied diet] their diet has been
reduced to rice and almost nothing else . . . A magic-bullet

solution, which places beta-carotene into rice while
leaving poverty, poor diets, and extensive monoculture
intact, is unlikely to make any durable contribution to

well-being.14 8
Similarly, Labonte et al. point out that countries of the G8 undermine
food security and nutritional welfare of less-developed countries, especially
in sub-Sahara Africa.149 They point to the hypocrisy of EU countries that
limit fishing vessels within their waters to protect stock and simultaneously
engage in paying generous compensation for European fishers affected by
147. HARVEST PLUS, HARNESSING AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE THE
HEALTH OF THE POOR: PLANT BREEDING TO COMBAT MICRONUTRIENT DEFICIENCY, 3
(2003), available at http://www.zab.uni-freiburg.de/forschung/HarvestPlusBrochure.
pdf
148. Altieri, supra note 38.
149. See LABONTE ET AL., supra note 82, at 93.
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the depletion of stock and tightened restrictions on fishing.150 Contrary to
G8 and EU posturing on food security in less-developed countries, they
pressure those less-developed countries to grant unsustainable fishing
licenses. 1s Through those licenses, European vessels engage in factorystyle over-fishing activities, which result in the depletion of fish stocks and
a threat to the nutritional balance and health of coastal communities,
especially in Africa.152
Despite these and several other drawbacks, as an initiative with
significant public health benefits, the biofortification program has more to
commend than to condemn it. Clearly, it is one of several concurrent and
multi-pronged approaches to tackling nutritional crises in less-developed
countries. It is hardly a magic bullet for everything wrong with the globalpolitical economics of food and agriculture. Given the backdrop of
malnutrition-driven public health crises in less-developed countries,
biofortification becomes a compelling option, at least in terms of its
empirical and timely results that match the urgency posed by these crises.
Other mutually reinforcing mechanisms with biofortification for addressing
the nutritional crisis as a public health intervention strategy include
continuing nutritional education, especially targeting parents and children
as the 2006 World Bank Studies on nutrition indicate.153 Indeed, dietary
uptake of micronutrient-rich vegetables, fruits, animal and fish products
remains an important aspect of improving the nutritional profile in lessdeveloped countries that needs to be promoted as matter of lifestyle, akin to
physical exercise in the containment of the obesity epidemic.
A few features of the biofortification initiative under the CGIAR extol
it in relation to the general skepticism around agricultural biotechnology.
First, it is being implemented by the CGIAR/IFPRI within a pubic goods
approach to the extension of the benefits of agricultural innovation to the
poor. Second, so far, CGIAR has co-opted the private sector in the
elaboration of this public goods vision. Even though the outcome of this
experience remains inchoate, it assists in fostering practical understanding
of public-private partnership in the context of food and agriculture as a
global public good. Third, unlike the GMOs and other products of
biotechnology, thus far, the HarvestPlus biofortification project targets key
staple crops that are selected not necessarily on the basis of their market
relevance. Rather, the crops are attractive because of their endemic or
integral profile to the food culture of the target population. Fourth, the

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Labonte, supra note 82 (Focusing on the Mauritanian experience, they argue
that G8 practices contribute directly to the problems of facing Africa's human and
economic development. One such practice, involves factory fishing off Africa's coast.).
153. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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operational modality of the HavestPlus initiative aims at boosting selfreliance and knowledge transfer for members of indigenous and local
communities. This is in contrast to the tendency of the biotechnology
industrial complex to lock up knowledge by a combination of intellectual
property and technology control mechanisms and to encourage dependence
and reliance on external interests by these communities. The HarvestPlus
model is a potential scheme to adapt modern biotechnology "to the
marginal environments where resource-poor farmers live."' 5 4 Fifth, the
emphasis of biofortification program on key staple foods may not align
with traditional diversity of agricultural crops in the target population.
However, since biofortification under the HarvestPlus program
involves publicly held germplasms in the IARCs' ex situ gene banks, many
of which are located in less-developed countries, the program takes the
form of agricultural assistance rather than food aid. It exposes members of
indigenous and local communities to dynamic new ways of dealing with
their traditional landraces. Further, the broad outreach of the initiative and
diverse collaborations undergirding its implementation create ample
knowledge transfer and knowledge convergence opportunities. The ability
to extend biofortification to traditional landraces of indigenous and local
communities is perhaps one way of developing biotechnology locally under
a culturally sensitive, purposeful and pragmatic arrangement.
The interest of the BMGF and a few other not-for-profit organizations
in the biofortification and functional food program is instructive and
symbolic in several respects. First, it identifies in a positive way the link
between agricultural biotechnology and public health, especially in lessdeveloped countries. The BMGF is already a significant player in
addressing the lapses in pharmaceutical R&D and in plugging the access
gap to essential drugs for needy population. As already noted, the access
freeze to essential drugs for needy populations is an aspect of the global
public health crisis that is now tackled both by a combination of therapeutic
and preventive strategies.
The biofortification project is mainly a
preventive public health strategy.
Increased interest of public, private and non-profit entities in the
HarvestPlus biofortification project will raise similar issues in regard to
intellectual property and proprietary control of research and innovation.
The CGIAR, its IARCs and the HarvestPlus program focus on germplasms
from publicly held gene banks. That does not necessarily settle the
intellectual property question, especially given the diversity of interest of
the multifarious collaborating institutions.
Also, the biofortification
program provides a platform R&D opportunity, with capacity for
expansion to other crops and markets beyond less-developed countries.

154.

Altieri, supra note 38; see also supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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That potential for expansion of the biofortification to program to developed
countries outside the public goods parameter will raise strong intellectual
property and market opportunities that stakeholders in the program will be
inclined to exploit.
As in the pharmaceutical R&D sector, a major challenge for all
stakeholders in the biofortification project is to develop a business model or
proprietary control strategy, including intellectual property that advances
their objectives. Presently, insofar as malnutrition in less-developed
countries accounts for a significant part of the global burden of disease, and
consequently a public health crisis, biofortification represents a viable
option for mitigating the crisis. As such, the global public goods argument
is equally applicable and provides an appropriate basis for leveraging
intellectual property or proprietary constraints in order to realize the full
benefits of this form of biotechnology intervention to public health.
V.

CONCLusIoN

Like most paradigmatic technologies, biotechnology, especially in the
context of agriculture, is a subject of controversy in some quarters. While
proponents and opponents of agricultural biotechnology are locked in deep
disagreement over the veracity of various claims made in regard to the
overall contributions of agricultural biotechnology, this has not slowed the
rapid pace of global uptake of agricultural technology as the source of
twenty-first century global food supply. Against the backdrop of historical
transformation in agricultural production, genetic engineering-driven
agricultural biotechnology marks a remarkable shift in the scientific
template of agricultural innovation. Such a change has opened modem
agriculture to greater opportunities that are often clouded by the ideological
and passionate oppositions to agricultural biotechnology as well as such
oppositions that arise from the global-political economics of agriculture,
especially in regard to food security.
However, a more pragmatic and prudent approach to the promise and
potentials of agricultural biotechnology easily demonstrates the benefits of
this form of innovation in other areas of need, particularly in regard to
malnutrition as a critical aspect of global public health crises, especially in
less-developed countries. It is possible that given the urgency and the crisis
undertone of malnutrition, a strategic deployment of agricultural
biotechnology in a constructive manner that adapts insights thereof to local
and cultural sensitivities of target populations and associated agricultural
practices could mitigate, if not help re-appraise, the characteristic
suspicions over agricultural biotechnology.
Like all paradigmatic
innovations, the challenge of agricultural biotechnology lies in negotiating
its access for those in need and in balancing its pros and cons and its
sustainability for ultimate public good. The choice is not between
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changing the food supply and changing consumer habits to meet health
needs. We need to do both. Agricultural biotechnology spurs important
evolutions within the food industry and opens opportunities, alongside
other forms of agricultural practices for a targeted revolution in nutritional
awareness and education with potential to positively impact nutritionrelated global public health crises, especially in the less-developed world.
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INTRODUCTION

Urban agriculture' takes many forms, including individual gardens on
privately owned land, neighborhood gardens, community gardens, and

* The landscape of urban agriculture is rapidly changing. During the time this article
was written, several of the cities featured passed new ordinances that amended existing
codes to accommodate urban agricultural activities. Every attempt was made to ensure
that the ordinances, policies, and programs discussed in this article were current at the
time of publication. However, ordinances that would amend some of the codes
discussed were proposed as this article went to press, and it is likely that the landscape
will continue to change as urban agriculture continues to flourishand command
attention. This article was originally written for the National Agricultural Law Center.
** Kathryn A. Peters received her J.D. from the University of Oregon. While earning
her J.D., she researched sustainability plans of major U.S. cities, including Portland,
Ore. and Seattle, Wash. During this time, her interest in urban agriculture and food
systems grew. She subsequently pursued a graduate degree in food and agricultural law
at the University of Arkansas. Ms. Peters expects to receive her LL.M. from the
University of Arkansas in the spring of 2012, upon completing her master's thesis,
which examines policies and legal issues pertaining to urban beekeeping. Ms. Peters
currently resides in West Virginia where she manages the agriculture and food policy
program for an environmental consulting firm.
1. Urban agriculture has been defined as: "an industry that produces, processes,
and markets food, fuel, and other outputs, largely in response to the daily demand of
consumers within a town, city, or metropolis, on many types of privately and publicly
297
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gardens located on church and school grounds, housing developments, and
other publicly owned property. The most essential factors for successful
urban agriculture efforts include land acquisition, zoning ordinances,
access to affordable water,2 infrastructure, and support services such as
education and outreach. Cities across the United States have formed task
forces with the mission of making their cities more sustainable or
strengthening the local food supply system; urban agriculture is
instrumental in both of these missions. Major cities across the United
States are recognizing the important role urban agriculture and local food
play in creating a healthy and vital community, including the City of
Seattle, which declared 2010 to be the Year of Urban Agriculture, 3 and the
City of Cleveland, which has declared 2012 the Year of Local Food.4
Securing suitable land is the crucial first step in establishing urban
agriculture projects. Most urban gardens are designed to be sustainable and
organic, due to their proximity to residences. The process of converting
land that has been used for non-agricultural purposes to fertile, productive
soil can take several years. Therefore, it is critical that land being
converted to urban agricultural use will be devoted to such use for a period
of time sufficient for urban gardeners to see the fruits of their labor.5 Land

held land and water bodies found throughout intra-urban and peri-urban areas.
Typically urban agriculture applies intensive production methods, frequently using and
reusing natural resources and urban wastes, to yield a diverse array of land-, water-,
and air-based fauna and flora, contributing to the food security, health, livelihood, and
environment of the individual, household, and community." JAC SMIT ET AL, U.N. DEV.
PROGRAMME, URBAN AGRICULTURE: FOOD, JOBS AND SUSTAINABLE CITIES 1 (2d rev.
2001).
2. See Erin Petersen, Urban Gardens Lead the Way for Water Policy in Milwaukee,
THIRDCOAST DIGEST (Apr. 15, 2011), http://thirdcoastdigest.com/2011/04/urbangardens-lead-the-way-for-water-policy-in-milwaukee/.
3. Food, SEATTLE.GOV: OFFICE OF SUSTAINABILITY AND ENVIRONMENT,
www.seattle.gov/environment/food.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2012). The intention of
Seattle's "2010: The Year of Urban Agriculture" campaign was to "promote urban
agriculture efforts and increase community access to locally grown food" by amending
the City's code to remove barriers to urban agriculture. Id. In August 2010, the City
passed an ordinance expanding permitted agricultural uses within the City. See infra
notes 242-266 and accompanying text (for a more detailed discussion).
4. CelebrationPoints, CITY OF CLEVELAND, http://portal.cleveland-oh.gov/
CityofCleveland/Home/Community/ThingsToDo/AlSummit/AnnualFocus (last visited
Oct. 11, 2011). As part of the City's Sustainable Cleveland 2019 campaign, the City
has identified nine "key areas fundamental to a sustainable economy." Id. Local Foods
will be the focus of the campaign in 2012, with five working groups established to
promote fresh food in school, local foods, long-term agriculture, sustainable microenterprise, and year-round local food. Id.
5. See Dorothy A. Borrelli, Note, Filly the Void: Applying a Place-BasedEthic to
Community Gardens, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 271, 279-80 (2008).
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trusts and long-term leases 6 are ways in which this can be accomplished.
Local zoning ordinances that establish urban agriculture as an allowed use
of urban land also foster urban agriculture. Funding for the establishment
and maintenance of urban agriculture projects is also critical.7 The City of
Seattle, through a recent two million dollar levy8 and its Neighborhood
Matching Fund Program,9 provides an example of a city committing
resources to the development of urban agriculture within the City.
While challenges exist, urban agriculture can provide many benefits
to cities and their residents. For example, urban agriculture can revitalize
depressed urban areas through neighborhood beautification, which in turn
can increase property values and halt urban flight. Further, conversion of
vacant lots in urban areas to agricultural use can reduce costs incurred by
cities for law enforcement (vacant lots are often places where criminal
activity occurs) and maintenance (vacant lots need to be mowed;' 0 they

6. The City of Seattle's P-Patch Community Garden Program works with residents
who wish to convert vacant or underused privately owned land to community garden
use and "will try to negotiate a lease of at least 5 years," or, if purchase of the land is
the only option, will "work with community groups to apply for sources of money,
such as private foundations, or public money available for open space." P-Patch
Community Gardens,SEATTLE.GOV: DEP'T OF NEIGHBORHOODS, http://www.seattle.

gov/neighborhoods/ppatch/start.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
7. According to the Portland Parks & Recreation Department, "[o]n average, a new
garden can require $50,000 for successful development." PORTLAND PARKS AND
RECREATION, COMMUNITY GARDENS TOOLKIT, available at http://www.portlandonline.

com/parks/index.cfm?c=52699&a=282909.
8. In 2008, Seattle voters approved the Parks and Green Spaces Levy, "that
included $2 million in funding for new community garden projects." Parks and Green
Spaces Levy, SEATTLE.GOV: DEP'T OF NEIGHBORHOODS, http://www.seattle.gov/

neighborhoods/ppatch/levy.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). The City of Milwaukee
also recently voted to provide funding to expand urban agriculture. The City plans to
contribute $425,000 to an "an ambitious urban agriculture program that could create
150 jobs for low-income central-city residents;" the program was proposed by Growing
Power, a Milwaukee-based nonprofit organization, which has promised to raise funds
to match the City's contribution at least dollar for dollar. Larry Sandler, Urban
FarmingProgram Gets Aid, JS ONLINE (Mar. 4,2011), http://www.jsonline.com/news/
milwaukee/Il 7447908.html.
9. In Seattle, residents can form groups to establish community gardens; after
acquiring a site, the group can apply to the Department of Neighborhoods for a
Neighborhood Matching Grant to provide funds to match the group's own labor. PPatch Community Gardens, supra note 6. Most sites require major improvements to
clear debris, improve the soil, install water source and build fences, compost bins and
tool sheds. Id.
10. The City of Cleveland spends $3.3 million annually to mow vacant lots.
Michael Tortorello, Finding the Potential in Vacant Lots, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/04/garden/finding-the-potential-in-vacant-lots-inthe-garden.html? r-4&pagewanted=1.
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may also be vandalized, used for illegal dumping, and infested with rats
and other pests).
Urban agriculture can provide job training for
marginalized segments of the population, including farming and marketing
skills. Similarly, urban farm stands provide residents with income
generating opportunities. Urban agriculture also addresses the growing
problem of food deserts and lack of affordable, fresh, healthy food for lowincome urban residents." These are just a few of the many benefits urban
agriculture can provide. Despite the many benefits of urban agriculture,
some urban residents are concerned about potential nuisance issues raised
by large-scale gardening and the keeping of animals in urban areas;
sanitation issues related to composting; and traffic and parking issues that
may result from the establishment of community gardens and neighborhood
farm stands. As cities work to promote urban agriculture, it is imperative
that they do so in a way that addresses these potential concerns.
This article provides an outline of many of the issues related to urban
agriculture, focusing on land use and zoning policies, and an overview of
what select cities, including Seattle, Washington; Portland, Oregon; Los
Angeles, California; Denver, Colorado; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Chicago,
Illinois; Cleveland, Ohio; and Baltimore, Maryland, are doing to promote
urban agriculture.
II.

LAND ACQUISITION ISSUES

In neighborhoods where lot areas are of sufficient size to
accommodate urban agriculture activities, land acquisition is not a
significant issue; however, residents in such neighborhoods may still wish
to convert unused vacant space into urban gardens to improve the
neighborhood and create a sense of community. In densely populated
urban areas, access to land for food production is a much more significant
issue. In either case, the policies of local governments and the efforts of
nonprofit organizations and community groups all contribute to the
establishment and maintenance of urban agriculture projects. Efforts to
secure land through use of public lands, land trusts, and long-term leasing
are discussed below; however, several creative land-acquisition techniques
merit brief mention here. In the City of Seattle, residents may use planting
strips for food production; certain restrictions apply and a free Street Use
permit is required in some circumstances.' 2
Redevelopment of

11. See Why is Urban Agriculture Important?,
http://www.ruaf.org/node/513 (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
12.

RUAF

FOUNDATION,

Growing Food in Planting Strips, SEATTLE.GOv: SEATTLE PUBLIC UTILITIES,

http://www.seattle.gov/util/Services/Yard/Natural Lawn & Garden Care/GrowingFo
odintheCity/PlantingStrips/index.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). "Many Seattle
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brownfields" into sites for community gardens and farmers' markets
provides another opportunity to transform unused land to agricultural use.14
Rooftops are also a popular spot for gardening where land is in short
supply; such gardens have become part of the restaurant-industry trend of
featuring locally-grown food." Vertical farming" utilizes buildings for
agriculture, "producing food in large, multi-story, urban buildings" while
"minimiz[ing] water use and waste output" through the use of aquaponic
farm techniques.17 Private land sharing for gardening is facilitated through
organizations such as Portland's Yardsharing.org'" and Urban Garden
Share, an innovative Seattle-based organization that hosts several websites
dedicated to "pair[ing] together eager gardeners with eager gardens" by
"[m]atching homeowners (with garden space) to gardeners (with
experience)."' 9 Homeowners and gardeners can create profiles and browse

residents are beautifying their streets by planting flowers, shrubs, and trees in the
planting (or "parking") strip in front of their property, between the sidewalk and street.
The Seattle Department of Transportation (SDOT) encourages this, but requires a free
permit for raised beds (or any structure) and tree planting, to insure that sightlines and
public safety are considered. Growing food is another option in the planting strip:
vegetables or berries - SDOT prohibits fruit trees because of the slipping hazard for
pedestrians from fallen fruit." Id.
13. "Brownfields are properties that are vacant or abandoned due to concerns about
real or perceived contamination on the property." EPA, How DOES YOUR GARDEN
GROW? BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT AND LOCAL AGRICULTURE (2010), availableat
http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/success/local ag.pdf.
14. Id.
15. See Rooftop Gardens: Urban Restaurants Are Raising The Roof (Literally) To
Put Garden-Fresh Eats On Your Plate, METROMIX CHICAGO (July 11, 2009),
http://chicago.metromix.com/restaurants/article/rooftop-gardens/1243828/content.
16. "Vertical farming uses many of the same techniques found in modern
greenhouses, but stacks them one on top of the other in order to create vertical farmland
that uses much less space than traditional fields. One indoor acre is equivalent to 4-6
outdoor acres or more, depending upon the crop." Michael Murray, Conversation:
Vertical Farms to Solve Future Food Crisis, ABC WORLD NEWS (Apr. 27, 2011),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/vertical-farming-solution-growing-global-foodinsecurity/story?id= 13463122.
17. Sarah Severson, After Success with Industrial Space, Designer Plans Urban
Farm, GAZETTE CHICAGO (Sept. 3, 2011), http://www.gazettechicago.com/index/
Conversion
2010/09/after-success-with-industrial-space-designer-plans-urban-farm/.
of a former meat packing plant into a vertical farm is underway in Chicago's historic
Stockyards Area, developing the building into a "test site using aquaponic farm
techniques throughout its four stories." Id.
18. PORTLAND'S YARDSHARING, http://www.yardsharing.org/ (last visited Oct. 11,
2011).
19. URBAN GARDEN SHARE, http://www.urbangardenshare.org/ (last visited Oct. 11,
2011).
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listings on the websites to successfully pair together. Urban Garden Share
currently serves eight areas throughout the United States.20
A. Publicly OperatedCommunity Gardens
Many cities run community garden programs, providing residents
low-cost access to garden plots on publicly owned land including city
parks. Such programs are often run by the city's community development
department or parks and recreation department or may be managed through
a University Extension Service. Community gardens may also be run by
nonprofit organizations through land trusts (see subsection B below).
Community garden plots are most often leased to residents for a low annual
rental fee, based on availability; many community gardens have waiting
lists for available plots. In addition to the garden plots, community garden
programs may also provide water, tools, garden inputs such as seeds and
compost, and education and training.
The City of Baltimore's Recreation and Parks Department has been
home to the City Farms program since 1978.21 Baltimore currently has
seven City Farms, located in seven different city parks, with a total of 640
garden plots available to Baltimore residents.2 2
Each plot offers
approximately 150 square feet of gardening space; the annual rental fee is
twenty dollars.23 City Farms participants may grow vegetables, herbs, and
flowers and "are responsible for the tilling, planting and seasonal
maintenance of their plots as well as the common areas." 2 4 In addition to
garden plots, City Farms provide participants with water, hoses, wood
chips, and leaf compost. 25
The City of Portland also runs its Community Gardens program
through the City's Parks and Recreation Department.26 In operation since
1975, Portland's Community Garden program currently has thirty-five
gardens located throughout the City. Plot sizes and annual fees vary from

20. Urban Garden Share currently serves Seattle, Washington; Whatcom County,
Washington; Bellingham, Washington; Louisville, Kentucky; Atlanta, Georgia; Boise,
Idaho; Santa Cruz, California, and Sonoma County, California. Id.
21. City Farms, CITY OF BALTIMORE, http://www.baltimorecity.gov/Government/
AgenciesDepartments/RecreationandParks/Programs.aspx (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Community Garden Program, PORTLAND PARKS & RECREATION,
http://www.portlandonline.com/parks/index.cfm?c=39846 (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
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year to year. 27 Despite its large number of community gardens, the
program has over 1,000 people on its waiting list; some Portland residents
"have been waiting for over 8 years for a garden plot in high-demand
areas." 28 In response to this shortage, the City is "working with partners to
reach [its] Climate Action goal of 1,000 new garden plots by 2012. ,29
addition to establishing and operating the City's Community Gardens,
Portland's Parks and Recreation Department also hosts programs,
workshops, and events, including children's and teens' gardening
programs; vegetable gardening, composting, and fruit tree workshops;
work parties; seed and plant exchanges; a community garden tour; and
various celebrations.3 0 It also provides information about the "numerous
resources in Portland that can help [residents] grow food by connecting
with other gardeners or usable yard space." 3' Working alongside the City's
Parks and Recreation Department is Friends of Portland Community
Gardens, a nonprofit organization established in 1985 "to provide support
to the Portland Parks and Recreation Community Gardens program on an
on-going basis." 32 Friends of Portland Community Gardens "is dedicated
to the improvement, advocacy and expansion of local community
gardening through fundraising activities, securing land [for gardens], and
organizing educational events and activities." 33

27. Community Garden Plot Request Form, PORTLAND PARKS & RECREATION,
http://www.portlandonline.com/parks/index.cfm?c=52116.
28.

Frequently Asked

Questions,

PORTLAND COMMUNITY GARDENS INITIATIVE

(2011), http://www.portlandonline.com/fish/index.cfm?c=50862&a=357075.
29.

1,000

Gardens,

NICK

FISH,

COMMISSIONER,

CITY

OF

PORTLAND,

http://www.portlandonline.com/fish/index.cfm?c=53380 (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
30. See PORTLAND PARKS AND RECREATION, COMMUNITY GARDENS TOOLKIT,
available at http://www.portlandonline.com/parks/index.cfm?c-52699&a=282909.
3 1.
32.

Id.
About

Us,

FRIENDS

OF

PORTLAND

COMMUNITY

GARDENS,

http://friendspdxgardens.org/facts.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
33. Funders

&

Partners, FRIENDS

OF

PORTLAND

COMMUNITY

http://depave.org/about/funders-partners/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2011).

GARDENS,
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B. Land Trusts3 4
The City of Seattle's P-Patch Community Gardening Program
provides an example of a program operated jointly by the City, a nonprofit
land trust, and volunteers.35 The P-Patch Program is primarily run through
the Seattle Department of Neighborhoods; its "[s]taff partner with
volunteers, the P-Patch Trust, 36 Seattle Housing Authority, and other
agencies to support, develop and manage community gardening in
Seattle." As of this writing, the P-Patch Community Gardening Program,
along with the P-Patch Trust, "oversees 75 P-Patches distributed
throughout the city, equaling approximately 23 acres, serving 4,400

34. "Land trusts are local, regional, statewide or national organizations that are
established to protect land and its resources. They may also be referred to as
conservancies, foundations, or associations. Their main purpose is to protect land that
has natural, recreational, scenic, historic, or productive value." Peggy Schear &
Thomas W. Blaine, Fact Sheet: Land Trusts, The OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY,
http://ohioline.osu.edu/cd-fact/1262.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2012). Land trusts
"initiate, implement, and monitor land protection devices for individual pieces of
Land
property or for larger land areas, depending on the trust's specific goals....
trusts often are formed to protect particular land related resources: forests, farmland,
open space, wetlands, or historic districts." Id Land trusts may protect land in various
ways, including, but not limited to, conservation easements, direct acquisition of land
through purchase or donation, and life estate plans. Id
35. See P-Patch community gardens - Growing Communities, SEATTLE.GOV: DEPT.
OF NEIGHBORHOODS, http://www.seattle.gov/neighborhoods/ppatch/ (last visited Oct.
12, 2011).
36. The P-Patch Trust, a nonprofit volunteer organization founded in 1979, "works
to acquire, build, preserve and protect community gardens in Seattle's neighborhoods."
P-PATCH TRUST, http://www.ppatchtrust.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2011). PPatch Trust targets its efforts on garden acquisition and development (the Trust is
chartered to "operate as a nature conservancy by acquiring, owning, conserving, and
preserving urban open spaces to be utilized as public community gardens") and also on
program support and advocacy (including "advocating organic principles, ensuring
access to low income gardeners, encouraging produce donations to food banks, and
preserving gardens through purchase"). Id. The Trust has a Building Gardens
Committee and a Growing Communities Committee, publishes a quarterly newsletter
(featuring "seasonal gardening tips, recipes, stories on inspirational gardeners, the
Trust's Board Presidents editorial and much much more"), provides funds for the
purchase of tools required to make the gardens function, hosts regular meetings for
garden leaders, incubates new programs, and "supports low-income gardeners through
a program that covers the cost of garden fees."
P-PATCH TRUST,
http://www.ppatchtrust.org/projects/, (last visited Oct. 12, 2011).
37. P-Patch Community Gardening Program, SEATTLE.GOv:
DEPT. OF
NEIGHBORHOODS, http://www.seattle.gov/neighborhoods/ppatch/gardening.htm (last
visited Oct. 12, 2011).
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gardeners." 3 8 The gardens "are located on municipal, county, state, and
other private & public lands."
Due to the growing demand for community gardening space in recent
years, the P-Patch Program's wait lists have increased; in an effort to
provide space to more residents, the P-Patch Program has established a
maximum square foot limit for plots and is also building new gardens with
community garden levy funds 40 and experimenting with alternative models
of community gardening, including "large tracts for food growth, collective
gardens that do not have individual garden plots, and giving gardens.'Al
Plot sizes vary from garden to garden (ranging from 40 to 2,500
square feet), "based on the overall garden size, the wait list length, the
population density of neighborhoods, and other programmatic goals."42
For 2011, the annual participant fees include a twenty-five dollar
application fee and a twelve dollar rental fee for each 100 square feet
gardened; a ten dollar alternative annual fee applies for accessible raised
beds and collective gardens.43 For residents who cannot afford to pay, plot
fee assistance is available." Gardeners are required to follow the Rules for
P-Patch Participants,45 must provide "seeds, soil, tools, and labor" and
contribute eight hours of community work per year in the collective areas
of the garden. 46 In addition to the use of land for gardening, P-Patch
provides participants with "[o]rganic fertilizer or cover crop, water, use of

38. P-Patchcommunity gardens-Growing Communities, supra note 35.
39. P-PATCH TRUST, http://www.ppatchtrust.org/p-patches/ (last visited Oct. 12,
2011). "The P-Patch Program maintains ongoing agreements with land-owners and
agencies but often land that P-Patches are on are not permanent." Id. Gardens are
located on property owned by the Seattle Department of Neighborhoods, the P-Patch
Trust (privately owned), Seattle Parks and Recreation, Seattle Department of
Transportation, Seattle City Light, Seattle Fleets and Facilities, Seattle Housing
Authority, King County Metro, and private parties. P-Patch Community Gardening
Program: Fact Sheet, SEATTLE DEPT. OF NEIGHBORHOODS (2010), available at
http://www.seattle.gov/neighborhoods/ppatch/documents/FactSheetnewcombined
version2012.pdf.
40. The community garden levy funds come from Seattle's 2008 Parks and Green
Space Levy. See supra note 8.
41. See P-Patchcommunity gardens-Growing Communities, supra note 35.
42. P-Patch Community Gardening Program, SEATTLE.GOv: DEPT. OF
(last
NEIGHBORHOODS, http://www.seattle.gov/neighborhoods/ppatch/gardening.htm
visited Oct. 12, 2011).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. P-Patch Community Gardening Program:Rules for Participants,SEATTLE.GOV:
DEPT. OF NEIGHBORHOODS, http://www.seattle.gov/neighborhoods/ppatch/documents/
StandardP-PatchRules.pdf.
46. P-Patch Community GardeningProgram,supra note 42.
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hoses, tools at most sites; [o]rganic gardening educational opportunities;" a
quarterly newsletter (published by the P-Patch Trust); and access to the PPatch Listserv. 7 Gardeners may grow small fruits, vegetables, flowers,
and herbs of their choice, but must "[g]arden organically (NO synthetic
chemicals including; pesticides, insecticides, herbicides, weed-killers, and
fertilizers)." 4 8 Gardeners are required to maintain their gardens year-round,
including providing for weed suppression and protection from rains in the
winter.49 P-Patch gardens are gathering spaces for the community and are
open to the general public, not merely P-Patch participants, to enjoy,
gather, and visit.50 P-Patch further fosters community building through its
"giving garden" program, which facilitates donations of fresh food to local
food banks; gardeners are encouraged to plant an extra row for donation
and many P-Patch gardens have "'food bank plots' that are communally or
individually gardened specifically to grow food for donation.",5
In
addition to its community gardening programs, P-Patch also runs several
programs directed towards low-income, immigrant, and youth populations,
including market gardening, youth gardening, and community food security
52
programs.
C. CreativeLeasing
Residents of the City of Milwaukee have several options for
community gardening. The City of Milwaukee promotes urban agriculture
by leasing publicly owned land or granting "seasonal garden permits" to
Milwaukee Urban Gardens, a nonprofit land trust established in 2000. 5
As a land trust, Milwaukee Urban Gardens "buy[s] land, lease[s] land, or
acquire[s] easements in order to secure land for gardens and communitymanaged open space." 54 Milwaukee Urban Gardens operates five gardens
on land it owns, eight gardens on land leased from the City of Milwaukee
under three-year leases, and several others under "seasonal garden
permits."55 Residents interested in community gardening can work with
Milwaukee Urban Gardens to obtain a "seasonal garden permit" to "garden
on City-owned land if there is not a development proposal pending for that

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
?page
54.
55.

Id
Id
Id
See P-Patch community gardens- Growing Communities, supra note 35.
P-PatchCommunity GardeningProgram,supra note 42.
P-Patchcommunity gardens - Growing Communities, supra note 35.
See About, MILWAUKEE URBAN GARDENS, http://milwaukeeurbangardens.org/
id=13 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
Id
Id.
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property."s6 Residents can also work with Milwaukee Urban Gardens to
obtain a lease for gardening on private property or apply to rent a garden
Milwaukee Urban Gardens
plot in an established community garden.
provides additional services to gardeners, including administrative and
organizational
assistance, 51 technical
assistance
and
resource
development,5 9 community collaboration, 60 and education.6' Additionally, it
sponsors events and celebrations in the gardens.62 Milwaukee residents can
also lease garden plots from the Milwaukee County Cooperative Extension
Urban Agriculture Program.63 The Program offers tilled and staked annual
plot rentals, available for the summer season, and a limited number of
"year 'round" plot rentals, intended to allow gardeners to grow perennial
vegetable crops as well as early and late season vegetables; gardeners of
"year 'round" plots are responsible for their own tilling and maintenance.

56. Latest News, Milwaukee Environmental Consortium, (Apr. 8, 2011),
"Th[e] permit will
http://www.milwaukeeenvironmentalconsortium.org/news/718.
guarantee that [the gardener] can harvest what (he or she] plant[s]. The permit is good
from about April 1 (or whenever [the] permit [is obtained]) through the end of
October." Id. Milwaukee Urban Gardens is the holder of the permit and will help
gardeners garden and provide insurance to cover gardeners. Id.
57. Id.
58. "MUG provides administrative and organizational support such as acquiring and
holding property, responsibility for paying the property taxes, liability insurance, and
acting as a fiscal agent for new groups." What We Do, Milwaukee Urban Gardens,
http://milwaukeeurbangardens.org/?page id=24 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
59. "MUG provides technical assistance for groups which may include securing on
site water for the garden, and connecting groups with resources to help sustain and
improve their community garden. MUG provides gardeners with group discounts and
in-kind donations of plants and seeds." Id.
60. Community collaboration activities include a Community Garden Collective
that provides "a space for discussion, resource sharing and learning. There are at least
two events per year, including the Spring Seed Swap and the Fall Community Garden
Tour." Id. Another is the Meet Me in the Garden Calendar, "a central location for
agricultural events and happenings around Milwaukee" including education workshops
about gardening. What We Do, supra note 58.
61. Milwaukee Urban Gardens conducts a backyard gardening course, Grow Your
Own Groceries, which "provides a detailed overview of organic gardening practices
and prepares participants for the challenges and rewards of starting a home garden.
Topics include: planning and crop rotation, healthy soil and composting, insect and
disease control, and much more!" Id.
62. Id.
63. See Urban Agriculture, MILWAUKEE COUNTY, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN
EXTENSION, COOPERATIVE EXTENSION, http://milwaukee.uwex.edu/agriculture/ (last

visited Oct. 20, 2011).
64. See Garden Rental, MILWAUKEE COUNTY, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN
EXTENSION, COOPERATIVE EXTENSION, http://milwaukee.uwex.edu/agriculture/garden-

rental/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
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The Program leases plots of various sizes, ranging from 400 to 900 square
feet; "[r]ental fees range from $23 for 400 square feet plots to $46 for 900
square feet plots." 6 5 In addition to renting gardens, the Milwaukee County
Cooperative Extension Urban Agriculture Program offers a Certified
Beekeeper program,66 an organic MircoFarm training program,67 an
Accessible Gardening program68 and runs its project FEEDs. 69
In the City of Denver, community gardens are operated
collaboratively by the City of Denver and Denver Urban Gardens, a
nonprofit organization established in 1985.70 The City provides a share of
the funding for Denver Urban Gardens' community garden operations7
and city and county agencies frequently partner with Denver Urban
Gardens "in garden lease agreements, program development, and
neighborhood improvement." 7 2 "Denver Urban Gardens has assisted
neighborhoods and community groups in establishing more than 100
community gardens across the Denver metro area."73 The gardens are
65. Id.
66. See Urban Agriculture, supra note 63.
67. "The Shoots n' Roots Urban MicroFarm Training program teaches small scale
vegetable growing ....
Participants learn organic methods to increase their food
production on a small scale to supplement their family's food budget or to begin
farming businesses." Id.
68. Through the Accessible Gardening program, "Extension Urban Agriculture
staff have been teaching gardeners with physical and developmental limitations the joy
and techniques of gardening. We train clients and caregivers at our innovative
accessible demonstration garden and adjacent greenhouse." Id.
69. FEEDs (Food, Ecosystem, and Educational Demonstration sites) builds
connections among gardeners to strengthen the community gardening movement. Id.
"Extension staff conduct workshops to help people create and sustain community
gardens. [They] enhance communication among gardeners through a website and
email list-serve." Id.
70. Mission and History, DENVER URBAN GARDENS, http://dug.org/mission-andhistory/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
7 1. "[DUG] currently receive[s] funding through a competitive grant program
offered by the Denver Office of Economic Development for [its] community garden
operations in the City and County of Denver." Frequently Asked Questions: What is
your relationship with city government?, DENVER
URBAN
GARDENS,
http://dug.org/faq/about-denver-urban-gardens/what-is-your-relationship-with-citygovernment.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). DUG also receives grants from other
government agencies and private and corporate foundations as well as donations from
community members. Frequently Asked Questions: How are you funded?, DENVER
URBAN
GARDENS,
http://dug.org/faq/about-denver-urban-gardens/how-are-youfunded.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
72. Frequently Asked Questions, What is your relationship with city government?,
supra note 71.
73. Frequently Asked Questions: Where are your gardens located, and who owns
the land?, DENVER URBAN GARDENS, http://dug.org/faq/gardening-in-a-denver-urban-
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located primarily on land leased through long-term leases from local
governments, schools, or other organizations; a small percentage of its
Denver
gardens are located on land owned by Denver Urban Gardens.
Urban Gardens leases garden plots of various sizes, generally
approximately 150 square feet; 75 plot fees also vary, averaging thirty-five
dollars, and are used to "cover the cost of water and other annual expenses
such as compost."7 6 Denver Urban Gardens provides assistance to lowincome gardeners through plot fee waivers and its "Free Seeds and
Transplants program" for low- to moderate-income residents.7 7 Denver
Urban Gardens also works with residents who wish to establish and
maintain community gardens, by providing "on-going technical expertise
with: 1. Securing sustainable land for gardens; 2. Designing and building
gardens; 3. Supporting garden organization, leadership, outreach and
maintenance; 4. Utilizing gardens as extraordinary places for learning and
healthy living; and 5. Linking gardens with related local food system
projects and policy."7 8 Denver Urban Gardens also offers education
opportunities through its school garden education and mentoring programs,
free public composting classes, on-site training workshops at its
community gardens, master community gardener training program, and
master composter program. 79 Denver Urban Gardens also provides an
extensive collection of resources for gardeners on its website, including
information on organic gardening; organic pest and weed control; crop
rotation, companion planting, when to plant; soil amendment, fertility, and
quality; extending the season, putting the garden to bed; water
conservation; harvesting, preserving foods, and saving seeds; composting;
beekeeping; and additional resources.80 Denver Urban Gardens hosts a

gardens-comm/where-are-your-gardens-located-and-who-owns-the-land.html
visited Oct. 24, 2011).

(last

74. Id.
75. FrequentlyAsked Questions: How big are the individualgardenplots?, DENVER
URBAN GARDENS, http://dug.org/faq/gardening-in-a-denver-urban-gardens-comm/how-

big-are-the-individual-garden-plots.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
76.

Frequently Asked

Questions,

How much does it cost?, DENVER URBAN

GARDENS, http://dug.org/faq/gardening-in-a-denver-urban-gardens-comm/how-muchdoes-it-cost.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
77.
78.

Id.
About Denver Urban Gardens, DENVER URBAN GARDENS, http://dug.orglabout-

dug/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
79. Education, DENVER URBAN GARDENS, http://dug.org/education/ (last visited
Oct. 24, 2011).
80. Community Resources, DENVER URBAN GARDENS, http://dug.org/communityresources/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
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series of events throughout the gardening season, including film screenings
and garden tours.81
As the demand for land for urban agriculture increases, cities are
looking at ways to utilize vacant, publicly owned land for agriculture. 82
The City of Baltimore is one city moving forward with a plan to put vacant
land into agricultural use. In March 2011, the Baltimore Department of
Planning and Department of Housing and Community Development issued
a Request for Qualifications ("RFQ") for Urban Agriculture in the City of
Baltimore.83 The purpose of the RFQ is to enable the agencies to "select a
pool of qualified applicants 84 who will then be eligible to be offered leases
with the City of Baltimore for urban agriculture activities on certain
properties."85 The agencies intend to lease 86 to qualified applicants up to
thirty-five acres of city-owned vacant land over the next three years for the
Applicants awarded leases will be
purpose of urban farming ventures.
responsible for securing their own funding; however, grants or loans from
the City may be available to support infrastructure costs." Land leased
81. Events and Workshops Calendar,DENVER URBAN GARDENS, http://dug.org/
events-workshops/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
82. In addition to the Baltimore and Richmond programs discussed in this section,
in July 2011, the City of Boston's Mayor announced that the City had released its
Request for Proposals for its Pilot Urban Agriculture Project. See Press Release, City
of Boston, City Seeks Proposals for Pilot Urban Agriculture Project (July 11, 2011),
available at http://www.cityofboston.gov/news/Default.aspx?id=5188.
"The Project
proposes to put three vacant, city-owned properties in Dorchester to productive use for
farming, with the goal of producing fresh, healthy food for sale in the community." Id.
83. Request for Qualificationsfor Urban Agriculture in the City of Baltimore PreSubmission Conference, BALTIMORE OFFICE OF SUSTAINABILITY (Apr. 8, 2011),
http://www.baltimoresustainability.org/media/newsDetail.aspx?id= 174.
84. "Qualified applicants can include not-for-profit organizations, for-profit
organizations or a partnership between any of these entities." BALTIMORE CITY DEP'T
OF PLANNING & DEP'T OF Hous. AND CMTY. DEv., REQUEST FOR QUALIFICATIONS:
URBAN
AGRICULTURE
IN
THE
CITY
OF
BALTIMORE
2, available at
http://cleanergreener.highrockhosting2.com/uploads/files/Urban%20Agriculture%20RF
Q%203.25.11 .pdf [hereinafter Request for Qualifications]. In the RFQ, the agencies
stated the offering of vacant city-owned land for the purpose of urban agriculture is
"intended to 1) develop successful entrepreneurial urban farms throughout the City of
Baltimore, 2) ameliorate the problem of food deserts in Baltimore City neighborhoods,
3) transform vacant and unused land to achieve economic, social and environmental
benefits." Id
85. Id.
86. "Selected Respondents will have the opportunity to negotiate a 5-year Land
Leasing Agreement (LLA) with a potential 5-year extension (and at least a 2-year
notice to vacate) setting forth the terms and conditions of the lease and development of

the site." Id. at 12.
87.
88.

Id. at 2.
Requestfor Qualifications,supranote 84.
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through the program may be used for entrepreneurial, educational, or
charitable sustainable urban agriculture; animal husbandry, including
chickens and apiaries, will not be "permitted in at least the first year of
farm production."8 9
In March 2011, the City of Richmond, Virginia announced
unanimous approval of the Mayor's "proposed ordinance of offering City
property to non-profit organizations, civic associations, community groups,
and other eligible entities to be developed into community gardens." 90
Pursuant to the ordinance and the Richmond Grows Gardens Program, the
City of Richmond is offering city property for community gardens91 and
commercial gardens.92 Community gardens, available only to incorporated,
unincorporated, and government organizations, "require[ ] a permit
between the organization (Garden Group) and the City;" the permit entitles
the Garden Group to use city property for non-commercial agriculture
activities for no more than twelve-months from the date of issuance. 93 The
permit fee is fifty dollars for the first year with an annual renewal fee of
twenty-five dollars; 94 Garden Group Applicants must satisfy additional
requirements specified by the City in order to obtain a permit. 95 The permit
is "revocable and terminable at will for any reason, upon due notice, by

89. Id.
90. Mayor's Community Garden Program Approved by City Council, CITY OF
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA (Mar. 29, 2011), http://richmondvaannouncements.blogspot.com/
2011/03/mayors-community-garden-program.html.
91. The City of Richmond "define[s] a community garden as: A portion of city
owned property used to grow fruits, vegetables, flowers, herbs, wood products, native
or ornamental plants for non-commercial purposes, i.e. where there is no exchange of
goods for monetary value." Community Gardens, CITY OF RICHMOND, VIRGINIA,
http://www.richmondgov.com/content/CommunityGarden/index.aspx (last visited Oct.
16, 2011). The City "offer[s] city property for community gardens to incorporated
organizations, unincorporated organizations and governmental organizations via an
online application process." Id. The City encouraged Garden Groups to "engage with
individual gardeners by creating their own policies to rent plots or otherwise let
individuals use their parcel." Id.
92. The City of Richmond "define[s] a commercial garden as: A portion of city
owned property leased from the City of Richmond and used by the lessee to grow
fruits, vegetables, flowers, herbs, wood products, native or ornamental plants to
exchange for monetary value off-site." Id. The City "offer[s] city property for
commercial gardens to eligible applicants who must negotiate a lease with the city's
Department of Economic and Community Development. The lease also requires
approval by City Council." Id.
93. Community Gardens, supra note 91.
94. Id.
95.

See generally CITY OF RICHMOND, RICHMOND GROws GARDENS: RULES AND

GUIDELINES (Feb. 2,2011), availableat http://www.richmondgov.com/content/
CommunityGarden/RulesAndGuidelines.aspx.
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either the City or the Garden Group." 96 Groups may divide a parcel into
plots and may charge approved gardeners a limited fee for the use of such
plots. 97 Commercial Gardens require a negotiated lease (up to five years
with renewal periods) between the applicant and the City; the lessee may
use such leased city property for commercial agricultural activities,
provided all sales occur off-site.98 Animals and livestock are prohibited on
Community Gardens, but are "allowed on a Commercial Garden if
permitted under applicable City code provisions and the terms of the
lease." 99 All participants in the Richmond Grows Gardens Program must
meet the requirements and comply with the City's rules and guidelines,
which are available on the City's Community Gardens website.'oo
Ill.

CODE-RELATED ISSUES

Determining which agricultural activities are permitted within an
urban area can be a complex task; municipal ordinances, zoning and
building codes, animal control regulations, and health codes may all
contain provisions that apply to agricultural activities within an urban area.
Zoning applies to urban agriculture in a variety of ways.' 0 ' Under a city or
county zoning code, agricultural activity as a primary use may be permitted
by right or as a conditional use 0 2 or may be prohibited within particular
established zone districts of an urban area; cities may also establish urban
agriculture districts.103 Agricultural activities may also be permitted as an
accessory use.104 Zoning codes and ordinances may apply to the keeping of
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Community Gardens,supra note 91.
See id.
See id.
Id.
CITY OF RICHMOND, supra note 95.
See Patricia E. Salkin, Trends in Urban Agriculture, ST020 ALL-ABA 621, 633

101.
(2011).
102. An activity or use that is permitted by right is an activity or use that is allowed
without special approval by the zoning authority. See Permitted Uses, aka "Use by
Right, " EXTENSION http://www.extension.org/pages/26509/permitted-uses-aka-use-byright (last visited Oct. 16, 2011). Depending on the zoning code ordinance, a use that
is permitted by right may or may not require the issuance of a permit. See id. A
conditional use is an activity that is allowed within a zoning district, but only upon the
issuance of a conditional use (or special use) permit, which requires approval by the
zoning authority. See id.
103. The City of Cleveland recently established an Urban Garden District as part of
its Zoning Code; community gardens and market gardens are permitted by right in the
Urban Garden District. See infra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
104. Accessory land uses are land uses or activities that are customarily conducted in
association with a principal and primary use, but which are incidental and subordinate
to the principal use. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS,
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bees, chickens, and other livestock within the urban area; health codes and
animal regulations may also apply to the keeping of animals. In addition,
zoning will generally address whether structures incidental to agricultural
activities, such as storage sheds, market stands, greenhouses, and
hoophouses are permitted and provide specifications for such structures
when they are permitted. These and other code related issues are discussed
in detail below.
A. Zoning and UrbanAgriculture

As discussed above, zoning applies to urban agriculture in a variety of
ways. City zoning codes that fail to include urban agriculture or urban
gardening as a permitted by right or conditional use can stymie urban
agriculture. Converting urban land to agricultural use requires sweat equity
and financial investment;' 0 5 uncertainty regarding the legality of urban
agriculture may deter such investments. In addition, zoning codes can
unintentionally create barriers to urban agriculture. For example, height
restrictions for vegetation on urban lots, tree planting and fencing
requirements, and similar landscaping regulations may impede urban
agriculture efforts.1 06 However, in response to Food Policy Task Force
findings,'0o Sustainability Plans, 0 8 and local organizations formed to

LAND USE PLANNING & DEv. REGULATION LAW 75-76 (2d ed. 2003). Accessory uses

may be permitted-by-right or require a conditional use permit; restrictions and
limitations on such uses may apply. See generally id.
105. Financial costs include land acquisition; soil testing and, when necessary,
remediation; gardening tools and equipment; and building materials for construction of
raised beds, fencing, composting bins, and garden sheds.
106. For example, residential zoning districts in the City of Seattle have tree planting
requirements; the planting of required trees may shade out prime food production areas.
See SEATTLE, WASH., SEATTLE MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 23, §§ 23.44.008(1), 23.45.524(B)
(2010). In addition, cities may require fencing or similar barriers for urban agricultural
uses. See id. § 23.42.051(B)(3). Such requirements may be cost-prohibitive for urban
agriculture activities in low-income populations.
107. Increasing concern over urban food deserts has prompted an interest in urban
agriculture. For example, the City of Baltimore's Food Policy Task Force has
recommended that community gardens and urban farming be supported to increase
access to healthy food in the City. See Press Release, City of Baltimore, Baltimore
City Food Policy Task Force Makes Citywide Recommendations for a Healthier
Baltimore (May 11, 2010), available at http://www.baltimorecity.gov/Officeofthe
Mayor/NewsMedialtabidl66/ID/365/BaltimoreCityFood PolicyTaskForceMakes
Citywide Recommendations for a HealthierBaltimore.aspx.
108. The City of Chicago's Sustainable Development Division of the Department of
Zoning and Land Use Planning's long-term initiatives include "the promotion of urban
agriculture and other aspects of the local food system." What We Do: Sustainable
Development, CITY OF CHICAGO, http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/dcd/

314

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 7

promote urban agriculture,109 cities around the United States have either
recently amended or are considering amending local zoning codes to foster
and promote urban agricultural activities. The cities surveyed for this
report illustrate the wide range of zoning policies concerning urban
agriculture.
The City of Portland contains a provision in its Zoning Code
authorizing the use of parks and open spaces for community gardens." 0 In
addition, under Portland's Zoning Code, agriculture use.. is permitted by
right in Portland's Open Space Zones,112 Employment and Industrial
Zones,113 and low-density Single Dwelling Zones;"14 in Portland's mediumdensity Single Dwelling Zones, agriculture is a conditional use." 5
Agriculture is also a conditional use in zones that are primarily commercial
in nature.'16 In January 2011, the City of Portland initiated the Urban Food
Zoning Code Update Project."' 7 Pursuant to the project, the City plans to
"update its zoning code to promote traditional and emerging ways of
producing and distributing food" by addressing five topics: farmers
markets, community gardens, urban food production, community food
distribution points, and animals and bees." t
In the City of Detroit, small-scale urban agricultural use is becoming
increasingly common; however, "Detroit's zoning code currently does not

provdrs/sustain.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
109. For example, the Milwaukee Urban Agriculture Network, a nonprofit
collaborative effort between Milwaukee individuals and organizations, is "focused on
advancing awareness of, and activities and policies that will promote, the many ways
that local production of food benefits a community." About MUAN, MILWAUKEE
URBAN AGRICULTURE NETWORK, http://www.mkeurbanag.org/Main/AboutMUAN (last
visited Oct. 23, 2011).
110. "Parks And Open Areas are uses of land focusing on natural areas, large areas
consisting mostly of vegetative landscaping or outdoor recreation, community gardens,
or public squares." PORTLAND, OR., PLANNING AND ZONING CODE tit. 33, § 33.920.460
(2010).
Ill. "Agriculture includes activities that raise, produce or keep plants or animals."
Id.§ 33.920.500. However, "[p]rocessing of animal or plant products, including milk,
and feedlots," livestock auctions, and "[p]lant nurseries that are oriented to retail sales"
are not agriculture uses. Id.
112. See PORTLAND, OR., PLANNING AND ZONING CODE tit. 33, § 33.100.100 (2010).
113. See id. § 33.140.100.
114. See id.§ 33.110.100.
115. See id.
116. See id § 33.120.100.
117. About the Urban Food Zoning Code Update Project, PORTLAND ONLINE:
BUREAU OF PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.portlandonline
.com/bps/index.cfm?a=334906&c=53834.
118. Id
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allow agriculture in any land use category."" 9 In response to the growing
interest in agricultural use of urban land, the City is reviewing its zoning
policy; the City Planning Commission has been working on an urban
agriculture draft policy, based upon recommendations made by the Urban
Agriculture Workgroup, to establish a vision and strategy as well as codes
and standards to promote urban agriculture in Detroit.120
However, the City Planning Commission's process has been
complicated by Michigan's Right to Farm Act. 21 The Act, created in
1981, aimed to protect rural farms from the effects of suburban sprawl by
"render[ing] commercial farms immune to nuisance lawsuits and exempt
from local zoning codes as long as they comply with standards set by the
Michigan Agricultural Commission."1 22 The Act was revised in 2000 to
expressly "preempt any local ordinance, regulation, or resolution that
purports to extend or revise in any manner the provisions of th[e] act or
generally accepted agricultural and management practices developed under
th[e] act."1 23 Under the Act, local governmental units may seek an
exemption, which would allow the local government to set different
standards; however, such an exemption may only be granted "if adverse
effects on the environment or public health will exist within the local unit
of government."1 24
While Michigan's Right to Farm Act protects rural farms, it also
threatens to prevent cities within the state from promoting urban
agriculture. The standards contained in the Act were intended to apply to
farms in rural areas and are not necessarily stringent enough to protect
urban residents from possible negative impacts of urban agriculture;1 25
unfortunately, the Act applies to all commercial farms, regardless of their
location. While the impacts of commercial urban farms on neighboring
residents may be significant, absent an adverse effect on the environment

119. Kami Pothukuchi, To Support Sustainable Urban Agriculture, Detroit Needs
Exemption From Michigan's Right To Farm Law, THE MICHIGAN CITIZEN (Sept. 18,
http://michigancitizen.com/to-support-sustainable-urban-agriculture-detroit2011),

needs-exemption-from-mic-p9230-77.htm.
120. See Nancy Kaffer, Detroit Officials Work to Create Zoning Code for Urban
Farming,CRAIN's DETROIT BusINESS (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.crainsdetroit.com/
article/20100323/FREE/100329977/#.
121. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 286.471-286.474 (2011).
122. Kristin Choo, Plowing Over: Can Urban Farming Save Detroit and Other
Declining Cities? Will the Law Allow It?, ABAJOURNAL (Aug 1, 2011), available at
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/plowingover can urban-farmingsave
detroit and other declining_cities_will/.
123. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 286.474(6) (2011).
124. Id. §286.474(7).
125. See Choo, supra note 122.
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or public health significant enough to warrant an exemption, the Act
precludes local governments and residents from taking any action to
mitigate adverse effects beyond those provided in the Act. In an attempt to
remedy the conflict, a House Bill was introduced to the Michigan
Legislature in September 2010 that would amend the Act to exempt a city
with a population of 900,000 or more;12 6 if enacted, Michigan's Right to
Farm Act will not apply to the City of Detroit. At this point, it remains to
be seen how the conflict between the Act and the City's future urban
agriculture policy will be resolved; for now, the City is promoting urban
agriculture by choosing to not enforce its Zoning Code.127
In September 2011, the Chicago City Council approved an ordinance
amending the City's Zoning Code to promote urban agriculture.128 Prior to
the passage of the ordinance, Chicago residents were permitted to use a
portion of their personal lots for gardening, but the sale of produce was not
permitted.129 Furthermore, only in limited circumstances were farms
located within the City permitted to sell their produce.13 0 "Community
gardens" were permitted by right in certain types of parks (mainly
community and neighborhood parks), but were not permitted in open
space/natural areas,131 nor were they expressly permitted in any other
zoning districts within the City, including Residential districts.
"Commercial greenhouses" were permitted by right in the Community
Shopping District' 32 as well as all Commercial" and some Manufacturing
Districts. 134 "Commercial Farm, Rooftop" was a permitted-by-right use in

126. H.D. 6458, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2010).
127. Choo, supra note 122.
128. See Press Release, The City of Chicago, Mayor Emanuel Commends City
Council Approval of Ordinances Supporting Affordable Housing, Improved Access to
Jobs and Urban Farms (Sept. 8, 2011), available at http://www.cityofchicago.org/
city/en/depts/mayor/press room/press releases/201 1/september 2011/mayoremanuel
commendscitycouncilapprovalofordinancessupportinga.html.
129. In 2004, the City of Chicago updated its zoning and the code permitting urban
agriculture was removed. Lindsay Banks, How Chicago Does and May Do Zoningfor
Urban Ag, THE LOCAL BEET CHICAGO ED. (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.thelocalbeet
.com/2010/11/02/how-chicago-does-and-may-do-zoning-for-urban-ag/. Residents were
still permitted to use up to twenty percent of their lots for gardening, but were not
permitted to sell their produce. Id. Farms that were grandfathered in, granted a
variance, or were considered Commercial Use (Commercial Uses are not permitted in
Residential Zones) were allowed to sell their produce. Id.
130. See id.
131. See CHICAGO, IL., MUNICIPAL CODE OF CHICAGO tit. 17, § 17-6-0203 Use Table
and Standards (2010).
132. See id. § 17-3-0207 Use Table and Standards.
133. See id.
134. See id. § 17-5-0207 Use Table and Standards.
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all Commercial,135 Downtown,' 36 Manufacturing, 3 7 and Planned
Manufacturing Districts.'3 8
In the Community Shopping District,
"Commercial Farm, Rooftop" was a special use requiring approval.' 39 The
City's Zoning Code did not contain category descriptions for the
"Community Garden," "Commercial Greenhouse," or "Commercial Farm,
Rooftop" uses.
The City of Chicago recognized that its Zoning Code lacked the
specificity required to foster urban agriculture; 4 0 in December 2010,
Chicago's then-acting Mayor, Richard M. Daley, introduced new zoning
provisions to the City Council. 141 Category descriptions for "Community
Gardens" 42 and "Commercial Gardens or Greenhouses,"143 as well as a
definition for "Hydroponic Systems"144 were included in Mayor Daley's
proposed zoning amendment. Community gardens, limited to 18,750
square feet in most zones,145 would have been permitted-by-right in all
zones other than Industrial Zones, Open Space/Natural Areas, and
135. CHICAGO, iL., MUNICIPAL CODE OF CHICAGO tit. 17 §17-3-0207 Use Table and
Standards (2010).
136. See id. 17-4-0207 Use Table and Standards.
137. See id. 17-5-0207 Use Table and Standards.
138. See id. 17-6-0403-F Use Table and Standards.
139. See id. 17-3-0207 Use Table and Standards.
140. "Though private and public gardens are currently allowed in Chicago, along
with small agricultural sites affiliated with certain businesses, the Zoning Code does
not provide the specificity that large urban agriculture sites need to thrive and expand,
especially in terms of commercial growing." News Release, City of Chicago, Zoning
Amendment Would Nourish Urban Agriculture Citywide (Dec. 8, 2010), available at
http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/mayor/press rooml/press releases/press-re
leasepdfs/2010 city council0/7803.res.
141. City of Chicago, Zoning Ordinance Proposal (Dec. 8, 2010), available at
http://mayor.cityofchicago.org/etc/medialib/mayor/ordinances/ordinancespdfs-by20
10/december 08 201 O.Par. 11995.File.dat/UrbanAgOrforCCintro.html.
142. The Chicago Zoning Ordinance Proposal defines a Community Garden as "[a]
neighborhood-based development with the primary purpose of providing space for
members of the community to grow plants for beautification, education, recreation,
community distribution or personal use. Sites owned and managed by public or civic
entities, nonprofit organizations or other community-based organizations that are
responsible for maintenance and operations. Processing, storage and sale of plants or
plant products are prohibited on site." Id. at sec. 8.
143. The Chicago Zoning Ordinance Proposal defines a Commercial Garden or
Greenhouse as the "lp]ropagation, processing and storage of plants products for
wholesale or retail sales. Typical uses include but are not limited to, growing beds,
hoop houses, greenhouses, vertical farming and hydroponic systems." Id.
144. The Chicago Zoning Ordinance Proposal defines Hydroponic System as the
"[p]ropagation of plants using a mechanical system designed to circulate a solution of
minerals in water with limited use of growing media." Id. at sec. 9.
145. See id. sec. 7.

318

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 7

cemeteries;146 storage, processing, and sales of produce would not have
been permitted in community gardens.147
Commercial gardens or
greenhouses, which would have been allowed to store, process, and sell
plant products, 14 would have been permitted-by-right in some Business,
Commercial, Industrial, and Planned Manufacturing Districts.149 While
Mayor Daley's proposed ordinance provided more specificity and
expanded the agricultural activities permitted within the City, stakeholders,
including the Chicago Food Policy Advisory Council, were concerned the
proposal was too restrictive.i1o
In July 2011, Chicago's newly inaugurated Mayor Rahm Emanuel
announced a more expansive urban agriculture ordinance proposal.' 5 '
Mayor Emanuel's proposed ordinance was approved by the Chicago City
Council in September 2011.152 In a press release announcing the approval,
Mayor Emanuel stated, "[t]he City worked with its sister agencies, urban
agriculture experts and community members in an effort to help strengthen
community ties and turn available empty lots into viable, productive urban
green spaces."
Chicago's new urban agriculture ordinance contains category
descriptions for the "Urban Farm" use, 154 including "Indoor Operation," 5 5

146. See id. sec. 1, amendment to § 17-2-0207 Use Table & Standards; sec. 2,
amendment to § 17-3-0207 Use Table & Standards; sec. 3, amendment to § 17-4-0207
Use Table & Standards; sec. 5, amendment to § 17-6-0203E Use Table.
147. See id. sec. 8.
148. See id.
149. See id. sec. 2, amendment to § 17-3-0207 Use Table & Standards; sec. 4,
amendment to § 17-5-207 Use Table & Standards; sec. 6, amendment to § 17-6-0403-F
Use Table & Standards.
150. The Chicago Food Policy Advisory Council (a nonprofit organization that
"advocates for responsible food and agriculture policy recommendations and promotes
systemic changes creating self-reliance for all communities in obtaining their food")
has prepared a response to Chicago's urban agriculture zoning, available at THE
CHICAGO FOOD POLICY ADVISORY COUNCIL, http://chicagofoodpolicy.org/CFPAC%
20Response%20to%2OUrban%20Agriculture%20Zoning%2OAmendment.pdf
151. See Press Release, City of Chicago, Mayor Rahm Emanuel And Alderman
Ameya Pawar Introduce Ordinance To Support Urban Agriculture, Create Jobs, And
Expand Access To Fresh, Healthy Food Across Chicago (July 28, 2011) (on file with
author).
152. See Press Release, City of Chicago, Mayor Emanuel Commends City Council
Approval of Ordinances Supporting Affordable Housing, Improved Access to Jobs and
Urban Farms (Sept. 8, 2011) (on file with author).
153. Id.
154. "Urban Farm. Growing, washing, packaging and storage of fruits, vegetables

and other plant products for wholesale or retail sales." Chicago, Ill., Ordinance
S02011-6411 sec. 9 amendment to § 17-17-0100 (Sept. 8, 2011).
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"Outdoor Operation,"' 56 and "Rooftop Operation"' as well as for the
"Community Garden" use; 158 the ordinance also defines "hydroponic
system," 159 "aquaponic system,"',6 0 and "apiary."'61 Community Gardens,
are permitted-by-right in all Residential,1 62 Business,163 Commercial," and
Downtown Distncts;l Community Gardens in these districts may not
exceed 25,000 square feet.' 66 Community Gardens are still permitted-byright in certain types of parks within the Parks and Open Space District;167
there is no size restriction for Community Gardens within this district. 168
The ordinance also contains standards for accessory buildings 69 and
155. "Indoor Operation. All allowed activities must be conducted within completely
enclosed buildings.
Typical operations include greenhouses, vertical farming,
hydroponic systems and aquaponic systems." Id.
156. "Outdoor Operation. Allowed activities are conducted in unecnclosed [sic]
areas or partially enclosed structures. May include indoor operations in conjunction
with outdoor operations. Typical operations include growing beds, growing fields,
hoophouses and orchards." Id.
157. "Rooftop Operation. All allowed activities occur on the roof of a principal
building as a principal use or accessory use. Typical operations include growing beds
and growing trays." Id.
158. "Community Garden. A neighborhood-based development with the primary
purpose of providing space for members of the community to grow plants for
beautification, education, recreation, community distribution or personal use. Sites
managed by public or civic entities, nonprofit organizations or other community-based
organizations that are responsible for maintenance and operations. Processing and
storage of plants or plant products are prohibited on site. Gardening tools and supplies
may be stored within an accessory building that is in compliance with Section 17-90103.5-B of the Municipal Code." Id.
159. "Hydroponic system. Propagation of plants using a mechanical system designed
to circulate a solution of minerals in water with limited use of growing media." Id. at
sec. 10 amendment to § 17-17-0200.
160. "Aquaponic system. The symbiotic propagation of plants and fish in an indoor,
constructed and recirculating environment." Chicago, Ill., Ordinance S02011-6411 at
sec. 10 amendment to § 17-17-0200 (Sept. 8, 2011).
161. "Apiary. Keeping or propagation of honeybee colonies for collection of honey
or other bee products. Up to five (5) colonies may be kept as an accessory use to the
primary activity on the site." Id.
162. See Chicago, Ill., Ordinance S02011-6411 sec. I amendment to § 17-2-0207
Use Table and Standards.
163. See id. sec. 2 amendment to § 17-3-0207 Use Table and Standards.
164. See id.
165. See id. sec. 3 amendment to § 17-4-0207 Use Table and Standards.
166. See Chicago, Ill., Ordinance S02011-6411 sec. 7 § 17-9-0103.5-A.
167. See Chicago, Ill., Ordinance S02011-6411 sec. 5 § 17-6-0203.5-A.
168. See Chicago, Ill., Ordinance S02011-6411 sec. 7 § 17-9-0103.5-A.
169. "Accessory buildings, such as sheds, greenhouses, hoophouses or farmstands
shall comply with the requirements of 17-9-0201-D. Hoophouses or other fabric based
shelters, which are not required to obtain a building permit shall not be considered
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composting 70 on Community Gardens; on-site sales are permitted, but are
"limited to incidental sales of plants or produce generated on site."'71
Indoor Urban Farm Operations are permitted-by-right in the
Community Shopping District,172 the Downtown Service District,'73 and all
Commercial,'174 Manufacturing, 17' and Planned Manufacturing Districts.176
Outdoor Urban Farm Operations are permitted-by-right in all Commercial
Districts, most Manufacturing Districts,'7 some Planned Manufacturing
Districts,179 and the Downtown Service District.'80 Rooftop Urban Farm
Operations are permitted-by-right in all Commercial," Downtown,182
Manufacturing, 83 and Planned Manufacturing Districts,184 and by special
permit in the Community Shopping District.'85 The ordinance imposes
square footage limitations for the accessory sales of goods produced on site
on all categories of Urban Farm Operations in the Manufacturing and
Planned Manufacturing Districts.' 8 6
The ordinance also contains

accessory buildings. Hoophouses or other fabric based shelters shall be securely
attached to the ground and designed and constructed to comply with appropriate
standards in Title 13 of the Municipal Code of Chicago." Id. § 17-9-0103.5-B.

170. "Composting is limited only to the materials generated on site, and must be used
on site, and must otherwise comply with the standards of Section 7-28-715 of the
Municipal Code." Id. § 17-9-0103.5-C.
171. Id. § 17-9-0103-D.
172. See id. sec. 2 amendment to § 17-3-0207 Use Table and Standards.
173. See Chicago, Ill., Ordinance S02011-6411 sec. 3 amendment to § 17-4-0207
Use Table and Standards.

174.
175.
176.
177.

See id. sec. 2 amendment
See id. sec. 4 amendment
See id. sec. 6 amendment
See id. sec. 2 amendment

to
to
to
to

§ 17-3-0207 Use Table and Standards.
§ 17-5-0207 Use Table and Standards.
§ 17-6-0403-F Use Table and Standards.
§ 17-3-0207 Use Table and Standards.

178. See Chicago, Ill., Ordinance S02011-6411 sec. 4 amendment to § 17-5-0207
Use Table and Standards.
179. See id. sec. 6 amendment to § 17-6-0403 Use Table and Standards.
180. See id. sec. 3 amendment to § 17-4-0207 Use Table and Standards.
181. See id. sec. 2 amendment to § 17-3-0207 Use Table and Standards.
182. See id. sec. 3 amendment to § 17-4-0207 Use Table and Standards.
183. See Chicago, Ill., Ordinance S02011-6411 sec. 4 amendment to § 17-5-0207
Use Table and Standards.
184. See id. sec. 6 amendment to § 17-9-0103.2 Use Table and Standards.
185. See id. sec. 2 amendment to § 17-3-0207 Use Table and Standards.
186. Urban Farm Operations in the Manufacturing and Planned Manufacturing
Districts are permitted to use a maximum of 3,000 square feet for accessory sales of

goods produced on site. See id. sec. 4 amendment to § 17-5-0207 Use Table and

Standards; id. sec. 6 amendment to § 17-6-0403-F Use Table and Standards.
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provisions that relax landscaping, Parkway Tree, and fencing,87 on Urban
Farms and provides standards for composting.
The nearby City of Milwaukee includes "plant nursery or
greenhouse"' 8 9 and "raising of crops or livestock" 90 as potentially
permissible agricultural uses in its Zoning Code.'9 1 Under Milwaukee's
Zoning Code, both agricultural uses are permitted as a matter of right in all
Residential and Industrial Zones.' 92 In addition, in the Parks District, the
"raising of crops or livestock" use is permitted as a matter of right,193 and
"plant nursery or greenhouse" use is permitted as a limited use' 94 - the
facility must "be owned and operated by a governmental agency or
entity." 95
The City of Cleveland has had an "Urban Garden District" in its
Zoning Code since 2007.196 According to the ordinance, "community
gardens' 97 which may have occasional sales of items grown at the site" and
187. See id. sec. 7 amendment to § 17-9-0100.
188. "Composting is limited to the materials generated on site only, and must comply
with the standards of Section 7-28-715 of the Municipal Code. Incidental sales of such
compost material is expressly allowed as an accessory use to the principal use of an
Urban Farm." Id.
189. A plant nursery or greenhouse is defined as "an establishment engaged in
growing crops of any kind within or under a greenhouse, cold frame, cloth house or
lath house, or growing nursery stock, annual or perennial flowers, vegetables or other
garden or landscaping plants. This term does not include a garden supply or
landscaping center." MILWAUKEE, Wis., CITY OF MILWAUKEE ZONING CODE s. 295201-455 (2010).
190. Raising of crops or livestock is defined as "the growing of crops, including any
farm, orchard, community garden or other premises or establishment used for the
growing of crops, or the use of land or buildings for the keeping of cows, cattle, horses,
sheep, swine, goats, chickens, ducks, turkeys, geese or any other domesticated
livestock if permitted by the health department under the provisions of ch. 78." Id.
295-201-473.
191. See id. 295-203-14.
192. See id. ss. 295-503-1, 295-803-1.
193. See id. s. 295-902-2-a.
194. MILWAUKEE, Wis., CITY OF MILWAUKEE ZONING CODE s. 295-902-2-a (2010).
195. Id. s. 295-903-2-b-2.
196.

CLEVELAND, OH., CODIFIED ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF CLEVELAND tit. VII,

ch. 336 (2010). The Urban Garden District was: "established as part of the Zoning
Code to ensure that urban garden areas are appropriately located and protected to meet
needs for local food production, community health, community education, gardenrelated job training, environmental enhancement, preservation of green space, and
community employment on sites for which urban gardens represent the highest and
best use for the community." Id. § 336.01.
197. The Zoning Code defines a community garden as: "an area of land managed and
maintained by a group of individuals to grow and harvest food crops and/or non-food,
ornamental crops, such as flowers, for personal or group use, consumption or donation.
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"market gardens,' 98 including the sale of crops produced on the site" are the
two main uses permitted in the Urban Garden District.199 Under
Cleveland's Zoning Code, once a community garden is designated an
Urban Garden District, the garden is protected from development without a

public process. 200
In the summer of 2010, the Denver City Council adopted a
comprehensive new Zoning Code. In effect since June 2010, the new
Zoning Code addresses agricultural uses within the City, including
"Gardens,"2 0' and "Urban Gardens."202 Under Denver's new Zoning Code,
Urban Gardens are a permitted primary use with limitations in all zoning
districts in the City; 203 such use is permitted only after review and approval
under Denver's zoning permit review process.204 Gardens are a permitted
accessory use to a primary residential use with limitations in all zoning
districts in the City except for the Downtown Civic Zone; 205 a zoning

Community gardens may be divided into separate plots for cultivation by one or more
individuals or may be farmed collectively by members of the group and may include
common areas maintained and used by group members." Id. § 336.02(a).
198. The Zoning Code defines a market garden as "an area of land managed and
maintained by an individual or group of individuals to grow and harvest food crops
and/or non-food, ornamental crops, such as flowers, to be sold for profit." Id. §
336.02(b).
199. Id. § 336.03.
200. See Dustin Brady, Councilman Introduces First Zoning Designation For
Community Gardens, PLAIN PRESS (Sept. 2007), http://www.nhlink.net/plainpress/
html/stories/200709/councilmanintroducesnewzoning.htm.
201. Garden is defined as "[t]he growing and cultivation of fruits, flowers, herbs,
vegetables, and/or ornamental plants." DENVER, COLO., DENVER ZONING CODE art. 11,
div. 12.7.2 (2010).
202. Urban Garden is defined as "[1]and that is (1) managed by a public or nonprofit
organization, or by one or more private persons, and (2) used to grow and harvest
plants for donation, for personal use consumption, or for off-site sales by those
managing or cultivating the land and their households." Id. art.l I div. 11.12.6(B)(2).
203. See DENVER ZONING CODE art. 3, § 3.4.4; art. 4, § 4.4.4; art. 5, § 5.4.4; art. 6, §
6.4.4; art. 7, § 7.4.4; art. 8, § 8.9.4; art. 9, § 9.7.9.5 (2010).
204. The zoning permit review process is detailed in DENVER ZONING CODE art. 12, §
12.4.1. "The purpose of the zoning permit review process is to ensure compliance with
the standards and provisions of this Code, while encouraging quality development in
Denver reflective of the goals, policies, and strategies found in the Comprehensive
plan." Id. § 12.4.1.1.
205. Such Garden use is subject to the general accessory use limitations contained in
DENVER ZONING CODE art. i1, § 11.7. See DENVER ZONING CODE art. 3, § 3.4.4; art. 4,
§ 4.4.4; art. 5, § 5.4.4; art. 6, § 6.4.4; art. 7, § 7.4.4; art. 8, § 8.9.4; art. 9, § 9.7.9.4.
Such use is also subject to specific limitations regarding maintenance, detached
structures, and the growing of medical marijuana. DENVER ZONING CODE art. 11, §
11.8.4.1. In addition, "[i]n a Residential Zone District, where permitted with
limitations, retail or wholesale sales of goods or products derived from a Garden

2011] CURRENT AND EMERGING ISSUES IN THE NEW URBAN AGRICULTURE

323

permit review is not required.206 Gardens are a permitted accessory use to
primary nonresidential use with limitations in all zones of the City; 207 a
zoning permit review is not required.208
The City of Los Angeles also addresses agricultural uses in its Zoning
209
Code.
In May 2010, the City passed an urban agriculture ordinance,
which clarified the City's urban agriculture policies and allows for the
cultivation and sale of fruits, nuts, flowers, or vegetables in many zone
districts within the City. 210 The ordinance, in effect since July 2010, adds
to the Los Angeles Municipal Code definitions for "farming" and "truck
gardening." 2 11 Farming is defined as "[t]he cultivation of berries, flowers,
fruits, grains, herbs, mushrooms, nuts, ornamental plants, seedlings or
vegetables for use on-site or sale or distribution on-site or off-site."212
Truck gardening is defined as "[t]he cultivation of berries, flowers, fruits,
grains, herbs, mushrooms, nuts, ornamental plants, seedlings or vegetables
for use on-site or sale or distribution off-site."2 13 Under the current Zoning
Code, farming is a permitted use in Agricultural ZoneS2 14 and under power
transmission rights-of-way in the Public Facilities Zone. 215 Farming is also
216
Truck gardening is a permitted
a permitted use in Industrial Zones.

accessory to a primary residential use are prohibited in a Residential Zone District." Id.
§ 11.8.4.5.
206. DENVER ZONING CODE art. 3, § 3.4.4; art. 4, § 4.4.4; art. 5, § 5.4.4; art. 6, §
6.4.4; art. 7, § 7.4.4; art. 8, § 8.9.4.
207. Such uses are subject to the general accessory use limitations contained in
DENVER ZONING CODE art. 11, § 11.7. See DENVER ZONING CODE art. 3, § 3.4.4; art. 4,
§ 4.4.4; art. 5, § 5.4.4; art. 6, § 6.4.4; art. 7, § 7.4.4; art. 8, § 8.9.4; art. 9, § 9.7.9.4. The
general accessory use limitations prohibit the growing of medical marijuana "as
accessory to a primary nonresidential use established in a Residential Zone District."
DENVER ZONING CODE art. 11, § 11.7.1.3(C).
Such uses are also subject to specific limitations pertaining to maintenance, detached
structures, beekeeping, and the sale of produce. See id. § 11.10.9.
208. See DENVER ZONING CODE art. 3, § 3.4.4; art. 4, § 4.4.4; art. 5, § 5.4.4; art. 6, §
6.4.4; art. 7, § 7.4.4; art. 8, § 8.9.4.
209. The stated purpose of the Comprehensive Zoning Plan of the City of Los
Angeles "is to consolidate and coordinate all existing zoning regulations and provisions
into one comprehensive zoning plan in order to designate, regulate and restrict the
location and use of buildings, structures and land, for agriculture, residence, commerce,
trade, industry or other purposes ..... L.A., CAL. L.A. MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 1, § 12.02
(2011).
210. See L.A., Cal. Ordinance 181188 sec. 1 (July 18, 2010).
211. See id.
212. Id
213. Id
214. See L.A. MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 1, §§ 12.05A6, 12.06A2f.
215. See id § 12.04.09B1.
216. See id §§ 12.17.5B3a, 12.17.6A1, 12.1811, 12.19Al.5, 12.20Al.
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primary use in many zones, including Suburban Zones,217 select Residential
and Mixed-Use Zones,218 and the Mobilehome Park Zone.2 19 Truck
gardening is also permitted as a Home Occupation use in many zones;220
truck gardening is subject to the Home Occupation regulations "if the main
use of the lot is a dwelling." 22 1 Under the Zoning Code, on-site sales and
distribution in connection with truck gardening as a Home Occupation use
are not allowed.222
The City of Baltimore is currently in the process of comprehensively
rewriting its Zoning Code. Under the current Zoning Code of Baltimore
City, activities related to agriculture are permitted in many zoning districts,
either as a primary use or an accessory use. For example, in the Open
Space Districts, conservatories and greenhouses are a permitted primary
223
use223 and agricultural
gardens are permitted as an accessory use. 224 In
many of the City's Residence Districts, "[a]gricultural uses, including
nurseries and truck gardens" are a permitted primary use, but "only if: (i)
no retail sales are made on the premises; and (ii) no offensive odor or dust
is created"225 and minimum lot area requirements are met.226 In addition,
"[g]reenhouses used to grow plants as a hobby or for the resident's
personal use" are permitted as an accessory use in all of the City's
Residence Districts. 227 Greenhouses are a permitted primary use in the City
of Baltimore's Industrial Districts. 2 2 8

217. See id. §§ 12.07A6, 12.07.01A3, 12.07. 1A3.
218. See id. §§ 12.08A3, 12.09Al, 12.10AI, 12.10.5Al, 12.11AI, 12.11.5Al,
12.12Al.
219. See L.A. MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 1, § 12.09.3B4.
220. See id. §§ 12.05Al6a3, 12.06Al, 12.07Al2, 12.07.01A8, 12.07.1A8, 12.08A8,
12.08.lB5, 12.08.386, 12.08.5B4, 12.09A6, 12.09.3B8, 12.09.5B5, 12.10A6,
12.10.5A1, 12.11 Al, 12.11.5A1, 12.12A1.
221. Id. § 12.05A16e.
222. See id. § 12.05Al6a19.
223. See BALTIMORE, MD., ZONING CODE OF BALTIMORE CITY tit. 3A, § 3A-104(3)
(2010).

224. See id. § 3A-105(2).
225. Id. at tit. 4 §§ 4-201(2), 4-301, 4-401, 4-501, 4-601, 4-701.
226. Some Residence Districts require a minimum lot area of 21,900 square feet for
primary agricultural uses. See id. §§ 4-206(a), 4-306(a), 4-406(a), 4-506(a). Other
Residence Districts require a minimum lot area of 15,000 square feet for primary
agricultural uses. See id. §§ 4-606(a), 4-706(a). Where agricultural uses are permitted
as a primary use, no minimum yard depth requirements apply for such uses. See id. §§
4-207(a), 4-307(a), 4-407(a), 4-507(a), 4-607(a), 4-707(a).
227. See id. § 4-202(8), 4-302, 4-402, 4-502, 4-602, 4-702, 4-802, 4-902, 4-1002, 41102, 4-1202, 4-1302. The Zoning Code provides specifications for the amount of lot
area that may be covered by accessory uses. See id. §§ 4-206(b), 4-306(b), 4-406(b), 4-

506(b), 4-606(b), 4-706(b), 4-806(b), 4-906(b), 4-1006(b), 4-1106(b). Greenhouses are
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In the summer of 2010, the City released the Baltimore Zoning Code:
Draft 1.0; based on public comments, the City updated its first draft and
released the Baltimore Zoning Code: Draft 2.0 in July 2011.229 The current
version of the Zoning Code Draft defines "Community-Managed Open
Space" 230 and "Urban Agriculture" 23 1 and details the activities permitted in
such use zones.
Under the Draft, Community-Managed Open Spaces are "limited to
the cultivation of herbs, fruits, flowers, or vegetables, including the
cultivation and tillage of soil and the production, cultivation, growing, and
harvesting of any agricultural, floricultural, or horticultural commodity.
They may also include community gathering spaces for active or passive
recreation; however playground equipment is prohibited." 232 The keeping
of livestock and animals is permitted in Community-Managed Open
SpaceS233 but such activities are subject to additional regulations.234

also permitted as an accessory use in the Office Residence Districts. See ZONING CODE
OF BALTIMORE CITY tit. 5, § 5-202(1).
228. See BALTIMORE, MD., ZONING CODE OF BALTIMORE CITY tit. 7,

§§ 7-206(45), 7306(1), 7-406(1) (2010).
229. See Baltimore City PlanningDept., CITY OF BALTIMORE, http://www.baltimore
city.gov/Government/AgenciesDepartments/Planning.aspx (last visited Oct. 18, 2011).
230. The Zoning Code Draft defines Community-Managed Open Space as "[a]n open
space area maintained by more than one (1) household that is used for the cultivation of
fruits, flowers, vegetables or ornamental plants, or as a community gathering space for
passive or active recreation, excluding playgrounds." BALTIMORE, MD., BALTIMORE
ZONING CODE: DRAFT 2.0 tit. 1, § 3 (July 2011), available at http://www.transform
baltimore.net/portal/transv2/transdraft2?pointld=d67498e329#section-d67498e329.
231. The Zoning Code Draft defines Urban Agriculture as "[the cultivation,
processing, and marketing of food within the City, which may or may not include the
use of intensive production methods, structures for extended growing seasons, and
onsite sale of produce. It may also involve animal husbandry, aquaculture, agroforestry, vineyards and wineries, and horticulture. 'Urban Agriculture' is characterized
by a primary emphasis on income generating agricultural activity and the operation of
the farm as a business enterprise." Id.
232. Id. tit. 14, § 14-305(1). The Draft addresses environmental risks where a
community-managed open space will be used for the production of food for
consumption. "The community-managed open space must demonstrate a match
between identified environmental risks and how the site is used. For any communitymanaged open space use that involves the cultivation of plants for human consumption,
the applicant must use imported, clean soil and an impermeable barrier between the
new soil and existing soil. Alternatively, soil testing can be used to measure nutrients,
heavy metals and any other harmful contaminants that may be present. The applicant
must present, as part of the use permit, the soil testing results and proposed remediation
methodology, if needed, to ensure that cultivated plants are safe for consumption." Id.
§

14-305(3).
233. See id.

§ 14-305(2).
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Urban Agricultural uses involving animal husbandry, processing of
food produced on site, spreading of manure or other nutrient-rich
fertilizers, spraying of agricultural chemicals, and/or the use of heavy
equipment such as tractors would require preparation of "a management
plan, subject to approval by the Director of Planning, that addresses how
the activities will be managed to avoid impacts on surrounding land uses
and natural systems."2 35 The Draft also provides standards for accessory
structures and farm stands and for soil quality where an agricultural use
involves the cultivation of plants for consumption.236
The Draft proposes that Community-Managed Open Spaces would be
permitted by right in most zoning districts, including, but not limited to the
Open Space, Detached and Semi-Detached Residential, Rowhouse and
Multi-Family Residential, Commercial, Industrial Mixed-Use Zones,
Office Residential District, and the Transit-Oriented District (TOD).237
Urban Agriculture would be a conditional use in most zones including, but
not limited to, Open Space, Detached and Semi-Detached Residential,
Rowhouse and Multi-Family Residential, Office Residential District, and
Commercial Use Zones; Urban Agriculture would be permitted by right in
some Industrial Use Zones.238 The Draft further promotes agriculture
within the City by permitting a height exception for rooftop greenhouses,239
and by expressly permitting greenhouses and hoop-houses in rear yards.240
The City of Baltimore Department of Planning intends to accept public
comments on the revised Draft through December 5, 2011 and to present a
final draft to the City Council in 2012.241
In August 2010, the City of Seattle passed an ordinance 24 2 that
updated the urban agriculture land use provisions to increase allowed
agricultural uses in many zones and also allow residents to sell food grown

234. See infra notes 304-314 and accompanying text for a discussion on how
Baltimore regulates the keeping of livestock and animals.
235. BALTIMORE, MD., BALTIMORE ZONING CODE: DRAFT2.0 tit. 14, § 14-333(l) (July
2011).

236. See id. § 14-333(3)-(6).
237. See id. tit. 7, § 7-201, tit. 8, § 8-201, tit. 9, § 9-201, tit. 10, § 10-201, tit. 11, §
11-201, tit. 12, § 12-301, tit. 12, § 12-402.
238. See id. tit. 7, § 7-201, tit. 8, § 8-201, tit. 9, § 9-201, tit. 10, § 10-201, tit. 11, §
1 l-201, tit. 12, § 12-301.
239. See id. tit. 15, § 15-301(b)(7).

240. See id. § 15-507.
241.
242.

See Baltimore City PlanningDept., supra note 241.
SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 123378 (Aug. 23, 2010).
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on their property.243 The ordinance expanded the Seattle Land Use Code's
definition of "agricultural use" beyond "animal husbandry," 244
247
"aquaculture," 245 and "horticulture" 246 to include "community garden"
249
248
to the Land Use Code's
and added "greenhouse"
and "urban farm,"
250
community gardens are
Code,
amended
the
Under
listed definitions.
251
permitted outright as a principal use in all zones; however, in designated
Manufacturing and Industrial Centers, community gardens are "permitted
only on rooftops and/or as vertical farming." 252 Urban farms with not more
243. Press Release, Seattle City Council, Seattle City Council Approves Urban Farm
and Community Garden Legislation Improving Access to Locally Grown Food (Aug.
16, 2010), available at http://www.seattle.gov/council/newsdetail.asp?ID= 10996
&Dept-28.
244. The Seattle Municipal Code defines animal husbandry as "a use in which
animals are reared or kept in order to sell the animals or their products, such as meat,
fur or eggs, but does not include pet daycare centers or animal shelters and kennels.
Examples of animal husbandry uses are poultry farms and rabbitries." SEATTLE,
WASH., SEATTLE MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 23, § 23.84A.002 "A" (2010). The keeping of
animals, including small animals, domestic fowl, bees, and farm animals is not
considered animal husbandry. See Client Assistance Memo 244, CITY OF SEATTLE:
DEP'TOF PLANNING &DEV. (2010), availableat http://webl.seattle.gov/dpd/cams/
CamDetail.aspx?cn=706.
245. The Seattle Municipal Code defines aquaculture as "a use in which food fish,
shellfish or other marine foods, aquatic plants, or aquatic animals are cultured or grown
in fresh or salt waters in order to sell them or the products they produce. Examples are
fish farms and shellfish beds." SEATTLE MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 23, § 23.84A.002 "A."
246. The Seattle Municipal Code defines horticulture as "a use, other than an urban
farm, in which plants are grown for the sale of them or their products or for use in any
business, and in which other customarily incidental products may be sold. Examples
include nurseries with greenhouses and garden stores." Id.
247. The Seattle Municipal Code defines a community garden as "a use in which land
managed by a public or nonprofit organization, or a group of individuals, is used to
grow plants and harvest food or ornamental crops from them for donation or for use by
those cultivating the land and their households. Examples include P-Patch community
gardens administered by the Department of Neighborhoods." Id.
248. The Seattle Municipal Code defines an urban farm as "a use in which plants are
grown for sale of the plants or their products, and in which the plants or their products
are sold at the lot where they are grown or off site, or both, and in which no other items
are sold. Examples may include flower and vegetable raising, orchards and vineyards."
Id.
249. The Seattle Municipal Code defines a greenhouse as "a structure or portion of a
structure, made primarily of glass or other translucent material, for which the primary
purpose is the cultivation or protection of plants." Id. § 23.84A.014 "G."
250. See SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 123378 secs. 24-25 (Aug. 23, 2010).
251. See SEATTLE MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 23, §§ 23.43.006(E), 23.44.006(C),
23.45.504(B) and Table A, 23.46.004(A), 23.47A.004(B) and Table A, 23.48.004(A),
23.49.042(A), 23.49.090(A), 23.49.142(A), 23.50.012(A) and Table A.
252. See id. § 23.50.012(A) and Table A.
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than 4,000 square feet of planting area are permitted outright in all
Residential Zones; urban farms exceeding 4,000 square feet of planting
area may be permitted as a conditional use.253 Urban farms in Residential
Zones are subject to provisions regulating use of mechanical equipment
and motor vehicles, sales, deliveries, location, structures, and signs. 2 54
Applicants seeking a conditional use permit for an urban farm in a
Residential Zone must submit a management plan that addresses potential
215
In Neighborhood
impacts and proposes mitigation measures.
Commercial and Industrial Zones, urban farms of any size are permitted
outright as a principal or accessory use;256 in designated Manufacturing and
Industrial Centers, urban farms are "permitted only on rooftops and/or as

vertical farming." 25 7
In addition to expanding allowable agricultural activities, the
ordinance also established exemptions from several zoning regulations for
urban farms, community gardens, the keeping of animals and greenhouses.
Under the Seattle Land Use Code as amended, the "establishment of an
urban farm, or community garden, that is permitted outright" and the
"keeping of animals as permitted" are excepted from the general approval
procedures required by the Code for "[tlhe establishment or change of use
of any structures, buildings or premises, or any part thereof."25 8 Urban
farms and related structures are also excepted from the requirement that all
accessory uses and structures in single-family residential zones "must be
located on the same lot as the principal use or structure."259 In addition, in
some zones, including Midrise and Highrise Residential, Commercial,
Mixed-Use, Downtown, and Industrial zones, greenhouses dedicated to
food production are allowed to exceed applicable height restrictions by
fifteen feet, provided size restrictions and applicable setback requirements
are met.260
B. Keeping ofAnimals

As the interest in urban gardening has grown, issues associated with
the keeping of animals in urban areas have also been garnering attention in

253. See id. §§ 23.43.040(E), 23.44.042, 23.45.504(C)(8).
254. See id § 23.42.051(A).
255. See id §23.42.051(B).
256. See SEATTLE MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 23, §§ 23.47A.004(B) and Table A,
23.50.012(A).
257. Id. § 23.50.012(A) and Table A.
258. Id tit. 23, § 23.40.002(A)(1) and (3).
259. Id § 23.44.040(B).
260. See
id.
§§
23.45.514(G)(8),
23.47A.012(D)(6),
23.48.010(F)(5),
23.49.008(D)(2)(d), 23.50.020(A)(5).
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cities across the United States. In particular, the keeping of chickenS261
and/or bees in urban areas has become more prevalent in recent years, as
evidenced by the passage of several municipal ordinances discussed below.
Some cities allow a wider variety of animals to be kept in certain urban
zoning districts, including other fowl, rabbits, and goats. The structure and
scope of regulations regarding the keeping of animals within urban areas
vary greatly among municipalities.
Depending on the municipality, the keeping of animals may be
addressed in zoning codes, health codes, and/or animal control regulations.
Zoning regulations may allow and provide specifications for structures on
urban lots for the housing of animals. A municipality may choose to
regulate each allowed species through individual regulations or a variety of
species may be covered under one broad regulation. The keeping of
animals within an urban area may be permitted by right or may be a
conditional use, or the keeping of animals may be prohibited. Where the
keeping of animals is permitted by right, the municipality may still require
an individual to obtain a permit and/or license; neighborhood approval may
be required and fees may apply. In addition to applicable local regulations,
nuisance262 and tort liability are additional factors to be considered prior to
engaging in urban animal keeping. Federal and state regulations may also
apply to the keeping of animals.263
The City of Milwaukee provides an example of a city that recently
passed ordinances to allow the keeping of bees and chickens within city
limits, subject to permit requirements and payment of a fee. In 2010, the
City passed an ordinance that allows residents within the City limits to
keep up to two hives of honey bees on private property.264 Under the
ordinance, only beekeeperS265 may keep honey bees in the City; 266

261. In recent years, numerous websites dedicated to providing information about
chicken keeping have been launched. For example, see http://www.eggzy.net/, which
EGGZY,
provides information on flock management and egg production.
http://www.eggzy.net (2010).
262. See Patricia E. Salkin, Feeding the Locavores, One Chicken at a Time:
Regulating Backyard Chickens, Zoning and Planning, 34 A.L.1. 4 (2011), available at
http://files.ali-aba.org/thumbs/datastorage/skoobesruoc/pdf/CTO20_chapter 34
thumb.pdf (discussing the application of nuisance law to keeping animals).
263. For example, "a number of federal and state health and food safety laws apply to
egg and poultry production." Id. at 4.
264. See MILWAUKEE, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. 78-6, s. 78-6-3 (2010).
265. According to the City's Code of Ordinances, a beekeeper is "a person who owns
or has charge of one or more colonies of bees and has demonstrated to the
commissioner that he or she has obtained formal education or sufficient practical
experience to act as a beekeeper." Id. ch. 78-1, s. 78-1-5.
266. See id. ch. 78-6, s. 78-6-1.
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furthermore, an annual permit must be obtained.267 Obtaining a permit to
keep bees requires submission of an application, payment of a fee,2 68 an
inspection, and neighborhood approval. 269 The ordinance includes detailed
rules for the keeping of honey bees, including, but not limited to, setback
requirements, proper maintenance of the hives, water supply requirements,
and flyway barrier requirements. 2 70 In addition, the ordinance contains a
provision addressing aggressive characteristics in a hive 2 71 and prohibits the
keeping of hives that "cause any unhealthy conditions or interfere with the
normal use and enjoyment of human or animal life of others, any public
property or property of others." 2 72
In May 2011, the Milwaukee Common Council voted to legalize
chicken-keeping throughout the City on a one-year trial basis.273 On
residential premises, the keeping of up to four chickens is allowed upon
issuance of a permit; permits will not be issued for commercial or mixeduse properties.274 The keeping of roosters and the slaughtering of chickens
are not allowed.275 In order to obtain a permit to keep chickens, a resident
must complete an approved site plan and "[c]omplete a Neighbor Approval
Statement Form from every neighbor required per the ordinance" and pay a
one-time fee of thirty-five dollars.276 Requirements for the care of chickens
and the provision of adequate housing, 277 including size requirements and
267. See id
268. Id The annual fee for keeping bees is $80. Id. ch. 60-7, s. 60-7-7.
269. See MILWAUKEE, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. 78-6, ss. 78-6-1, 78-6-2.
Prior to the issuance of a permit, the commissioner of health shall notify "all property
owners within a circular area having a radius of 200 feet, centered on the premises for
which a permit has been requested." Id. at 78-6-2. Any such property owners
objecting to the granting of the permit have fourteen business days to file a written
objection and request a hearing. See id.

270. See id. § 78-6-3.
271. "In any instance in which a hive exhibits unusually aggressive characteristics it
shall be the duty of the beekeeper to destroy or re-queen the hive. Queens shall be
selected from stock bred for gentleness and non-swarming characteristics." Id § 78-63-i.
272. Id § 78-6-3-j.
273. Larry Sandier, Milwaukee Common Council Allows Residents to Keep Chickens,
JS ONLINE (May 24, 2011), http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/122520844
.html.
274. Chickens Information Page, CITY OF MILWAUKEE: DEPT. OF NEIGHBORHOOD
SERVICES, http://city.milwaukee.gov/chicken (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
275. Id

276. Id
277. "Chickens shall be provided with a sanitary and adequately-sized, covered
enclosure, or coop, and shall be kept in the enclosure or a sanitary and adequately-sized
and fenced enclosure, or yard, at all times. Chicken coops and enclosures may not be
homes or garages." Id
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restrictions and setbacks for such enclosures, are contained in the
ordinance.27 8 In addition, the ordinance contains several provisions
regarding nuisance and public health. 27 9 To assist residents in complying
with the chicken-keeping regulations, the City maintains a "Chickens
Information Page" on its website 2 80 and provides a brochure containing all
necessary information regarding keeping chickens in the City.281
In February 2009, the City of Cleveland revised its Municipal Code to
allow "the keeping of small livestock, including bees, in all neighborhoods
of Cleveland."28 2 As amended, Cleveland's Zoning and Health Codes
contain detailed sections titled "Restrictions on the Keeping of Farm
Animals and Bees."2 83 The purpose of the Zoning Code's restrictions is "to
permit the keeping of farm animals and bees in a manner that prevents
nuisances to occupants of nearby properties and prevents conditions that
are unsanitary or unsafe."284 The regulations contained in the Health Code
prevent any person engaging in the keeping of animals from "creat[ing]
noxious or offensive odors or unsanitary conditions which are a menace to
the health, comfort or safety of the public." 2 85 Cleveland's Health Code
requires anyone proposing to keep farm animals or bees on a property
within the City to apply for a two-year license 2 86 with the City's

278.
279.

See id.
See Chickens InformationPage,supra note 274.

280. See id.
281.
THE

CITY OF MILWAUKEE: DEPT. OF NEIGHBORHOOD SERVICES, REQUIREMENTS OF
available at
ORDINANCE,
COOP
CHICKEN
MILWAUKEE
OF
CITY

http://city.milwaukee.gov/ImageLibrary/User/tweile/pdf/broc/DNS-361_V3Chicken
Brochurewbl.pdf.
282.

Land

Use &

Planning, CLEVELAND-CUYAHOGA

COUNTY

FOOD POLICY

COALITION, http://cccfoodpolicy.org/working-group/land-use-planning (last visited Oct.
15, 2011).
283. CLEVELAND; OH., CODIFIED ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF CLEVELAND tit. 1, ch.
205, § 205.04; tit. VIl, ch. 347, § 347.02 (2010).
284. Id. tit. VII, ch. 347, § 347.02(a).
285. Id tit. 1,ch. 205, § 205.02.
286. The applicant must provide: "l) the name, phone, phone number and address of
the applicant; (2) the location of the subject property; (3) the size of the property; (4)
the number of animals or bee hives to be kept on the property; (5) a description of any
proposed cages, coops, beehives, fences or enclosures; (6) a scaled drawing showing
the precise location of cages, coops, enclosures, beehives, stables and fences in relation
to property lines and to houses on adjacent properties; (7) a description of the manner
by which feces and other waste materials will be removed from the property or will be
treated so as not to result in unsanitary conditions or in the attraction of insects or
rodents; (8) in the case of a lot that is vacant or has no occupied residence,
documentation demonstrating that the use will be managed in a manner that prevents
the creation of nuisances or unsanitary or unsafe conditions; (9) a signed statement
from the property owner, if the applicant is not the property owner, granting the
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Department of Health; payment of a fee is also required. 287 The Director of
Public Health may deny a license if there is evidence of a nuisance or an
unsafe or unsanitary condition relative to the subject property.2 88 Prior to
the issuance of an initial license, the applicant's site plan must be approved
by the Department of Building and Housing; in residential districts, twentyone days notice and an opportunity to comment must be provided "to the
owner of each property directly adjoining the property that is the subject of
the license application."289
The regulations contained in Cleveland's Zoning Code govern the
species and number of animals and/or beehives allowed.2 90 In residential
districts, residents are allowed no more than one chicken, duck, rabbit, or
similar animal for each 800 square feet of parcel or lot area2 91 and no more
than one beehive for each 2,400 square feet of lot area.2 92 In residential
districts, on parcels of land at least 24,000 square feet in area, a maximum
of two goats, pigs, sheep, and similar animals are allowed, with one
"additional animal permitted for each 2,400 square feet of area." 29 3 In
addition to specifying the types and number of animals allowed, the Zoning
Code also governs setback requirements; requirements for coops, cages,
enclosures, and fences; 29 4 water requirements; application requirements to
the Building and Housing Department 295 and the Public Health
applicant permission to engage in the keeping of farm animals or bees as described in
the registration; and (10) The addresses of all properties directly adjoining the subject
property." Id § 205.04(a).

287. See id. § 205.04(b)(2).
288.
205,

§

CLEVELAND, OH., CODIFIED ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF CLEVELAND tit. I, ch.
205.04(b)(1).

289. Id § 205.04(b)(2).
290. Square footage of the parcel or lot area determines the types and number of
species allowed to be kept on the premises. See id. § 347.02.
291. Id. § 347.02(b)(1). In non-residential districts, the keeping of such animals is
limited to one animal for each 400 square feet of lot area. Id. § 347.02(b)(2).
292. Id. § 347.02(d)(1)(A). In non-residential districts, the number of beehives is
limited to one beehive for each 1,000 square feet of lot area. Id. § 347.02(d)(2).
293. CLEVELAND, OH., CODIFIED ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF CLEVELAND tit. 1, ch.
205, § 347.02(c)(1). In non-residential districts, the keeping of up to two such animals
is allowed on a parcel of land at least 14,400 square feet in area; one additional animal
is permitted for each additional 1,200 square feet of lot area. Id. § 347.02(c)(2).
294. "[A] covered, predator-proof coop or cage or other shelter" with adequate
ventilation and of sufficient size is required for all animals. Id. § 347.02(b)(1)(D). For
chickens or other birds, "access to an outdoor enclosure adequately fenced or otherwise
bounded to contain the birds" and protect them from predators is also required. Id. §
347.02(b)(1)(E).
295. Approval by the Department of Building and Housing is not required for:
"cages, coops or beehives that are not permanently attached to the ground or to another
structure and do not exceed thirty two (32) square feet in area nor eight (8) feet in
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In
Department; and sanitation, nuisance, noise, and slaughtering.296
297 chicken coops and beehives are
Cleveland's Urban Garden Districts,
listed as permitted accessory uses and structures.298
The current Zoning Code of Baltimore City provides that agricultural
uses are a permitted use in many residential zoning districts; 299 in addition,
"[f]acilities that house pets and wild animals, as permitted under the Health
Code of Baltimore City" are allowed as an accessory use in all Residence
Districts,300 Office Residence Districts,301 Business Districts,302 and
Industrial Districts.303 The Health Code of Baltimore City gives the
Commissioner of Health the authority to "adopt and enforce rules and
regulations to carry out" the Health Code, 304 which includes regulations for
animal control and protection. 305 The Health Code prohibits any person
from keeping "(1) an exotic animal; (2) a farm animal; (3) a pigeon; (4)
bees; or (5) a Vietnamese pot bellied pig" without obtaining a permit from
The Health Code authorizes the
the Commissioner of Health.306
Commissioner of Health to adopt rules and regulations for the issuance of
permits and licenses and the care and control of animals, 307 to perform
inspections, 308 and to set fees pertaining to the keeping of animals. 309
Baltimore City allows a person to keep no more than four chickens
over the age of one month provided certain requirements are met, including
the issuance of a permit from the Bureau of Animal Control and

height. No Building Permit shall be required for the barrier constituting a required

enclosure if such barrier is not permanently attached to the ground and does not exceed
three (3) feet in height; and no permit shall be required for a 'flyway' barrier not
exceeding six (6) feet in height and six (6) feet in length." Id § 347.02(d)(2)(i)(2).
296. See id. § 347.02(d)(2)(f)-( h).
297. See supra note 196-200 and accompanying text.
298.

CLEVELAND, OH., CODIFIED ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF CLEVELAND tit. VII,

ch. 336, § 336.04(d).
299. See BALTIMORE, MD., ZONING CODE OF BALTIMORE CITY tit. 4, §§ 4-201(2), 4301, 4-401, 4-501(1), 4-601, 4-701 (2010). Agricultural uses are permitted "only if: (i)
no retail sales are made on the premises; and (ii) no offensive odor or dust is created."
Id. § 4-201(2). Agricultural use in not defined in the Code.
300. Id. §§ 4-202(3)(ii), 4-302, 4-402, 4-502, 4-602, 4-702, 4-802, 4-902, 4-1002, 41102(1), 4-1202(a), 4-1302(a).
301. See id. tit. 5, § 5-202(1).
302. See id. tit. 6, §§ 6-207(3), 6-307, 6-407, 6-507, 6-607.
303. See id. tit. 7, §§ 7-209(2)(ii), 7-310, 7-409.
304. BALTIMORE, MD., HEALTH CODE OF BALTIMORE CITY tit. 2, § 2-106 (2003).
305. See id. tit. 10.
306. Id. § 10-312(b).
307. Id. § 10-104.

308. Id. § 10-105.
309.

BALTIMORE, MD., HEALTH CODE OF BALTIMORE CITY tit. 10

§

10-106.
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registration with the Maryland Department of Agriculture, Domestic
Poultry and Exotic Bird Registration Division. 310 The standards require
that "[a]ll chickens must be confined at all times to a movable pen" and
pens must be at least twenty-five feet away from any residence.3 " The
standards further require that the chickens be provided with proper shade,
potable water and feed, "veterinary care if they are known or suspected to
be sick or injured," and "access to a well-constructed shelter that provides
suitable protection from inclement weather." 312 Other fowl, including but
not limited to roosters, ducks, geese, and turkeys are prohibited. 1 A onetime fee of eighty dollars will be assessed for the issuance of a permit to
keep chickens.3 14
Bee keeping is also allowed in the City of Baltimore; for each 2,500
square feet of lot area, "no more than one hive, containing no more than
one swarm" may be kept."
Any person keeping bees in the City must
register with the Maryland Department of Agriculture.3 16 The hives and
310. See BALTIMORE CITY HEALTH DEP'T ANIMAL CONTROL PROGRAM, FOWL:
ACCEPTABLE
STANDARDS
FOR
RAISING
(2007),
available
at
http://www.baltimorehealth.org/info/animals.ExoticPetRegs(Final).pdf
[hereinafter
Acceptable Standards]. See also Raising Chickens in Baltimore City, BALTIDOME
BLOG (Oct. 30, 2009), http://baltidome.wordpress.com/category/raising-chickens-inbaltimore/.
311. Acceptable Standards, supra note 311. In addition, "[e]ach pen must be kept
clean, free of all odors and materials that can attract rodents" and "must be moved
frequently to minimize turf destruction and the build up of manure borne pathogens
such as coccidiosis and roundworms" and "[p]ens with feed boxes and nest boxes must
allow 2 square feet per hen." Id.
312. Id
313. Id.
314. BALTIMORE CITY HEALTH DEP'T ANIMAL CONTROL PROGRAM, ANIMAL
PERMITS: FEE SCHEDULE (2007), availableat http://www.baltimorchealth.org/info/
animals.ExoticPetRegs(Final).pdf. "A permit may not be transferred from place to
place or person to person." Id.
315. BALTIMORE CITY HEALTH DEP'T ANIMAL CONTROL PROGRAM, BEES:
ACCEPTABLE STANDARDS FOR KEEPING (2007), availableat http://www.baltimore
health.org/info/animals.ExoticPetRegs(Final).pdf. See also Be a Baltimore Beekeeper,
BALTIDOME BLOG (Nov. 3, 2009), http:/ibaltidome.wordpress.com/category/
baltimore-beekeeping/.
316. BALTIMORE CITY HEALTH DEP'T ANIMAL CONTROL PROGRAM, BEES:
ACCEPTABLE STANDARDS FOR KEEPING (2007), available at http://www.baltimore
health.org/info/
animals.ExoticPetRegs(Final).pdf. "Maryland Law requires everyone who keeps bees
to register their colonies within 30 days of first obtaining a honey bee colony and then
annually thereafter." Apiary Inspection, MD. DEP'T OF AGRIC., http://www.mda.
state.md.us/plants-pests/plantprotection weedmgmt/apiary inspection/index.php
(last visited Oct. 19, 2011). Apiary inspectors annually visit approximately two-thirds
of Maryland's apiairies, examining the colonies for diseases and pests. See id.
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swarms must not be accessible to the public and must be kept so that "bee
movement to and from the hive does not unreasonably interfere with the
proper enjoyment of the property of others, with the comfort of the public,
or with the use of any public right-of-way."3 17
As discussed above, the City of Baltimore is currently rewriting its
Zoning Code. Under the current draft, "[a]nimal husbandry, including
chicken coops and apiaries" would be allowed as an urban agriculture
use;318 urban agriculture would be a conditional use in many zones
including, but not limited to, Open Space, Detached and Semi-Detached
Residential, Rowhouse and Multi-Family Residential, and Commercial but
it would be permitted in most Industrial Use Zones.3 19 The current draft
requires that a management plan be prepared if animal husbandry activities
are engaged in; the management plan must address "how the activities will
be managed to avoid impacts on surrounding land uses and natural

systems." 320
In the City of Denver, "[t]he keeping of domestic animals is allowed
as accessory to a primary dwelling unit use subject to compliance with the
following standards regarding number and kinds of animals [limited to cats,
dogs, rabbits, pigeons or doves, horses, small rodents, fish, small reptiles
and amphibians, and domestic honey bees]" 3 2 1 in all Neighbor Context
Zone Districts except the Civic District,322 as well as in all Industrial
Context Zone Districts, 323 Campus Context Zone Districts, 324 and Master
Planned Context Zone Districts.325 Under the Denver Zoning Code, the
keeping of domestic honey bees is limited to two hives per zone lot and
"[h]ives must be in rear 1/3 of zone lot with a 5 foot setback from side and
rear zone lot lines; the hives must be screened so that the bees must
surmount a 6 foot barrier, which may be vegetative, before leaving the

317.
318.

Id
See BALTIMORE, MD., BALTIMORE ZONING CODE: DRAFT 2.0 tit. 14, § 14-331(1)

(2011), available at http://www.transformbaltimore.net/portal/transv2/transdraft2
?pointld=d90102e2773#section-d90102e2773.
319. Id. tit. 7, § 7-201, tit. 8, § 8-201, tit. 9, § 9-201, tit. 10, § 10-201, tit. 11, § 11201.
320.
321.
322.
art. 8,
323.
324.
325.

Id. tit. 14, § 14-333(1).
DENVER, COLO., DENVER ZONING CODE art. 11, § 11.8.5.1 (2010).
See id. art. 3, § 3.4.4, art. 4, § 4.4.4, art. 5, § 5.4.4, art. 6, § 6.4.4, art. 7, § 7.4.4,
§ 8.9.4.
See id. art. 9, § 9.1.4.5.
See id. § 9.2.7.5.
See id. § 9.7.9.5.
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,,326
property."6
The keeping of domestic honey bees is also allowed as
accessory to the Urban Garden use, 3 2 7 subject to compliance with the above
standards "except that in an Industrial Context Zone District or Open Space
Context Zone District, the number of permitted bee hives may be increased
to a maximum of 2 hives per 6,000 square feet of gross zone lot area." 328
Landowners who want to keep animals that are not specifically
permitted 3 29 may apply to the Zoning Administrator for a zoning use
permit.330 Zoning use permits authorizing animal keeping exceptions are
reviewed in accordance with the Zoning Code's "Zoning Permit Review
with Informational Notice" standards; 3 3 1 any authorized exception must
comply with the Zoning Code's general provisions for unlisted accessory
uses. 33 2 The application fee for such a zoning use permit is $100.00.333 An
application for an animal keeping exception must demonstrate that "[tihe
proposal will not substantially or permanently injure the appropriate use of
adjacent conforming property."3 34
In addition to the zoning use permit, any person keeping livestock or
fowl must obtain a livestock or fowl permit; 33 5 the owner must provide the
Director of Animal Control a copy of the zoning approval letter and must
purchase the applicable permit from the Denver Municipal Animal
Shelter.336 Livestock and fowl permits must be renewed annually; the

326. See DENVER, COLO., DENVER ZONING CODE art. 9, § 11.8.5.1(A). In addition,
"[n]o outdoor storage of any bee paraphernalia or hive materials not being used as a

part of a hive." Id.
327. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
328. DENVER, COLO., DENVER ZONING CODE art. 11, § 11.6.1.1(C).
329. "The animal shall be kept solely as a pet; a hobby; for educational, research,
rehabilitation or propagation purposes; or for the production of food products for
personal consumption by the resident." Id. § 11.8.5.1(B).
330. Id
331. See id art. 12, § 12.4.2 (outlining the standards for Zoning Permit Review with
Informational Notice).
332. Id. art. I1, § 11.8.5.1(B).
333. Zoning Applications and Reviews & Landmark PreservationApplications Fee
Schedule, DENVER COMMUNITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT, http://www.denvergov.
org/Portals/696/documents/320%20-20Zoning%20Fee%20Schedule.pdf.
334. DENVER ZONING CODE art. 12, § 12.4.2.11.
335. Any person keeping "any livestock or fowl such as, but not limited to, horses,
mules, donkeys, burros, cattle, sheep, goats, swine, chickens, geese, ducks or turkeys"
on any property within the City of Denver must obtain a livestock or fowl permit from
the manager of Environmental Health. The permit must be renewed annually and "[a]
fee shall be assessed for each new and renewal permit application." DENVER, COLO.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 11,ch. 8, § 8-91(a) (2010).
336. See Denver Animal Shelter: Livestock or Fowl Permit, CITY OF DENVER,
http://www.denvergov.org/FrequentlyAskedQuestionsandRelatedLinks/LivestockPerm
its/tabid/434853/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
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annual fee for a fowl permit is $50.00 and the annual fee for a livestock
permit is $100.00.337
In contrast to Denver's complex permit and licensing requirements
for the keeping of certain types of animals, the City of Chicago's
regulations regarding the keeping of domesticated animals within the City
are written more broadly and generally. The Municipal Code of Chicago,
including the Chicago Zoning Ordinance, does not contain any provisions
prohibiting the keeping of domesticated animals within the City. Title 7 of
the Municipal Code of Chicago contains the Health and Safety ordinances
for the City, including the City's Animal Care and Control ordinances. The
Municipal Code's Animal Care and Control chapter broadly defines "pet"
as "any species of domesticated animals customarily regarded as suited to
live within an abode used for human occupancy."038 The Municipal Code
does not contain any further restrictions regarding the number or types of
animals that residents are allowed to keep within the City; therefore, the
keeping of chickens (including roosters), 339 bees, 340 and other domesticated
animals such as livestock 341 is not illegal in the City of Chicago.
General provisions contained in the Municipal Code apply to anyone
keeping any animals within the City of Chicago, including Animal Care
and Control ordinances and Health Nuisance ordinances. For instance, the
Animal regulations require an owner to "keep and maintain his animal
under restraint."342 Excessive animal noise is prohibited.343 The Municipal

337. Id.
338. CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE OF CHICAGO tit. 7, § 7-12-020 (2010).
339. See Alissa Irei, Controversial Urban Chickens Still Roost Around Chicago,
MEDILL REPORTS (March 9, 2010), http://news.medill.northwestem.edu/chicago/
news.aspx?id=160734 (discussing the legality of keeping chickens in the City of
Chicago). See also Policies & City Chickens, CHICAGO CHICKEN ENTHUSIASTS,
https://sites.google.com/site/chicagochickenenthusi/city-chicken-policy.
340. In addition to allowing the keeping of bees within the City, the City of Chicago
itself maintains hives on the green roofs of its municipal buildings, including the
Chicago Cultural Center and City Hall. The bees "pollinat[e] flowers, fruit trees and
vegetable gardens all over the city." Rooftop Beehives, EXPLORE CHICAGO,
http://www.explorechicago.org/city/en/about-the city/green chicago/GreenRoofs_.ht
ml (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
341. According to Chicago Chicken Enthusiasts, "[t]here is no specific prohibition on
other livestock in residential areas, but slaughtering, nuisance, sanitation, and humane
treatment and housing ordinances apply." Policies & City Chickens, supra note 339.
342. MUNICIPAL CODE OF CHICAGO tit. 7, § 7-12-030. The Municipal Code defines
"animal under restraint" as any animal: "(1) either secured by a leash or lead; (2) within
the premises of its owner, or confined within a crate or cage, or confined within a
vehicle, or on the premises of another person with the consent of that person; provided
that any animal not secured by a leash or lead and that is outdoors on the premises of its
owner or outdoors on the premises of another person with consent of that person shall
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Code of Chicago also prohibits cruelty to animals, including the failure to
provide "proper food, water, air or sanitary shelter," 34 4 and the slaughtering
The City's Health Nuisances chapter contains
of any animals. 3 45
ordinances that prohibit the keeping of any "yard, lot, premises, or part
thereof' in a manner "that shall be the occasion of any nuisance, or shall be
dangerous to life or detrimental to health," 34 6 as well as the bringing or
keeping for any purpose "any dead or live animal ... which shall be a
nuisance or which shall occasion a nuisance in the city, or which may or
shall be dangerous or detrimental to health."347
In the City of Portland, the keeping of animals, including the
"breeding or raising of fowl or other animals" is considered an "agriculture
use" activity. 348 In Portland, agriculture use is permitted by right in Open
Space Zones, 34 9 Employment and Industrial Zones, 3 0 and low-density
Single Dwelling Zones 35 ' and is a conditional use in medium-density
Single Dwelling Zones.352 While the Portland Planning and Zoning Code
broadly allows the keeping of animals, the Code of the City of Portland,
Oregon contains detailed ordinances regarding the keeping of animals

not be considered under restraint unless the animal is on a fenced portion of the
premises and the fence is: (i) constructed to keep the animal from reaching through the
fence; and (ii) of sufficient height appropriate to the size of the animal to prevent the
animal from jumping or reaching over the fence; or (3) within an area specifically
designated by the Chicago Park District or by the City of Chicago as a dog park, or as
an animal exercise run; provided that the animal is under the control of a competent
person." Id § 7-12-020.
343. "It shall be unlawful for any person who owns ... any dog or other animal to
allow such animal to make excessive noise in a manner that unnecessarily disturbs the
comfort, quiet, peace or repose of any other person in the vicinity, at any time of the
day or night." Id. § 7-12-100. Under the ordinance, excessive noise is defined as "any
continued, repeated or habitual barking, whining, crying, howling, whimpering,
crowing, or loud noise common to an animal's species" if the noise either persists for
over ten consecutive minutes or "occurs intermittently for a significant portion of the
day or night." Id.
344. Id. § 7-12-290.
345. "No person shall own, keep or otherwise possess, or slaughter any sheep, goat,
pig, cow or the young of such species, poultry, rabbit, dog, cat, or any other animal,
intending to use such animal for food purposes." Id. § 7-12-300.
346. Id. § 7-28-060. See also § 7-28-740 (detailing the City of Chicago's lot
maintenance requirements).
347. MUNICIPAL CODE OF CHICAGO tit. 7, § 7-28-090.
348. PORTLAND, OR., PLANNING AND ZONING CODE tit. 33, § 33.920.500 (2010).
349. Id § 33.100.100.
350. Id. § 33.140.100.
351. Id. § 33.110.100.
352. Id
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within the City. 3 53 In Portland, the "keeping [of] a total of three or fewer
chickens, 3 54 ducks, doves, pigeons, pygmy goats or rabbits" does not
require a permit, provided the keeper does not allow the animals to roam at
large and keeps the animals in a clean and sanitary condition. 3 5 5 The
keeping of more than three such animals and the keeping of other
livestock356 and the keeping of bees require a "specified animal keeping
facility"357 permit, issued by the Multnomah County Health Department.358
Any person applying for such a permit must provide adequate evidence that
all "property owners and residents within 150 feet of the property lines of
the property on which the specified animal facility will be located" have
been notified by the applicant. 35 9 Applicants must complete and sign an
application granting permission for the Director of the Health Department
to enter and inspect the premises at any reasonable time and assuring that
the issuance criteria have been met. 360 The issuance criteria address the
adequacy of the facilities, including sanitation, nuisance, and confinement
issues; the health and well-being of the animals; setback requirements;
compliance with applicable building and zoning codes; and personal
liability for any damages caused by the animals.36 A permit fee must also
be submitted with the application. 3 62 The fee for a beekeeping specified
animal facilities permit is twelve dollars; the fee for all other specified
animal facility permits is thirty-one dollars.363 Once issued, the permit
See PORTLAND, OR., CODE OF THE CITY OF PORTLAND, OR. tit. 13 (2011).
354. Roosters are prohibited within the City of Portland. Id. § 13.10.010.
355. Id. § 13.05.015(E).
356. Livestock "include[s], but is not limited to, fowl, horses, mules, burros, asses,
cattle, sheep, goats, llamas, emu, ostriches, rabbits, swine, or other farm animals
excluding dogs and cats." Id. § 13.05.005(C).
357. A "specified animal keeping facility" is defined as "a permitted site for the
keeping of one or more specified animals, including but not limited to a stable,
structure, or other form of enclosure." Id. § 13.05.005(G). "'Specified Animals' means
bees or livestock." Id. § 13.05.005(F).
353.

358.

PORTLAND, OR., CODE OF THE CITY OF PORTLAND, OR. tit. 13,

§

13.05.015.

In the case of bee colonies and pigeon facilities, an
359. Id. § 13.05.015(B).
applicant is "required to obtain written and signed permission from all neighbors within
150 feet of the proposed or existing facility using a provided petition form." Permit
Application Requirements, MULTNOMAH

COUNTY

HEALTH

DEP'T,

available at

http://web.multco.us/sites/default/files/
health/documents/sappermitreq.pdf. In the case of a tenant applicant, written and
signed permission "from the property owner to keep specified animals on the rental
property" must also be obtained. Id.
360.
361.
362.
363.

CODE OF THE CITY OF PORTLAND, OR. tit. 13, § 13.05.015.
See id § 13.05.015(C).
Id. § 13.05.020.
HEALTH
COUNTY
MULTNOMAH
Codes,
Animal

http://web.multco.us/health/animal-codes.

DEPARTMENT,
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remains valid unless revoked.364 Livestock, whether picketed or roaming,
are prohibited from approaching within fifty feet of any residence or "any
commercial building in which foodstuff is prepared, kept or sold." 36 5
As discussed above, the Seattle Land Use Code includes "animal
husbandry,"3 66 and "aquaculture,"36 7 in its definition of "agricultural
use." 368 In Seattle, animal husbandry is permitted as an accessory use in all
Commercial Zoning Districts and is also permitted as a primary use in one
Commercial Zoning District.369 Aquaculture is permitted as a primary or
accessory use in all Industrial Zoning Districts 3 70 and all Commercial
Zoning Districts, however, in some Commercial Zones, size limitations

apply. 37 1
In the City of Seattle, the keeping of certain animals is not considered
animal husbandry.3 72 The Seattle Land Use Code includes provisions for
the keeping of animals in its General Use Provisions chapter; 373 the keeping
of "small animals, farm animals, domestic fowl and bees" is permitted
outright as an accessory use in all zones, subject to the standards listed in
the Keeping of Animals section.374 For small animals, the Code provides
that "[u]p to three small animals375 may be kept accessory to each business

364. See CODE OF THE CITY OF PORTLAND, OR. tit. 13, § 13.05.015(B). A permit will
be revoked if the Director of the Health Department determines that the issuance
criteria, listed in § 13.05.015(C), are not being met. See id. § 13.05.015.
365. Id. § 13.05.035.
366. The Seattle Municipal Code defines animal husbandry as "a use in which
animals are reared or kept in order to sell the animals or their products, such as meat,
fur or eggs, but does not include pet daycare centers or animal shelters and kennels.
Examples of animal husbandry uses are poultry farms and rabbitries." SEATTLE,
WASH., SEATTLE MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 23, § 23.84A.002 "A" (2010).
367. The Seattle Municipal Code defines aquaculture as "a use in which food fish,
shellfish or other marine foods, aquatic plants, or aquatic animals are cultured or grown
in fresh or salt waters in order to sell them or the products they produce. Examples are
fish farms and shellfish beds." Id.
368. Id
369. See id. § 23.47A.004 and Table A.
370. See id. § 23.50.012 and Table A.
371. See SEATTLE, WASH., SEATTLE MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 23, § 23.47A.004 and
Table A.
372. See Client Assistance Memo 244: Urban Agriculture, CITY OF SEATTLE DEP'T
OF PLANNING & DEv. (2010), availableat http://www.seattle.gov/DPD/Publications/
CAM/cam244.pdf.
373. See SEATTLE, WAsH., SEATTLE MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 23, ch. 23.42.
374. Id. § 23.42.052.
375. Potbelly pigs are limited no more than one per business establishment or
dwelling unit. Id. § 23.42.052(A)(1). "Pygmy, Dwarf and Miniature Goats may be kept
as small animals, provided that male miniature goats are neutered and all miniature
goats are dehomed." Id. § 23.42.052(F).
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establishment, other than an urban farm, or dwelling unit37 6 on a lot." 377 in
single-family zones, additional small animals are permitted on lots of at
least 20,000 square feet37 8 with a required minimum ten-foot setback for
any accessory structures for four or more small animals. 379 The keeping of
farm animals, including "[c]ows, horses, sheep, and other similar farm
animals,"380 is also permitted outright on lots of at least 20,000 square
feet.381 On such lots, one farm animal per every 10,000 square feet of lot
area is permitted; in residential zones, a fifty-foot setback is required for
382
farm animals and farm animal housing structures.
In all zones, '[u]p to
eight domestic fowl may be kept on any lot in addition to the small animals
permitted" and additional fowl are permitted on lots "greater than 10,000
square feet that include either a community garden or an urban farm." 83 In
all zones, roosters are prohibited.3 84 Beekeeping is also "permitted outright
as an accessory use," but registration with the State Department of
Agriculture is required.38 On lots of less than 10,000 square feet, up to
four hives with one swarm each are permitted.386 Specific setback
requirements are provided for beehives. 3 87 Although not referenced in the
Seattle Land Use Code, the Seattle Municipal Code's Animal title3 88
contains applicable provisions such as cruelty to animals, 38 9 safety and
sanitation, 390 control of animals,391 and nuisance. 392
In the City of Los Angeles, the keeping of animals is also addressed
by zoning district. In agricultural zoning districts within the City, the

376. In single-family zones, accessory dwelling units are not considered separate
dwelling units. Id. § 23.42.052(A)(2)(a).
377. Id. § 23.42.052(A).
378. In single family zones, on lots of at least 20,000 square feet, up to four small
animals are permitted; for each additional 5,000 square feet of lot area in excess of
20,000 square feet, one additional animal is permitted. SEATTLE WASH., SEATTLE
MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 23, § 23.42.052(A)(2)(b)-(c).
379. Id. § 23.42.052(A)(2)(c).
380. The keeping of swine, with the exception of potbelly pigs, is not permitted. Id.
§ 23.42.052(D).
381. Id. § 23.42.052(D).
382. Id. § 23.42.052(D)(l)-(2).
383. SEATTLE, WASH., SEATTLE MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 23, § 23.42.052(C)(1).
384. Id. § 23.42.052(C)(2).
385. Id. § 23.42.052(E).
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. SEATTLE, WASH., SEATTLE MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 9.
389. Id. § 9.25.081.
390. Id. § 9.25.082.
391. Id. § 9.25.084.
392. Id. § 9.25.092.
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keeping of domestic livestock is an allowed use on lots meeting minimum
square footage requirements. 39 The keeping of poultry, fowl, rabbits,
chinchillas, and other small animals394 is also allowed in the City's
agricultural zoning districts. The keeping of livestock and/or small animals
must be "in conjunction with the residential use of the lot" and the keeping
of animals may not be for commercial purposes unless an exception
applies. 395 In July 2010, the City's Zoning Code was amended to permit
the keeping of "equines, 39 6 poultry, rabbits and chinchillas, in conjunction
with the residential use of the lot, provided that such animal keeping is not
for commercial purposes" in the City's Residential Estate, 397 "RS"
Suburban,398 One-Family,399 and "RMP" Mobilehome Park400 zoning
districts. In addition to the animal keeping restrictions contained in the
City's Zoning Code, the Los Angeles Municipal Code's Public Safety and
Protection chapter contains regulations pertaining to the keeping of animals
within the City. 40 1 Under the regulations contained therein, persons are
generally not permitted to keep more than one rooster within the City of
Los Angeles.402 Animals are prohibited from being at large;403 anyone
keeping animals within the City is required to comply with minimum
separation distances for animals, coops, cages, and enclosures as
Currently,
established by the Department of Animal Services. 40 4
393. "The keeping of equines, bovines, goats or other domestic livestock" is
permitted in L.A.'s agricultural zoning districts, provided the lot has at least 17,500
square feet of lot area. L.A., CAL., L.A. MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 1, §§ 12.05(A)(7),
12.06(A)(2)(g), 12.07(A)(7) (2011). The keeping of up to five swine is permitted in
"Al" agricultural zoning districts. Id. § 12.05(A)(7). In all agricultural zoning districts,
"[w]here equines and/or bovines are being kept, the number kept shall not exceed one
equine or bovine for each 4,000 square feet of lot area." Id. §§ 12.05(A)(7),
12.06(A)(2)(g), 12.07(A)(7).
394. In "Al" and "A2" agricultural zones, the keeping of fish and frogs is also a
permitted use. Id. §§ 12.05(A)(7), 12.06(A)(2)(g).
395. Id §§ 12.05(A)(7), 12.06(A)(2)(g), 12.07(A)(7). In "Al" and "A2" agricultural
zones, "chickens, rabbits or chinchillas may be kept for commercial purposes on lots of
five acres or more." Id. §§ 12.05(A)(7), 12.06(A)(2)(g).
In all agricultural zones,
exceptions apply to the keeping of up to two equines not owned by the resident of the
property. d. §§ 12.05(A)(7), 12.06(A)(2)(g), 12.07(A)(7).
396. Lot square footage requirements may apply for the keeping of equines. See id.
§§ 12.07.01(A)(3), 12.07.1(A)(3), 12.08(A)(3).
397. Id § 12.07.01(A)(3).
398. L.A., CAL., L.A. MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 1, § 12.07.1(A)(3).
399. Id. § 12.08(A)(3).
400. Id § 12.09.3(B)(4).
401. Id ch. V, art. 3 (2011).
402. Id. § 53.71.

403. See id. §§ 53.06, 53.07.
404.

See L.A., CAL., L.A.

MUNICIPAL CODE

ch. V, art. 3,

§ 53.59.
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beekeeping is not legal throughout the City; 40 5 however, apiaries are a
permitted use in the "Al" and "A2" Agricultural Zones 406 and in some
Industrial Zones.407 Citizens in Los Angeles are in the process of
petitioning the Mayor of the City to legalize beekeeping throughout the
City. 408
C. Zoning and Sales of Farm/GardenProduce409
In the context of urban agriculture, there are a variety of approaches
cities can take concerning the sales of products grown and raised by urban
farmers. Often, the type of garden, for example community garden versus
urban farm or commercial garden,410 and the zoning district in which the
agricultural activity is conducted will determine whether sales of farm
products are allowed. For example, a city may outright prohibit the sales of
urban agriculture products grown in residential zones. In some instances, a
city will allow food produced in an urban garden to be sold, provided all
sales occur offsite. In other cases, particularly where urban agriculture is
intended to alleviate food desert problems or provide economic
opportunity, on-site sales will be allowed.41 Urban agriculture provisions
in city zoning codes will generally address the permissibility of the sale of
urban agriculture products. City permits and licenses may also be required
for such sales.

405. Danny Jensen, Beekeeping: Eco-Friendly, Healthy, and Completely Illegal in
L.A., CHANGE.ORG (Dec. 15, 2010), http://news.change.org/stories/beekeeping-ecofriendly-healthy-and-completely-illegal-in-la.
406. See L.A., CAL., L.A. MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 1, §§ 12.05(A)(6), 12.06(A)(2)(f).
407. See id. §§ 12.17.5(B)(3)(a), 12.17.6(A)(1),
12.18(B)(1), 12.19(A)(1.5),
12.20(A)(1).
408. See Tell Los Angeles City Council to Legalize Beekeeping for all of LA,
CHANGE.ORG, http://www.change.org/petitions/tell-los-angeles-city-council-to-legalize
-beekeeping-for-all-of-la.
409. While Farmers' Markets are frequently used as a venue for the sale of produce
in urban areas, this section examines regulations pertaining to on-site and off-site sales
of agricultural products grown on urban land.
410. The City of Richmond, Virginia provides an example of a city that does not
allow the sale of any agricultural products grown in its "community gardens," but does
allow the sale of agricultural products grown in its "commercial gardens." See supra
notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
411. For example, in the City of Cleveland's Urban Garden District, onsite sales are
allowed in both of the District's permitted main uses: "(a) community gardens which
may have occasional sales of items grown at the site; (b) market gardens, including the
sale of crops produced on the site." CLEVELAND, OH., CODIFIED ORDINANCES OF THE

CITY OF CLEVELAND tit. VII, ch. 336, § 336.03 (2010). Seasonal farm stands are
permitted as an accessory use in the City's Urban Garden District. Id. § 336.04.
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The Denver Zoning Code addresses sales in its Use Limitations and
Definitions article; whether sales are allowed is dependent, in part, upon
whether the agricultural use occurs in a residential zone. In all Residential
Zone Districts, the Denver Zoning Code prohibits "retail or wholesale sales
of goods or products derived from "a Garden 4 12 accessory to a primary
residential use." 4 13 The Denver Zoning Code does allow sales of
agricultural goods or products in other situations; in Denver's Residential
Zone Districts, "retail or wholesale sales of goods or products derived from
a Garden are allowed when such use is accessory to a primary
nonresidential use, including but not limited to a permitted Public,
Institutional and Civic Use."414 In all other zone districts, the Denver
Zoning Code also allows "retail or wholesale sales of goods or products
derived from a Garden . .. when such use is accessory to a primary

nonresidential use."415
In the City of Seattle, the urban farm use is a specific agricultural use
category "in which plants are grown for sale of the plants or their products,
and in which the plants or their products are sold at the lot where they are
grown or off site, or both, and in which no other items are sold. Examples
may include flower and vegetable raising, orchards and vineyards." 4 16 The
urban farm use is permitted in Residential, Commercial and Industrial
Zones.4 17 The City promotes urban agriculture in Residential Zones by
permitting sales of plants and their products grown on an urban farm in
residential zones between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. every day of
the week 418 and by waiving any parking requirements for community
gardens or urban farms in Residential Zones.4 19
D. Buildings andStructures
Structures commonly associated with urban agriculture include hoop
houses, greenhouses, storage sheds, market stands, and structures for the
keeping of animals. Depending upon the specific zoning or land use code,
such structures may be permitted by right as a primary or accessory use or
may require a special use or conditional permit. In some instances,

412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.

See supra note 201.
DENVER ZONING CODE art. I1, § 11.8.4.2.
Id. § 11.10.9.1.
Id.
SEATTLE, WASH., SEATTLE MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 23, § 23.84A.002"A" (2010).
See supra notes 248, 253-57 and accompanying text.
SEATTLE MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 23, § 23.42.051 (A)(2).
Id. § 23.54.015.
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building code regulations will apply to urban agriculture structures; 420
regardless, the zoning and land use codes generally contain size, height,
and setback restrictions for such structures, either in the general accessory
use provisions or in the city's urban agriculture ordinances.
In the City of Denver, Urban Gardens, Gardens, 42 1 and the keeping of
animals 42 may be permitted as a primary or accessory use or permitted as a
special use upon issuance of a permit. The Denver Zoning Code contains
use limitations for each of the agricultural activities allowed within the
City; the use limitations specifically address structures associated with
urban agriculture. Where Urban Garden use is a permitted primary use,423
the Code requires that all "[d]etached structures that are incidental to the
Urban Garden use, such as accessory storage or utility buildings, gazebos,
trellis, or accessory greenhouse structures" be in compliance with "all
applicable detached accessory structure building form standards in the
subject Zone District."4 24 Such structures in an accessory Garden use are
also required to comply with all applicable building form standards.425
addition, all Garden accessory uses must comply with the general
426
provisions applicable to all accessory uses.
In the City of Denver, the keeping of most agricultural animals,
including chickens, requires a special use permit under the animal keeping
427 Teaia
The animal keeping exception provision requires that the use
exception.
must comply with the provisions applicable to all accessory uses and other
listed requirements.4 28
The City of Cleveland also specifically addresses structures incidental
to urban agriculture in its Zoning Code. The City's Urban Garden
District29 permits accessory structures such as "greenhouses,430

420. For example, the City of Portland's Specified Animal Regulations require that
any structure used in connection with a specified animal keeping facility comply with
the City's building code, if applicable, as well as any zoning and land use regulations.
PORTLAND, OR., CODE OF THE CITY OF PORTLAND, OR. tit. 13, § 13.05.015(C)(8)
(2010).
421. See supra notes 201-208 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 321-37 and accompanying text.
423. Urban Garden use requires approval under Denver's zoning permit review
process. See supra note 204.
424. DENVER ZONING CODE art. 11, § 11.6.1.1(B).
425.

See id.

§§

11.8.4.1(B), 11.10.9.1(B).

426. Id. art. 3, § 3.4.4; art. 4, § 4.4.4; art. 5, § 5.4.4; art. 6, § 6.4.4; art. 7, § 7.4.4; art.
8, § 8.9.4; art. 11, § 11.7.1.
427. See supra notes 321-37 and accompanying text.
428. See DENVER ZONING CODE art. 11, § 11.8.5.1(B).
429. See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
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hoophouses, 431 cold-frames,432 and similar structures used to extend the
growing season" as well as chicken coops; tool sheds; planting preparation
The Zoning Code provides supplemental
houses; and barns.433
434
for such structures including setback 4 35 and height
regulationS
4 36
requirements;
in addition, "[t]he combined area of all buildings,
excluding greenhouses and hoophouses, shall not exceed fifteen percent
(15%) of the garden site lot area.' 37 Seasonal farm stands are also
permitted as accessory structures, but "shall be removed from the premises
or stored inside a building on the premises during that time of the year
when the garden is not open for public use."A3 8 Upon issuance of a license,
the keeping of specified farm animals is also permitted in the City of
Cleveland. 4 39 The Zoning Code contains regulations for structures used in
connection with such animal keeping, including size and setback
requirements for coops and cages44 0 as well as stables and enclosures for

430. Greenhouse is defined as "a building made of glass, plastic, or fiberglass in
which plants are cultivated." CLEVELAND, OH., CODIFIED ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF
CLEVELAND tit. VII, ch. 336, § 336.02(c) (2010).
431. Hoophouse is defined as "a structure made of PVC piping or other material
covered with translucent plastic, constructed in a 'half-round' or 'hoop' shape." Id. §
336.02(d).
432. Coldframe is defined as "an unheated outdoor structure consisting of a wooden
or concrete frame and a top of glass or clear plastic, used for protecting seedlings and
plants from the cold." Id. § 336.02(e).
433. Id. § 336.04.
434. The supplemental regulations are set forth in the Urban Garden District
provision. Id. § 336.05.
435. "Buildings shall be set back from property lines of a Residential District a
minimum distance of five (5) feet." CLEVELAND, OH., CODIFIED ORDINANCES OF THE
CITY OF CLEVELAND tit. VII, ch. 336, § 336.05(a).
436. "No building or other structure shall be greater than twenty-five (25) feet in
height." Id. § 336.05(b).
437. Id. § 336.05(c).

438. Id. § 336.05(f).
439. See supra notes 281-98 and accompanying text.
440. Chickens, ducks, rabbits and similar farm animals must be provided with a
sufficient coop, cage or shelter. "The total area of all coops or cages on a lot shall not
be greater than thirty two (32) square feet for up to six (6) animals. Coops and cages,

singly or in combination, shall not exceed fifteen (15) feet in height."

CLEVELAND,

ch. 347, §
347.02(b)(1)(D). Coops and cages "may not be located in front yard or side street yard
areas;" the regulations also require that such structures "shall not be located within five
(5) feet of a side yard line nor within eighteen (18) inches of a rear yard line, except
where the rear lot line forms the side lot line or front lot line of an abutting property, in
Id. §
which case the setback from such rear lot line shall be five (5) feet."
347.02(b)(1)(B).
OH., CODIFIED

ORDINANCES

OF THE CITY OF CLEVELAND

tit. VII,
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larger animals such as goats and sheep." 1 The Zoning Code's animal
keeping regulations require a building permit for the construction of related
structures that routinely require a building permit, but specifically excepts
"cages, coops or beehives that are not permanently attached to the ground
or to another structure and do not exceed thirty two (32) square feet in area
nor eight (8) feet in height" from the building permit requirement.442
As discussed above, in an effort to promote urban agriculture, the
City of Seattle's urban agriculture ordinance amended the City's Municipal
Code in 2010;443 several of these amendments created exceptions to general
code requirements for structures for urban agricultural use. For instance,
the construction or change of use of structures and buildings, or any part
thereof, for permitted urban farm, community garden, and animal-keeping
uses is excepted from the Municipal Code's general approval procedures
required for a change in use or establishment of a structure or building.44 4
In addition, urban farms and related structures are excepted from the
requirement that all accessory uses and structures in single-family
residential zones "be located on the same lot as the principal use or
structure."4 5
The City also amended its Municipal Code to allow, in certain
zones,446 greenhouses dedicated to food production to exceed applicable
height restrictions by fifteen feet; applicable size restrictions and setback
requirements must be met." 7 The Seattle Municipal Code's General Use
Provisions also specifically address structures associated with urban
agricultural use; in residential zones, structures for urban farm use on lots

441.

In residential districts, such structures "shall not be permitted in front yards or in

side street yards and shall be set back at least forty (40) feet from any street and from
any property other than a property located in an Industrial District and shall be set back
at least one hundred (100) feet from a dwelling on another parcel or from the permitted
placement of a dwelling on an adjoining vacant parcel." Id. § 347.02(c)(1). In nonresidential districts, such structures "shall be set back at least forty (40) feet from any
street and from any property other than a property located in an Industrial District and
shall be set back at least one hundred (100) feet from a dwelling on another parcel or
from the permitted placement of a dwelling on an adjoining vacant parcel." Id. §
347.02(c)(2).
442. Id. § 347.02(i)(2).
443. See SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 123378 (Aug. 23, 2010).
444. See SEATTLE, WASH., SEATTLE MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 23, § 23.40.002(A) (2010).
445.

Id.

§ 23.44.040(B).

446. The greenhouse height restriction exception applies to greenhouse use in the
Midrise and Highrise Residential, Commercial, Mixed-Use, Downtown, and Industrial
Zones.
See id. §§ 23.45.514(J)(10),
23.47A.012(C)(6),
23.48.010(F)(5),
23.49.008(D)(2)(d), 23.50.020(A)(5).
447. See
id
§§
23.45.514(J)(10),
23.49.008(D)(2)(d), 23.50.020(A)(5).

23.47A.012(C)(6),

23.48.010(F)(5),
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with no principle structure are "subject to the development standards that
would apply to an accessory structure in the zone." 4 48 The General Use
Provisions also contain square footage 44 9 and height 450 limits for structures
for urban farm use on residential lots with no principal structure. In all
zones, identical provisions apply to structures for community garden use.41
The Seattle Municipal Code's General Use Provisions also contain specific
setback requirements for structures housing small animals, 452 domestic

fowl, 45 3 farm animals, 45 4 and for beehives. 4 5 5
Under the current Zoning Code of Baltimore City, greenhouses are
listed as a permitted primary or accessory use in some zoning districts; 4 56
the Zoning Code does not contain specific restrictions for such uses. As
discussed above, the City of Baltimore is currently rewriting its Zoning
Code. The current Zoning Code Draft provides use standards, including
restrictions on structures, for Community-Managed Open Space 4 57 and
Urban Agriculture4 5 8 uses. Under the current Draft, the CommunityManaged Open Space use standards prohibit permanent structures for such
use; "temporary greenhouses, including high tunnels/hoop-houses, coldframes, and similar structures are permitted to extend the growing season.
Accessory structures, such as sheds, gazebos and pergolas, are also

448. Id. § 23.42.051(A)(7)(c) (2010).
449. "The total gross floor area of all structures for urban farm use may not exceed
1,000 square feet."
SEATTLE, WASH., SEATTLE MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 23, §
23.42.051 (A)(7)(a).
450. "Structures for urban farm use may not exceed 12 feet in height, including any
pitched roof." Id. § 23.42.051(A)(7)(b).
451. See id. § 23.42.053.
452. In single-family zones, "[a]ccessory structures, including kennels, for four or
more animals must be at least 10 feet from any other lot in a residential zone." Id. §
23.42.052(A)(2)(c).
453. "Structures housing domestic fowl must be located at least 10 feet away from
any structure that includes a dwelling unit on an adjacent lot." Id. § 23.42.052(C)(3).
454. "Farm animals and structures housing them must be kept at least 50 feet from
any other lot in a residential zone." SEATTLE, WASH., SEATTLE MUNICIPAL CODE tit.
23, § 23.42.052(D)(2).
455. Hives generally must be at least 25 feet from any lot line, however exceptions
apply for hives "situated 8 feet or more above the grade immediately adjacent to the
grade of the lot on which the hives are located" and for hives "situated less than 8 feet
above the adjacent existing lot grade and behind a solid fence or hedge six (6) feet high
parallel to any lot line within 25 feet of a hive and extending at least 20 feet beyond the
hive in both directions." Id. § 23.42.052(E)(2).
456. See supra notes 223-28 and accompanying text.
457. See supra note 230.
458. See supra note 231.
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permitted."4A9 The Draft proposes to permit one farmstand per zoning lot,
"limited to sales of items grown at the site" and requires that farmstands be
"removed from the premises or stored inside a structure on the premises
during that time of the year when the open space is not open for public
use." 460 Under the current Draft, the Urban Agriculture use standards
permit permanent or temporary greenhouses and similar structures without
imposing limitations on the number or square footage of such structures.46'
462
Limited permanent accessory structures are permitted, subject to setback,
463
Farmstands are permitted, but are
height, and square footage restrictions.
subject to the same removal or storage of farmstands provision in the
community garden use standards.464
E. Soil Testing
Soil contamination exists in many urban areas; soil may be
contaminated with lead, arsenic, polyaromatic hydrocarbons, 465 and other
toxic substances that have entered the soil through spills and runoff. Due
to the risks associated with growing food in contaminated soil,466 urban
farmers are often encouraged, and may be required, to perform soil testing
prior to establishing a garden. The City of Seattle's Land Use Code does
not require residents to have soil tested for contaminants, but the City's

459. BALTIMORE, MD., BALTIMORE ZONING CODE: DRAFT 2.0 tit. 14, § 14-305(4),
July 2011, availableat http://www.transformbaltimore.net/portal/transv2/transdraft2
?pointld=d90102e439#section-d90102e439.
460. Id. § 14-305(5).

461. "Greenhouses (permanent or temporary), high tunnels/hoop-houses, coldframes, and similar structures used to extend the growing season are permitted. There
is no limit on the number or square footage on these structures." Id. § 14-333(2).
462. "Permanent accessory structures are limited to tool sheds, shade pavilions,
barns, rest-room facilities, planting preparation houses, and post-harvest processing
facilities." Id. § 14-333(4).
463. "Buildings must be set back from any lot line a minimum distance of ten (10)
feet. No structure may exceed twenty-five (25) feet in height, except for structures
designed to capture wind energy." Id. In addition, "[t]he combined area of all accessory
structures is limited to twenty-five percent (25%) of the lot area. For multiple adjacent
lots under common ownership and use as community managed open space, the limit for
the combined area of structures is applied over the entire site rather than each
individual lot. The limit for the combined area of structures for such individual lots
must not exceed that of the underlying zone." Id. § 14-333(5).
464. Id. § 14-333(6).
465. See David Runk, Urban Gardens Tainted with Lead, Arsenic, THE HUFFINGTON
POST (Mar. 23, 2011, 3:33 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/23/urbangardens-chemicals-lead-arsenic n 839485.html?ir-Food.
466. See Kate Murphy, For Urban Gardens, Lead Is a Concern, N.Y. TIMES (May
13, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/14/garden/14lead.html.
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Urban Agriculture Client Assistance Memo highly encourages soil testing,
especially in particular areas of Seattle. 46 7 In Seattle, the King County
Conservation District currently offers free testing of soil samples for pH,
nitrate, phosphate, extractable cations organic matter, and cation exchange
capacity and will make recommendations specific to the landowner's plant
needs to achieve maximum efficiency with fertilizers; however, King
County is "not currently pay[ing] for testing of heavy metals or
contaminants."468 Perhaps because of the increasing concern regarding soil
contamination, the City of Baltimore's Zoning Code Draft 2.0 requires
either soil testing or the use of an impermeable barrier and imported clean
soil for uses in which plants will be cultivated for human consumption. 4 69
F. Composting
Compost, decayed plants, and other organic matter such as yard waste
and kitchen scraps,470 plays an important role in organic agriculture and
also has significant environmental benefits. The environmental benefits of
composting include soil enrichment, remediation of contaminated soil,
pollution prevention (including the diversion of waste from landfills) and a
reduced need for water, fertilizers, and pesticides.47' Compost also benefits
gardens in a variety of ways, including improved soil health, replenishment
of nutrients, humus formation, promotion of root growth, control of plant
diseases, and enhanced soil structure. 47 2 Despite its benefits, composting
may attract pests such as rodents and flies, and may also cause nuisance
467. Client Assitance Memo 244, supra note 244.
468. Free Soil Testing Program, KING CONSERVATION DISTRICT,
profar soi.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2011).

http://kingcd.org/

469. According to the City of Balitmore's Zoning Code Draft 2.0: "For any
community-managed open space use that involves the cultivation of plants for human

consumption, the applicant must use imported, clean soil and an impermeable barrier
between the new soil and existing soil. Alternatively, soil testing can be used to

measure nutrients, heavy metals and any other harmful contaminants that may be
present. The applicant must present, as part of the use permit, the soil testing results
and proposed remediation methodology, if needed, to ensure that cultivated plants are
safe for consumption." BALTIMORE, MD., BALTIMORE ZONING CODE: DRAFT 2.0 tit. 14,
§ 14-305(3), July 2011, availableat http://www.transformbaltimore.net/portal/transv2/
See also Id. § 14-333(3)
transdraft2?pointld=d90102e439#section-d90102e439.
(detailing soil standards for urban agriculture use).
470. See CITY OF SEATTLE, COMPOSTING YARD AND FOOD WASTE AT HOME,(2005),
availableat http://www.seattle.gov/util/groups/public/@spu/@csb/documents/
webcontent/spu0 _001989.pdf.
471. See Environmental Benefits, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/osw/conserve/rrr/
composting/benefits.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2011).
472. See Organic Gardening Compost Benefits, ORGANIC GARDEN INFO,
http://www.organicgardeninfo.com/compost-benefits.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2011).
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odors. Nonetheless, composting is permitted in many cities, and some cities
require the composting of yard waste and food scraps.47 3 A city may
directly address composting in its zoning code, for example including
composting or compost bins as a permitted accessory use to an urban
agriculture use.474 Composting activities may also be regulated by the
city's health and safety codes and/or state regulations.
The City of Chicago's new urban agriculture ordinance addresses
composting on Community Gardens and Urban Farms. Under the City's
Zoning Code as amended, composting in conjunction with a Community
Garden use is "limited only to the materials generated on site and must be
used on site," and must comply with composting standards contained in the
City's Municipal Code.475 Composting in conjunction with an Urban Farm
use is also "limited only to the materials generated on site," and must
comply with composting standards contained in the City's Municipal Code;
however, "[i]ncidental sales of such compost material is expressly allowed
as an accessory use to the principal use of an Urban Farm." 4 7 6 The City's
Municipal Code currently imposes general composting standards, including
nuisance, rat and vector control, surface water, mixing, moisture level, and
sewage restriction provisions.47 7 The composting standards exempt some
composting operations from permits otherwise required by the Municipal

473. The City of Seattle operates a food and yard waste collection service, which is
required for all single-family households (residents who compost at home may opt out
of the service). See Food and Yard Waste at Your House, SEATTLE.GOV: SEATTLE
PUBLIC UTILITIES, http://seattle.gov/util/Services/Yard/Yard Waste Collection/
index.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2011). Where the service is required, "[y]ard debris such as leaves, grass, and plant trimmings - are not allowed in [the] garbage." Id. The
service "ieduces garbage, saves landfill space, and reduces landfill methane (a potent
greenhouse gas)." Id. The City processes the collected materials into compost for use
on the City's parks and gardens. Id. The City of San Francisco has had a mandatory
composting policy in place since 2009; residents and businesses are required to
separate compostable material from trash and place compostable material compost
collection containers. Malia Wollan, San Francisco to Toughen a Strict Recycling
Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/ 11/us/
11 recycle.html. See also SF ENVIRONMENT, http://www.sfenvironment.org/our
programs/topics.html?ssi=3&ti=86 (last visited Oct. 14, 2011).
474. In the City of Cleveland's Urban Garden District, compost bins are a permitted
accessory use. CLEVELAND, OH., CODIFIED ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF CLEVELAND

tit. VII, ch. 336, § 336.04 (2010).
475. CHICAGO, ILL., ORDINANCE S02011-6411 sec. 7 amendment to § 17-9-0100
(Sept. 8, 2011).
476. Id.
477.

See CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE OF CHICAGO tit. 7,

§

7-28-715(2) (2011).

352

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 7

Code, including qualifying garden compost operations and on-site organic
.478
waste composting operations.
Composting is not addressed in the City of Milwaukee's Zoning
Code. However, the City's composting policies are controlled by state
regulation. Since 1993, the State of Wisconsin has "ban[ned] the disposal
of grass clippings or other yard waste in garbage carts."479 The City's
Department of Public Works website provides information to residents on
the "types of yard waste and the proper ways to dispose of them." 48 0 The
Department includes composting as a proper method for disposing of grass
clippings, garden debris, and leaves. 4 8 1 The Department of Public Works'
website includes links to the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
website, which includes a home composting overview, 4 82 and the State's
compost rules and regulations. 483 While the Department of Natural
Resources regulates most composting facilities, "[h]ouseholds,
neighborhoods, community gardens and businesses do not need DNR
approval for composting yard materials and vegetable food scraps (manure
may also be added to enhance nutrients and decomposition) as long as they
do not have more than 50 cubic yards on-site at any one time."484
IV.

OUTREACH

Outreach to promote urban agriculture includes providing residents
with information regarding relevant laws, including permitted and
prohibited activities and applicable restrictions. Outreach may also include
access to resources, education, workshops, and events focused on urban
agriculture. Depending upon the locale, the city itself may perform
outreach activities or various local community-based or nonprofit
organizations may be the primary source of outreach; cooperative extension

478. See id. §§ 7-28-715(3)-(5).
479. Sanitation Services: Yard Waste Disposal, CITY OF MILWAUKEE DEPT. OF
PUBLIC WORKS, http://city.milwaukee.gov/mpw/divisions/operations/environmental/
sanitation/YardWasteDisposal.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2011). "The state prohibits
yard waste dumping because of the hundreds of thousands of tons of yard refuse that
make up a major percentage of material hauled to landfills." Id.
480. Id
48 1. See id
482. See Home Composting Overview, WIsCONsIN DEPT. OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
http://www.dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/wm/recycle/homecompost.htm (last visited Oct. 14,
2011).
483. See Compost Rules and Regulations, WIsCONsIN DEPT. OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, http://www.dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/wm/recycle/issues/compostrules.htm (last
visited Oct. 14, 2011).
484. Id
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services may also perform outreach activities.485 Cities and nonprofit
organizations may provide brochureS 486 and memos that outline guidelines
for urban agriculture activities. Where available, this information can
generally be accessed on the city's or nonprofit organization's website.
The City of Seattle's website contains a wide range of information on
urban agriculture activities within Seattle. The website features an urban
agriculture page which contains a calendar of local urban agriculture
events, primarily farmer's markets; information on urban agriculture
community organizations, urban agriculture, and the City's Local Food
Action Initiative; and links to information on Seattle's P-Patch Program
487
street use permits for gardening in
and Market Gardening Program,
planting strips, and raising chickens in Seattle.4 88
In addition to these resources, the City of Seattle's Department of
Planning and Development has prepared several Client Assistance Memos
on the topic. The Urban Agriculture Client Assistance Memo provides a
summary of each of the City's allowed urban agriculture activities and
details restrictions and permit requirements for such activities as well as the
Memo provides information on business and health licensing requirements,
gardening in a planting strip, soil testing, rainwater harvesting, and P-Patch
community gardens. 489 The City has also prepared additional Client
Assistance Memos specifically addressing gardening in planting stripS 490
485. The University of California Cooperative Extension's Common Ground Garden
Program offers services, including education, garden information, gardening tips, and
volunteer hours to low-income Los Angeles County residents to assist them in
gardening and growing their own food. See Gardening with the Common Ground
Garden Program, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA COOPERATIVE EXTENSION: Los
ANGELES CNTY., http://celosangeles.ucdavis.edu/CommonGround Garden Program/
(last visited Oct. 14, 2011).
486. For example, the City of Milwaukee Department of Neighborhood Services has
prepared a brochure on beekeeping within the City. See CITY OF MILWAUKEE: DEP'T
OF NEIGHBORHOOD SERVICES, BEEKEEPING IN THE CITY OF MILWAUKEE, available at
http://city.milwaukee.gov/ImageLibrary/User/tweile/pdf/broc/DNS-

309BeeBrochureV1B WB.pdf
487. "Seattle P-Patch Market Gardens' mission is to help establish safe, healthy
communities and economic opportunity through development of CSA enterprises in
low-income neighborhoods." Seattle Market Gardens, SEATTLE.Gov: DEPT: OF
NEIGHBORHOODS, http://seattlemarketgardens.org/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2011).
488. See Food,supra note 3.
489. See Client Assitance Memo 244, supra note 244.
490. See Client Assistance Memo 2305: Gardening in Planting Strips, SEATTLE
DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, (2010), availableat http://www.seattle.gov/transportation/
cams/cam2305.pdf. In Seattle, the growing of food in planting strips is allowed,
provided setback and height guidelines are met; some types of fruit trees are prohibited
in planting strips. Id. A free Street Use permit is required for the planting of trees or
the installation of raised planting boxes, pavers, and other hardscape elements. Id.

354

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 7

and rainwater harvesting.49' The Seattle Public Utilities Department
provides information about backyard composting and using compost on its
website; in addition, the Department has links to web pages on composting
and guides to building or using specific types of compost bins.492 The
Department has prepared several fact sheets and brochures on backyard
composting, which are also available on its website. 4 93
The City of Seattle is also home to a large number of community and
nonprofit organizations involved in promoting urban agriculture throughout
the City. 49 4 For example, Lettuce Link 495 is a community-based Seattle
program that "distribute[s] seeds, plant starts and gardening information to
low-income gardeners all over the city" and also provides elementary
school children with information about healthy food and sustainable food
production. 4 96
Seattle Tilth, a "nationally recognized non-profit
educational organization dedicated to inspiring and educating people to
garden organically and conserve natural resources," offers gardening and
master composting programs, summer camps and garden tours for children,
maintains a garden hotline to provide garden and resource questions, and
hosts events related to urban agriculture.4 97
In the City of Denver, Denver Urban Gardens (DUG) 49 8 performs the
majority of outreach activities. DUG, an independent 501(c)(3) nonprofit
organization, is "funded through a variety of sources, including individual
contributions, grants from government agencies as well as private and
corporate foundations."499 In addition to its work building and supporting

49 1. See Client Assistance Memo 701: Rainwater Harvesting for Beneficial Use,
SEATTLE DEP'T OF PLANNING & DEv. (2009), availableat http://www.seattle.gov/DPD/
Publications/CAM/CAM520.pdf.
492. See
Brochures & Fact Sheets, SEATTLE.GOV: PUBLIC UTILITIES,

http://www.seattle.gov/util/Services/Yard/Composting/Brochures_&_FactSheets/inde
x.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2011).
493. See id.
494. A list of Seattle area community and nonprofit organizations is available at
URBAN FARM HUB, http://www.urbanfarmhub.org/organizations/ (last visited Feb. 23,
2012).

495.

Lettuce Link is one of nearly thirty programs administered by Solid Ground, a

Seattle organization "that works to end poverty and undo racisim and other oppressions
that are root causes of poverty."
About Us, SOLID GROUND, http://www.solidground.org/AboutUs/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2011).
496. Lettuce Link, SOLID GROUND, http://www.solid-ground.org/Programs/Nutrition/
Lettuce/Pages/default.aspx. (last visited Oct. 19, 2011).
497. SEATTLE TILTH, http://seattletilth.org/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2011).
498. See DENVER URBAN GARDENS, http://dug.org/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2011).
499. Frequently Asked Questions: How are you funded?, supra note 71. Denver
Urban Gardens "currently receive[s] funding through a competitive grant program
offered by the Denver Office of Economic Development for [its] community garden
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community gardens throughout Denver,500 DUG provides education and
resources to Denver residents. Education opportunities include school
garden education and mentoring programs, free public composting classes,
garden education through community gardens, training workshops, master
501
community gardener training programs, and master composter programs.
Resources provided by DUG include extensive garden resource sheets and
links for information on organic gardening tips, organic weed and pest
control, crop rotation and planting, soil quality and fertility, cool season
crops, extending the growing season, winter gardening activities, water
conservation, harvesting, preserving foods, saving seeds, composting,
community farm and composting workshops, the Free Seeds and
Transplant Program (which "provides free vegetable seeds and transplants
to residents in underserved neighborhoods",) 50 2 and information on
beekeeping information. 50 3 DUG also hosts events throughout the
gardening season, such as film screenings, garden tours, a booth at the
Denver County Fair, Art Farm (an evening of art and music), and a field-totable brunch event.504
V.

CONCLUSION

As illustrated throughout this article, cities across the United States
are actively promoting urban agriculture. Zoning and land use codes that
permit urban agriculture activities, funding for community gardens,
education and outreach activities, and partnerships with nonprofit
organizations and community groups are all essential to establishing and
maintaining urban agriculture within a city. In addition to the cities
discussed throughout this article, many other U.S. cities are establishing
policies that promote urban agriculture, including San Francisco, 505 New

operations in the City and County of Denver, and frequently partner[s] with city and
county agencies across the metro area in garden lease agreements, program
development, and neighborhood improvement." FrequentlyAsked Questions: What is
your relationshipwith city government?, DENVER URBAN GARDENS, http://dug.org/
faq/about-denver-urban-gardens/what-is-your-relationship-with-city-government.html.
500. See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
501. See Education, DENVER URBAN GARDENS, http://dug.org/education/.
502. Free Seed Transplants, DENVER URBAN GARDENS, http://dug.org/free-seedstransplants/.
503. For a complete list of DUG's resources, visit Community Resources, supra note

80.
504. See Events and Workshops Calendar,supra note 81.
505. See Mayor Lee Signs Urban Agriculture Legislation for Greater Local Food
Production in SF, CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO: MAYOR'S OFFICE (Apr. 20,
2011), http://www.sfmayor.org/index.aspx?page=353.
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York,506 and Pittsburgh, 50 7 to name a few. While this article was being
drafted, several ordinances and initiatives discussed above were passed or
proposed. As the interest in local food production appears to be rapidly
increasing, it is foreseeable that urban agriculture policies and creative
partnerships will continue to evolve to meet the demand of urban residents
wishing to produce local food.

506. See Derek Denckla, 2010 NYC Urban Agriculture Roundup, THE GREENEST
(Jan. 3, 2011), http://thegreenest.net/2011/01/2010-nyc-urban-agriculture-roundup/.
507. See Joe Smydo, City Establishes Rules for Urban Farms, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/1 1039/1123852-53.stm.

THE TRAGEDY OF THE HORSE, AMERICAN ICON
Tim Opitz*
I.

II.
III.
IV.

V.
VI.

AUTHOR'S NOTE ..........................................
INTRODUCTION....................................358
FORMER INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES......
................................
HORSE PROCESSING

357
................. 360
........ 363

A. Anti-slaughterPosition...........................364
..... 365
..................
B. RegulatedHorse Processing
........................ 368
TRANSPORTATION OF THE HORSE....
LAWS GOVERNING THE HORSE-SLAUGHTER INDUSTRY.................370

........................
A. FederalLegislation
B. ProposedFederalLegislation ...........
..........................
C State Legislation
VII. CONSEQUENCES OF THE BAN ON SLAUGHTER......
....................................
VIII. CONCLUSION

I.

..... 370
......... 374
...... 376
............. 379
.........

381

AUTHOR'S NOTE

Whether a prohibition on slaughter improves the welfare of the
American horse population is the focus of this article. At the time it was
written, winter of 2010-2011, a confluence of Federal and State legislative
action had ended domestic slaughter. These actions are detailed in the
body of this article. Since 2007, the legal status of horse slaughter
remained static. Just as Sir Isaac Newton's first law of motion explained,
an object at rest tends to stay at rest. Legislative inertia is the perspective
from which this article was originally written. However, Newton's first
law also stated that the object at rest will move when acted upon by an
external pressure. The welfare of the American horse pressured a change
in the legal status of horse slaughter in the United States.
In 2011, perhaps as a result of this pressure, the ground shifted. First
in June, the United States Government Accountability Office released a
report to Congress titled "Action Needed to Address Unintended
Second, in
Consequences from Cessation of Domestic Slaughter."'

* Tim Opitz is a May 2012 Juris Doctor candidate at the University of Arkansas School
of Law, Fayetteville, Arkansas. This comment received the University of Arkansas
Journalof FoodLaw & Policy's 2011 Annual Arent Fox/Dale Bumpers Excellence in
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November, Congress passed and President Obama signed an appropriations
bill that determines agricultural appropriations for 2012.2 This bill
included USDA funding without the restriction on the inspection of
horsemeat that had constituted a de facto ban on domestic slaughter.
The pressures have changed the legal status of domestic horse
slaughter. Although there are not currently any horse processing plants
operating in the United States, it is now possible that we will see at least
one plant open in the coming months.4
Almost immediately, there has been pushback from anti-slaughter
advocates. 5 The findings of the GAO report on horse welfare largely
parallel this article. The GAO report and this article make the case for
developing a pragmatic policy on slaughter that would enhance the welfare
of all American horses. Reverting to a sentimental, short-sighted, and
temporary protection of horses would only increase "the heartache, and the
thousand natural shocks that flesh is heir to," and is no favor to our equine
friends.6
II.

INTRODUCTION

Whether 't is nobler in the mind to suffer
The slings and arrows of outrageousfortune,
Or to take arms againsta sea of troubles,

Writing Award. The author wishes to thank Professor Mark Killenbeck for his helpful
comments and ideas throughout the writing process.
1. Horse Welfare: Action Needed to Address Unintended Consquences from
Cessation of Domestic Slaughter, U.S. Gen. Accountability Office, GAO 11-228 (June
2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d l 1228.pdf.
2. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub L. No. 112-055
(2012); See also Laura Allen, U.S. Equine Slaughter Legal Again, ANIMAL LAW
COALITION (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.animallawcoalition.com/horse-slaughter/
article/1887.
3. Id.
4. Justin Juozapavicius, Horse Meat Inspection Ban Lifted in the U.S.,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 20, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/30/horsemeat-consumption-us_n 1120623.html.
5. Allen, supra note 2 (Representative Jim Moran (D - Virginia) stated: "I am
committed to doing everything in my power to prevent the resumption of horse
slaughter and will force Congress to debate this important policy in an open,
democratic manner at every opportunity. Now, more than ever, it is crucial that
Congress pass the American Horse Slaughter Prevention Act (H.R. 2966) to
permanently prohibit the slaughter of American horses.").
6. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 3,
sc. 1.
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And by opposing end them.
Many horse lovers cheered when the slaughterhouses in the United
States were closed in 2007.8 From the "Brown beauty" ridden by Paul
Revere to Teddy Roosevelt's horse "Little Texas" at San Juan Hill to
Caroline Kennedy's pony "Macaroni," horses have been a beloved and
integral part in our American history and culture. Slaughter was inhumane;
horses, after all, are "American icons and deserve to be treated as such." 9
Now, only a few years after domestic slaughter was ended, some activists
are beginning to rethink their position.'o Some experts cautioned that
closing the processing plants would decrease the overall welfare of the
American horse population." Temple Grandin, animal science professor at
Colorado State University, commented that the closure of slaughterhouses
was "well intentioned but [would have] very bad unintended
consequences." 2 The negative consequences have included increased
instances of abandonment and tragic neglect of horses.13
This article intends to portray the issue of horse slaughter, not as an
ignoble end, but as "a humane, economically viable disposal option for
unwanted or dangerous horses under careful federal regulation." 1 4 Part II
considers the former horse slaughter industry in the United States and the
role that it played in the overall horse industry. Part III details the process
of slaughter and addresses the objections of anti-slaughter activists. Part
IV discusses the transportation of horses for slaughter. Part V explains the
legislative framework that the horse slaughter industry must operate within,
both federal and state. Part VI of this article evaluates the impact that the
ban on domestic horse slaughter has had on the overall welfare of the
American horse population. Part VII offers conclusions on the desirability
of a ban on horse slaughter.

7. Id.
8. Stephanie Simon, Rethinking Horse Slaughterhouses, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052748703808704576062064022541024.
html.
9. Laura Jane Durfee, Anti-Horse Slaughter Legislation: Badfor Horses, Bad for
Society, 84 IND. L.J. 353 (2009).
10. Simon, supra note 8.
11. Hallie S. Ambriz, The American Horse Slaughter Prevention Act, 14 SAN
JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REv. 143, 157 (2004).
12. Jennifer O'Brien & Randall Szabo, 2009 Legislative Review, 16 ANIMAL L. 371,

389 (2009-2010).
13.
14.

Ambriz, supra note 11, at 157.
Durfee, supra note 9, at 359.
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FORMER INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES

To die, - to sleep -

No more; and by a sleep to say we end
The heart-ache,and the thousand naturalshocks
Thatflesh is heir to, - 'tis a
consummation
Devoutly to be wish'd.'5
The United States is home to over nine million horses.16 In 2006, the
United States was the fifth-largest exporter of horsemeat.' 7 At that time,
over twenty-six million pounds of meat was exported, valued in the
millions of dollars.'s Despite the strong numbers in 2006, the total number
of horses slaughtered in the United States had been decreasing over several
decades.' 9 In the early 1990s, nearly 300,000 horses were processed
annually. 2 0 Further evidence of the decline of the domestic industry was
the number of plants operating in the country.21 In the early 1950s, over
thirty processing facilities operated in the United States.2 2 The number
decreased to fifteen in the 1980s before dwindling to only four in 1999.23
By 2006, only three plants remained.24
Despite the decline in horse slaughter, the overall horse industry in
the United States has a large economic footprint.25 Approximately 4.6
million Americans are involved with horses in some way - 460,000 having
a job related to or working with horses. 2 6 All of these horses and jobs
create considerable revenue, accounting for $39 billion in "direct economic
activity." 2 7 When the spending of industry suppliers and employees is
factored in, the total activity of the industry is over $100 billion.28

15. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 6.
16. Durfee, supra note 9, at 356.
17. Bradley J. Sayles, The Decline of Edible Equine: A Comment on Cavel
InternationalInc. v. Madigan, 2 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L. 103,
103 (2009-10).
18. Id.
19. Ambriz, supra note 11, at 144.
20. Id.
21. Durfee, supra note 9, at 364.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id at 356.
25. See generally Id.
26. Durfee, supra note 9, at 356.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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Before being shut down in 2007, domestic horse slaughter was a part
of the industry.2 9 In 2006, the American plants exported $65 million worth
of horsemeat. 30 During that year, there were three processing plants
operating - one in Illinois and two in Texas.3 1 In addition to millions of
dollars in taxable revenue, these plants provided jobs to many people.32
The plant in Dekalb, Illinois, employed more than sixty workers.33 The
two plants in Texas employed a combined 140 people.34 It has been
estimated that the total economic impact of a ban on domestic horse
slaughter for export is between $152 million to $222 million per year.
Not only were the plants economically profitable, they were a
valuable counter-balance to the overproduction of horses.36 Combined, the
three plants processed between 90,000 to 100,000 horses annually.37 Horse
slaughter added revenue, jobs, and more importantly, provided "a humane,
economically viable disposal option for unwanted or dangerous horses
under careful federal regulation."3 8 The slaughtered horses were the
unwanted leftovers of an industry that bred them without a responsible plan
in place to deal with disposal. Anti-slaughter activists are quick to point
out that "[h]orses are not normally bred in the U.S. to become someone's
dinner, but, rather to serve some other purpose." 39 One slogan urges us to
"[k]eep America's horses in the stable and off of the table."40
Approximately one-third of all horses slaughtered domestically were
former racehorses. 4 1 In the quest to breed a champion, between 30,000 and
35,000 thoroughbreds are born annually in the United States.42 When they

29.
30.

Id.
Tadlock Cowan, CONG RESEARCH SERV., RS21842, HORSE SLAUGHTER
PREVENTION BILLS AND ISSUES (2010).
31. O'Brien & Szabo, supra note 12, at 388; Sayles, supra note 11, at 106; Ambriz,
supra note 11, at 147.
32. Durfee, supra note 9, at 356.
33. Sayles, supra note 17, at 106.
34. Ambriz, supra note 11, at 147.
35. Durfee, supra note 9, at 368.
36. Id. at 359.
37. Kimberly May, Frequently asked questions about unwanted horses and horse
slaughter, AMERICAN VETERINARY MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (Sept. 5, 2008),
http://www.avma.org/issues/animal welfare/unwantedhorsesfaqpf.asp.
38. Durfee, supra note 9, at 359.
39. Daniel Hammer, Unwanted Horses: The Limits of Protection, FRIENDS OF
http://www.friendsofanimals.org/actionline/summer2005),
(Summer
ANIMALS
2005/unwanted-horses.html.
40. Id.
41. Ambriz, supra note 11, at 148.
42. Hammer, supra note 39.
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do not win, they often end up being sold for slaughter.4 3 One horse track in
New Jersey has a "meat man" come twice a week to buy the horses that are
no longer valuable to race. 44 Wild horses constituted another segment of
the horses slaughtered.4 5 The United States Bureau of Land Management
(BLM), the agency charged with managing wild horses on federal land,
puts horses up for adoption, some of which are then slaughtered.46 For
many years, the commercial slaughter of wild horses was illegal because of
the Wild Free Roaming Horse and Burrow Act of 1971. That changed in
2005 when former Senator Conrad Burns of Montana added an amendment
to the Omnibus Appropriations bill, requiring the BLM to sell or destroy
horses older than ten years for which private adoption has been
unsuccessful. 48 The remaining segment of horses that were slaughtered
consisted of companion horses. 4 9 These horses included riding horses
whose owners lost interest, horses with behavioral problems, and horses
whose families face financial hardship.50
As the horse industry continues to over-produce horses, the animals
must go somewhere. For many horses, the fate remains the same slaughter. 5t However, instead of being processed in the United States, the
horses are shipped to Mexico and Canada.52 The USDA estimated that
19,000 live horses were exported to Mexico and 26,000 live horses were
exported to Canada in 2006." The year after the plants in Illinois and
Texas closed, 47,000 horses were sent to Canada and 45,000 to Mexico,
the majority of them for slaughter.54 The number of live horses exported in
2008 continued the increase, with 77,000 having been sent to Canada and
69,000 to Mexico.

43. Some winners face slaughter as well. See Ray Paulick, Death of a Derby
Winner: Slaughterhouse Likely Fate for Ferdinand, BLOODHORSE (July 25, 2003),
http://www.bloodhorse.com/horse-racing/articles/17051/death-of-a-derby-winnerslaughterhouse-likely-fate-for-ferdinand, for a discussion on how Kentucky derby
winner Ferdinand was reported to have been slaughtered in Japan.
44. Ambriz, supra note 11, at 148.
45. Id. at 149.
46. Robert Gehrke, Horse Adoption Program Challenged, WASH. POST, December
26, 2001, at A29.
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
48. Id at § 1333(e)(1); O'Brien & Szabo, supra note 12, at 385.
49. Ambriz, supra note 11, at 149.
50. Id.
51. Durfee, supra note 9, at 357-58.
52. O'Brien & Szabo, supra note 12, at 389.
53. Cowan, supra note 30, at 6.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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Although Americans almost never raise horses for food, people in
other countries want to eat them. Even before the processing plants in the
United States closed, the demand for horsemeat was almost exclusively
foreign.57 In the last two decades of domestic slaughter, more than three
million horses were slaughtered and sent abroad.58 The majority of the
processed meat was shipped to Italy, Japan, France, Belgium, Switzerland,
and Mexico. 59 In the European countries, the meat is such a delicacy that
customers are willing to pay up to fifteen dollars per pound.o
The former horse slaughter industry in the United States was a
profitable part of the overall horse industry. Closing down the processing
plants in the United States did little to stop the over-production of horses.
The most important thing that the horse slaughter industry provided was
not the meat, but rather the mechanism to control the horse population.
Even without processing plants in the United States, this balance to overproduction is provided by plants in Mexico and Canada. In order to
improve the welfare of the American horse, a system that addresses the
production of horses is necessary. Without addressing the root problem,
prohibiting the domestic slaughter and the transportation of horses to other
countries will only compound the plight that American horses face.
IV.

HORSE PROCESSING

To die; to sleepTo sleep!-perchanceto dream: ay, there's the rub;
For in that sleep of death what dreams may come
When we have shuffled off this mortal coil,
Must give us pause. There's the respect
That makes calamity ofso long life[.]6 1
In horse processing, the term "slaughter" primarily means "the
commercial slaughter of one or more horses with the intent to sell, barter,
or trade the flesh for human consumption." 6 2 If the horse meat is intended
for human consumption, then the animal must be alive immediately prior to

56. Ambriz, supra note 11, at 150.
57. Durfee, supra note 9, at 356-57.
58. Ambriz, supra note 11, at 146.
59. Id.
60. Tamara Jones, An Ugly Fate In An Auction Ring?; Horse Slaughterfor Human
Diets Debated, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2003, at Al.
61. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 6.
62. Robert Laurence, Cowboys and Vegetarians: The Proposed American Horse
SlaughterPreventionAct, 2003 ARK. L. NOTES 103, 104 (2003).
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slaughter.6 3 In the United States, the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act
(HMSA) governed acceptable methods of slaughter.64 When enacting this
law, Congress found that slaughtering animals in a humane manner had
additional benefits to the horse slaughter industry. 6 5 In addition to
preventing needless suffering of the animals, humane slaughter made the
working conditions safer for employees, improved products, and increased
efficiency. 66 The following methods of slaughter are listed in the statute as
humane:
(a) in the case of cattle, calves, horses, mules, sheep,
swine, and other livestock, all animals are rendered
insensible to pain by a single blow or gunshot or an
electrical, chemical or other means that is rapid and
effective, before being shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast, or
cut;67
HMSA also allows animals to be slaughtered according to the ritual
requirements of the Jewish faith; under this exception, the animal "suffers
loss of consciousness by anemia of the brain caused by the simultaneous
and instantaneous severance of the carotid arteries with a sharp
instrument." 68
A. Anti-slaughterPosition
Anti-slaughter advocates contend that although slaughterhouses
portray a plant environment "where everything is sanitized, with workers
adhering to every humane, safety, and sanitation code and regulation,"
reality is much more brutal. 69 Anti-slaughter advocates contend that
adequate head restraint on a scared horse is "virtually impossible" and as a
result, the horses often receive numerous blows to the skull and are
stunned, but still remain conscious when they are hoisted and their throats
are cut.70 One former processing plant worker described his experience,
saying, "[y]ou move so fast, you don't have time to wait till a horse bleeds

63. Sayles, supra note 17, at 109.
64. Humane Methods of Livestock Slaughter, 7 U.S.C § 1901 (2006).
65. Id.
66. Amy Mosel, What about Wilbur? Proposing a Federal Statute to Provide
Minimum Humane Living Conditionsfor Farm Animals Raisedfor Food Production,
27 U. DAYTON L. REV. 133, 144 (2001-02).
67. 7 U.S.C § 1902.
68. Id.
69. Ambriz, supra note 11, at 154.
70. Id. at 153-54.
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out. You skin him as he bleeds. Sometimes a horse's nose is down in the
blood, blowing bubbles, and he suffocates." 71
After slaughter was stopped in the United States, anti-slaughter
advocates feared that in Mexico the processing plants gruesomely disable
the horses by severing their spinal cords with knives.72 These activists
contend that the bolt method used in Juarez, just like in the United States,
often fails to incapacitate the animals.7 3 In the United States, activists
contend the horse is slaughtered alive as the animal drowns in blood.7 4
Whereas in Mexico, it is contended, workers incapacitate the horse with the
"puntilla technique,"" stabbing the horse as many as thirteen times in the
neck in an effort to sever the spinal cord.7 6 After using this technique to
incapacitate the horse, "it is attached to a chain, lifted up, and has its throat
slit." 7 7 The plant owner in Juarez has compared the brutal "puntilla"
method to watching someone work with an ice pick. 78 The methods
depicted by anti-slaughter activists are obviously disturbing. The cruelty
described by anti-slaughter advocates is the same kind of treatment of
animals that led Congress to enact the HMSA.
B. Regulated Horse Processing

With the HMSA already in place, United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) employees ensure compliance by inspecting the plant
and methods of slaughter.80 The inspectors are authorized to stop slaughter
and close the plant immediately if they see evidence of inhumane
treatment."' In the United States, the slaughterhouses kill the horses by
driving a steel pin into the horse's brain, killing them quickly.82 This
method is known as the "bolt," and is one of the humane methods listed in
the HMSA. 83 To perform it, an employee uses a "compressed air
pneumatic captive-bolt gun" to shoot a four-inch bolt into the horse's

71.
72.

Id. at 153.
O'Brien & Szabo, supra note 12, at 389.

73. Id.
74.
75.
76.

Ambriz, supra note 11, at 153.
Durfee, supra note 9, at 366.
Id.

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Mosel, supra note 66, at 152.
80. Durfee, supra note 9, at 358.

81.

21 U.S.C § 603(b) (2006).

82. O'Brien & Szabo, supra note 12, at 389.
83. See Ambriz, supra note 11, at 153-55; see generally 7 U.S.C. 1902 (stipulating
the allowed humane methods of slaughter).
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skull.84 After the horse is incapacitated, it is shackled and hoisted by a rear
leg before its blood is drained." Thereafter, the plant employees proceed
to carve the horse for meat. When done properly, this method has resulted
in greater efficiency, improved products, and prevented needless suffering
of the horse. 6
The HMSA only applies to horse processing plants in the United
States. With the closure of the remaining United States plants in 2007,
many horses are now shipped to Mexico and Canada for slaughter.8 1 Some
people are concerned that the methods of slaughter used in Canada and
Mexico are inhumane compared to the bolt method used in the United
States."
At least the slaughter itself, when done domestically, was
performed under veterinary supervision, and subject to the USDA
oversight. 89 Once the horses leave the United States, they may be
transported and killed inhumanely. 90
However, the claims of mistreatment in foreign countries can be
greatly exaggerated. Anti-slaughter advocates in the United States had
claimed that adequate head restraint was "virtually impossible,"' but this
is not the case. In 2009, a delegation representing the American
Association of Equine Practitioners toured two slaughter facilities in
Mexico. 9 2 The first plant they toured was a South American-owned plant
that processed 1,000 horses per week.93 This plant operated under Mexican
and European Union slaughter regulations. 94 A veterinarian was on hand

84. Ambriz, supra note 11, at 155.
85. Id. at 153.
86. Mosel, supra note 66, at 144.
87. Tom Lenz, The Unwanted Horse Issue in the United States and its Implications,
ANIMAL WELFARE COUNCIL 4, http://www.animalwelfarecouncil.com/html/pdf/
Canadian-unwanted-horse-presentation-nov2009.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
88. See O'Brien & Szabo, supra note 12, at 389.
89. See James J. Ahern ET AL., The Unintended Consequences of a ban on the
Humane Slaughter (Processing) of Horses in the United States, ANIMAL WELFARE
COUNCIL, 11 (2006). See also Ambriz, supra note 11, at 151.
90. See generally Key Facts: Humane Slaughter, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE (June 22, 2001),
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/FactSheets/Key FactsHumane_Slaughter/index.asp
[hereinafter Key Facts] (setting forth USDA's guidlines for the humane slaughter of
animals). Animals slaughtered outside the United States are not subject to USDA
oversight.
91. Ambriz, supra note 11, at 154.
92. Malinda Osborne, Horse Slaughter Conditions in Mexico Explored by AAEP
Group, JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN VETERINARY MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (Mar. 1,
2009), http://www.avma.org/oninews/javma/mar09/09030Lpf.asp.
93. Id
94. Id
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to inspect the horses.95 At this plant, the workers moved the horses with
flags rather than whips.96 Then, one by one the horses went into stocks.97
The delegation described the operation of the restraint system, saying that
"[o]nce in place, a hydraulic bar pushes the horse forward while a wedgeshaped stainless steel device comes under the chin and cradles the head.
This limits the horse's movement, . . . which better facilitates placement of

the captive device." 98
Once the horse is secured, the horse is incapacitated with a captivebolt to the head. 99 Dr. Tom Lenz, one member of the delegation, described
the plant as "an extremely clean, well-run plant. . . . From a veterinary
perspective, the animals were handled well." 0 0 He further stated "[i]f you
look at it from the hard perspective of the meat industry, they're in the
business to produce meat. They don't want an injured or down or stressed
horse any more than they have to, because it affects the meat quality."o.
The second plant visited by the delegation was a locally-owned
Mexican company that dealt only with Mexican horses.10 2 The plant
processed only 280 horses per week and did not have a veterinarian on
site. 0 3 However, a veterinarian inspected the meat and the facility once a
week.10 4 This plant also used the captive bolt method of killing, but
without the use of advanced stocks.10 5 The delegation from the United
States concluded the horses were well-cared for and the slaughter was
humane and efficient at both plants. 106
Anti-slaughter activists are correct that slaughter can be a gruesome
and inhumane process. However, with proper enforcement of the
regulatory structure in place, the process can be as efficient and humane as
possible. Even though the instances of animal cruelty during slaughter in
foreign countries may be exaggerated, people who are sympathetic to
slaughter would prefer that it happened domestically. The slaughter itself,

95.
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97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
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when done in the United States, was performed under veterinary
supervision and subject to USDA rules. 07
V.

TRANSPORTATION OF THE HORSE

The undiscover'dcountry,from whose bourn
No travellerreturns,puzzles the will,
And makes us rather bear those ills we have
Than fly to others that we know not of?'os
More than 98,000 horses were sent across the United States borders to
Canada and Mexico for slaughter in 2008.109 Because Americans do not
raise horses for human consumption, the horses must be gathered before
they can be slaughtered.1io The processing plants purchase stock from
people known as "killer buyers" who travel the country to buy horses."'
"Killer buyers" purchase horses from several different venues including
auctions, private dealers, and racetracks throughout the country."12 These
horses have an average weight of 1,000 pounds and are bought for about
thirty to forty cents a pound. 113
Once the horses are purchased, they are often hauled several thousand
miles to a processing plant.' 14 In the past, horses were shipped in crowded
double-deck trailers.i"5 These trailers were often designed for different
species with shorter necks." As a result, the horses traveled thousands of
miles with their necks bent in an uncomfortable and dangerous position. 17
Because many of the horses arrived at the processing plants in an injured
state, the USDA commissioned a study on the transportation methods and
injuries of horses transported for slaughter."s
The results of the survey were as follows:
[Forty-two percent] of the horses were transported on
double decks. [Nine percent] of horses were transported
on straight single deck semi-trailers and 49 [percent] on
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See generally Key Facts,supra note 90.
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Ambriz, supra note 11, at 150.
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Ambriz, supra note t1, at 146.
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gooseneck trailers. Approximately 73 [percent] of the
severe welfare problems observed at the plants did not
occur during transport or marketing but were caused by
the owner: severely foundered feet, emaciated, skinny,
weak horses, animals which had become non-ambulatory
and injuries to the legs such as bowed tendons." 9
The survey concluded that the injuries to horses transported to
slaughter were caused by the previous owner's neglect, fighting with other
horses during transportation, and the design of the trailers. 120 To reduce
the injuries caused during transportation, Congress passed the Commercial
Transportation of Equine for Slaughter provision as part of the Federal
Agriculture Improvement Reform Act in 1996. 121 The Act was
prospective, and did not take effect until 2007.122 Under the Act, the
USDA was directed to write regulations regarding the food, water, and rest
that must be provided to horses during transport.1 23 The regulations
developed permitted the horses to be transported for twenty-eight hours
without food, water, or rest.' 2 4 Additionally, the USDA passed a regulation
banning double-deck trailers for transporting horses to slaughter.125
These rules were intended to be enforced by the USDA veterinarians
who would have inspected each shipment of horses upon arrival at the
processing plant.12 6 However, in 2007 when the regulations would have
taken effect, the three processing plants in the United States were forced to
close by state laws.127 Currently, the horses are shipped to Canada and
Mexico to be slaughtered, bypassing the primary method of enforcing the
regulations because they never arrive at a United States plant.12 8 A senior
veterinarian with the USDA says that the horses sent to Canada and
Mexico "are crowded into trailers, with no access to food or water, and
have difficulty keeping their balance." 29
The conditions that the horses face during transportation are a part of
the mistreatment of the animal. Without processing plants in the United

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104127, § 901 (1996).
122. Ambriz, supra note 11, at 144.
123. Ambriz, supra note 11, at 151.
124. Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act § 901.
125. Commercial Transportation of Equines for Slaughter, 9 C.F.R. § 88.3(b) (2011).
126. Ambriz, supra note 11, at 151.
127. Cowan, supra note 30; Ambriz, supra note 11, at 144.
128. See generally, O'Brien & Szabo, supra note 12, at 383.
129. Id.
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States, the primary means for enforcing regulations on the transportation of
horses is circumvented. The fact that the horses are transported across state
borders and into other countries makes this an area that would most
effectively be addressed by federal action which could bring uniform
standards of treatment, rather than a hodgepodge of varying state laws.
VI.

LAWS GOVERNING THE HORSE SLAUGHTER INDUSTRY

For who would bear the whips andscorns of time,
Th' oppressor's wrong, the proudman's contumely
The pangs of despis'dlove, the law's delay,
The insolence of office, and the spurns
That patient merit of th' unworthy takes,
When he himself might his quietus make
With a bare bodkin?'3"
Surrounding the horse slaughter debate is a legal framework of both
state and federal laws. The following sub-sections discuss both the laws
currently in place and the proposed laws governing horse slaughter in the
United States.
Reading the legislative framework in light of the
information about the horse industry may give the reader a greater

understanding of the problems that a ban on horse slaughter might create.
A. Federallegislation
In the area of horse slaughter there are several overarching federal
laws that govern the industry. First is the Federal Meat Inspection Act of
1906 (FMIA). '' This law governs all meats commercially sold for human
consumption and requires that the USDA inspect the meat.' 32 The
inspection is mandatory and the costs for the inspection must be covered by
appropriated funds, except for holiday and overtime periods.' 33 The USDA
treats the inspection of horses in a manner similar to other livestock.134
Under FMIA, horses were inspected upon arrival at the plant. Any animals
showing signs of disease required additional inspection and were then
slaughtered later.13

130.

SHAKESPEARE, supra note 6.

131.

21 U.S.C. § 601.

132.

Id. at §§ 601, 603.

133. Id.
134.

Durfee, supra note 9, at 358.

135. 21 U.S.C. § 603(a).
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Following the FMIA, all horses slaughtered for human consumption
were subject to the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA).1 6 Under
this act, all livestock must be unconscious before slaughter.137 The Act
allows for two methods of slaughter.'38 Under one, the animal may be
slaughtered using Kosher or religious methods."' 9 Under the other, the
animal must be rendered "insensible to pain by a single blow or gunshot or
an electrical, chemical or other means that is rapid and effective."'l 4 0 To
ensure compliance with this Act, USDA employees must inspect the
facility and methods of slaughter.141 The inspectors are authorized to stop
slaughter and close the plant immediately if they see evidence of inhumane
treatment. 142
The Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 (AMA) has played an
important role in the horse slaughter industry.143 The AMA establishes that
livestock processing plants can request that the USDA assign official
grades to their products.'" Because the grading is voluntary, the plants
must pay user fees for the grading service.14 This would later be used to
temporarily allow processing plants to avoid the requirement that all
inspections be funded by appropriations.146
The next piece of legislation especially pertinent to the horse
slaughter industry is the Wild Free Roaming Horse and Burro Act of
1971. "7 This Act was enacted to protect wild horses and burros on federal
land, and the Act criminalized the commercial sale and slaughter of these
animals.148 The agency tasked with the care of these animals is the United
States Bureau of Land Management (BLM).14 9 The BLM protected wild
horses under the law, until 2005 when then-Senator Conrad Bums of
Montana added an amendment to the Omnibus Appropriations Bill." 0 The
amendment eliminated the restriction on selling wild horses for slaughter
and allows the government to control the wild horse population by selling
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older horses for slaughter. ' The BLM is now required to sell animals
older than ten years of age and those for which private adoption has been
unsuccessfully attempted at least three times.15 2 To counteract Senator
Bums' amendment, Congress placed a temporary moratorium on federal
funding for the inspection of horsemeat by amending the Agricultural,
Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 2006.153 This amendment prevented the USDA from
paying for inspections of horse processing plants or horses to be
slaughtered for human consumption. 154 However, the language only
prohibited ante-mortem inspection of the horses.' 55 Without the USDA
inspections, the FMIA prohibited the slaughterhouses from selling the
The sponsors of the 2006
horsemeat for human consumption.156
amendment intended the provision "to end the practice of horse slaughter
for human consumption."'5 7 However, the final House and Senate report
stated:
It is the understanding of the conferees that the
Department is obliged under existing statutes to provide
for the inspection of meat intended for human
consumption (domestic and exported). The conferees
recognize that the funding limitation in section 794
prohibits the use of appropriated funds only for payment
of salaries or expenses of personnel to inspect horses.
In November 2005, the three slaughter plants operating in the United
States petitioned the USDA for voluntary inspection under the AMA to be
funded by user fees. 1 By February 2006, the USDA published a rule
amending regulations on the slaughter of exotic species to apply to horses
as well.16 0 This rule continued to apply the existing FMIA guidelines for
151. Durfee, supra note 9, at 360.
152. 16 U.S.C. § 1333(e)(1).
153. Durfee, supra note 9, at 360, Agricultural, Rural Development, Food and Drug
Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-97,
119 Stat. 2120 (2006).
154. Mary W. Craig, Just Say Neigh: A Call for Federal Regulation of By-Product
Disposal by the Equine Industry, 12 ANIMAL L. 193, 198-99 (2005-06).
155. Exotic Animals and Horses; Voluntary Inspection, 9 C.F.R. § 352.3 (2006)
(Ante-mortem means the inspection of the horses before they are slaughtered).
156. 21 U.S.C. § 603.
157. Durfee, supra note 9, at 360.
158. Ante-Mortem Inspection of Horses, 71 Fed. Reg. 6337 (Feb. 8, 2006) (to be
codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 352).
159. Cowan, supra note 30.
160. Ante-Mortem Inspection of Horses, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6338.
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ante-mortem horse inspection, the difference being that the user must pay a
fee for the service. 161 The rule further explained that post-mortem, or after
slaughter, inspections could still be paid for with money appropriated to the
USDA. 16 2 This ruling and interpretation by the USDA allowed the horse
processing plants to continue operating.' 6 3
Subsequently, the House of Representatives prohibited the USDA
from implementing this rule allowing user fees for inspection in the fiscal
year 2008 USDA appropriation bill passed in July 2007.164 However, this
restriction was not included in the Senate version. 6 5 Yet, the discrepancy
did not matter because the bill was not passed as a freestanding law.16 6
Rather, the USDA funding was eventually appropriated under Division A
of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008.167 This bill included the
language from the House bill prohibiting user fees to pay for ante-mortem
horse inspection, effectively reversing the temporary USDA rule. 168 By the
time this funding was removed, the three slaughter houses operating in the
United States had been shut down by the enforcement of state laws. 169
Subsequent appropriations bills continued to restrict the appropriation of
funds for the inspection of horses, including the Omnibus Appropriations
Act of 2009 and the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug
Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2010.o17
However, in November 2011, an appropriations bill was passed, without
the prohibition on the inspection of horsemeat.'
Prior to November, the federal laws in place effectively prevented
commercial horse processing plants from operating in the United States.
The 2012 agricultural appropriations bill, lifts the defacto ban that resulted
from restrictions on the USDA tied to appropriations money.

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Durfee, supra 9, at 360.
164. H.R. 3161, 110th Cong. § 738 (1st Sess. 2007); Cowan, supra note 30.
165. See generally S. 1859, 110th Cong. (2007).
166. Cowan, supra note 30.
167. Id.; Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, Division A
§ 741 (2008).
168. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 § 741; see also Cowan, supra note 30.
169. Cowan, supra note 30.
170. Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, Division A § 739
(2009); Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-80 (2009).
171. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub L. No. 112-055
(2012); See also Laura Allen, U.S. Equine Slaughter Legal Again, ANIMAL LAW
COALITION (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.animallawcoalition.com/horse-slaughter/
article/1 887.
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B. ProposedFederallegislation
Currently, there are three different pieces of proposed legislation
One bill is the Horse
relevant to the horse slaughter industry.
Transportation Safety Act of 2009 (HTSA).17 2 The HTSA was introduced
by then-Representative Mark Kirk of Illinois, after a double-decker truck
carrying fifty-nine draft horses overturned, killing eighteen of the
animals. 73 HTSA would ban the interstate transport of horses on multilevel trailers, imposing a fine of 100 to 500 dollars per horse.174 The bill
was referred to committee, and never became law.' 75 Representative Kirk
is now Senator Mark Kirk of Illinois, having been elected to the United
States Senate to fill the seat formerly held by President Barack Obama.1 76
The 2010 mid-term elections significantly changed the membership of
Congress. Many of the proponents of horse slaughter regulation have been
replaced or moved to a different position. Because of these changes, it
remains to be seen who, if anyone, will re-introduce the HTSA in the 112th
Congress. However, the USDA has passed a regulation banning the use of
two-level trailers for transporting horses to slaughter, finding that the
multi-level trailers are unsafe. 177
A second piece of legislation is the Prevention of Equine Cruelty Act
of 2009 (PECA), introduced in the House of Representatives by
Representative John Conyers of Michigan and in the Senate by Senator
Mary Landrieu of Louisiana. 1
PECA would make it a crime to
knowingly possess, ship, transport, purchase, sell, deliver, or receive "any
horseflesh or carcass . . . with the intent that it is to be used for human

consumption."' 79 Had this bill become law, it would have outlawed the
current practice of transporting horses to Mexico and Canada for
slaughter. 80 A similar bill was passed in the House of Representatives in
2006 but never became law, as many critics contended that the bill did not

172. H.R. 305, 111 th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2009).
173. O'Brien & Szabo, supra note 12, at 381.
174. H.R. 305.
175. H.R. 305: Horse Transportation Safety Act of 2009, GOVTRACK,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill =hl11-305.
176. Lynn Sweet, Mark Kirk Sworn in as Illinois Senator to Fill Obama's Unexpired
Term, POLITICS DAILY (Jan. 2011), http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/1 1/29/markkirk-swom-in-as-illinois-senator-to-fill-obamas-unexpired/.
177. 9 C.F.R. § 88.3(b).
178. Prevention of Equine Cruelty Act of 2009, H.R. 503, 11Ith Cong. (1st Sess.
2009); Prevention of Equine Cruelty Act of 2009, S. 727 111 th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
179. Id; See also Cowan, supra note 30.

180.

O'Brien & Szabo, supra note 12, at 384.
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actually protect horses."8 ' Speaking about PECA, Representative Bob
Goodlatte of Virginia stated:
Even if the goal of this legislation was desirable, and I do
not accept the premise, this is not a bill that will improve
the treatment of horses. Too little has been done to deal
with the consequences of destroying a legitimate industry
by government fiat. If anything, H.R.503 in its current
form will lead to more suffering for the horses it purports
to help. 182
Some critics took the position that the PECA legislation was
"woefully inadequate, emotionally misguided, and fail[ed] to serve the best
interest of the American horse and horse owner."183 The sentiment that the
PECA was not in the best interest of the horse led many major horse owner
organizations in the country to oppose the Act.184
These organizations included over "144 horse organizations, animal
health organizations and agricultural organizations, including the American
Veterinary Medical Association, the American Association of Equine
PECA
Practitioners, [and] the American Quarter Horse Association."'
did not receive a vote in the 11 1th Congress and never became law.' 86 As
of February 2012 PECA has not been re-introduced into the 1 12th
Congress. However, a similar bill titled, "American Horse Slaughter
Prevention Act of 2011" was introduced in September 2011 and has since
been referred to subcommittee.187
A third bill, the Restore our American Mustangs Act (ROAM) was
introduced in the House of Representatives by Representative Nick Rahall
of West Virginia and in the Senate by the late-Senator Robert Byrd. 18

181.

Press Release, Liz Friedlander & James Ryder, Ag Committee Sends Horse Bill

to the Floor Unfavorably (July 27, 2006), available at http://agriculture.house.gov/

press/PRArticle.aspx?NewslD=579.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. S. 727: Prevention of Equine Cruelty Act of 2009, GOvTRACK,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bili.xpd?biil=sl 11-727 (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).
187. American Horse Slaughter Prevention Act of 2011, H.R. 2966, 112th Cong.
(2011).
188. H.R. 1018, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); S. 1579: Restore Our American
Mustangs Act, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sl111-1579
[hereinafter Mustangs Act]; Adam Clymer, Robert C. Byrd, a Pillarof the Senate, Dies
at 92, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/29/us/politics/
29byrd.html.
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ROAM would restore protections for wild horses and burros by amending
the Wild Free Roaming Horses and Burros Act.' 89 ROAM has several
provisions that would change how the BLM could manage the wild horse
population, but most importantly it would once again prohibit the
The House of
commercial sale and slaughter of wild horses.190
Representatives passed the ROAM by a vote of 239 -185 in July 2009.'9'
However, ROAM never received a vote in the Senate, and therefore did not
become law in the 1 1 1 th Congress.1 92 In October 2009, Department of the
Interior Secretary, Ken Salazar, introduced a new program that would
affect the management of wild horses on federal land.19 3 The new program
contains many of the proposed changes in the ROAM Act, including new
preserves and increased use of contraceptives to control the population.194
The current legislation that is proposed appears to have moved past
trying to ban slaughter outright and is instead largely focused on restricting
or ending the transportation of American horses abroad for slaughter.
However, aside from the ROAM act, these laws do not address the problem
of the overproduction of horses. Without population control measures, the
horse industry will likely continue to breed horses and cast aside the excess
animals. Legislation that does not address this problem is inadequate and
compounds the problem by removing an industry that is an effective and
profitable balance to overproduction.
C. State Legislation
Until November 2011, Federal legislation prevented horse slaughter
domestically, but it was state laws that ultimately closed the processing
plants.195 Texas and Illinois were the only states that had horse-processing
The plant in Illinois was Cavel International
plants in 2007.196
Incorporated (Cavel), located in Dekalb, Illinois, and had operated there for
over twenty years.19 7 In 2007, the plant had sixty employees who
slaughtered approximately 40,000 to 60,000 horses a year.198 In May 2007,
the Illinois Horse Meat Act was amended to make horse slaughter for

189.

O'Brien & Szabo, supra note 12, at 386.

190. H.R. 1018.
191. Mustangs Act, supra note 188.
192. Id.
193. O'Brien & Szabo, supra note 12, at 388.
194. Id.
195. Cowan, supra note 30.
196. O'Brien & Szabo, supra note 12, at 388.
197. Sayles, supra note 17, at 106.
198. Id.
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human consumption illegal. 99 Cavel then filed a lawsuit for an injunction
against the amendment, which Cavel ultimately lost. 200 The Seventh
Circuit held that the Illinois Horse Meat Act was not preempted by the
201
Federal Meat Inspection Act nor did it violate the Commerce Clause.
Upon losing the case, Cavel was forced out of business.
Texas's law prohibiting horse slaughter was not a newly enacted law,
but rather, a newly enforced law that had been passed in 1949.202 The law
was enforced by then-Texas Attorney General John Comyn after receiving
complaints from an animal rights activist. 203 The Texas statute reads:
A person commits an offense if: (1) the person sells, offers
for sale, or exhibits for sale horsemeat as food for human
consumption; or (2) the person possesses horsemeat with
the intent to sell the horsemeat as food for human
204
consumption.
The two processing plants in Texas challenged the validity of the
Texas law.205 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the statute finding
that it was neither preempted by federal law nor did it violate the Dormant
Commerce Clause. 2 06 Subsequently, the two plants in Texas were forced to
close, eliminating 140 jobs.20 7
Even as Texas and Illinois were enacting or enforcing laws to ban
horse slaughter, seventeen states proposed bills urging Congress to support
United States horse processing facilities and oppose the PECA. 208 A
common theme in the bills is a statement that the prohibition on slaughter
has resulted in an increase in abandoned and neglected horses. 2 09 Further,
the bills go on to say that the domestic horse surplus of 100,000 horses,
The
compounding annually, will overwhelm welfare agencies.210

199. Illinois Horse Meat Act, 225 ILL. COMP STAT. 635 (2007).
200. Cavel Int'l, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2007).
201. Idat 553-54.
202. TEX. AGRIC. CODE. ANN. § 149.002 (West 2004).
203. Durfee, supra note 9, at 362.
204. TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 149.002.
205. Empacadora de Carnes de Fresnillo, S.A. de C.V. v. Curry, 476 F.3d 326, 329
(5th Cir. 2007).
206. Empacadora, 476 F.3d at 329.
207. Ambriz, supra note 11, at 146.
208. O'Brien & Szabo, supra note 12, at 389, 392-94 (Missouri, Minnesota, South
Carolina, Kansas, Arizona, Georgia, Tennessee, Idaho, Utah, Wyoming, Arkansas,
Illinois, and Iowa, South Dakota, North Dakota, Montana, and Nebraska).
209. Id.
210. Id.
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legislation generally asserts that the issue of horse slaughter and welfare is
best dealt with through regulation and inspection rather than prohibition. 2 11
Some states have undertaken studies to examine the feasibility of
starting a horse slaughter plant in their state, including North Dakota, South
Dakota, and Nebraska.212 The South Dakota legislature took aim at the
denial of appropriated funds for horse inspections. It "urge[d] Congress
and the United States Department of Agriculture to reinstate and fully fund
USDA's inspection program for horse euthanasia and horse slaughter
facilities and to enact legislation to authorize the establishment of horse
slaughter facilities in the United States."2 13
There have been some state laws that have passed. According to the
National Conference of State Legislatures, Arkansas, Missouri, and South
Dakota have adopted resolutions urging Congress to support horse
21
processing.214 Montana passed a bill restricting judicial challenges to
future equine processing plants.2 15 Wyoming went further by passing a law
that allows any state-licensed meat-processing plant to sell horsemeat to
state institutions. 2 16 On the anti-slaughter side of the debate, Rhode Island
passed a bill in 2009, which urged Congress to support the federal horse
slaughter ban.2 17
Without federal appropriations available to inspect the horses that are
slaughtered, the meat cannot be sold in interstate commerce. Many state
legislatures have recognized this and are taking steps to re-instate the
USDA funding. Further, some state legislatures are beginning to consider
bills that would establish state meat inspection programs intended to allow
for horse processing plants to open in the state.218
The move by some states to allow slaughter would almost certainly
complicate the United States slaughter industry. Although it would provide
the necessary balance to overproduction of horses, other issues would
remain. Rather than transporting horses across national borders, horses
would cross state lines. With the slaughter overseen by different state
regulations, a varying degree of methods of slaughter would appear. In
order for more consistency, particularly because the animals travel in

211. O'Brien & Szabo, supra note 12, at 389.
212. N.D. H. 1496, 61st Leg. (2009); S.D. Sen. 114, 84th Leg. (2009); Neb. Leg.
Res. 229, 101st Leg. (2009).
213. S.D. Sen. Con. Res. 2, 84th Leg. (2009).
214. Id.
215. Mont. H. 418, 61st Leg. (2009).
216. Simon, supra note 8.
217. R.I. H. 6026 (2009).
218. Neb. L.B. 305, 102nd Leg. (2011).
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interstate commerce, comprehensive federal regulation is necessary and
appropriate.
VII.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE BAN ON SLAUGHTER

Thus conscience does make cowards of us all;
And thus the native hue of resolution
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,
And enterprises of greatpith and moment
With this regardtheir currents turn awry,
And lose the name of action.21
Before the remaining horse processing plants were shut down in the
United States, some experts argued the overall conditions for horses would
deteriorate without the option of slaughter available. 220 Dr. Malcom
Commer was one expert who predicted that instances of horse abuse and
neglect would increase if the domestic processing plants were closed. 22 1
Unfortunately, the cases of neglect and abuse in the years since the closing
of the plants in the United States have risen.222 Some estimates say that
over 120,000 horses have been abandoned.22 3 According to Keith Dane,
director of Equine Protection for the Humane Society of the United States,
local officials are seizing large numbers of horses, and rescue organizations
are taking in more animals than ever. 224 He laments that, because many of
the rescue centers are getting full, the horses are sold to "killer buyers" or
left to "perish in barren fields."22 5
One rescue farm in Massachusetts, which normally took in twenty
horses per year, had seventy-four released to it in 2010.226 The recent
economic downturn has probably amplified the problem of abandoned
horses. More than 80 percent of the horses abandoned nationwide every
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year were owned by people who could not afford to care for them.227 The
average minimum cost of caring for a horse is about $1,825 per year.228
According to one shelter worker, the trend has been significant increases in
the number of horses being surrendered. 229 Heather Robertson stated,
"[t]his is the third year that we've had significant increases in animals
being surrendered." 2 30 The last processing plant in the United States closed
four years ago, in 2007.231
Recently, several large cases of horse neglect made headlines. In
Arkansas, authorities seized 117 hungry, diseased, and neglected horses. 23 2
In Texas, 50 horses were rescued from a ranch, most showing signs of
neglect and severe emaciation.233 In Missouri, 33 emaciated horses were
rescued from a farm in November 2010.234 It is not hard to imagine
someone struggling to provide for a large number of horses when
considering the average cost of caring for each horse.
It is not just large farms that are neglecting or abandoning horses.
The Unwanted Horse Coalition estimated 170,000 horses nationwide were
abandoned in 2010.235 Tragically, "most of the nation's 432 recognized
rescue facilities are at capacity-many turning away horses. ,,236 Whitney
Wright, director of Hope for Horses, a rescue group in Asheville, North
Carolina, said recently: "[e]very day, I'm turning horses away. I feel like
I'm playing God, because I have to pick and choose."237 Even some rescue
farms themselves are struggling to care for the horses. 2 38 One such farm is
Hidden Meadows Equine Rescue in West Virginia, where authorities
seized 50 emaciated horses and the ownership is now under criminal
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Debbie Arrington, 170,000 cast-off horses leave U.S. shelters overcapacity,
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investigation.239 The recurring theme of horse neglect has strained
resources available to care for the animals. With no end in sight to the
economic downturn, the number of abandoned horses may continue to
compound without a comprehensive plan in place to manage them. Some
people in the horse industry are adjusting their positions on slaughter.
Whitney Wright, director of a horse rescue group, once worked to shut
Now she supports reopening a few
down slaughterhouses.2 40
slaughterhouses under strict guidelines for humane handling as a way to
manage the number of horses in the United States.241
The instances of neglect and abandonment occurring in the United
States have increased in the years since the closing of domestic processing
plants. Even though many horses are now transported to Mexico and
Canada for slaughter, the overproduction of horses is apparent. Despite the
increased instances of abandonment and neglect, the United States has only
begun to see the impact of a ban on horse slaughter.242 Because
slaughterhouses in Canada and Mexico provide an outlet for nearly
100,000 unwanted horses every year, a large number of the horses
susceptible to being abandoned or neglected are slaughtered instead.243
Without addressing the overproduction of horses, a ban on transportation
for slaughter would be devastating. The number of unwanted horses is
certain to increase and compound each year, decreasing the overall welfare
of the American horse population.244
VIII. CONCLUSION

If a ban on horse slaughter is desired to improve the welfare of horses,
it should be a federal ban coupled with a comprehensive program to
manage the population of horses through contraception and restricted
breeding. Alternatively, Congress should restore USDA appropriations for
horse inspections to allow states that choose to allow processing plants to
do so. Following the Release of the GAO report which recommended:
That Congress may wish to reconsider restrictions on the
use of federal funds to inspect horses for slaughter or,
instead, consider a permanent ban on horse slaughter.
GAO recommends that USDA issue a final rule to protect
horses through more of the transportation chain to
239. Id.
240. Simon, supra note 8.
241. Id.
242. Durfee, supra note 9, at 365.
243. Id.

244. Id. at 368.
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slaughter and consider ways to better leverage resources
for compliance* activities. 245
Congress passed an appropriations bill without restrictions on the
USDA inspection of horses.2 46 Although there are not currently any horse
processing plants operating in the United States, as of January 2012, it is
now possible that we will see at least one plant open in the coming
months.24 7
Without a comprehensive horse management program or the horse
slaughter industry, the plight of the American horse will likely continue.

245. Horse Welfare: Action Needed to Address Unintended Consquences from
Cessation ofDomestic Slaughter, U.S. Gen. Accountability Office, GAO 11-228 (June
2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dl 1228.pdf.
246. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub L. No. 112-055
(2012).
247. Justin Juozapavicius, Horse Meat Inspection Ban Lifted in The U.S., HUFF. POST
GREEN (Nov. 30, 2011, 9:45 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/
30/horse-meat-consumption-us n_ 1120623.html.

UNITED STATES FOOD LAW UPDATE: MOVING TOWARD A MORE
BALANCED FOOD REGULATORY REGIME

A. Bryan Endres & Nicholas R. Johnson
For decades, the federal government has played a significant role in
promoting healthy eating. In the early 1900s, the United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA) promoted a foundational diet of milk, proteins,
fruits and vegetables, and grains.' Most Americans are at least somewhat
familiar, although perhaps confused, with the more nuanced healthy eating
recommendations contained in the food pyramid - first employed in 1992.2
And virtually every American has experienced the federally supported
school lunch program. In the first half of 2011, these two iconic programs
underwent significant change as part of a stepped-up effort to improve the
health of the country through better food choices. Part I of this article
describes the "MyPlate" initiative that replaces the iconic USDA food
pyramid and menu revisions to the national school lunch and school
breakfast programs. This section also profiles administrative decisions in
two school districts to ban, on health grounds, brown-bag lunches in favor
of school-provided lunches. Finally, this section describes some of the
challenges of implementing a rule for chain restaurant menu labeling under
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
Part II of this article discusses several food safety issues, both
legislative and administrative, intended to minimize consumer vulnerability
to the increasing complex food supply chain.
Part III profiles four developments in food-related litigation. The
first, Seaside Farms v. United States, seeks compensation from the
government for negligently identifying tomatoes as the source of a 2008
Salmonella outbreak eventually traced to jalapeno peppers. Other litigation
* Associate Professor of Agricultural Law, University of Illinois, Department of
Agricultural and Consumer Economics, and Director, European Union Center,
University of Illinois. This research was supported in-part by the USDA National
Institute of Food and Agriculture, Hatch Project No. ILLU-470-309. Any opinions,
findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those
of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the view of the funding agency.
** Associate, Mayer Brown LLP, Chicago, Illinois.
1. See Jeanne P. Goldberg, et al., The Obesity Crisis: Don't Blame it on the
Pyramid, 104 J. AM. DIET. AssoC. 1141, 1142 (2004) (describing history of dietary
guidance at the federal level).
2. See id. at 1141 (noting general awareness of the pyramid); John M. Kinney, The
US Department of Agriculture Food Pyramid; the birth and aging of an idea, 6
CURRENT OPINION IN CLINICAL NUTRITION AND METABOLIC CARE 9, 11-12 (2003)

(noting confusing recommendations).
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described below includes a claim for exposure to diacetyl through daily
consumption of microwave popcorn; a failure to label meat analogues
containing mycoprotein sourced from the cell protoplasm of the fungus
Fusarium venenatum, an alleged allergen; and a settlement in a multidistrict class action dispute regarding baby products containing Bisphenol
A.
This article concludes with a discussion of two significant
developments relating to biotechnology: the resolution of an injunction
prohibiting the planting of genetically engineered alfalfa and a multimillion dollar settlement in the Liberty Link rice contamination class action
arising from the unauthorized commingling of genetically engineered rice.
As in previous editions of this update, necessity dictates that not every
change is included; rather, the authors limited their analysis to significant
changes within the broader context of food production, distribution, and
retail. The intent behind this series of updates is to provide a starting point
for scholars, practitioners, food scientists, and policy makers determined to
understand the shaping of food law in modern society. Tracing the
development of food law through these updates also builds an important
historical context for the overall progression of the discipline and hopefully
prompts further scholarship by others on many of these emerging issues.
I.

HEALTH INITIATIVES

A. USDA's MyPlate
With substantial backing from Michelle Obama, the USDA recently
replaced its longstanding (and often maligned) food pyramid with a new
nutrition guide aimed at giving consumers easy-to-understand information
about daily food choices. The guide, called MyPlate, depicts a typical
consumer's daily food intake in the form of a dinner plate that graphically
illustrates the recommended daily proportions of grains, proteins, dairy
products, and fruits and veggies. If the consumer's actual plate mirrors that
of the MyPlate icon, then - in the words of the First Lady - "we're good;
it's as simple as that." 3
The MyPlate icon already has garnered praise from nutrition
advocates for being much easier to use than the old food pyramid system.
A companion USDA website, www.choosemyplate.gov, elaborates upon
the MyPlate icon using simple, pithy directives: "[e]njoy your food, but eat
less," "[m]ake half your plate fruits and vegetables," and "[d]rink water

3. William Neuman, Nutrition Plate Unveiled, Replacing Food Pyramid, N.Y.
TIMES, June 2, 2011, B3, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/03/business/
03plate.html?_r-l1&scp=4&sq=myplate&st=cse.
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instead of sugary drinks." 4 The website's section on "empty calories"
helpfully juxtaposes foods with some empty calories (e.g., sweetened
applesauce; regular ground beef; whole milk) against companion foods that
have few or no empty calories (e.g., unsweetened applesauce; extra lean
ground beef; fat-free milk).
B. FDA's Menu Labeling Rules

While the USDA's MyPlate icon is perhaps nothing more than a
breezy effort to make consumers think more about the foods they eat on a
daily basis, the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
recently engaged in formal rulemaking that aims to accomplish essentially
the same goal. The FDA's efforts will have real consequences for chain
restaurants throughout the United States, who will soon be required to
place calorie information on menus and display cases. 6 These menu
labeling requirements are part of a long-running effort by health and
nutrition advocates to curb the growing obesity epidemic in the United
States. About a third of the average American's daily caloric intake now
comes from food prepared outside the home, and studies have shown that
consumers often badly underestimate the number of calories in these
prepared foods. 7 But that is not to say that consumers do not want to know
how many calories are in their Big Macs and Whoppers: to the contrary, a
national telephone survey revealed that more than 70% of U.S. adults
supported the idea of listing calorie counts on restaurant menus.
Responding to this demand, some states and municipalities have enacted
menu labeling requirements for the chain restaurants within their
jurisdictions, but the laws' differing requirements have proven burdensome
for the chain restaurants that must comply with them.9
of
Agriculture,
Department
U.S.
CHOOSEMYPLATE.GOV,
4. See
http://www.choosemyplate.gov/index.html (last visted Dec. 20, 2011).
5. Empty Calories, CHOOSEMYPLATE.GOV, U.S. Department of Agriculture,
http://www.choosemyplate.gov/foodgroups/emptycalories.html (last visited Dec 19,
2011).
6. See Food Labeling; Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu Items in Restaurants
and Similar Retail Food Establishments, 76 Fed. Reg. 19,192, 19,192 (Apr. 6, 2011) (to
be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 11 and 101).
7. See id.
8. Id. at 19,193.
9. See id. (noting that "[s]ome jurisdictions required only calories on menus and
menu boards while others required additional nutrient declarations (e.g., variations of
the following: total grams of trans fat, grams of saturated fat, grams of carbohydrates,
and milligrams of sodium). Some State and local laws required a statement on menus
and menu boards regarding daily intake amounts for calories and other nutrients and
other laws did not require such a statement.").
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In response, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act' 0 amends
section 403(q) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) to
require "restaurants and similar retail food establishments that are part of a
chain with 20 or more locations doing business under the same name and
offering for sale substantially the same menu items . . . to provide calorie

information for standard menu items, including food on display and selfservice food."'' "Calorie information" means the number of calories
contained in each menu item as it is usually prepared, as well as a statement
suggesting daily caloric intake for contextual purposes.' 2
If this
information is not on the menu, then the food is misbranded under the
FFDCA. 13
The menu labeling provisions of the Affordable Care Act went into
effect upon the law's enactment in 2010, but the FDA has said that it does
not intend to enforce the self-executing provisions of the law until it
promulgates final regulations that more clearly delineate the scope of the
labeling requirements.1 4 This is perhaps a smart move, given the
definitional complexities that lay hidden beneath what appears to be a
rather simple requirement. Take, for example, an issue tackled by the
FDA's recent round of draft rulemaking: the definition of "retail food
establishment." The menu labeling provisions of the Affordable Care Act
apply only to foods offered for sale "in a restaurantor similar retailfood
establishment that is part of a chain with 20 or more locations doing
business under the same name . . . and offering for sale substantially the

same menu items." 15 But what sort of places does Congress view as being
a restaurant or similar to it? Acknowledging that the term is ambiguous,
FDA proposes to define the phrase as "a retail establishment that offers for
sale restaurant or restaurant-type food, where the sale of food is the primary
business activity of that establishment."' 6 The "primary business activity"
requirement would be met if the establishment has either (1) held itself out
to the public as a restaurant, or (2) devotes more than 50% of its gross floor

10. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010).
I1. Food Labeling; Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu Items in Restaurants and
Similar Retail Food Establishments, 76 Fed Reg. 19,192, 19,193(Apr. 6, 2011) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 11 and 101).
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 19,194 (noting that "[a]lthough these provisions became requirements
at the time the law was signed, FDA has previously announced that we intend to

exercise our enforcement discretion until the final rule is published and in effect.").
15. 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(H)(i) (2011) (emphasis added).
16. Food Labeling, Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu Items in Restaurants and
Similar Retail Food Establishments, 76 Fed. Reg. at 19,192, 19,197 (Apr. 6, 2011) (to
be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. II and 101).
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area to the preparation, purchase, service, consumption, or storage of
food. 1
This proposed definition seems sensible enough, but there is a
linguistic point worth emphasizing: FDA's proposed definition turns on an
establishment's sale of food in general, regardless of whether that food is
prepared restaurant-style. That means, for example, that grocery stores and
convenience stores would fall within the proposed definition of "restaurant
or similar retail food establishment" because, while they might not hold
themselves out as restaurants, more than 50% of their gross floor space is
devoted to the preparation, purchase, service, consumption, or storage of
food.' 8 Therefore, any "restaurant-type food" (generally defined by the
FDA as ready-to-eat food that is prepared in the establishment in question
and not for sale outside of it' 9) offered in grocery stores and convenience
stores that otherwise meet the law's requirements must label those items
with calorie information. As a less-inclusive alternative to its proposed
definition, the FDA has suggested "to define 'restaurant or similar retail
food establishment' to mean a retail establishment where the sale of
restaurantor restaurant-typefood - as opposed to food in general - is the

primary business activity of that establishment." 20 That would by and large
exclude grocery and convenience stores, whose primary business activity is
selling food products to be prepared by consumers. The FDA seeks
comment on which of these definitions it should adopt.
If the FDA sticks with its proposed definition of "restaurant or similar
retail establishment," the result may be some thinly split hairs. The FDA
anticipates that "most movie theaters, amusement parks, general
merchandise stores with in-house concession stands, hotels, and
transportation carriers such as trains and airplanes" will not meet the
definition because they do not present themselves to the public as
restaurants (and they likely also would not meet the 50% floor space
requirement). 2 1 Furthermore, it is equally clear that chain restaurants
within larger establishments (e.g., Subway in a Walmart or Starbucks
inside a Barnes & Noble) will need to label their menu items with calorie
information, because they have locations outside of that larger
establishment.22 But what of the Target or Walmart Caf&- the little sitdown dining area that serves hot dogs, nachos, and Icees? In its draft

17. See id
18. See id. at 19,198.
19. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(A)(ii) (2011).
20. Food Labeling, Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu Items in Restaurants and
Similar Retail Food Establishments, 76 Fed. Reg. at 19,198.
21. See id. at 19,197.
22. See id at 19,198.
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guidance, FDA suggests that these restaurant-style areas would fall outside
of the menu labeling requirements because they are not part of a chain with
locations outside of the Target or Walmart.23 FDA would, therefore,
consider these eating areas to be part of the Target or Walmart itself, and
the question is whether the big-box store has presented itself as a restaurant
or devotes more than 50% of its floor space to food (likely not, on both
The FDA has asked for comments on whether these
counts). 24
establishments should fall within the scope of the labeling rule.
In any case, the definition of "restaurant or similar retail
establishment" matters, because once the FDA's menu labeling
requirements apply, they are quite broad. For example, FDA proposes to
define the "menu" or "menu board" that contains calorie information as the
"primary writing ... from which a consumer makes an order selection," no
matter where the consumer is physically located in proximity to the
restaurant. 25 That means that affected restaurants will need to put calorie
information not only on primary menus and menu boards inside the
restaurant, but also on drive-through menus, express window menus, takeout menus, and even menus on the restaurant's website if consumers can
place orders via phone, fax, or online.26
The FDA further proposes to define "restaurant-type food" broadly to
include not only standard menu items,27 but also items routinely contained
in standing self-serve displays - for example, "[p]otato salad that is
routinely offered at a salad bar, pancakes that are routinely offered at a
buffet, and pudding that is routinely offered at a cafeteria line." 2 8 Under
the proposed rules, restaurants will need to place a sign next to each one of
these salad bar or buffet items stating the number of calories either per item
(e.g., a muffin or a baked potato) or per serving (e.g., potato salad or ice
cream). 29 The same would go for pastries, ready-made sandwiches, or
23. See id. ("If... a facility selling restaurant or restaurant-type food is not part of a
chain with locations outside of the chain of the larger retail establishment, the facility
would be considered part of the larger retail establishment. For example, if Superstore
XYZ has a caf6 that appears only in the other locations of Superstore XYZ chain, the
cafe would be considered part of Superstore XYZ.").
24. See id.
25. Food Labeling; Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu Items in Restaurants and
Similar Retail Food Establishments, 76 Fed. Reg. at 19,201-202.
26. See id. at 19,201.
27. See id at 19,202 (defining standard menu items to include "combination meals,
variable menu items, self-service food, and food on display," but not custom orders,
daily specials, foods being test-marketed, and temporary menu items).
28. Id at 19,203.
29. See id. at 19,215. Per serving measurements can be done using the serving
utensil as the measure (e.g., 400 calories per scoop) or by common household

measurements (e.g., 400 calories per cup). Id.
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similar items for purchase from a display case. 3 0 The labeling rule even
reaches self-serve soda dispensers, which "must have calorie declarations
for each flavor or variety offered" and in amounts corresponding to the size
of the drink purchased (e.g., "140 calories per 12 ounces"). 3'
Given these requirements, it is interesting to examine FDA's costbenefit analysis of the proposed regulations. The agency estimates that its
new menu labeling rules would affect about 278,600 establishments
organized under 1,640 chains. 32 The mean aggregated start-up cost of
compliance with the regulations would be $315 million - or roughly $1,100
per restaurant - with mean ongoing costs of $44 million. 33 But will these
substantial costs be offset by lowered obesity rates? FDA admits that
"[flood choice and consumption decisions are complex," and that it is
"unaware of comprehensive data allowing accurate predictions of the effect
of the proposed requirements on consumer choice and establishment
menus." 34 Nevertheless, the agency has offered a ballpark break-even
estimate: FDA estimates that at least 0.06 percent of the adult obese
population would need to reduce their caloric intake by at least 100 calories
per week to break even on the mean annualized cost of the regulations.
Current U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) data
indicate that 34% of the U.S. population - or roughly 105 million people are obese, 36 which means that if only 6,300 obese Americans reduce their
caloric intake by 100 each week each year, the economy won't lose a dime
on FDA's menu-labeling investment. While such bureaucratic numbercrunching is often impossible to objectively confirm, the menu-labeling
rules are a positive step forward in shifting consumer preferences toward
more healthy fare at chain restaurants. When a McDonald's patron sees
"790 calories" prominently displayed next to the Angus Bacon and Cheese
burger on the menu board, she may pick the company's 290-calorie
southwest grilled chicken salad instead,37 and McDonald's may alter its
menu offerings accordingly in the face of this evolving demand.

30. Food Labeling; Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu Items in Restaurants and
Similar Retail Food Establishments, 76 Fed. Reg. at 19,215.
31. See id. at 19,216.
32. See id. at 19,222.
33. See id.
34. Id. at 19,223.
35. Food Labeling; Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu Items in Restaurants and
Similar Retail Food Establishments, 76 Fed. Reg. at 19,223.
36. See id. at 19,192.
37. See McDonald's USA Nutrition Facts for PopularMenu Items, MCDONALD'S,
http://nutrition.mcdonalds.com/getnutrition/nutritionfacts.pdf (last visited Dec. 20,
2011).
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C. USDA's Revisions to the National School Lunch and School Breakfast
Programs
The federal government has long targeted obesity as a national
concern, but it has recently focused on combating that problem in
children. 38 CDC data suggest that about 32% of children and adolescents
aged 2 to 19 are overweight, and countless studies have linked childhood
obesity to adulthood health problems like heart disease, diabetes, strokes,
and high blood pressure." Naturally, one of the key risk factors associated
with obesity at any age is caloric intake, and for children, one of the main
daily sources of calories - whether good or bad - is the breakfast and lunch
programs in the nation's school systems. The problem is these meals do
not always provide children with the healthy food needed to combat
obesity. A 2007 report by the USDA indicates that under current school
menu planning, fewer than one-third of school lunches offered in the 20042005 school year met program requirements of less than 10% of total
calories from saturated fat. 4 0 A report by the Institute of Medicine (IOM)
found that "children's consumption of whole grains is extremely low in
comparison with the Dietary Guidelines recommendation that half of all
grains consumed [should be] whole grains."4 1 Current school lunch
regulations allow schools to serve whole and reduced-fat (2%) milk
without restriction, but do not require schools to offer the quantities of
fruits and vegetables recommended by the 2005 Dietary Guidelines for
Americans.42 Finally, school meals also have extremely high levels of
sodium-lunches in particular average 1,400 mg of sodium, according to
one report.4 3
Therefore, the USDA issued significant draft revisions to its National
School Lunch Program (NLSP) and School Breakfast Program (SBP) in

38. See, e.g., A. Bryan Endres & Nicholas R. Johnson, United States Food Law
Update: The FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Obesity, and Deceptive Labeling
Enforcement, 7 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 135, 139-41 (2011) (outlining key provisions of the
Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010).
39. See Food Labeling, Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu Items in Restaurants
and Similar Retail Food Establishments, 76 Fed. Reg. at 19,192.
40. Nutrition Standards in the National School Lunch and School Breakfast
Programs, 76 Fed. Reg. 2494, 2496 (Jan. 13, 2011) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pts. 210

and 220).
41.
42.
43.
than

Id
See id. at 2495-96.
Id. at 2502 (noting that the average sodium content of all school lunches is more
1,400 mg).
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order to align them with the recommendations set forth by the 2005 Dietary
Guidelines for Americans.44 In particular:
The proposed standards for menu planning improve the
school meals' alignment with the 2005 Dietary Guidelines
by offering more fruits at breakfast; increasing the amount
and variety of vegetables at lunch; offering more wholegrain rich foods; limiting fluid milk choices to fat-free
(unflavored or flavored) and unflavored fluid low-fat milk;
establishing minimum and maximum calorie levels for
each age/grade group; increasing the emphasis on limiting
saturated fat; seeking gradual but major reductions in the
sodium content; and minimizing trans fat.45
To help it implement the 2005 Dietary Guidelines into the NSLP and
the SBP, USDA turned to the IOM, an independent, nonprofit arm of the
National Academy of Sciences that provides "unbiased and authoritative"
health advice to the public and policymakers.4 6 At USDA's request, IOM
conducted an independent review of the nutritional needs of school-aged
children in the U.S. using both the 2005 Dietary Guidelines and its own
Dietary Reference Intake (DRI) reports.47 Based on this review, IOM "set
targets for 24 nutrients and other dietary components that serve as a
scientific basis for the proposed standards for menu planning." 4 8 However,
schools will not use these nutrient targets to plan their own menus; rather,
the crux of the revamped program are the new "food-based meal patterns"
(FBMP) developed by IOM that incorporate the 24 nutritional targets. 49
There are two main patterns - one for breakfast and one for lunch - and
each sets minimum daily values for fruits, vegetables, grains, meats, and
fluid milk, while also capping the total number of calories per meal.50 The
daily values vary by three different age groups: Grades K-5, Grades 6-8,
So long as school menu planners stick within the
and Grades 9-12.5

44. See id at 2494.
45. Nutrition Standards in the National School Lunch and School Breakfast
Programs, 76 Fed. Reg. at 2496-97.
46. See About the IOM, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES,
http://www.iom.edu/About-IOM.aspx (last visited July 19, 2011).
47. See Nutrition Standards in the National School Lunch and School Breakfast
Programs, 76 Fed. Reg. at 2496.
48. Id. at 2497.
49. See id. at 2497-98.

50. See id. at 2498.
51.

Id.
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patterns recommended by IOM, they should be in compliance with
USDA's nutritional requirements.
In order to carry out these new FBMPs, the proposed rule
recommends a significant change in how the NSLP and NBP are operated.
Currently, there are five menu planning approaches schools may use when
planning school breakfasts and lunches: two follow the FBMP approach,
two follow the nutrient standard menu planning (NSMP) approach (which
uses computer modeling), and one allows for individualized modification
of either the FBMP or the NSMP. 52 The proposed regulations eliminate the
NSMP approaches in favor of a FBMP-only approach; no other menu
planning approaches would be permitted.
USDA estimates that a single
menu plan will not only simplify operations (70% of U.S. schools already
use the FBMP approach), but will also better effect USDA's goals by
requiring schools to stay within the new dietary guidelines established by

IOM.54
In setting calorie limits for its school meal programs, USDA noted
that it was "mindful of the childhood obesity trend and the food choices
available to school children outside of [school meals]."5 Therefore, the
minimum and maximum calorie levels for school lunches and breakfasts
take into consideration the meals and snacks kids eat when they are not in
school - food that in many cases is less healthy than what the government
prescribes for breakfast and lunch. The recommended calorie ranges are
fairly narrow - there's a 100-calorie variance between the upper and lower
limits at lunch, and a 150-calorie range at breakfast.5 6 The USDA states
that the goal of the calorie ranges "is not to reduce children's intake of
food, but to avoid excessive calories," and that its guidelines "leave
relatively few discretionary calories for fats and added sugars. ",57

52. See Nutrition Standards in the National School Lunch and School Breakfast
Programs, 76 Fed. Reg. at 2495.
53. Id. at 2499.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 2501.
56. See id.
57. Nutrition Standards in the National School Lunch and School Breakfast
Programs, 76 Fed. Reg. at 2501.
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D. Wanna Brown-BagIt? Not At This Chicago School
The upshot of the USDA's revised school meal guidelines seems
clear: less wiggle room for school administrators to fill breakfasts and
lunches with unhealthy food choices. Of course, there is another way for
kids to get all the bologna, potato chips, and Twinkies they want - pack a
bag lunch. And that is why one Chicago school has taken the drastic step
of banning all homemade lunches, instead requiring its pupils to sign on to
the federally-funded school meal programs.s Chicago Public Schools has
no formal policy on brown bag lunches, leaving the decision up to the
principal at each school.59 The principal at Little Village Academy on
Chicago's West Side enacted the homemade lunch ban after she saw
students "bring 'bottles of soda and flaming hot chips' on field trips for
their lunch." 60 Another school on Chicago's South Side allows students to
bring bag lunches but apparently dispatches the food constabulary to
"confiscate any snacks loaded with sugar or salt." 61 A spokeswoman for
Chicago Public Schools defended Little Village's policy in the Chicago
Tribune, stating that the school's principal "is encouraging the healthier
choices and attempting to make an impact that extends beyond the

classroom." 62
However, not everyone is thrilled with the policy. For parents who do
not qualify for free or reduced-price school meals, homemade lunches can
be less expensive than the fixed-price school programs.63 And for picky
eaters, no home lunches may mean no lunch at all: the Chicago Tribune
described a lunchtime scene at Little Village in which "dozens of students
took the [required school] lunch but threw most of it into the garbage
uneaten." 64 But the rottenest tomato that can be lobbed at homemade lunch
bans is that they do not allow kids and their parents to make good food
decisions. Vegans and vegetarians certainly suffer - the NSLP and NBP
mandate servings of protein but do not allow for tofu because it does not
have a federal standard of identity.6 s Children with food allergies may

58. See Monica Eng and Joel Hood, Chicago School Bans Some Lunches Brought
From Home, CHICAGO TRIBUNE Apr. 11, 2001, http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/education/ct-met-school-lunch-restrictions-041120110410,0,4567867.story.
59. See id.

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63.

See Eng and Hood, supra note 58.

64.

Id.

65. See Nutrition Standards in the National School Lunch and School Breakfast
Programs, 76 Fed. Reg. at 2501.
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have to wrangle with school administrators for an exception to the policy.66
And finally, the brown-bag lunch ban does not allow children to learn to
take responsibility for making wise food choices. When asked by a
reporter what he would bring for lunch if he were able, Little Village
student Gerardo Ramos - only a second-grader - responded: "I would bring
a banana, orange, and some grapes."67
II. FOOD SAFETY INITIATIVES
Food safety has been a long-running topic in these Food Law
Updates, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has continued
to include the topic in its "High Risk Series" reports.6 ' But the issue has
taken on new resonance in light of an E. coli outbreak that spread
throughout Europe in May and June, killing 49 people and sickening at
least 4,100 more. 69 The outbreak involved a rare, mutated strain of E. coli
that officials suspect originated from organic fenugreek seeds shipped from
Egypt and used to grow sprouts in Germany. 70 The European outbreak also
laid bare the formidable food safety challenges posed by an increasingly
global and industrialized food system. First, the E. coli strain proved
highly resistant to antibiotic treatment, suggesting it had originated in
growing fields with the high levels of antibiotic use often found in
Second, global supply chains have made
industrial-scale farming.7'
traceback vexingly difficult. Eleven tons of the suspect seeds were shipped
from Egypt to a distributor in Germany that resold the seeds to 54
companies in Germany and 16 companies in 11 other European countries,
and officials still had not accounted for another five tons of the seeds as of
late July. 72
Though the European outbreak largely spared the United States, it
illustrates the need for continuing food safety efforts in all corners of the
globe. Following on the passage of the Food Safety Modernization Act in
66. See Eng and Hood, supra note 58.
67. Id.
68. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-99-184, HIGH-RISK SERIES:
AN UPDATE Ill (Feb. 2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
dl 1278.pdf.
69. See William Neuman, A Search IsUnderway For Tainted Sprout Seeds, N.Y.
TIMES, July 6, 2011, B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/06/
business/06seeds.html?_r-1&ref=foodsafety.
70. See id.
71. See Tom Randall and Catherine Larkin, Europe E. Coli Is Deadliest Outbreak as
Rare Strain Causes Kidney Failure, BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 3, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-03/e-coli-outbreak-in-europe-reachesdeadliest-on-record-with-kidney-failure.html.
72. See Neuman, supra note 69.
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early 2011, U.S. policymakers have continued their efforts to ensure the
safety and integrity of the U.S. food supply. A few of these efforts are
detailed briefly below.
A. Senate passes bill that would increasepenaltiesfor willful food safety
violators
In the midst of a Salmonella outbreak investigation at his company,
Peanut Corporation of America (PCA) president Stewart Parnell sent an
email to FDA officials begging them to allow the company to stay in
business, noting that PCA "desperately at least need[s] to turn the raw
peanuts on our floor into money."" The company subsequently went
bankrupt - a direct consequence of the outbreak that FDA traced to
unsanitary conditions at PCA's plant, which killed eight people and
sickened nearly 600 more. 74 Reaction in Congress to the flagrant food
safety violations in PCA's plants was justifiably harsh: "I'd like to see
some people go to jail," Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) told the Los Angeles
Times.7 1
Now, thanks to Senator Leahy, prison time may be a possibility for
those who willfully or recklessly disregard food safety laws. Senate Bill
216, introduced by the Senator and several co-sponsors in April, amends
Section 333 of Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act to prescribe prison
time for knowing or reckless violations of the Act's prohibitions on
Violations of the Act with intent to
adulterated or misbranded food.
defraud or mislead are already punishable by prison time under § 333,n but
Senator Leahy's bill increases the penalty for such violations from a threeyear maximum to a ten-year maximum.78 The bill also reduces the level of
mens rea necessary for imprisonment under § 333 by providing that those
who act "with conscious or reckless disregard of death or serious bodily
injury" may also go to prison for up to ten years.79 The bill passed the

73. Gardiner Harris, Peanut Products Sent Out Before Tests, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 12,
2009, A24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/12/health/policy
/12peanut.html?hp.
74. Ben Meyerson, Senators Rebuke Federal Regulators in Peanut-Borne
Salmonella Outbreak, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2009, http://articles.latimes.corn/2009/
feb/06/nation/na-peanut-fda6.

75. Id.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See S. 216, 112th Cong. (2011).
See 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2) (2011).
S. 216, 112th Cong., § 2 (2011).
See id

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

396

[VOL. 7

Senate by unanimous consent in April, but the House has yet to act on the
legislation as of this writing.80
B. FDA issuesfirst administrativeregulationsunder FSMA
The FDA has issued its first administrative regulations under the
watershed Food Safety Modernization Act signed into law by President
Obama in early 2011.81 The first regulation involves a change to the
criteria by which FDA can order administrative detention of food that it
suspects to be adulterated or misbranded. The Bioterrorism Act of 200282
gave FDA the authority to order administrative detention of any article of
food "if during an inspection, examination, or investigation an FDA officer
or qualified employee finds there is credible evidence or information
indicating that the article of food presents a threat of serious health
consequences or death to humans or animals." Section 207 of the FSMA,
and an FDA official may now
however, loosens that language
administratively detain food during an inspection "if there is reason to
believe that an article of food is adulterated or misbranded."84 The
substantive changes thus are twofold: (1) the "credible information or
evidence" has been substituted for the mushier "reason to believe" as
sufficient knowledge to trigger detention; and (2) the inspector need not
show a threat of "serious health consequences or death" - just that the food
may violate the law.
The actual consequences of this change, however, are so far unknown
- in large part because FDA has yet to exercise its administrative detention
authority in the nine years since the Bioterrorism Act's passage. 85
Nevertheless, under the new standard, FDA believes that it will be more
likely to use its administrative detention powers - and especially in
situations where "the use of, or exposure to, a violative product may cause
temporary or medically reversible adverse health consequences or where
the probability of serious adverse health consequences is remote." 86 In
80. See Bill Summary & Status Search, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d 112:1:./temp/~bdBDGm:@@@X|/home/
LegislativeData.php| (last visited Dec. 20, 2011).
81. See, e.g., Endres & Johnson, supra note 38, at 136-39 (outlining the major food
safety provisions of the FSMA).
82. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188 (2002).
83. Criteria Used to Order Administrative Detention of Food for Human or Animal
Consumption, 76 Fed. Reg. 25,538, 25,539 (May 5, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.

pt. 1).
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 25,538.
See id. at 25,540.
Id
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other words, the new FSMA provisions give FDA the authority to go
further out on a limb to address less serious-but still potentially harmfulviolations of the FDCA. That approach is consistent with the policy goals
of the FSMA, which are to enable "FDA to focus more on preventing food
safety problems rather than relying primarily on reacting to problems after
they occur." 87
The second regulation involves a change to FDA's imported food
notification procedures. Section 801(m) of the FDCA requires anyone
importing food into the United States to submit to the FDA prior notice of
that importation so that the agency may inspect the food before it enters the
U.S. 88 Before the FSMA's passage, that notice was to include a description
of: (1) the article of food itself; (2) the manufacturer and shipper of the
article; (3) the grower of the article; (4) the country of origin; (5) the
county from which the article is shipped; and (6) the anticipated port of
entry. 89 Current FDA regulations add a number of detailed requirements to
the statutory list. 90 Section 304 of the FSMA adds a seventh statutory
9
requirement: "any country to which the article has been refused entry," 1
and so FDA's Interim Final Rule simply amends the agency's own
regulations to reflect that change. FDA expects that requiring notice of
prior refusals will help the agency to "better identify imported food
shipments that may pose safety and security risks to U.S. consumers."92
C. New FDA recall search engine allows consumers to trackproduct

recalls
In April, FDA completed another one of its FSMA mandated tasks.
Specifically, Section 206 of the FSMA required FDA to add a "consumer93
friendly" search engine that tracks both ongoing and completed recalls.
FDA consulted with consumer groups such as the Consumers Union, Food
Marketing Institute, Grocery Manufacturers Association, and the Pew
Health Group on ways to easily communicate recall information to
consumers. 94 The result is a searchable online database that organizes

87. Id. at 25,538.
88. 21 U.S.C. § 381(m) (2011).
89. Id.
90. See Food and Drug Administration, Department of Health and Human Services,
21 C.F.R. § 1.281 (2010).
91. Criteria Used to Order Administrative Detention of Food for Human or Animal
Consumption, 76 Fed. Reg. at 25,542.
92. Id. at 25,543.
93. See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, § 206 (2011).
94. See Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Launches
Consumer-Friendly Web Search for Consumers During Recalls (Apr. 4, 2011),
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recalls by date, product brand name, product description, and the reason for
recall.95 Consumers can view all FDA recalls, or they can click on
different tabs to see recalls for food, drugs, animal health, biologics, and
medical devices. 9 6 Helpfully, most food product recall notices also include
a picture of the recalled product's label and a link to a company-issued
press release announcing the recall. 97
D. USDA proposes new "test and hold" procedurefor meat andpoultry
The USDA has introduced a proposed rule that would change the way
the agency inspects meat and poultry products for harmful pathogens under
the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) 98 and the Poultry Products
Inspection Act (PPIA). 99 Under current law, the USDA's Food Safety and
Inspection Service (FSIS) periodically tests sample lots of meat and poultry
at federally-inspected slaughterhouses for the presence of Salmonella, E.
coli, Listeria monocytogenes, and other harmful pathogens. 0o The FMIA
and PPIA require meat and poultry products to bear a certification mark
before they are introduced into interstate commerce; that mark signifies
that the meat has been inspected and is free from adulteration. 101
Currently, FSIS recommends, but does not require, that individual
slaughterhouses hold all meat products sampled by FSIS until negative test
results are received.' 02 But because producers may ship meat before
sample test results are available, meat products contaminated with harmful
pathogens may, in some cases, enter into the food supply.
In fact, that situation is precisely what led FSIS to change its rule.
Although the agency has considered a "test and hold" requirement since

at
available
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm249437.htm.
95. See Recalls, Market Withdrawals, & Safety Alerts, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/default.htm (last visited Dec. 20,
2011).
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. The Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) authorizes the USDA to license and
inspect meat production facilities that ship in interstate commerce. See Federal Meat
Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (2011).
99. The Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) authorizes the USDA to license and
inspect poultry production facilities that ship in interstate commerce. See Poultry
Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-471 (2011).
100. See Not Applying the Mark of Inspection Pending Certain Test Results, 76 Fed.
Reg. 19,952, 19,953 (Apr. 11, 2011).
101. See id.
102. Id.

2011]

UNITED STATES FOOD LAW UPDATE

399

2002,103 recent recall data appears to have been the catalyst for change.
FSIS reports that as a result of its testing procedures, there were 14 recalls
in 2007, 19 in 2008, and 11 in 2009, with the bulk of them involving E. coli
and Listeria monocytogenes bacteria.1 0 4 Apparently, "[t]hese recalls
occurred because the establishments that produced the product that tested
positive released the product into commerce while test results were
pending."' 0o
The agency's own numbers suggests that the problem is not quite
epidemic: across establishment size, "between 79 percent and 100 percent
of establishments already hold product pending test results."' 06 The
agency's proposed mandatory test-and-hold requirement therefore
represents an effort to corral the laggards in the bottom twenty percent.
Nevertheless, FSIS's data show that many of the establishments not
voluntarily holding meat and poultry pending testing results qualify as
small and very small establishments,10 7 and the National Meat Association
(NMA) has asked FSIS to analyze the consequences of its rule on these
producers in two contexts: (1) in cases where the establishment's products
have a shelf life less than the amount of time required to complete testing,
and (2) in cases where the establishment makes same-day deliveries to
buyers. 08 FSIS believes it can minimize hardship in those cases by giving
establishments advance notice of inspection (something it already does) so
that they can produce and set aside an adequate amount of meat for
testing. 109
E. FSIS announcesfinal rulesfor cooperativestate meat andpoultry
inspectionprograms
USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) promulgated
final regulations that will allow certain state-inspected meat and poultry
processors to ship their products in interstate commerce. Qualifying stateinspected establishments must meet all Federal standards under the FMIA
and PPIA.
FSIS's rule adds a third cooperative state-federal meat inspection
regime to the agency's already-existing procedures. Generally, the FMIA
and the PPIA authorize FSIS to work with state agencies to develop meat
103. See id.
104. See id at 19,954.
105. Not Applying the Mark of Inspection Pending Certain Test Results, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 19,954
106. Id at 19,959.
107. See id. (Table 3).

108. See id. at 19,955.
109. See id
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or poultry inspection programs. "0 These cooperative inspection regimes
require standards "at least equal to" Federal programs, and they apply to
meat and poultry produced and sold within the State."' In addition, the
Talmadge-Aiken Act authorizes FSIS to enter into separate agreements
with State agencies to conduct meat, poultry, and egg inspections on behalf
of FSIS." 2 These programs also operate only intrastate." 3 The 2008 Farm
Bill1 4 amendments to the FMIA and PPIA added new sections that
"supplement the existing cooperative State meat and poultry inspection
programs by establishing a new cooperative program under which certain
State-inspected establishments would be permitted to ship meat and poultry
products in interstate commerce,"'
and bear the USDA's federally6
inspected certification mark."
The FSIS final rule describes the requirements for this voluntary
cooperative interstate inspection regime." 7 In general, a meat or poultry
processor may participate in the State-inspected interstate shipment
program if it: (1) submits a request to be considered for the program; I1"(2)
employs no more than 25 employees as that term is defined in the
regulations;" 9 (3) is in compliance with all the requirements under the
cooperative State inspection programs authorized by the FMIA and
PPIA; 120 and (4) is otherwise in compliance with the implementing
regulations for the interstate shipping program. 121
110. See 21 U.S.C. § 661 (2011); 21 U.S.C. § 454 (2011); see also Cooperative
Inspection Programs: Interstate Shipment of Meat and Poultry Products, 74 Fed. Reg.
47,648, 47,648 (Sept. 16, 2009) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 321, 332, and 381).
111. 21 U.S.C. § 661(a)(1) and § 454(a)(1).
112. See 7 U.S.C. § 450 (2011); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FSIS
DIRECTIVE, 5720.2 REVISION 3, STATE COOPERATIVE INSPECTION PROGRAMS (Nov. 16,
2004).
113. See Cooperative Inspection Programs: Interstate Shipment of Meat and Poultry
Products, 74 Fed. Reg. at 47,648 (noting that under the Talmadge-Aiken Act, FSIS
"enters into a separate agreement with a State agency for the State program to conduct
meat, poultry, or eggs products inspection or other regulatory activities on behalf of
FSIS.").
114. The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, 112
Stat. 1651 (June 18, 2008).
115. Cooperative Inspection Programs: Interstate Shipment of Meat and Poultry
Products, 74 Fed. Reg. at 47,648.
116. Id.
117. See Cooperative Inspection Programs: Interstate Shipment of Meat and Poultry
Product; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,714, 24,715 (May 2, 201 1)(to be codified at 9
CFR Parts 321, 332, and 381).
118. See id. at 24,753-54; 24, 757.
119. See id. at 24,753-54; 24756-57.
120. See id. at 24,754; 24,757.
121. See id.
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The new inspection regime seems aimed at encouraging more small
businesses to ship their meat and poultry across state lines by increasing the
number of available slaughtering facilities. Establishments that already
ship their products interstate may not participate in the new cooperative
program.12 2 However, though the new interstate inspection program is
separate from the intrastate cooperative programs, the proposed FSIS
regulations allow a facility to participate in both, so long as "the
establishment implements and maintains written procedures for complete
physical separation of product and process for each operation by time or

space."

23

III.

LITIGATION

A. Tomato produceralleges FDA was negligent in implicating tomatoes in
2008 Salmonella outbreak
The regulatory developments outlined in section II of this Food Law
Update suggest that FDA plans to exercise an abundance of caution when it
comes to food safety outbreaks. The problem with acting in the face of
uncertainty and incomplete information is that sometimes the agency gets it
wrong and innocent parties get blamed. At least that is the general idea
behind a complaint filed in South Carolina federal court by Seaside Farms,
a tomato producer that alleges the FDA acted negligently in fingering
tomatoes as the source of a 2008 Salmonella outbreak eventually traced to
jalapeno peppers.12 4
The complaint, filed under the Federal Tort Claims Act,125 pleads
several causes of action, including negligence, defamation, and a Fifth
Amendment takings claim - as well as violations of South Carolina
consumer protection laws.126 The crux of the negligence claim is that the
FDA owes a duty to Seaside to act in a way that is not reckless, and that the
FDA was "negligent, grossly negligent, and reckless" in, inter alia: (1)
failing to identify any contaminated tomatoes in South Carolina before
issuing a nationwide recall for tomatoes;1 27 (2) failing to verify reports of
Salmonella due to consumption of tomatoes before issuing a nationwide

122. See Cooperative Inspection Programs: Interstate Shipment of Meat and Poultry
Products, 74 Fed. Reg. at 47,649.
123. See Cooperative Inspection Programs: Interstate Shipment of Meat and Poultry
Product; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,755, 24,759.
124. Complaint at 6-7, Seaside Farms v. United States, No. 1l-cv-1199-CWH
(D.S.C. May 18, 2011) [hereinafter Complaint].
125. See 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq.; Complaint supra note 124, at 1.
126. See Complaint,supra note 124, at 5, 7-8.
127. Id. at 6.
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tomato recall;128 (3) "failing to follow FDA standards and practices with

regard to tomatoes and without regard to the processes of food
supervision;" 2 9 and (4) issuing a nationwide tomato recall and then
subsequently identifying tomatoes from 41 states as safe.13 0 The complaint
alleges that Seaside has always been in cooperation with FDA audits and
did not source any contaminated tomatoes at any time during the recall.' 3 '
Commentators have cited the 2008 Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak as
a communications failure between the CDC, FDA, and state departments of
health.132 On May 31, 2008, the CDC first informed FDA about an
outbreak of Salmonella thought to be associated with tomatoes. FDA's
investigation therefore initially focused on raw tomatoes, and its early
public statements suggested that "raw red plum, red Roma and round red
tomatoes [were] the likely suspect food."' 33 But by mid-July, jalapeno
peppers linked to a single Texas distributor had been pinpointed as the
source of the outbreak. 134 Though FDA had lifted its warning on eating
tomatoes by this time, the damage to the tomato industry had been done to the tune of an estimated $200 million in economic losses.'3 1 One
postmortem analysis concluded that "[t]he outbreak response was marked
by a lack of organization, capacity, and coordination that calls into the
Finally, messages
question the public-health effectiveness of the response.
36
contradictory."1
not
if
mixed,
often
to the public were
But from a liability perspective, the picture is muddy. It is not just
that other actors besides the FDA, such as the CDC and state departments
of public health, were involved - it is also the fact that none of these

128. See id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Complaint, supra note 124, at 3.
132. See Nathan M. Trexler, "Market" Regulation: Confronting Industrial
Agriculture's Food Safety Failures, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 311, 335 (2011); Sara M.
Benson, Guidancefor Improving the FederalResponse to Foodborne Illness Outbreaks
Associated With Fresh Produce, 65 FOOD & DRUG. L.J. 503, 510 (2010); Elizabeth A.
Trachtman, Note, Food-Borne Illnesses Strike U.S. Food Supply: A Discussion of
InadequateSafety ProceduresandRegulations in the U.S. and Abroad, 20 IND. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 385, 404 (2010); Produce Safety Project, Breakdown: Lessons To Be
Learned From the 2008 Salmonella Saintpaul Outbreak (Nov. 17, 2008), available at
http://www.producesafetyproject.org/admin/assets/files/0015.pdf. [hereinafter Produce
Safety Project].
133. Produce Safety Project,supra note 132, at 10.
134. See Benson, supra note 132, at 510.
135. Id
136. Produce Safety Project,supra note 132, at 17.
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organizations can control the market reaction to the recall. 13 7 One report
noted that, given the agencies' lack of consistent messaging as to the source
and scope of the contamination, "[i]t should not have been surprising ...
that several large retail outlets pulled tomatoes off their shelves and out of
their menu items in the middle of the outbreak, and consumers stopped
eating all types of tomatoes," even though FDA had consistently said that
certain types of tomatoes were safe to eat. 13 8 This type of market
overreaction is typical in the early stages of foodborne illness outbreaks:
during the 2006 E. coli outbreak in fresh spinach, the bottom dropped out
of the entire spinach market even though the FDA later clarified that
canned and frozen spinach was safe to eat;' 3 9 during the 2011 E. coli
outbreak in Europe, Russia announced a complete ban on all produce
sourced from Europe. 140
To the extent that it reaches the merits, the viability of the Seaside
litigation will likely turn upon the discovery process: What did the
government know about tomato contamination, and when? How did it
communicate this information to other food safety officials? Did those
actions or non-actions amount to negligence? The Seaside case is an
interesting illustration of what happens when the interests of commodity
producers collide with the precautionary principle that underlies safety
regulation. In the regulation context, risk management often involves
making complex judgments about the available science, the underlying
harm, and the number of lives that may be put at risk if regulation does not
occur. Agencies weigh these factors and then come up with the appropriate
"amount" of proactive regulation to address the harm. The problem with
the U.S. food safety regime, however, is that it is largely reactive rather
than proactive. Given limited agency resources and the sporadic nature of
pathogenic outbreaks, FDA and CDC can only scramble to put out fires,
sometimes applying water cannons to problems that need only fire
extinguishers.

137.

For a good introduction to the topic of so-called "veggie libel" laws designed to

protect the economic interests of small agricultural producers, see David J. Bederman,
et. al., Of BananaBills and Veggie Hate Crimes: The ConstitutionalityofAgricultural
DisparagementStatutes, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 135 (1997).
138. Produce Safety Project, supra note 132, at 11.
139. See A. Bryan Endres & Nicholas R. Johnson, Integrating Stakeholder Roles in
Food Production, Marketing, and Safety Systems: An Evolving Multi-Jurisdictional
Approach, 26 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 29,56, n. 137 (2011) (describing the FDA's
contradictory messages throughout the spinach recall).
140. See Russia bansfresh Europeanproduce, state media report, CNN WORLD (Jun.
2, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-02/world/russia.e.coli 1 russia-bans-colivegetables?_s=PM:WORLD.
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The recent developments discussed in this Update - in particular, the
provisions that allow FDA to detain food if it has "reason to believe" that it
violates the FDCA, as well as FSIS's new "test-and-hold" procedures - are
incremental steps toward a more proactive food safety regime. So long as
they are bolstered by adequate funding for enforcement, these new
procedures may help food safety officials stop contaminated jalapenos from
ever being released into the marketplace, or prevent an entire commodity
industry from bearing the consequences of the actions of a minor segment.
B. Federaldistrictjudge denies summary judgment in consumer's diacetyl
microwave popcorn suit
A federal district judge in Colorado has denied the defendant's
motion for summary judgment in a suit by a consumer who alleges that
microwave popcorn caused his respiratory ailments. According to the
complaint in Watson v. Dillon Companies, Inc.,141 Wayne Watson ate two
to three bags of the defendants' microwave popcorn at his home on a daily
basis for about seven years.142 Doctors subsequently diagnosed him with a
rare lung condition called brochiolitis obliterans, which is primarily
characterized by small airway obstruction that causes shortness of breath
even upon mild exertion and does not respond to the use of an inhaled
bronchodilator.143 Watson filed his claim under the Colorado Consumer
Protection Act, alleging that the defendants either knew or should have
known that their microwave popcorn was unreasonably dangerous, and
they failed to provide material facts about the risks of the product to the
popcorn-consuming public. 144
The basis for the claim is a series of studies linking exposure to
vapors from the flavorings used in microwave popcorn production - and in
particular diacetyl, a chemical used in artificial butter flavoring - to
decreased lung functioning in popcorn plant workers.14 5 These studies
have shown that "the highest levels of [diacetyl] release occur when
opening the bag after popping,"l 4 6 and researchers have "issued
recommendations for reducing exposures in the workplace, including better
exhaust and ventilation, closed production systems, personal protective
141.

2011 WL 2490963 (D. Colo. June 22, 2011) (slip. op.).

142. Id.at *1.
143. See id. at *5.
144. Id. at *18.
145. Id at *3. For a comprehensive history of the so-called "popcorn lung crisis" and
a critique of the regulatory response to it, see Andrew Scott Dulberg, The Popcorn
Lung Case Study: A Recipe for Regulation?, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 87
(2009).
146. Watson, 2011 WL 2490963 at *3.
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equipment, and removal of diacetyl as an ingredient in butter flavoring."l 47
Put generally, Watson claims that his respiratory condition was caused by
his excessive consumption of microwave popcorn,1 4 8 and that the evidence
of respiratory problems in microwave popcorn plant workers should have
put the defendants on notice that their product was unreasonably dangerous

for consumers.1 49
The bulk of the court's analysis consisted of a Daubert analysis 50 of
the plaintiffs' medical experts, which it resolved largely in the plaintiffs'
favor.15 ' Based mainly on the strength of the proffered expert testimony,
the court also concluded that the plaintiffs had offered enough evidence to
survive a motion for summary judgment on the issue of causation.15 That
being said, however, causation may yet be an issue if and when the case (or
others like it) comes before a jury. Although the studies that examined
diacetyl exposure in microwave popcorn plant workers have established a
clear relationship between butter flavorings and respiratory conditions, the
Watson court noted that "there remain numerous unanswered questions
about what level of exposure triggers health effects and whether such
effects are caused by peak or by cumulative exposures."' 53 Many of the
studies cited by the plaintiffs had examined the effects of diacetyl exposure
on plant quality control workers who popped and then opened bags of
microwave popcorn to determine the number of unpopped kernels and
other quality issues.154 The plaintiff in the Watson case claims that his
exposure "is more similar to that of QC workers, who pop and open
popcorn in the same manner as consumers, albeit at much greater rates."' 55
The defendants in Watson argue that "the studies of QC workers are
inapplicable because of the significantly higher number of bags popped per
day (often a hundred or more compared to Mr. Watson's two or three) and
variations in the workplace assignments and environments." 5 6
While that argument was not a winning one for purposes of a Daubert
expert testimony analysis, it could very well sway a jury. Indeed, at least
two other consumer lawsuits alleging injury from diacetyl exposure in
147.

Id. at *4.

148. Seeid.at*16
149. Id. at*19.
150. The standard for admissibility of expert testimony is primarily governed by the
Supreme Court's holding in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals,509 U.S. 579
(1993).
151. See Watson, 2011 WL 2490963 at *9-* 17.
152. Id. at *18.
153. Id. at *4.
154.

Id. at *1.

155. Id. at *4.
156.

Watson, 2011 WL 2490963, at *12.
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microwave popcorn have been litigated; one was dismissed on motions 157
and the other resulted in the jury verdict for the defendant corporation.
The district court in Newkirk v. ConAgra Foods excluded broad swaths of
testimony from Dr. David Egilman, an expert upon whom the Watson
plaintiffs rely, on grounds that it was not sufficiently reliable and then
dismissed the case on summary judgment motions; 159 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed that decision in June. 60
While juries in several states have awarded multimillion dollar
verdicts to popcorn plant workers who claimed that their respiratory
conditions were caused by exposure to diacetyl,161 they have not been so
generous to consumers making the same claims. The first such claim to
reach a jury, Khoury v. ConAgra Foods, resulted in a verdict for ConAgra
on all counts.162 After the verdict, a defense attorney in the Khoury case
opined that plaintiffs' attorneys in consumer diacetyl cases are "trying to
take the regular popcorn consumer and turn them into a popcorn
worker .... Some enterprising attorneys got involved and decided to bring
it into your kitchen whether the science is there or not." 63
C. State courtjudge rules that mycoprotein allergy claims arepreempted
by federal labelingrules
A circuit court judge in Connecticut has dismissed a suit by a
consumer who claims that a maker of vegetarian chicken patties should
157. See Newkirk v. ConAgra Foods, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (E.D. Wash. 2010); aff'd,
2011 WL 2421144 (9th Cir. June 17, 2011) (unpublished).
158. See Khoury v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 0816-cv-31620 (Mo. Cir. Ct., Jackson
County Aug. 2, 2010).
159. See Newkirk, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 1029 ("There is simply too great an analytical
gap between the existing data, indicating that exposure to butter flavoring vapors in the
occupational setting can cause bronchiolitis obliterans, and Dr. Egilman's opinion that
a consumer of microwave popcorn is exposed to a vaporized substance equivalent to
production plant butter flavoring vapors at levels sufficient to cause bronchiolitis
obliterans .

. .

. His opinion testimony, therefore, is inadmissible under Daubert and

Fed.R.Evid. 702.").
160. Newkirk v. ConAgra Foods, 2011 WL 2421144 (9th Cir. June 17, 2011).
161. See Alyson E. Raletz, Regular Popcorn Snacker's Lawsuit Over Lung Condition
Starts In, FINDARTICLES (July 6, 2010), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi 7992/is
20100706/ai n54413207/; see also Jeff Lehr, Illinois Worker Wins $30 Million Verdict
in Diacetyl Popcorn Chemical Lawsuit, THE JOPLIN GLOBE (Aug. 16, 2010),
http://www.joplinglobe.com/local/x369041172/Illinois-worker-wins-30-millionverdict-in-diacetyl-popcorn-chemical-lawsuit.
162. Khoury, No. 0816-cv-31620.
163. Alyson E. Raletz, In Jackson County Circuit Court, Consumer Loses 'Popcorn
Lung' Case, FINDARTICLES (July 30, 2010), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi 7992/
is 20100730/ai n55294593/.
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have warned her that the product contained a food allergen. Plaintiff Kathy
Cardinale filed a lawsuit against defendant Quorn Foods, claiming the
mycoprotein in the company's vegetarian "Chik'n Patties" was the cause of
The suit alleged violations of
her food-allergy-related injuries.1 64
Act
(CUTPA),1 65 which prohibits
Practices
Trade
Unfair
Connecticut's
"unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
the conduct of any trade or commerce."l66
Mycoprotein is sourced from the cell protoplasm of the fungus
Fusariumvenenatum, which is fermented in vats that use glucose syrup as
food. 167 Quorn Foods uses mycoprotein as a meat analogue for its frozen
meat-free food products, including the Chik'n patties that allegedly
sickened the plaintiff.168 The FFDCA at 21 U.S.C. § 321(qq) lists major
food allergens that must be labeled as prescribed by the statute at § 343(w),
but mycoprotein is not on that list.169 Nevertheless, the plaintiff alleged
that Quorn's "failure to warn consumers on their product labels of the
'allergenicity' of mycoprotein" made her "unaware of the possible health
risks ... when she purchased the Chik'n Patties."'170 The plaintiff in the
Cardinalecase alleged that she experienced vomiting and dizziness within
hours of eating Quorn Chik'n patties, and she was apparently able to isolate
the patties as the cause by eating them multiple times and experiencing the
same symptoms each time.'
The court, in an unpublished opinion, found that the allergen labeling
requirements codified at § 321 of the FFDCA preempted the plaintiffs
claims.' 72 The court reasoned that by enacting uniform allergen labeling
requirements, "Congress expressed a federal intent to occupy the field of
labeling of products with potential food allergens." 73 The court noted that
FDA currently is reviewing mycoprotein's status as a food allergen, but
that "Congress has not yet acted on any recommendation from the FDA to
add [mycoprotein] to the list of allergens it believes consumers should be
warned about in the interests of public health." 7 4 The court further noted

164. See Cardinale v. Quom Foods, Inc., 2011 WL 2418628 (Conn. Super. filed May
19, 2011).
165. See id. at 1.
166. Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 42-1 10b (2010).
167. See How Mycoprotein is made, MYCOPROTEIN (2008),
http://www.mycoprotein.org/what is mycoprotein/productprocess.html.
168. Cardinale,2011 WL 2418628 at *1.
169. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 343 (2010).
170. Cardinale,2011 WL 2418628 at *1.
171. See id.

172.

See id. at 4-5.

173. Id. at *8.
174. Id.
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that the FDA, "with its staff of food scientists, nutrition experts and vast
regulatory authority over our nation's food supply is in a far better position
and possessed of more adequate resources to properly assess the pros and
cons of additional or specific labeling for the food product at issue here."17 5
Though the Cardinaleopinion is an unpublished state court decision,
it is significant for two reasons: (1) it is the first court case (as the authors
are aware) to address the allergenic properties of mycoprotein; and (2) it
represents yet another setback for consumer advocates who have long
argued that the fungus can cause serious allergic reactions and is, therefore,
unsafe. The parent company of Quorn, Marlow Foods, is a British
company that has been selling meat-free mycoprotein products in the UK
since the mid-1980s.1 76 The UK's Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and
Food (the British equivalent of the FDA) approved mycoprotein as safe to
eat in 1985,17 but Marlow nonetheless faced serious opposition from the
Center for Science in the Public Interest (CPSI) when it began selling
Quorn products in the U.S. in 2002. CPSI claimed that hundreds of people
in the UK had had serious adverse allergic reactions to Quorn products
with mycoprotein - including hives, vomiting, fainting, and shortness of
breath - and argued that these products "should not be allowed to remain in
our food supply either as a GRAS substance or a food additive." 78
Nonetheless, FDA stated that it had "no questions" about Marlow Foods'
own determination that mycoprotein is GRAS - which is essentially the
agency's position to date.17 9 CPSI's crusade against the company was
dismissed by food pundits and scientists as "puzzlingly tenacious"' 80 and
"overblown,""' and Marlow's retail sales zoomed to $200 million in
2004.182 But after nearly ten years on the market, the Cardinalecomplaint
175.
176.

Id. at *5.
See Kate Jackson, Once-Scorned Quorn Still Alive and Kicking, TODAY'S
DIETICIAN (Aug. 2004), http://www.todaysdietitian.com/newarchives/td_0804
p32.shtml.
177. See id.
178. Letter from Michael F. Jacobson, Ph.D., Executive Director, Center for Science
in the Public Interest, to Dr. Mark McClellan, Commissioner, U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (Apr. 21, 2003), availableat http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/quorn
mcclellan-letter 4-23.pdf.
179. Letter from Alan M. Rulis, Ph.D., Director, Office of Food Additive Safety,
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, to Stuart M. Pape, Patton Boggs LLP
(Jan. 7, 2002), availableat http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodingredientsPackaging/
GenerallyRecognizedasSafeGRAS/GRASListings/ucml 54623.htm.
180. Jackson, supra note 176.
181. Joe Lewandowski, Quorn Dogged: Scientists Call Advocacy Group's
Complaints Unfounded, NEWHOPE360.COM (Apr. 24, 2008), http://newhope360.com/
quorn-dogged-scientists-call-advocacy-groups-complaints-unfounded.
182. See Jackson, supra note 176.
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again raises the question of whether FDA should add mycoprotein to its list
of recognized food allergens.
D. Settlement in BPA Litigation

Bisphenol-A (BPA) is a chemical commonly used in polycarbonate
plastics and epoxy resins.183 Whether low concentrations of BPA cause
adverse endocrine-related effects in humans - primarily exposed through
food packaging - remains subject to considerable debate.184 Although food
contact materials fall under FDA jurisdiction, approximately 85 to 90
percent of BPA use in the United States is in products under EPA's Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA) authority. 85 Accordingly, the EPA
requested public comment on a toxicity testing and environmental sampling
study of BPA's potential environmental impacts.' 8 6 This study would
complement existing efforts at FDA to study the potential human health
7
issues associated with BPA consumption via food packaging.' 8
Earlier in 2011, Philips Electronics North America Corporation
(Philips), the successor to Avent America, Inc., settled a series of putative
class actions arising from the sale of baby products containing BPA.'" In
January 2011, the parties agreed to a settlement whereby Philips agreed to
not sell baby bottles or "sippy" cups containing BPA.189 However, if a
competitor began selling these products containing BPA, then Philips could
resume sales of the products so long as it disclosed the presence of BPA in
the product material.190 This disclosure mandate would last for one year.19'
The settlement also provided class members a refund for purchased
183.

Bisphenol A Action Plan, U.S.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

I (Mar.

2010), http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/existingchemicals/pubs/actionplans/bpa-action
plan.pdf.
184. See id. at 1-2 (noting that "BPA is a reproductive, developmental, and systemic
toxicant in animal studies and is weakly estrogenic," which leads to questions about the
impact on children's health).
185. See id. at 3.
186. See EPA. Testing of Bisphenol A, Advance notice of proposed rulemaking, 76
Fed. Reg. 44535 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 799).
187. See Update on Bisphenol A for Use in Food Contact Applications: January
2010, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/ucml97739.htm [hereinafter FDA].
188. In re Bisphenol-A (BPA) Polycarbonate Plastic Products Liability Litigation,
Master Case NO. 4:08-1967-MD-W-ODS, MDL No. 1967 (W.D. Mo. 2011).
189. See Stipulation of Class Action Settlement, In re Bisphenol-A (BPA)
Polycarbonate Plastic ProductsLiability Litigation, Master Case NO. 4:08-1967-MDW-ODS, MDL No. 1967 (W.D. Mo. 2011), available at http://www.wdklaw.com/
images/FE/chain232siteType8/site201/client/Stipulation%200f/20Settlement.pdf.
190. See id. at 16.
191. Id. at 16.
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products sold by Philips that contained BPA.' 92 The injunctive relief,
however, may have little market impact as according to the FDA, major
manufacturers of bottles and infant feeding cups have stopped selling
polycarbonate products containing BPA in the US market - switching back
to more traditional glass and polypropylene bottles and disposable bag
liners. 193
IV.

BIOTECHNOLOGY LITIGATION AND REGULATORY UPDATE

A. Alfalfa
In 2004, Monsanto Co. and Forage Genetics International petitioned
the USDA to deregulate an alfalfa variety resistant to the herbicide
glyphosate.194 A coalition of alfalfa farmers and environmental NGOs
challenged USDA's decision to deregulate the genetically engineered
alfalfa.1 95 The court entered an injunction prohibiting future planting of the
alfalfa variety pending completion by USDA of a full Environmental
Impact Statement.196 The initial problem with the agency's deregulation
decision was the failure to consider the potential impacts of pollen drift on
non-GM farmers as well as the cumulative environmental impact of
another crop resistant to the glyphosate herbicide.' 9 7 The Supreme Court
subsequently reversed this injunction on procedural grounds - leaving
intact the requirement for further agency review of potential environmental
impacts.198
USDA issued a final Environmental Impact Statement for GM Alfalfa
in December 2010.199 In a shift from the agency's previous environmental
assessments, the agency proposed an option of partial deregulation in
addition to the usually proffered preferred alternative of full
deregulation.2 00 The partial deregulation alternative envisioned production
zones to minimize the potential for unwanted cross-pollination and thereby
192. Id. at 17-18.
193. See FDA, supra note 187 (noting Interim Public Health Recommendations).
194. See Petition for Determination of Nonregulated Status for Roundup Ready@
Alfalfa (Medicago Sativa L.) Events JI01 and J163, 19 (2004), APHIS (Apr. 16, 2004),
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/04_11001p.pdf.
195. See Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 2007 WL 518624 at *12 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
13, 2007).
196. See id. at 12.
197. See id.
198. See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S.Ct. 2743 (2010).
199. See USDA, GLYPHOSATE-TOLERANT ALFALFA EVENTS J1101 AND J163: REQUEST
FOR NONREGULATED STATUS; FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (Dec.
2010).
200. See id. at iv.
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facilitate coexistence between GM and non-GM alfalfa. Although the
agency eventually settled on the full deregulation alternative,201 the
consideration of a partial deregulation decision to facilitate coexistence was
a significant signal by the agency that it may seriously consider coexistence
impacts in future regulatory decisions.
B. GM Rice Lawsuit
In 1998, Aventis CropScience (Aventis) began field testing a
genetically engineered rice variety resistant to the Liberty Link brand
herbicide. At the time, Aventis (later purchased by Bayer CropScience),
202
did not seek regulatory approval for the rice variety.
In January 2006,
Riceland Foods, Inc. (Riceland), the largest rice cooperative in the United
States, discovered trace amounts of genetically engineered DNA in the
2005 rice harvest. 2 03 USDA publically confirmed the stray genetic material
as LLRice601 (Liberty Link Rice) in August 2006.204 Importers in Japan
and the European Union subsequently banned long-grain rice imports from
the US and implemented genetic testing regimes.2 05 The first lawsuits were
filed against Bayer and Riceland within days of the USDA
announcement.206
1. Duty to Defend
Riceland, a successful plaintiff (jury verdict of more than $136
million) in an Arkansas state case against Bayer CropScience (Bayer) in the
207
is also a defendant in over
Liberty Link Rice contamination litigation,
170 lawsuits brought by rice farmers over the contamination of their
conventional crops with the genetically engineered Liberty Link variety.208
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., the issuer of a commercial general liability
201. See Record of Decision, Glyphosate-Tolerant Alfalfa Events 1101 and J163:
Request for NonregulatedStatus, APHIS (Jan 27, 2011), http://www.regulations.gov
/#!documentDetail;D=APHIS-2007-0044-12941.
202. See AgrEvo USA Co., Availability of Determination of Nonregulated Status for
Rice Genetically Engineered for Glufosinate Herbicide Tolerance, 64 Fed. Reg. 22595,
22595 (April 27, 1999) (USDA approval of petition for nonregulated status for two
related GE rice events - LLRice06 and LLRice 62 - but not LLRice 601).
203. See Bayer Crop Science v. Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518 at 3.
204. See id.
205. See id at 4.
206. See id.
207. See Martinne Geller, Bayer ordered to pay $136.8 mln in U.S. rice case,
RUETERS (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/21/idUSN212980
2520110321.
208. See Riceland Foods, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 WL 2262932 (E.D. Ark.
2011).
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policy for Riceland, refused coverage, arguing that the policy expressly
precluded liability from cross-pollination. 2 09 The court, however, found for
Riceland, holding that because the policy was silent regarding liability for
the physical mixing of the GE crop with conventional rice during harvest,
processing, transportation, or storage - allegations made by plaintiff
farmers in addition to cross-pollination - Liberty Mutual had a duty to
defend the entire action brought against Riceland.2 10
2. Settlement
During the Riceland-Liberty Mutual insurance coverage litigation, a
number of plaintiffs brought successful claims against Bayer. In the first
federal case, a jury awarded two Missouri farmers approximately $2
million in compensatory damages for the economic loss arising from the
contamination of the rice supply. 21' Three farmers from Arkansas and
Mississippi obtained a $1.5 million federal verdict a month later.2 12 In
April 2010, 14 farmer-plaintiffs obtained a state verdict of approximately
$6 million in compensatory damages and $42 million in punitive
damages. 213 An informal survey of jury verdicts and settlements with
farmers indicated an average compensatory damage award of over
$434,000, 214 not including the Riceland victory noted above.
In July 2011, Bayer agreed to a $750 million settlement in an attempt
to end any future threat of litigation. 2 15 The settlement allows rice farmers
to opt into one of three settlement pools. Pool one compensates for
"market losses" and is available to any farmer who planted rice between
209. See Id. at 3-4.
210. Seeld.at3-5.
211. See Joe Whittington & Andrew M. Harris, Bayer Must Pay Farmers for
Contaminated
Rice
Crop
(Update
5),
BLOOMBERG
(Dec.
4,
2009),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=adGubJZ21 Uzo.
212. See Allison Retka, Second contaminated rice trial nets another plaintiff's
verdict, MISSOURI
LAWYERS
WEEKLY
(Mar.
1, 2010)
available at
http://www.grgpc.com/News-PDFs/GRG48.pdf
213. Margaret Cronin Fisk & Joe Whittington, Bayer Loses Fifh Straight Trial over
U.S.
Rice
Crops,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST
(July
14,
2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-yn/content/article/2010/07/14/AR2010071404574.
214. See id.; Margaret Cronin Fisk & Joe Whittington, Bayer Settles Texas Suits
Alleging its GM Seed Contaminated Rice Fields, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 18, 2010),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-18/bayer-settles-suits-with-texas-farmersover-genetically-engineered-rice.html (3 famers settle for $270,000); Rice Famers
Settle with Bayer BIZJOURNALS (Jan 14, 2011), http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/
news/2011/01/14/rice-farmers-settle-with-bayer.html (4 farmers settle for $873,000).
215. See David Bennett, GM rice: settlement construction and farmer options, DELTA
FARM PRESS (July 3, 2011), http://deltafarmpress.com/print/rice/gm-rice-settlementconstruction-and-farmer-options.
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The pool establishes a damages schedule that.
2006 and 20 10.216
compensates farmers on a per acre basis for economic damages incurred as
21
a result of decreased export demand for US-grown rice.21 Farmers who
suffered damages beyond the market losses covered by the first pool can
recover by opting into one of two other settlement pools with more
complex filing requirements.
The second settlement pool compensates farmers who planted two
contaminated seed varieties later banned by the government - Cheniere and
Clearfield 131.218 In an effort to prevent further contamination of the rice
seed supply, farmers were instructed not to plant any variety of rice on land
planted with the Cheniere or Clearfield 131 variety the previous year. In
response, those farmers either planted less lucrative soybeans or let the land
219
lay fallow. The settlement will compensate those farmers $100 per acre.
Farmers experiencing other losses, such as cleaning expenses or any other
documented losses may claim actual losses under the third settlement pool,
up to a cumulative cap of $100 million.220
The voluntary settlement as a whole is premised upon one big
condition: farmers who farmed at least 85% of the total acres of rice
planted in the United States between 2006 and 2009 must participate in the
settlement, and if that 85% threshold is not achieved, then Bayer reserves
the right to opt out.221 Of course, this would result in additional,
individualized litigation in state and federal courts - litigation in which
Bayer has yet to prevail in any of the previous trials.
The Bayer LibertyLink settlement is reminiscent of the 2002
settlement between Aventis Crop Science and thousands of corn farmers
affected by contamination of StarLink GM corn with corn intended for
food and export channels. 222 In 1998 and 1999, Aventis received EPA
approval, subject to several restrictions, to market the StarLink variety of
seed corn. 22 3 In 2000, numerous reports surfaced that human food products

216. See id.
217. Farmers can prove their damages simply by producing FSA Form 578 (which
lists the number of rice acres planted by that farmer in a given year). See id. Damages
start at $120 per acre for rice planted in 2006, declining to $10 per acre for rice planted
in 2010. Id.
218. See Bennett, supra note 215.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See D.L. Uchtmann & Gary Hoff, Non-StarLink FarmerLitigation: Where is
MY Settlement Payment? How Much Is It? What Do I Do When It Arrives? How Is It
Taxed?, AGRIC. L. & TAx'N BRIEFS 04-12 (Nov. 4, 2004).
223. See D.L. Uchtmann, StarlinkTM - A Case Study of Agricultural Biotechnology
Regulation, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 159, 162 (2002).
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had tested positive for the GM protein found in the StarLink corn
variety.224 Manufacturers issued recalls for products containing corn and
fear of contamination convinced some food processors to replace
domestically produced corn with imports.22 5 The market price for corn fell
and many members of the supply chain required testing of all corn
shipments for the presence of StarLink DNA. 22 6 I subsequent class-action
litigation, a federal district court in Illinois ruled that Aventis had a duty to
ensure that its GM variety did not enter the food supply (i.e., a duty to
abide by the EPA's permit restrictions) and that Aventis breached several
of these obligations, which caused the plaintiffs' corn to be
contaminated. 2 27 The court then approved a $110 million class-action
settlement designed to compensate farmers for their losses.228
The settlement in the GM Liberty Link rice litigation is almost seven
times the amount in the StarLink corn class action. Considered together,
these two GM contamination cases have established additional certainty in
the evolving common law of biotechnology - crop developers will be held
responsible for the market losses resulting from the unauthorized
commingling of their regulated GM products with conventional crops.
Moreover, the economic loss rule may not insulate firms in contractual
privity with impacted farmers. Accordingly, firms should take particular
precautions to develop and implement coexistence strategies that prevent
unwanted commingling.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Governments walk a fine line between public protection and
nannying, and the optimal level of regulation is often frustratingly difficult
to obtain. The developments described in this Update suggest that the
federal government is still tinkering with its health and food safety
regulations but has, in some cases, decided that it needs to be more
proactive about protecting the public from unhealthy and dangerous food.
While the tort system has in many cases moved to fill in perceived gaps in
this system of federal oversight (e.g., diacetyl and mycoprotein labeling), it
has at the same time pushed back when federal agencies take proactive
224. See id. at 182.
225. Thomas P. Redick & Donald L. Uchtmann, Coexistence Through Contracts:
Export-Oriented Stewardship in Agricultural Biotechnology vs. California's
PrecautionaryContainment, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 207, 213-14 (2008).
226. In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation, 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 833-35.
227. Id. at 843.
228. Redick & Uchtmann, supra note 225, at 214 (citing In re StarLink Corn
Products Liability Litigation, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1380 (J.P.M.L. 2001)) (this class
action suit was settled for $110,000,000).
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(some would say reactive) steps to protect the public (e.g., the Seaside
Farms lawsuit). This inter-branch tug-of-war has played out in the midst of
secondary, but very relevant, political concerns such as a sagging economy
that threatens federal funding for food safety programs, as well as a
burgeoning local foods movement that demands less regulation of food
production. In the near term, then, we can probably expect much of the
same: a federal government that addresses food safety issues in fits and
starts, and a tort system that opportunistically provides a backstop when
regulatory efforts amount to a swing and a miss.

